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ABSTRACT 
 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of epistemic responsibility in 
the practice of book-length literary journalism. Literary journalism offers a powerful 
alternative to mainstream journalism. Its narrative mode and storytelling techniques 
open possibilities of representation often closed by traditional reporting practices. 
Subsequently, literary journalists have attracted criticism for unorthodox modes of 
representation and attendant “truth claims” in many texts. In this thesis I draw on the 
work of epistemologist Lorraine Code to highlight the tension between the branches 
of ethics and epistemology, and argue that holding them apart for the purposes of 
explication yields important insights into the practice of literary journalism. I argue 
that criticism of literary journalism has at times conflated ethical and epistemic 
concerns, resulting in censure of the practitioner on primarily moral grounds. While 
such a critique is often valid, I propose that it can mislabel problematic cognitive 
processes as moral deficiencies.  
 
A re-examination of significant controversies raised by literary journalism shows 
disputed areas stemming from epistemic “blind spots”. These “blind spots” are often 
characterised as ethical lapses, but I argue that framing criticism in this way inhibits 
progress in sound practice. Recurring controversies over works by practitioners such 
as Janet Malcolm and Australia’s Helen Garner bear this out. I also offer close 
readings of three works of contemporary US literary journalism through their 
paratextual frames. The limits of transparency are demonstrated here, including the 
fact that disclosure can hide more than it illuminates. Code’s “epistemic 
responsibilist” approach is subsequently presented as an important addition to literary 
journalism scholarship, as it offers a sound foundation for reflexive practice—for both 
writers and critics. Using this approach, I offer critical readings of the “truth claims” 
in three contemporary US texts: Adrian Nicole LeBlanc’s Random Family (2003), 
Dave Cullen’s Columbine (2009) and Rebecca Skloot’s The Immortal Life of 
Henrietta Lacks (2010). 
 
A secondary aim of this thesis is to characterise contemporary Australian book-length 
literary journalism. Using Code’s concept of an “epistemic community”, I propose 
that the nature of national discourse influences the voice of the Australian literary 
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journalist, as revealed by anxiety over representation in the texts under analysis. 
These texts highlight the pressures of subjectivity on truth, which results in a 
destabilisation of “truth claims”. In comparison with the US practitioners analysed, 
their three Australian counterparts analysed place less emphasis on disclosure 
transparency, and rely more heavily upon self-presentation as seekers, rather than 
discoverers, of knowledge and truth. I further maintain that these three texts represent 
a dominant national function of book-length literary journalism. Issues of national 
identity are bound up in the relationship between the land and its people, and are 
evident in the work of Margaret Simons, Chloe Hooper and Anna Krien, three of 
Australia’s most notable literary journalists. Through the lens of a civic dispute, each 
of these practitioners join one of the most pressing cultural issues in contemporary 
national discourse, that is, to explore what it means to be “Australian”.  
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Chapter One 
Terra Nullius: Exploring the Territory of Literary Journalism 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1997, the State of New Jersey took legal action against the State of New York over 
the jurisdiction of Ellis Island. Originally a three-acre dot of land between the two 
states, the island was claimed by New York in 1834, despite being on New Jersey’s 
side of the state boundary. It is well-known today as the site of processing for millions 
of people immigrating to the United States. After 1891, the federal government began 
to build up the island with landfill to accommodate the growing need for processing 
space, to the point where today, approximately 24 acres—or nine-tenths—of the 
current island is new land. Evidently, this is not part of the original land upon which 
the States’ agreement was made. New York’s sovereignty over Ellis Island was 
legally contested in 1997, when the state of New Jersey argued in the Supreme Court 
that it had never been notified of New York’s intention to claim the built-up areas, 
and that it had never acquiesced sovereignty of the new land to that State. In its final 
ruling in 1998, the Supreme Court invoked the term terra nullius to explicate the legal 
meaning of territorial sovereignty. The Latin phrase is used in international law to 
describe land that has never been occupied by any sovereign state, and may therefore 
be acquired. Terra nullius can be interpreted in a number of ways: as “emptiness”; as 
“absence of civilised society”; or as “uninhabited or barbarous country” (as under 
English common law); but in layman’s terms, it simply means “no-man’s land”. At its 
core is the concept of a territory that has yet to be explored and settled. Justice 
Souter’s opinion read in part: 
 
Even as to terra nullius … a claimant by right as against all others has 
more to do than planting a flag or rearing a monument. Since the 19th 
century the most generous settled view has been that discovery 
accompanied by symbolic acts give no more than “an inchoate title, an 
option, as against other states, to consolidate the first steps by 
proceeding to effective occupation within a reasonable time” (“State”). 
 
The Court upheld New Jersey’s claim to the new land, citing the State of New York’s 
failure to notify its intention to extend the original agreement, and New Jersey’s 
refusal to yield its rights over the 24 acres. Today, both States exercise jurisdiction 
over Ellis Island, with the majority lawfully belonging to New Jersey. 
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Four elements pertaining to terra nullius can be inferred from the Court’s written 
opinion: discovery, exploration, consolidation, and occupation. In this case, New 
York State’s 64-year occupation was not, in legal parlance, considered “insufficient as 
a matter of general law” to claim sovereignty, but the Court’s opinion cited a 
“conviction that in the interest of stability … the present possessor should be 
considered the rightful owner of a territory” (“State”). Neither can “symbolic acts” 
ensure jurisdiction—giving “new” land a name and planting a flag on its shore are not 
sovereign acts. Time, stability and consolidation are all necessary for a claim over 
terra nullius, as is the hearing of all counter-claims and dissent by opposing parties. It 
is these elements that make the term such a rich metaphor for the scholarship on 
literary journalism. Similarly, contested jurisdiction over the new land added to Ellis 
Island prefigures issues faced by the New Journalists and contemporary literary 
journalists alike: ownership, control, purpose, and responsibility. 
 
The International Association for Literary Journalism Studies (IALJS), founded in 
2006, has begun to illuminate the areas researchers in this field could explore. To 
invoke the terra nullius metaphor, the practice of literary journalism—particularly in 
the United States—is well into the consolidation, and perhaps even occupation, 
phases. Scholarship, on the other hand, is still firmly in a period of exploration. The 
purpose of this thesis is to enhance this exploratory phase by contributing to the 
advancement of literary journalism scholarship in two areas. In the inaugural issue of 
the scholarly journal Literary Journalism Studies (2006), leading scholar Norman 
Sims outlined the need for “elucidating the form’s international nature and how it 
relates to different national cultures, placing the form within the context of a broad 
time frame for its history, recognizing the role that practicing writers of the genre can 
play in reflexive critique, and the promise of online presentation as a vehicle for the 
form. Finally, there is the problem of … the “reality boundary,” which … is central 
to such scholarship” (“Problem” 7–8 emphasis added). 
 
Of these areas, this thesis primarily engages in the two highlighted above: namely, the 
“reality boundary”, and exploration of the national character of Australian literary 
journalism. The “reality boundary”, however, is somewhat of a misnomer for the 
perspective offered in this study. Here I contend that while attempts to assess literary 
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journalism with established journalistic norms such as the “objectivity standard” and 
the “discipline of verification” are valuable, these attempts are often frustrated by 
texts’ and practitioners’ resistance to such norms. In practice, this is manifested in 
attempts to assess “truth claims” against epistemological categories such as belief and 
understanding. The fact that empirically verifiable data is always subject to individual 
perception and framing is also problematic for normative, objective standards. As a 
result, attempts to apply such standards can only offer limited assessments of the 
value of literary journalistic texts. It will be further contended in this thesis that some 
frustration proceeding from such analyses stems from a conflation of epistemological 
and ethical issues. In order to address this state and propose an alternative way to 
conceptualise and study literary journalism, I will draw on Lorraine Code’s important 
work Epistemic Responsibility (ER). Code’s approach has not been applied to literary 
journalism in a sustained way. In this thesis it illuminates aspects of the practice of 
literary journalism, and provides a language and framework through which epistemic 
issues can be discussed.  
 
Complementing the assessment of a text’s truth claims with an analysis of epistemic 
responsibility acknowledges the role of the literary journalist as something more than 
a “recorder” of reality—a supposition upon which the assessment of “truth claims” 
lies. To appropriate and apply Code’s language to literary journalism, analysing the 
truth claims of a work of literary journalism independent from its epistemic 
foundations renders practitioners as abstractions, and closes off the possibility of 
significant epistemological scrutiny. For Code, “concentration upon end-states grants 
them an unwarranted finality, making them seem implausibly definitive, static, and 
removed from the flux of cognitive forces” (ER 8). Epistemic enquiry consequently 
places the literary journalist at the centre of the knowledge claims of a text. It asks 
whether or not a practitioner is in a position to make knowledge claims—knowledge 
that often cannot be parsed through normative processes of verification. 
 
Epistemic Responsibility received a mixed reception amongst epistemologists. In an 
article titled “Responsibility and Rhetoric” (1994) published seven years after 
Epistemic Responsibility, Code notes the “uneasy” location the book occupies within 
the discourse of Anglo-American epistemology, and attributes its reception—ranging 
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from admiring to ambivalent to critical—to a number of factors.1 She identifies the 
primary resistance to its premise, however, in the following way:  
 
the book sits uneasily with epistemologists, I suggest, because such 
questions are thought not to be properly epistemological at all, but to 
belong to ethics, or to the softer fringes of everyday talk about 
knowledge, rather than to the hard center of serious epistemological 
analysis. My claim is that if epistemology is indeed about the scope and 
limits of human knowledge, then it needs to address such questions, and 
not just the more formal ones that have been its principal preoccupation 
(“Responsibility and Rhetoric” 3). 
 
Code’s work may lack a firm affiliation with an identifiable philosophical position, 
hence its tenuous position in the academy. But I argue that this weakness is actually a 
strength, in that it considers the phenomenological before constructing the theoretical. 
Code sets out to “adduce a set of claims about expectations and responsibilities” rather 
than proposing a theory to which human cognitive and communicative practices 
ostensibly conform. She continues:  
 
 In each case, a responsibility to know is at issue, and it is to that 
responsibility that I wish to draw attention. It is true that, in many of the 
cases, it is the action(s) based upon the inadequately or carelessly 
arrived at knowledge claims or beliefs that come under public scrutiny 
and that seem to invite moral and/or legal censure, for the consequences 
of being wrong are serious. But it is instructive, for epistemological 
purposes, to focus upon the assumed or alleged knowledge itself, to 
consider what is involved in the contention that there is, often, a 
responsibility to know, or at least to know better than one does (ER 2 
emphasis in original). 
 
Here Code identifies a crucial distinction between epistemology and ethics. Actions—
or, in the case of literary journalism, narratives—may invite moral and/or legal 
censure, but in many cases the root causes of disputes originate from weak or 
unjustifiable epistemological foundations, from which (moral) errors ensue. This 
distinction illuminates a number of controversies that have been triggered over 
ostensibly ethical lapses, but I argue that they are primarily epistemic, and occur in the 
immersion stage of the reporting process. The crucial distinction here is that a literary 
journalist with a flawed epistemological base does not choose to write unethically, but 
that is the inevitable outcome of a flawed epistemology. In gathering and ordering 
knowledge to produce “truth claims”, a practitioner may act irresponsibly, but this is 
only a choice if they are aware of sound and unsound epistemic practice. As literary 
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journalism goes beyond the epistemological boundaries of “mainstream” journalism,2 
practitioners can benefit from Code’s responsibilist approach that encourages 
reflexivity and the best possible practice in an innovative field. In its application to 
literary journalism, Epistemic Responsibility finds “a readily available space within the 
discourse/rhetoric of epistemology” to test its interpretive potential (“Responsibility 
and Rhetoric” 5).3 The primary aims of this thesis, therefore, are to apply Code’s 
approach to past and present works of literary journalism; to identify and isolate 
epistemic issues that have been obscured by ethical criticism or praise; to model 
reflexive epistemic questioning that leads to best practice; and, thus, to advocate a 
“responsibilist” approach to literary journalism. 
 
Although to a lesser extent, Epistemic Responsibility will also support the secondary 
focus of this thesis; that is, the nature and function of Australian literary journalism. 
Here, again, terra nullius is a particularly apt metaphor. The term itself is 
controversial in both Australian political and public discourse. Although it is 
primarily used in the legal arena, the concept became familiar to many Australians in 
1992 during a High Court case over land rights. Australia is the only Commonwealth 
nation not to have signed a treaty with its indigenous peoples, its settlers having 
invoked terra nullius to justify the acquisition of land at various times through the 
19th and 20th centuries. Two decades ago, however, Eddie Mabo led a group of 
Meriam people from the far Northeast in legal action to recognise their possessory 
title over the land by reason of long possession. Judicial bodies had endorsed terra 
nullius in previous Australian cases where indigenous peoples sought to claim their 
traditional land back from British settlers, but the High Court found for Mabo in this 
landmark decision, ruling that there is a concept of native title to be found in common 
law. This finding effectively overturned terra nullius—legally recognising traditional 
ownership of the land for the first time. The effects of this ruling cannot be overstated. 
While subsequent cases modified the 1992 Mabo decision, this case was a touchstone 
event in Australia’s “history wars”, a term denoting two decades of deeply divisive 
public and political debate over the nature of British colonisation and the subsequent 
treatment of the country’s first peoples. Historians, anthropologists and political 
parties polarised into camps that either supported or opposed the Mabo decision 
during the 1990s, dividing not only over Mabo but also a version of history that saw 
the British as settlers, occupiers, or invaders. Public opinion also split over the Mabo 
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decision, and remains divided today. At the heart of the history wars, however, is a 
struggle common to all colonised nations: that of reconciling what it means to be a 
citizen in the wake of a nation’s colonial past. It is this issue—the forging of national 
identity—that I propose is a central concern of contemporary literary journalism in 
Australia.  
 
The dual focus of this thesis may initially seem incongruous; epistemic responsibility 
and national identity do not obviously occupy common ground. In the final chapter, 
however, these two elements achieve synthesis when the literary journalist’s 
epistemic community—including subjects, readers, critics, publishers, publicists, and 
academics—is shown to impact upon the practice and unique features of Australian 
literary journalism. Whether or not this is the case for other national forms is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. But Australia’s small population and celebrated national 
character, I argue, have laid the foundations for a deeply introspective form of literary 
journalism that exhibits anxiety over representation in the texts under analysis.  
 
Before proceeding with the central arguments outlined above, the purpose of this 
chapter is to engage with key theoretical issues underpinning current international 
scholarship of literary journalism. It will discuss reportorial and textual features, 
definitions and nomenclature, before drawing on advances in genre studies to 
reconceptualise literary journalism in relation to other journalistic and fictional forms 
of narrative. These are standard discussions in literary journalism scholarship; 
however, not only does this chapter set up a critical framework within which to situate 
an analysis of primary texts, it also offers a brief overview of current scholarship to 
inform readers pursuing this field of study, a field that is largely unoccupied—or terra 
nullius—in Australia. 
 
Chapter two seeks to meet the challenge to the fiction/non-fiction dichotomy and set a 
theoretical foundation for literary journalism as non-fiction. I employ Code’s reading 
of Immanuel Kant, which offers an alternative theory of cognition to that relied upon 
by deconstructionists. Kant’s concept of “the creative synthesis of the imagination” is 
critical for Code. By extension, it provides a philosophical foundation for this thesis’s 
positioning of literary journalism as non-fiction. This chapter also defines important 
terms associated with epistemic responsibility, as they will be used for the remainder 
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of the study, and works through issues in avenues of epistemic responsibility such as 
paratexts, author-reader contracts, and transparency. The third chapter lays out a full 
reading of Code’s Epistemic Responsibility and applies her approach to the practice 
and criticism of literary journalism. Critical to this section is the separation of ethics 
and epistemic modes of enquiry; this is the starting point from which analyses in the 
following chapters will be performed. Chapter three will also suggest how Code’s 
definitions of key terms such as knowledge, meaning, understanding, belief, balance, 
and truth, can be employed as a framework to assess literary journalism’s claims. This 
theoretical framework will then be applied to a number of well-documented 
controversies in chapter four, including Masson v New Yorker, Helen Garner’s literary 
journalism, and Åsne Seierstad’s experience with the nexus between ethics and 
epistemology. Revisited through an epistemological lens, these analyses attempt to 
separate epistemic and ethical issues, at least for the purposes of explication, and 
identify pertinent areas for future analysis of literary journalistic texts and practice. 
 
Chapter five moves away from well-documented controversies to contemporary, 
critically acclaimed works of book-length literary journalism. In this section I employ 
Code’s approach to analyse three debut texts. My readings engage with critical 
responses to these texts, published in the United States between 2000-2010. Here I 
identify epistemological issues in acclaimed texts, demonstrate the limitations of 
transparency, respond to truth claims, and suggest areas for future literary journalism 
scholarship and criticism to consider. The final chapter also analyses epistemic 
responsibility in three contemporary book-length works of literary journalism. These 
Australian texts, also debuts published between 2000-2010, may not be representative 
of all literary journalism in Australia, but when analysed as a group they reveal an 
important relationship between the epistemic community within a relatively small 
population and its impact on literary journalistic practice. Not only do these analyses 
collectively illuminate this relationship, individually they also demonstrate what I 
suggest is the dominant function of contemporary practice in Australia, that is, to 
explore what it means to “be Australian”. 
 
Background: Discovering a “New” Land 
 
In 1965 Truman Capote famously declared himself the author of a new creation: the 
non-fiction novel. Assiduously researched and written in narrative form, In Cold 
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Blood began a wave of sensation as an example of journalism written with the artistic 
flair of a novel. Capote’s claim, according to Tom Wolfe, caused a “status panic in 
the literary community” (The New Journalism 25): was it possible to create a work of 
non-fiction, at once “true” and “creative”? Today the wave of critical dissent begun 
over four decades ago is still rippling through the academic world—and at times—the 
wider public domain, as book-length works of narrative literary journalism continue 
to challenge the objectivity standard and what constitutes the representation of truth.  
 
While scholarship clearly shows Capote’s claim of creating something new to be 
optimistic at best (see Bak 1-3; Hartsock; Kerrane and Yagoda 17-19; Sims and 
Kramer 3-5), the term “non-fiction novel” was coined in the mid-1960s, an era closely 
associated with the rise of the New Journalism. Practitioners already experimenting 
with the form were further energised by the positive reception of In Cold Blood. 
Writers such as Wolfe (The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test 1968), Hunter S. Thompson 
(Hells Angels 1966, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas 1973), Joan Didion (Slouching 
Towards Bethlehem 1968) and Norman Mailer (The Armies of the Night 1968, The 
Executioner’s Song 1980) similarly applied literary techniques to news articles and 
essays, creating divisions between critics who struggled with this “new” phenomenon 
in journalism. The features of this type of writing invite critical attention for many 
reasons. However, the seemingly irreconcilable fusion of factual content and narrative 
form remains a contentious feature in works written during this era. 
 
The literary world has arguably seen the death of the “New Journalism” in the five 
decades since Capote’s claim, and is currently witnessing the coming-of-age of what 
Robert Boynton would have his readers believe is its near-eponymous progeny. The 
somewhat playful title The New New Journalism (NNJ) (2005) refers to a growing 
number of contemporary North American works linked through their journalistic 
roots, immersive reporting practices and narrative approach. According to Boynton, 
the New New Journalism has “benefited enormously from both the legitimacy 
Wolfe’s legacy … brought to literary nonfiction, and from the concurrent 
displacement of the novel as the most prestigious form of literary expression” (NNJ 
xii). That the prestige of the novel has been “displaced” will not be debated in this 
thesis; however, Robert Vare’s assertion in 2000 that narrative non-fiction in the US 
“shows every sign of being in the midst of something of a golden age” is a 
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quantifiable reality. Among practitioners in this field are winners of the Pulitzer Prize 
for journalism, National Book Critics Circle Awards for general non-fiction, and 
numerous other honours. These best-selling works range from treatise to exposé to 
jeremiad—all products of intensively researched and painstakingly crafted 
investigative journalism. Indeed, it is the wide range of forms and practices 
represented by these texts that obscures a clear or simply definable canon for literary 
critics or the wider reading public to recognise. Works in this field can be labelled as 
diversely as politics, contemporary history, science, cultural studies, transportation, 
biography and urban studies. The dilemma of classification is perhaps most obvious 
with texts such as The Carpet Wars by Christopher Kremmer, the 2007 edition of 
which is labelled: “current affairs/social history/travel”. Such diversity reflects the 
range and depth of literary journalism being practised today, as well as highlighting 
the lack of homogenous features of works in this field.  
 
Boynton claims that recent movement away from New Journalism’s controversial 
characteristics represents a “continued maturation of literary journalism” (NNJ xi), 
and observes that current practitioners’ achievements are “more reportorial than 
literary” (NNJ xii). His analysis is echoed by practitioner William Langewiesche, who 
states: “What’s going on now is a new form of clean classicism.” Langewiesche 
regards the more recent iteration of the form as “equally as deep” as New Journalism 
(Reynolds 66), evidently referring to the powerful thematic, political, cultural, and 
advocatory concerns of contemporary works. These judgments are supported by this 
thesis, in which six debut works of book-length literary journalism published between 
2000-2010 are analysed. Hollowell observes that discussing literary developments 
without the clarity of perspective provided by time has inherent risks; the critic “may 
fall prey to the distorting proximity of a decade just past” (ix), but the value of my 
study relies in part on its timeliness.4 Surveys of contemporary practice reveal the 
state of practice; the results of the analyses in chapters five and six, then, are relevant 
for current and future practitioners, scholars and readers. 
 
Features 
 
It is perhaps unfortunate that the terra nullius analogy can apply equally well to the 
scholarship of literary journalism as to its practice. The core of the colonial project 
involves the appropriation of an area otherwise uninhabited—a virgin territory to be 
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carved out, quantified, labelled and “tamed”. The parallels with academia are clear. If 
the process of genrification is inevitable, however, it can be undertaken with 
sensitivity to the intentions of practitioners—particularly in this non-fiction field 
where the relationship between the author, subject and reader can have ramifications 
beyond the text itself.  
 
The scholarship of an earlier form of literary journalism emerged in the field rather 
than the academy. In 1973, Tom Wolfe proposed his own framework for the practice 
of New Journalism. He posited the following features as characteristic of reportage, or 
journalism written with literary techniques: scene by scene construction; dialogue in 
full; third-person point of view; symbolic details of status life; interior monologue; 
and composite characterisation (The New Journalism 31–32). Many of these features 
can be found in contemporary works; however, at this point a divergence of opinion 
occurs regarding the use of certain narrative techniques in non-fiction, such as interior 
monologue and composite characterisation, some of which have caused controversy. 
Writers such as Gail Sheehy and Joe McGuiness are well-known for storms created 
over composite characterisation (see Sims, Literary Journalism 104, 115). More 
recent cases such as Australian Helen Garner’s The First Stone are widely 
documented, and will be further discussed in chapter four. This does not mean such 
practices have been abandoned, however. Richard Preston uses interior monologue in 
The Hot Zone (1995), for example; but he is careful to defend his practice in the 
Foreword to the book.5 Other features such as third-person point of view are clearly 
not grounds for identifying or excluding texts from this field, as both heterodiegetic as 
well as homodiegetic narration is common in contemporary practice; however, 
authorial decisions about narratorial presence and technique have similarly proved 
contentious, such as in John Hersey’s extended version of Hiroshima (1985) and—
more recently—William Langewiesche’s American Ground (2002) and Adrian Nicole 
LeBlanc’s Random Family (2003). Clearly this field resists classification by specific 
features. As such, identification rests predominantly on the shared characteristics of 
exhaustive research of “real” entities, timeliness, and narrative mode.  
 
Almost a decade on from Wolfe’s attempt to characterise New Journalism, Norman 
Sims argued for historical roots Wolfe attempted to downplay. He proposed two 
active generations of literary journalists were practising at the time of writing, and 
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cited—among others—James Agee, George Orwell and John Hersey as earlier literary 
journalists (Literary Journalists 5). From interviews with “new gen” writers—
Richard West, Mark Kramer, Sara Davidson, Tracy Kidder and Mark Singer—Sims 
derived six characteristics to create “the boundary of the form” (8): immersion (8-12); 
dynamic structure that does not conform to a journalistic formula (12-15); accuracy 
(15-16); individual voice (16-18); responsibility (to the subjects of the text) (18-21); 
and symbolism, or symbolic reality (21-25). Sims contended “literary journalism has 
been around just long enough to acquire a set of rules. The writers know where the 
boundaries lie” (5). This statement is as questionable now as it was in 1984 when The 
Literary Journalists was published, and indicates a more static conception of genre 
than is in current use—a point that will be explored later in this chapter. Sims 
extended the historicisation of the form in the first edition of Literary Journalism in 
the Twentieth Century (1990), although in the introduction he seems to loosen up 
from restrictive issues of definitions, noting “it seems easier and more definitive to 
cite examples” than to define literary journalism (xvii). 
 
Another decade on, Thomas B. Connery went beyond Sims’s study to propose three 
historical cycles of modern literary journalism: the 1890s, 1930s and the 1950-1960s 
(Sourcebook xii–xiii). Connery prefers more open boundaries, stating “immersion 
may or may not be an element of literary journalism; its use is not necessary for a 
work to be classified as literary journalism. Making immersion optional allows for a 
broader, yet legitimate application of the definition” (12 emphasis in original). 
Connery allows that immersion is crucial to longer, more complex articles or book-
length works (13), but is wary of excluding texts on the basis of immersive reporting 
practices. Connery praises Barbara Lounsberry’s proposed four constitutive features 
of literary or artistic non-fiction. They are: documentable subject matter chosen from 
the real world as opposed to “invented” from the writer’s mind; exhaustive research; 
the scene; and fine writing: a literary prose style (xiii–xv). But again he goes beyond 
the scope of her analysis—Talese, Wolfe, McPhee, Didion and Mailer, who were all 
still closely associated with New Journalism—to represent the historical cycles of 
literary journalism. 
 
Published in 2000, John C. Hartsock’s A History of American Literary Journalism 
offers a preliminary definition of narrative literary journalism as “those true-life 
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stories that read like a novel or short story” (22) before working through the 
difficulties inherent in such a definition. Hartsock focuses on the complexities of 
nomenclature rather than the identification of features to delimit the field, a focus 
consistent with his aim to acknowledge the scholarly discussion but move beyond it 
(12). The IALJS similarly avoids demarcating features to create boundaries. The 
Association does not currently endorse a single definition, instead offering six 
definitions of literary journalism to “establish a meeting ground for its critical study” 
(“Mission Statement”). The point here is not to create a comprehensive overview of 
features evident in scholarly studies. Rather the intention is to demonstrate how, over 
time, scholarship has moved away from imposing boundaries that exclude texts on the 
grounds of individual features, allowing for a more inclusive, text-driven body of 
analysis to emerge.  
 
Taking the lead from this trend in scholarship, I will characterise the works surveyed 
in this thesis by their shared features: they are book-length non-fiction narratives 
written with literary techniques, resulting from immersive research of actual 
contemporary people and issues through the lens of contemporary events. In this 
definition the narrative mode differentiates works in the field from texts in which the 
dominant mode is expository or analytical. The term “contemporary” separates 
literary journalism from historical works. That is, while texts may divert into 
historical records to provide background information, the narrative is primarily 
concerned with issues and events occurring up to a ten-year period before the book’s 
publication. This definition also distinguishes biography from literary journalism with 
the phrase “through the lens of contemporary events”. A subject’s life story may be 
relevant and thus referenced by practitioners, but here the primary journalistic focus is 
the event. “Practitioner” is also preferred over “journalist” in this thesis to 
acknowledge the varied professional backgrounds of writers featured in chapters five 
and six. While some theorists consider only former or practising journalists in their 
study of literary journalism, here the features of the work and process of gathering 
information are given precedence over the professional background of the writer. 
“Literary style” includes such features as a narrative arc; figurative language; 
symbolism; and the preference of narration over exposition. The term essentially 
differentiates between what Ronald Weber identifies as skilled factual reconstruction 
and non-fiction writing with a literary purpose (132). This “literary” descriptor signals 
 
 
 18 
a text’s value beyond its informative function. Finally, shorter works are often 
featured in anthologies such as Sims’s The Literary Journalists and share many 
features of book-length works, but considering short texts lies beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
 
The Story Behind the Name (Or: The Name Behind the Story) 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of this field of study has been assigning a name 
to texts with such broad characteristics and loosely related features. This reluctance to 
label has been—and continues to be—a point of contention between some academics, 
authors, journalists and interest groups in the wider public domain. In 1990, 
Lounsberry posed the question: “If we live in an age of nonfiction, then why is critical 
appreciation of this work so rare? This is explained, in part, by the inevitable lag of 
the critic behind the artist, but also by the lack of a satisfactory name for this work” 
(xi). More than two decades later, her observation still accurately describes the 
uncertain nomenclature for what she herself terms “literary nonfiction”; however, 
critical appreciation of individual works is a thriving, and arguably urgent, field of 
study in the world of literary criticism. Lounsberry’s accounting for the nameless state 
of “this work” nevertheless raises an important question: is there good reason for this 
lack of critical consensus? Corollary questions follow: does this work need to be 
named? And, if so, what effect does labelling texts have on academic and/or public 
reception of works bearing a common label?  
In 2000, Hartsock suggested the state of scholarship in this area has altered little since 
the time of Lounsberry’s writing. He also suggested this lack of development was 
linked to lack of consensus on a name:  
because there are only a few book-length examinations of literary 
journalism and the scholarship is generally meagre, the form’s study 
lacks a critical or scholarly mass. Such a problematic conclusion 
might suggest in more traditional academic circles that literary 
journalism/nonfiction cannot be critiqued because it appears to lack 
focus and weight, with the result that such a position can only 
continue to marginalize the form. Yet as I attempt to demonstrate, the 
form—by whatever name—is alive and well given the ongoing critical 
acknowledgement of it (259). 
 
Here Hartsock identifies a difference between the “lack of scholarly mass” and 
“ongoing critical acknowledgement”, indicating positive reception of literary 
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journalism among mainstream reviewers without a correlating reception among 
scholars. This was accurate in 2000, but the state is changing. If the practice of 
literary journalism is in the midst of a golden age, its scholarship is arguably also 
entering a golden age of its own. Despite the rapid development of the field, however, 
Jenny McKay argues that as recently as 2011, reportage remains “invisible” to the 
general public in Britain, partly out of neglect by the academy (Reportage 53). She 
writes:  
 
it would be [heartening if] reviewers felt they could depend on their 
readers’ knowledge about reportage through having read enough of it to 
equip them with a framework of critical reference other than that 
provided by fiction. This is not a trivial point. It is a use of words that 
helps to perpetuate the invisibility of a significant and important genre 
of writing. …[A]nd so if something has no name, no verbal label, then 
it can comfortably be ignored (Reportage 54).  
 
McKay’s reference to a critical framework here is tied to the notion of “generic 
competence”, or a knowledge set that “enables readers to decode a narrative, co-
creating the story as a meaningful and coherent whole” (Pyrhönen 110). She concludes 
that this state of invisibility perpetuates reportage’s low profile and limits would-be 
practitioners’ access to resources: “There is money available, in the national press at 
least. It’s just that it is being spent on astronomically high fees for personal columnists 
or their admittedly more serious and possibly more interesting to read commentary-
column colleagues” rather than practitioners who investigate using immersion 
techniques (“Hidden Genre” 57). If writers do manage to support themselves, McKay 
contends, they will struggle to get their work published due to limited column space in 
magazines and newspapers (“Hidden Genre” 57). This is perhaps not the case in the 
US, where recognisable traditions still flourish in publications such as the New 
Yorker—and book-length narrative journalism is finding both mainstream and critical 
success. But for McKay, the invisibility of reportage in Britain is directly linked to a 
lack of funding, as is the absence of a critical framework through which readers can 
consume narrative forms of journalism. A similar state exists in Australia, and will be 
elaborated on in chapter six. Evidently, settling on a name has significant “real-world” 
benefits for scholars, practitioners and readers alike.  
 
Despite a lack of consensus, some names have been gaining more currency than 
others. Norman Sims’s use of “literary journalism” has gained traction in the 
 
 
 20 
academy, as evidenced by successive anthologies, historical studies, and the 
eponymous association and journal. Eisenhuth and McDonald note that many 
journalists distrust such terms: “Literary Journalism: Bunging It On?” (41), a position 
held by almost all Australian practitioners, as well as American writers such as Ron 
Rosenbaum who finds the term “self-consciously highfalutin” (in Boynton NNJ 339). 
The “Creative Nonfiction” movement has spawned textbooks, anthologies, a 
magazine-turned-journal and podcast. The stated aims of the Creative Nonfiction 
Foundation, or CNF, are to: “provide a venue … for high quality nonfiction prose 
(memoir, literary journalism, personal essay); to serve as the singular strongest voice 
of the genre, defining the ethics and parameters of the field; and to broaden the 
genre's impact in the literary arena by providing an array of educational services and 
publishing activities” (“The CNF Foundation”). The genre referenced in this 
manifesto is identified as “literary nonfiction”—“The [CN] Foundation pursues 
educational and publishing initiatives in the genre of literary nonfiction” (“The CNF 
Foundation”)—a label to which “Creative Nonfiction” somewhat surprisingly seems 
to defer.  
 
Boynton’s title The New New Journalism draws on its predecessor’s reputation for 
rigorous reporting, innovation and influence, although he defaults to “literary 
journalism” when invoking genre (The New New Journalism xxx). Other terms in use 
include “reportage” in John Carey’s Faber Book of Reportage (1996), “personal 
reportage” (McDonald 269), “literary non-fiction” in Weber’s The Literature of Fact 
(1985), and of course the “non-fiction novel” as promoted by Capote. Critics and 
theorists at times use these terms interchangeably. Caveats such as “I choose the term 
reluctantly” (Ricketson “Hitchhiking” 85) are not uncommon. Dispute over names 
continues in public and academic discourse; however, as scholarship advances, 
academics are, in fact, carving out fields with clear differences that often—but not 
always—reflect the biases of their backgrounds. Overlapping features can create 
diffuse expectations for readers, however; this is a difficulty to be addressed by all 
scholars in the wider field of narrative non-fiction. 
 
Assigning a name is a daunting task in the light of historical constructions and 
divergences between fact and fiction, journalism and literature, and those who would 
uphold such distinctions. As identified by John Hartsock, the four main terms used in 
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varying pairings—“non-fiction”, “narrative”, “literary”, and “journalism” (4)—are all 
problematic in their own way. As William Howarth notes, the label non-fiction is 
frustrating “for it says not what a book is, but what it is not. Since fiction is 
presumably made up, imaginative, clever, and resourceful, a book of non-fiction must 
not be any of those things, perhaps not even a work of art” (in Smith 209–210). The 
term “non-fiction” hence invokes the field in the negative instead of reflecting actual 
features, and, as McKay notes, in doing so “we imply that we attach much more value 
to the opposite—to fiction in this case” (Reportage 54). “Narrative” is a similarly 
problematic term, whether used in adjectival form or as a noun. While in common 
usage “narrative” usually connotes “story”, Abbott’s Cambridge Introduction to 
Narrative cites four definitions of narrative, ranging from Abbott’s own—“simply 
put, narrative is the representation of an event or series of events” (13)—to Marie-
Laure Ryan’s complex definition with eight criteria indicating variable degrees of 
membership. Ryan describes narrative texts as “a fuzzy set … but [a set that is] 
centred on prototypical cases that everybody recognises as stories” (Towards 28). 
Such definitions may not inspire confidence in those wanting an accurate, defensible 
term in an emerging field of academic study. The question of narrative is pertinent to 
the study of literary journalism as a function of identifying the field of inquiry. Texts 
may be written in a narrative mode but contain extended passages of exposition, 
argument or simple description that does not add to the narrativity of the text. Many 
works cited in Boynton’s The New New Journalism, for example Susan Orlean’s The 
Orchid Thief (1999), Jon Krakauer’s Under the Banner of Heaven (2003) and Richard 
Ben Cramer’s How Israel Lost: The Four Questions (2004) are highly digressive, and 
contain long expository or descriptive passages. Narrativity is expressed to different 
degrees in each text, with Orlean’s perhaps displaying the strongest narrative 
tendencies with multiple digressions, while Cramer’s would be difficult to 
characterise as a narrative at all.  
 
“Non-fiction” and “narrative”, however, are arguably less controversial terms than 
“literary” and “journalism” when attempting to apply them to these texts with shared 
essential features. Phyllis Frus’s historical outline of the term “literature” highlights 
the problematic nature of the term “literary” because of its association with fiction. 
Frus demonstrates that the term “literature” denotes fictional status and argues that: 
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It is clear that narrative does give up its nonfictional status when it is 
enshrined in the canon of literature … because nonfiction is thought of 
as the realm of discourse where true and false are important 
distinctions, and literature is thought of as the realm where, even when 
a work represents the world, its truth or falsity is irrelevant. Not so 
incidentally, this makes the term “literary nonfiction” logically 
contradictory, for under these notions of literature a narrative can be 
either nonfictional or literary, but not both (9). 
 
Frus further criticises the application of “literary” to the definition as works in this 
field are often politically or socially charged; whereas, she finds the canon of 
literature “does not value political and historical narrative” (126). Finally, she 
contends that such terms as literary journalism/non-fiction “imply the existence of 
journalistic or factual discourses that are not literary; therefore, some way must be 
found to distinguish one category from the other, which leads to the imposition of 
what are invariably formalist criteria” (126); whereas, she argues, “texts do have 
inherent qualities, but literariness is not one of them” (16). This is a moot point. Dow, 
for example, understands the term as highlighting in literary journalistic texts “the 
literary and the ‘factually unverifiable’ in order to foreground (the contingencies of) 
… authorial perceptions and truth claims” (133). But Frus’s answer to this conundrum 
is to collapse the historical division of “literary” and “non-literary”, essentially 
conflating all discourse into one category: literature. This enables a “reflexive 
reading”, ultimately “[reinserting] a text, genre, or mode into the conditions which 
gave rise to it” (33), thus avoiding the fact-fiction question (48). This ambitious 
project does indeed avoid difficult territory; however, it also raises its own problems, 
none more so than how to convince the academy that a common news report can (and 
should) be redeemed and read as literature, if, as Frus claims, the academy is 
responsible for creating the division. From another angle, the objectivity standard 
observed by Western mainstream journalism is an intentional demarcation from other 
forms of non-fictional discourse. This is not the imposition of formalist criteria by 
critics, but the creation of boundaries of discourse by a historical, conscious process 
of exclusion. 
 
Tzvetan Todorov, on the other hand, unpacks “literature” and in doing so exposes a 
conflation of the term’s effect with its definition. He writes: 
  
Literature is a fiction: this is its first structural definition. ... Is such a 
definition satisfactory? We may well wonder whether we are not about to 
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substitute a consequence of what literature is for a definition of literature. 
Nothing prevents a story that recounts a real event from being perceived 
as literature. Nothing in its composition needs to be changed; we need 
only say that we are not interested in its truth value but are reading it “as” 
literature. A “literary” reading can be imposed on any text: the question 
of truthfulness will not arise because the text is literary. Rather than a 
definition of literature, we are offered here, in a roundabout way, one of 
its properties (3 emphasis in original). 
 
Todorov offers that the “second great definition of literature, then, comes under the 
banner of the beautiful: here pleasing wins out over instructing” (5). He follows 
theoretical reconceptions of this definition over time, observing: “the notion of the 
beautiful is crystallized, toward the end of the eighteenth century, in an affirmation of 
the intransitive, noninstrumental nature of the work of art. Having once been identified 
with the useful, the beautiful is now defined by its nonutilitarian nature”. This 
progression produces an understanding of literature as “a system, a language that 
attracts attention to itself through its systemacity alone, a language that becomes 
autotelic. This is its second structural definition” (5). But as with his first point, 
Todorov finds that these “two definitions allow us to account for a number of works 
ordinarily called literary, but not for all”. He concludes: “We remain floundering in 
imprecision and vagueness” (9). If these are not definitions but descriptors, there is, as 
Todorov notes, nothing to prevent non-fiction from being literary. A feature of such 
texts, then, should be an internal systematic consistency in addition to correspondence 
with reality. Thus, literary journalism is bi-referential in nature. 
 
Hartsock also tracks the development of “literature” in A History of American 
Literary Journalism. Here he shows the diverging paths of literature and journalism: 
“The concept … of a transcendental literature largely derives from the nineteenth 
century, with roots in neoclassical rhetoric and oratory that provided universal forms 
even as literature was reacting against neoclassical rhetoric. Journalism never made a 
claim to such a transcendent universality” (218). Both Hartsock and Frus, supported 
by Connery (1990), show how objective journalism emerged as a result of positivist 
ideology during the second half of the nineteenth century—itself a reaction against 
Romanticism—creating an epistemological gulf at a moment of social and cultural 
transformation and crisis. Following shortly after, as a reaction against the 
objectifying and alienating effects of “objective journalism”, the literary journalism of 
the 1890s emerged (Hartsock 6, 17, 20, 41, 42, 87; Frus 9, 54, 100, 103; Connery, 
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“Third Way” 4, 6, 9). This sequence shows how literary realism/naturalism, objective 
journalism and literary journalism arose in opposition to each other, and in response 
to the effects of the previous movement, thus highlighting the difficulties of 
combining the terms “literary” and “journalism” to denote a type of discourse that 
grew out of opposition to both the (fictional) literary and (objective) journalistic 
traditions.  
 
Each of these four terms, then, “non-fiction”, “narrative”, “literary” and “journalism” 
can be seen as problematic. They are, however, the most widely used in reference to 
this loosely linked body of works, and each has a reasonable claim to viability. “Non-
fiction” denotes the externally verifiable content of texts in this field, but this element 
is arguably implicit in the form as labelled “journalism”. As Connery contends, “Use 
of the word ‘journalism’ is preferred over ‘non-fiction’ because the works assigned to 
this literary form are neither essays nor commentary. It is also preferred because 
much of the content of the works comes from traditional means of news gathering or 
reporting” (“Third Way” 15). “Journalism” thus references the research element of 
the writer’s practice as well as the timeliness of the account, and further delimits the 
field from historical works, biography and autobiography; as such it is both more 
specific and economical than “non-fiction”. The terms “narrative” and “literary” 
ostensibly both reference the mode of writing: “Rather than standing alone, modes are 
usually qualifications or modifications of particular genres (gothic thriller, pastoral 
elegy, satirical sitcom) … [T]hey specify thematic features and certain forms of 
modalities of speech, but not the formal structures or even the semiotic medium 
through which the text is to be realised” (Frow, Genre 65). While scholars and 
practitioners alike use the terms interchangeably, or, like Hartsock, as a compound 
such as “narrative literary journalism”, in this thesis the term “literary” is preferred as 
it subsumes “narrative”, differentiates the form from hard news reports that at times 
are written in a narrative mode, and arguably has a richer stylistic connotation—style 
being a feature of the form. 
 
The term “literary journalism” is perhaps the term with the most traction in this field 
of study (Hartsock 4; see also Bak and Reynolds; Connery; Sims, True Stories). The 
term is a medium by which the stylistically rich, transcendent nature of literature and 
the practice of immersive journalism can merge. If indeed Frus is correct in assigning 
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literature the capability of conveying universal truths and journalism belonging to the 
medium that reports everyday facts (53), literary journalism can be seen as the site 
where the everyday affairs of real entities take on a meaning that transcends the 
temporal and holds universal significance, if not truth. Christa Wolf argues that this 
has traditionally been the domain of literature, to create “a truth beyond the important 
facts of the world”, as facts in themselves do not necessarily provide understanding 
(in Josephi and Muller 68). Viewed in this light, literary journalism offers an 
alternative to both objective journalism and fiction, and undoubtedly is a fertile field 
for scholarly inquiry.  
 
Genre or Discipline? 
 
Up to this point I have used the somewhat awkward terms “form” or “works in this 
field” rather than “genre”. This has been intentional. Conceptualising literary 
journalism as a genre is the subject of critical debate, as previously noted. Many 
scholars use the terms “form” and “genre” interchangeably, as in Sims’s call for 
international scholarship for literary journalism (“Problem”). Hartsock speculated in 
2000: “Perhaps critical usage will eventually characterise such texts as a ‘genre’ but 
for the moment, I adopt the more conservative usage of ‘form’ … as an 
acknowledgement that our understanding of it is still very much emerging” (3). He 
uses the term “genre”, however, in the 2008 preface to Sims’s Literary Journalism in 
the Twentieth Century. More recently, Bak argues that both terms, “form” and 
“genre”, limit the advancement of international scholarship. He writes: 
 
Continually calling it a genre locks literary journalism into a 
subcategory of literature, alongside poetry and drama. Referring to it as 
a journalistic form sandwiches it somewhere between fiction and 
journalism. Suggesting that it is a subcategory of nonfiction 
dangerously sets it on even ground with biography, travelogues, policy 
analysis, history, cultural studies, and memoirs, some of which can be 
literary journalism but are not by that definition that alone (18). 
 
I would suggest, however, that while the term “genre” is used in literary criticism, it 
has a much wider application and use than Bak has given it in this instance. The 
contractual “force” afforded by genrification, for example, is one consideration here, 
and will be further explicated in chapters two and three. But, as I have demonstrated, 
“literary” moderating “journalism” does not push texts into the fictional domain; nor 
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is it, I would argue, situated somewhere between fiction and journalism. Bak’s use of 
the term “dangerously” conceivably refers to—in layman’s terms—the “poetic 
license” taken in memoir and biography particularly; further along the spectrum, 
history and cultural studies lack the interpretive potential afforded by literary 
narratives. But to set literary journalism on “higher ground”, as Bak’s statement here 
implies, is to burden it with expectations of verifiability it is not equipped to bear. 
Each of these subcategories of non-fiction have their unique attendant aims; the task 
of literary journalism scholars is in part to make clear the terms of reception for this 
genre.  
 
Bak also introduces the term “discipline” into the discussion. He contends that 
“[r]aising literary journalism to the level of a discipline would institute a moratorium 
on the barrage of definitions and defenses that have hindered the advancement of 
literary journalism studies”, and would “certainly reduce the pedagogical problems 
facing international literary journalism” (18, 19). It is questionable, however, that 
achieving disciplinary status would institute a moratorium on definitions and 
defences. Discussions among scholars might be less influenced by loyalties to one 
academy or another, but conceivably the “barrage” will not cease until critical 
agreement is reached—with or without disciplinary status. But if the discipline is 
formed and consensus is reached, boundaries that are currently porous and 
overlapping might become firm and necessarily exclude writers and texts deserving 
critical attention. At the level of practice, any attempt to delimit the field relies on a 
combination of research and writing processes (intensive/immersive reporting, 
independent writing, externally verifiable entities and events) as well as shared 
narrative techniques. As demonstrated in collections such as Boynton’s The New New 
Journalism, however, the journalistic practices employed by practitioners are often as 
diverse as the works produced. Australian writer Chloe Hooper, for example, 
perceived herself to be working outside the traditions of both journalism and 
anthropology when investigating and writing her first work of literary journalism; 
many of Boynton’s interviewees similarly consider themselves loosely linked to a 
tradition resembling literary journalism without belonging to it. Before a call for 
disciplinary status, then, consideration should be given to the trade-off between 
smoothing pedagogical problems and delimiting the field of study. To reinvoke the 
analogy of colonising unoccupied land, the movement from pioneering to settlement 
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or occupation necessarily involves building boundaries and assigning territory, but 
can this be done without limiting the potential of the land, and excluding some of its 
inhabitants? For a field that is noted for its pioneering spirit, how will the 
formalisation of pedagogy affect a new generation of practitioners?  
 
Bak’s observations reflect an inflexible taxonomic certainty that the term “literary 
journalism” itself contradicts. Resistance to conceiving of the field as a genre on the 
grounds that it “locks literary journalism into a subcategory of literature” (18) 
disregards recent advances in genre theory that destabilise the idea of fixed 
boundaries and open genre studies to a broader function than classification and 
hierarchy. Swales notes that during the past decade “the genre movement has 
coalesced somewhat” to reconsider the function of genre (148); in the words of one 
academic, “Discourse as genre … extends the analysis beyond the textual product to 
incorporate context in a broader sense to account for not only the way the text is 
constructed, but also the way it is often interpreted, used and exploited in specific 
institutional or more narrowly professional contexts to achieve specific disciplinary 
roles” (Bhatia 20). These functions of genre studies are particularly useful to the 
scholarship of literary journalism. As Sims suggests, works of literary journalism 
need to be examined on their own terms (“Problem” 8). This calls for analysis not 
only of the practice or construction of literary journalism, but also analysis of its 
reception and interpretation. Genre studies offers a broad framework through which 
scholars can analyse the claims literary journalism makes about itself, and utilise 
literary analysis to offer readings that examine those claims.  
 
Genrification: The Search for New Horizons 
 
The taxonomic function of genre is important in establishing a recognisable market 
for literary journalism, although its popularity is clearly not dependent on a label 
identifying it as such. Publishers and retail venues alike classify works of literary 
journalism in pre-existing genres, such as travel writing, politics, true crime or 
cultural studies. At times, bookstores do not know where to put works of writers such 
as Lawrence Weschler, although Weschler classifies his own works—independently 
labelled “Economics”, “Psychedelics” and “Latin America”—as “writerly nonfiction” 
(Boynton The New New Journalism 404). This variance in labelling raises some 
critical questions: does this classification affect reader expectations? Could it inhibit 
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or enhance the reading experience? Does it distort authorial intention? Will the 
audience receive the text differently according to the section of the bookstore they 
found the book in or in relation to other genre markers throughout the text? A book 
label on a dust-cover jacket is unlikely to prevent a reader from choosing to purchase 
or read a book; however, they may never discover a book if it is labelled and 
catalogued in an unexpected way. 
 
Genre indicates how a reader might approach a book before they turn to the first page. 
Hans Robert Jauss explains that such indications create a “horizon of expectations and 
rules familiar from earlier texts, which are then varied, corrected, changed or just 
reproduced. Variation and correction determine the scope, alteration and reproduction 
of the borders and structure of the genre. The interpretative reception of a text always 
presupposes the context of experience of aesthetic perception” (13). Genre is also the 
first step in a negotiation of an author/reader contract. Pyrhönen asserts, “to 
understand the function of textual components and the reading experience, we should 
understand the rules governing the relationship between author and reader. These 
rules are grounded in generic practices, although they are not identical with them. 
Rather, they arise from a conjunction of generic conventions and interpretive 
strategies, enabling the reader’s moves in a game played with and against the author” 
(115–6). The concept of an author/reader contract will be further explored in the next 
chapter. But the taxonomic function of genre has been attacked in the past. As Wai 
Chee Dimock has observed: 
 
Theorists from Benedetto Croce to Jacques Derrida have long objected to 
the concept of genre, pointing out that something as dynamic as literature 
can never be anatomized ahead of time, segregated by permanent 
groupings. “[I]nstead of asking before a work of art if it be expressive 
and what it expresses,” genre criticism only wants to label it, putting it 
into a pigeonhole, asking only “if it obey the laws of epic or of tragedy.” 
Nothing can be more misguided, Croce says, for these “laws of the 
kinds” have never in fact been observed by practising writers (1377). 
 
Indeed, interest groups such as scholars, students and publishers conceivably have 
more of a vested interest in establishing generic boundaries than practising writers. 
But to state that the laws of genre have never been observed by writers is a particularly 
broad generalisation—one that is difficult to substantiate, and perhaps equally as 
questionable as a claim that all writers are cognisant of generic boundaries in their 
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writing process. Barbara Foley observes, “treating generic categorization as a 
framework imposed a posteriori by literary critics [rules] out the possibility that it may 
constitute a necessary basis for the contracts formed between actual writers and 
readers” (Telling the Truth 32).6 Perhaps a mid-point between these positions is most 
applicable to literary journalism. Anecdotal evidence—presented more extensively in 
chapters five and six—suggests contemporary practitioners depend in part on 
journalistic standards and narrative frameworks from their predecessors to define the 
scope of their enquiry and shape their narratives. But innovation is also a vital 
characteristic of literary journalism. A tension is evident here. What, then, is genre’s 
role in mediating production and consumption of literary journalism? 
 
Derrida’s study “The Law of Genre” further critiques the effects of genrification. With 
some hyperbole he asserts that historically “as soon as genre announces itself, one 
must respect a norm, one must not cross a line of demarcation, one must not risk 
impurity, anomaly, or monstrosity” (57). An effect of “traditional” genrification, then, 
for Derrida is somewhat of a closing of ranks, a stagnation of form and a limit to a 
text’s interpretive potential—ostensibly for critics a minimal loss in the trade-off for 
taxonomic certainty. Such a view, however, conceives of genre as a prescriptive power 
that controls writers and scholars alike. The history of innovative, boundary-breaking 
practitioners and the emergence of new genres show this to be an exaggeration of 
genre’s function. Neither are scholars limited by generic conventions in their criticism: 
the most innovative literary criticism arguably results from the analysis of texts 
through unorthodox or unexpected critical frames.  
 
Derrida goes on to posit a law of “participation without membership” (63), offering an 
alternative classificatory system where a text may belong to one or multiple genres 
without necessarily being demarcated (67). This concept has parallels with literary 
journalism, a field in which many practitioners participate while resisting membership. 
But in terms of genre, this “law” effectively loosens taxonomic and hierarchical 
structures. It recognises that texts can participate in multiple genres, thus does not 
limit their rhetorical potential. Works of literary journalism may also participate in 
genres such as travel writing, current affairs and medicine, for example, while 
corresponding to the definition of literary journalism. A difficulty here is conflicting 
expectations raised by genre assignation. 
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For John Frow, following Derrida, genre has a “dynamic” function; this is reflected in 
the literary journalistic contract, which will be dealt with more fully in chapter two. 
Frow sees texts as performances of genre rather than reproductions of a class to which 
they belong. His theory represents “a shift away from an ‘Aristotelian’ model of 
taxonomy in which a relationship of hierarchical belonging between a class and its 
members predominates, to a more reflexive model in which texts are thought to use or 
perform the genres by which they are shaped” (Genre 25). This concept contributes 
much to an investigation in this field where there are “real world effects” in the 
production, reception and function of non-fiction texts. In works that represent actual 
events, entities and issues, a channel of communication between the “real” author and 
“real” reader is paramount. Genre is one function that facilitates this communication, 
shaping the expectations of the reader through the “performative structures that shape 
the world in the very process of putting it into speech” (“Reproducibles” 1632–3). 
Frow offers the following definition of genre:  
Genre, we might say, is a set of conventional and highly organised 
constraints on the production and interpretation of meaning. In using 
the word “constraint” I don’t mean to say that genre is simply a 
restriction. Rather, its structuring effects are productive of meaning; 
they shape and guide … generic structure both enables and restricts 
meaning, and is a basic condition for meaning to take place (Genre 
10). 
 
Frow’s definition implies two functions of genre. Firstly, genre is widely understood 
as a classifying structure that is composed of “conventional and highly organised 
constraints”. These can be summarised as the taxonomic function—that identified by 
Derrida. In the broadest sense, these classifications can be seen in labels on shelves in 
bookstores, in DVD rental outlets and at the beginning of arts reviews in newspapers, 
and are widely understood to demarcate the content and style of one group of texts 
from another. As Frow contends: “Genre is, amongst other things, a matter of 
discrimination and taxonomy: of organising things into recognisable classes” (Genre 
51). Thomas Beebee’s assertion that genre is “primarily the precondition for the 
creation and the reading of texts” (250) supports Frow’s definition; although the term 
“precondition” implies a static, fully conceived way of reading which is 
predetermined by the author, publisher or the librarian who determines where it is 
shelved. For Derrida, this is the law of genre that inhibits a text’s agency.  
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As stated, Frow’s definition also ascribes a dynamic function to genre. He asserts that 
“texts work upon genres as much as they are shaped by them” (Genre 28). The effect 
of this function is to destabilise the notion of a static set of rules used to classify texts, 
and to posit a set of “actual and contingent forms rather than necessary and essential 
forms” (“Reproducibles” 1629). This dynamic nature of genre is supported by 
Dimock, who argues that: 
 
Genres have solid names, ontologized names. What these names 
designate, though, is not taxonomic classes of equal solidity but fields 
at once emerging and ephemeral, defined over and over again by new 
entries that are still being produced. …Far from being clear-cut slices 
of the literary pie, genres have only an on-demand spatial occupancy. 
They can be brought forth or sent back as the user chooses, switched 
on or off, scaled up or down. Each is one among several levels of 
resolution, with alternating features that can be read either as random 
detail or as salient pattern (1379). 
 
In this way, texts can be said to perform genre, rather than have genre assigned to 
them. Significantly, genre’s performative function opens the possibility of negotiation 
between the author and reader over how to interpret meaning—a possibility that 
echoes Derrida’s law of participation without inclusion. Dimock’s term “user” here 
invokes not only the writer, who employs genre to shape a text, but also the reader, 
who consciously or unconsciously uses elements of genre to inform and perform an 
interpretation of the text. Dimock assigns the reader with the power to “choose”, 
“switch on or off” or “scale up or down” elements that signal genre. As such, genre 
can be understood as a dynamic site of negotiation between the author and reader, 
with the characteristics of genre: working on the text; being worked on by the text; 
informing the writer and reader; and being informed by previous experience and 
knowledge of the writer and the reader. Clearly there is more happening here than the 
drawing of a line of demarcation that cannot be crossed. Negotiating what the text is, 
then, is fundamental to deciding how to read and interpret the text. This phenomenon 
is a foundational element in the discussion of literary journalism because of its claim 
to non-fiction status in a mode that is often self-consciously subjective. 
Understanding this field’s reliance upon genre and the expectations it creates is vital 
to—in Swales’s words—the “better consumption and production” of texts, or in this 
case, of literary journalism.  
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To date, the taxonomic function of genre as applied to literary journalism has 
produced much discussion but little consensus. In spite of this, perhaps movement 
towards a traditional form of genrification was inevitable. Frow’s bi-functional model 
of genre as both taxonomic and dynamic, however, provides a theoretical framework 
within which a genre such as literary journalism may be conceived that does not rely 
on strict taxonomic boundaries, but exemplifies participation without membership. 
Rather than conceptualising the genre through commonalities of textual features 
alone, the “minimal traits” by which literary journalism should be recognised include 
those that represent its process: exhaustive research; presentation of externally 
verifiable entities and events; timeliness; narrative mode; and (for the purposes of this 
thesis) book length. While these traits are effectively taxonomic, they are also 
dynamic in that they signal to the reader particular messages about the way the text 
has been constructed, and thus initiate negotiations about how the text can be read.  
In summary, Frow’s concept of genre defines a field of study without delimiting it. It 
simultaneously allows texts to participate in—or perform—multiple genres at once, 
acknowledging that dominant features will predispose it to a primary genre 
assignation. Scholarship that conceives of literary journalism as a genre opens texts to 
be studied with the tools of both narrative and rhetorical analysis, and will produce a 
body of criticism that: equips readers with a framework of critical reference to 
approach texts (Reportage McKay); potentially enhances the market for works of 
literary journalism (Reportage McKay); provides the focus necessary to prevent the 
genre from being marginalised (Hartsock); spurs practitioners to new innovations 
(Swales); and illuminates the relationship between texts and their environments of 
production (Sims, “Problem”).  
 
To invoke the analogy of terra nullius once again, exploration in any field should be 
respectful of the individual inhabitants of unclaimed land. This is true of literary 
journalism scholarship. In this thesis I approach the criticism of contemporary US and 
Australian book-length literary journalism with an intent to illuminate the effects of 
textual and epitextual features that compromise practitioners’ epistemic integrity, in 
order to inform contemporary practice and theory; I also engage with criticism of 
literary journalistic practice and defend practitioners where possible, on the 
theoretical basis set out in this, and the following, chapter. Further, I acknowledge 
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that while this thesis identifies important thematic connections between texts, book-
length works of Australian literary journalism do not represent a homogenous set of 
research or writing practices, neither do practitioners identify with membership in a 
group; this is typical of the field internationally. However, comparing characteristics 
of individual Australian texts does reveal an underlying cultural function consistent 
with contemporary international theory, and finally invites closer engagement with 
works in a field which, to date, is largely unexplored.  
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Chapter Two 
Negotiating Non-fiction: Taking Back Ground 
 
In Defence of Non-fiction 
 
Common to many works of literary journalism is a claim to non-fiction status. For 
readers, this classification may produce a range of responses, from a vague awareness 
of a text’s referentiality to a strong, personal engagement with its subjects. For critics, 
literary journalism’s particular claims about itself have often been the first point of 
reference for critical engagement. The concept of permeable borders becomes less 
tenable when “truth” is at stake; terra nullius is not likely to be invoked either by 
those who uphold, or those who conflate, the fiction/non-fiction dichotomy. As the 
following chapters examine knowledge and truth claims in literary journalism, the 
purpose of this chapter is to establish a theoretical foundation for the position taken in 
this thesis. I will discuss this central issue informing literary journalism scholarship, 
that is, the genre’s status as non-fiction. After establishing a theoretical position, the 
remainder of this chapter will define key terms and engage with issues affecting 
epistemic responsibility, such as paratexts, author-reader contracts, and transparency. 
 
Opponents of the New Journalism argued strongly against supposed “truth claims” of 
texts based on externally verifiable referents (Pauly, “Politics” 112). In the main, 
attacks were levelled against experimental forms of writing, for example the so-called 
“linguistic pyrotechnics” of Tom Wolfe within the discipline of journalism (Hartsock 
195). Wolfe further provoked critics with contentious claims such as: “I am the first to 
agree that the New Journalism should be as accurate as traditional journalism. In fact 
my claims for the New Journalism, and my demands upon it, go far beyond that. I 
contend that it has already proven itself more accurate than traditional journalism” 
(“The New Journalism” 46). Gay Talese, widely recognised as another founding 
father, also lent his weight to the claims of New Journalism. He cited as its purpose: 
“to reveal a larger truth than is possible through the mere compilation of verifiable 
facts, the use of direct quotations, and adherence to the rigid organizational style of 
the older form” (vii), a role traditionally assigned to the domain of literature. As a 
result, critics such as Dwight MacDonald used terms such as “faction” and 
“parajournalism” pejoratively to discredit works of the nascent form. MacDonald 
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wrote in 1965 that the New Journalism “seems to be journalism—‘the collection and 
dissemination of current news’—but the appearance is deceptive. It is a bastard form, 
having it both ways, exploiting the factual authority of journalism and the 
atmospheric license of fiction” (3). A number of key terms are at play here (accuracy, 
truth, fact, tradition and authority) without acknowledgement of the underlying 
assumptions that inform each individual’s position. MacDonald implies that accuracy 
of atmosphere is not achievable; or, if it is, that it cannot be authoritative as it subverts 
traditional journalistic standards of truth. Such a critique avoids a critical discussion 
of the relationship between types of knowledge such as facts, accuracy, meaning and 
truth. 
 
Literary journalism has attracted a new opponent since the volatile arguments over the 
New Journalism—one that attacks the foundation upon which its “truth claims” rest. 
The work of Jacques Derrida is standard in literary theory; his critique of Saussure’s 
system of signs and signified meanings has destabilised logocentrism and brought into 
question notions of representation, meaning and truth in all forms of discourse. For 
Derrida, deconstructive criticism aims “to show that any text inevitably undermines 
its own claims to have a determinate meaning, and licences the reader to produce his 
own meanings out of it by an activity of semantic ‘freeplay’” (in Lodge 108). The 
implications for non-fiction are clear: the belief that a text can have a determinate 
meaning is central to any claim of presenting a “true” account of externally verifiable 
phenomena. The effect of mimetic representation is further called into question by 
this challenge. If discourse that claims to represent “reality” (or, more plainly, 
externally verifiable phenomena) is unable to present a fixed, or objective 
representation of such phenomena by virtue of its nature as discourse, all discourse 
can be said to be fictional. The “organic” nature of the dichotomy is exposed as a 
construction, and attempts to present discourse as “true” or “real” are discredited as 
naïve.  
 
The postmodern project has not been entirely antithetical to literary journalism, 
however. One outcome of the attempt to reduce all discourse to fiction has been to 
subject so-called “non-literary” discourse to narratological investigation (Ryan, 
“Postmodernism” 177). Non-fiction’s status has historically been subordinate to that 
of literature, resulting in what Gerard Genette terms a silent annexing of factual 
 
 
 36 
narrative from the study of narratology, “without investigation or justification” 
(Fiction 55). In A History of American Literary Journalism, Hartsock traces the rise 
of fiction, or “imaginative literature” in prose, through the late nineteenth century to 
its pre-eminence as a form of writing (204–245). He demonstrates how other forms of 
prose came to be classified in opposition to fiction, resulting in the negatively charged 
term “non-fiction” (12). The justification, it seems, was inherent in the belief that 
representations of the real and associated notions of objectivity did not merit the 
attention of literary theorists. The postmodern challenge has effectively brought non-
fiction texts such as literary journalism out of fiction’s shadow and exposed them to 
questions about the relationship between narrative discourse and reality. So the 
challenge for literary journalism not only remains but is heightened: what does the 
classification “non-fiction” mean? 
 
The first defence for upholding the fiction/non-fiction dichotomy can be found, 
paradoxically, in historian Hayden White’s writings. White challenges a naïve belief 
in historical realism in his poetics of historical discourse. In the introduction to 
Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (1978), White cautions against 
accepting mimetic texts as representations of “things as they are” (Tropics 3). He 
points out that the purest intention to employ mimesis necessarily fails as mimesis 
inevitably distorts reality. Such can be proven by competing descriptions of the same 
externally verifiable phenomena which may have more claim to realism, thus a 
stronger claim to being “faithful to the facts” (Tropics 3). White asserts that historical 
narrative is “not only a reproduction of the events reported in it, but also a complex of 
symbols which gives us directions for finding an icon of the structure of those events 
in our literary tradition” (Tropics 88 emphasis in original). Working towards a 
critique of objectivity, White here implicitly connects narrative with meaning. While 
the arguments come from different directions, both Derrida’s and White’s theories 
arrive at the conclusion that narrative is not a reliable vehicle for representing 
externally verifiable phenomena in a way that has traditionally been considered 
“objective”. However, White does not appear to go as far as the deconstructionist’s 
position, as the “fictive” process involved in interpretation does not necessarily 
produce a work of fiction. Narrative is, however, widely employed as a medium 
through which representations of historical events are conveyed, and as such must be 
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reconsidered in the light of epistemological choices practitioners make as they write 
history.  
The term “narrative” is itself a contested site of criticism, having been defined in 
multiple ways that emphasise particular characteristics of its form. Etymologically, 
the term “narrative” does not seem to belong exclusively to the domain of fiction; its 
origins are in the ancient Sanskrit “gna” meaning “know,” and the Latin “gnarus” 
(knowing) and “narro” (telling) (Abbott 10). Subsequent definitions as simple as 
Abbott’s “the representation of an event or series of events” (13) and Rimmon-
Kenan’s “[narrative] represents a succession of events” (2) are helpful in that they 
open the field of narratological study, but are perhaps too permissive in their scope. 
Marie-Laure Ryan’s definition lies at another end of the spectrum. She posits eight 
potential constitutive features of narrative, including: a signification transformation in 
the story-world caused by non-habitual events; the communication of something 
meaningful to the audience; and a unified causal chain that leads to closure 
(“Definition” 29). Significantly, none of these definitions precludes phenomenal 
reality as the subject of a narrative. The question that arises here is fundamentally 
epistemic: what does it mean to “know” and “tell”?   
In “Narrativity in the Representation of Reality”, White builds on an understanding of 
the effects produced by historical narrative by contrasting the non-totalizing nature of 
the annal and cumulative chronicle forms with narrative. The relevance of White’s 
analysis here is that he shows how different forms of historical discourse reflect 
prevailing ideologies of meaning and reality, or “particular products of possible 
conceptions of historical reality” (“Narrativity” 5). The annal, for example, reflects 
prevailing beliefs in a history and future determined by an omnipotent and omniscient 
power through a purely objective, incomplete and somewhat deterministic account of 
events. In contrast, the chronicle approaches a narrative form as the writer is a self-
conscious presence in the account, seeking a fuller account of reality, thereby—
paradoxically—decreasing the “objectivity” as a historical account (“Narrativity” 18). 
Ideology in the annal is revealed through its absence of commentary, whereas the 
chronicler approaches a more explicit sense of meaning by presenting his—albeit 
limited—subjectivity and alluding to the potential effects of chronicled events. Both 
of these forms lack closure, instead terminating without commentary or analysis. To 
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“know” for annalists and chroniclers, was to observe, and to “tell” was simply to 
record.  
In contrast to both the annal and the chronicle, White contends that meaning is 
immanent in any narrative account of real events and that narrative is dependent upon 
closure, which he suggests is “a demand … for moral meaning” (“Narrativity” 20, 
21). Here lies the crux of White’s analysis of annal to narrative: historical discourse 
functions as a record of historical events, but in its narrative form it also moralises by 
producing meaning, and through closure creates a sense of totalisation. These are both 
products arrived at by “fictive” measures, that is, processes that are not found in 
history itself, but produced by the historian. White asserts:  
[The] value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events 
arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, 
integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only 
be imaginary. … Does the world really present itself to perception in 
the form of well-made stories, with central subjects, proper 
beginnings, middles, and ends, and a coherence that permits us to see 
“the end” in every beginning? … And does the world, even the social 
world, ever really come to us as already narrativised, already 
“speaking itself” from beyond the horizon of our capacity to make 
scientific sense of it? Or is the fiction of such a world, capable of 
speaking itself and of displaying itself as a form of a story, necessary 
for the establishment of that moral authority without which the notion 
of a specifically social reality would be unthinkable? (“Narrativity” 
24–5) 
 
One potential response is that the natural world (as opposed to the social world) does 
indeed present itself to perception. Northrop Frye is one example of a literary critic 
who uses natural phenomena to inform his archetypal schemata; beginnings and 
endings can be seen in the systematic rotation of the seasons, while naturally 
occurring dichotomies such as night and day, cold and heat, and life and death do 
reveal some structure in a world that, for White, is essentially chaotic. An important 
point is made in this passage, however, when White refers to the human capacity to 
make scientific sense of the world. Here White invokes a dualism that I argue is at the 
heart of criticism that fails to thoroughly assess literary journalism thoroughly; that is, 
the application of scientific methodology to discover “facts” to the process of 
discovering “knowledge” and “meaning”. But for White to label the possibility of 
narrative coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of a representation of life 
“imaginary” is a bleak assessment. It somewhat belies the possibility of accurate 
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representation in narrative, and discredits the roles of evidence and logic in the 
historical method for historians—and immersion reporting for literary journalists. 
White may not go as far as the poststructuralist critic; his analyses of the annal and 
chronicle forms highlight the possibility for him that language can represent reality 
without or with minimal interpretation, to the extent that it eschews causal 
explanations and remains “elements” rather than “story”. The form and content of 
narrative, however, are inextricably linked through the “fictive” process of using 
“real” events to produce the narrative form.  
 
Is the dichotomy that underpins literary journalism’s truth claims collapsed, then, by 
the application of meaning to the recounting of past events? If meaning, which is 
always constituted rather than found, is mistaken for reality, which is always found 
rather than constituted, does the form of narrative make void the claims to reality it 
seeks to represent? Here the distinction must be made that White does not consider 
histories fictions, despite claiming that the process of producing history inherently 
involves acts of the imagination. This distinction becomes clear as White defends 
narrative as a vehicle for meaning production through historical experience: 
 
In the historical narrative the systems of meaning production peculiar to 
a culture or society are tested against the capacity of any set of “real” 
events to yield to such systems. If these systems have their purest, most 
fully developed, and formally most coherent representations in the 
literary or poetic endowment of modern, secularized cultures, this is no 
reason to rule them out as merely imaginary constructions. … In its 
origins, historical discourse differentiates itself from literary discourse by 
virtue of its subject matter (“real” rather than “imaginary” events) rather 
than its form. But form here is ambiguous, for it refers not only to the 
manifest appearance of historical discourses (their appearance as stories) 
but also to the systems of meaning production (the modes of 
emplotment) that historiography shared with literature and myth 
(“Question of Narrative” 44). 
 
The first defence for upholding the fiction/non-fiction dichotomy can be found in this 
passage. He draws a distinction between texts that referentially represent the “real” or 
present the “imaginary”. It is important to emphasise that in non-fiction all 
represented events are externally verifiable and thus are contestable, but that 
meanings are also open to contestation can further support the dichotomy. Even if 
“the production of meaning … can be regarded as a performance”, it does not follow 
that, as White asserts, “any given set of real events can be emplotted in a number of 
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ways, can bear the weight of being told as any number of different kinds of stories” 
(“Question of Narrative” 44). This is to claim that events culminating in a natural 
response of grief can be emplotted as comic. The inverse is also logically true. But, as 
Code suggests, practitioners of non-fiction are finally limited in the ways they can 
represent reality. That literary journalism is established as non-fiction is fundamental 
not only to how it is read, but also to how it is produced. For Weber, an essential 
difference between fiction and non-fiction is the limit imposed upon practitioners of 
the latter. He observes: “The writer of literary nonfiction, like the writer of fiction, 
can take us deeply inside people and events and construct works that move beyond 
story to plot. But in neither case can he do this to the same extent that the fiction 
writer can. He is finally restrained by his commitment to the facts” (45).7  
 
Referentiality is also a key feature of narrative non-fiction for Daniel Lehman in 
Matters of Fact: Reading Nonfiction over the Edge (1997). The “edge” here for 
Lehman is an acknowledgement that a non-fictional text contains entities and 
phenomena that “are … available to and experienced by the reader outside the written 
artifact” (Matters 4)(Matters 4). His project is thus to encourage readers to read “over 
the edge”, either by going outside the text for external verification or by reading with 
the knowledge that this is a possibility. Accordingly, reading in this reflexive or 
critical manner will “implicate” the reader, producing an experience of reading that is 
anything but identical to reading fiction (Matters 4, 32). At this point Lehman departs 
from Frus’s concept of a “reflexive reading”, as she ultimately denies any difference 
between the experiences of reading a fiction or non-fiction text (Frus 160). For 
Lehman, then, to claim non-fictional status is to invoke a text’s referentiality. The 
critical difference between fiction and non-fiction is that readers of non-fiction live in 
the world represented by the text, and therefore have direct access to its constituents: 
an impossibility in the possible worlds of fiction. Eric Heyne centres his critique of 
Lehman’s work on both the notion of reading over the edge and the corollary 
inference of a fixed boundary between fiction and non-fiction. Heyne contends that 
Lehman’s trope of reading “over the edge” is a metaphor, and thus a poor substitute 
for critical theory on the relationship between author, text, reader and subject, and that 
his argument is “closer to ethical criticism than rhetorical criticism” (“Where Fiction 
Meets Nonfiction” 325). 
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Lehman does not go so far as to assert an essential boundary between fiction and non-
fiction within the text, however, preferring instead to demonstrate the complexity of 
reading texts that contain real world events and people as well as inventions and/or 
recontextualisations of such. Having restated the impossibility of equating “actuality” 
with non-fiction (“Mining” 335), Lehman is free to focus on his main concern: the 
relationships between author, text, reader and subject. The framework developed in 
Matters of Fact—“writer (outside text) to event; writer (through text) to event; reader 
(outside text) to event; reader (through text) to event; event arbitrated by text; text 
arbitrated by event and interpreted by writer and reader” (36)—highlights the fact that 
not only can a reader have access to the event without the text, but details of a writer’s 
relationship to the event outside the text itself can also be known and influence how 
the text is received.  
 
The two distinctions of referentiality and verifiability can be read as defining points 
between fiction and non-fiction, and are upheld by proponents of maintaining the 
dichotomy such as Marie-Laure Ryan, Eric Heyne and Daniel Lehman. Ryan, for 
example, contends that the shared versus unique reference world could provide a basis 
for a definition of reality: “In an ontological model encompassing a plurality of 
possible worlds, the real world is the only one that can function as the target of many 
texts and as the object of conflicting versions” (“Postmodernism” 167). Further, 
Heyne writes “we can recognize nonfiction by a concomitant recognition of 
competing versions” (“Where Fiction Meets Nonfiction” 330). Both Heyne and 
Lehman agree with Ryan that the distinction of forms is fundamental to our 
understanding of reality. But Ryan goes further. She pleads in favour of the 
fiction/non-fiction distinction as “it provides our only protection against the 
‘hyperreality syndrome’ (to borrow Baudrillard’s concept): the replacement of reality 
(of the masking of its absence) by the simulacra thrown at us by culture and the 
media” (“Postmodernism” 180). This indeed is a heavy burden for non-fiction to bear. 
The debate over the fiction/non-fiction status of texts is evidently a complex one, 
loaded with ideological, epistemological and ontological concerns, and is further 
complicated by the claims of literary journalism. Recognising the complexities of 
interplay between the world, language, meaning and the structures of the human mind 
does not, however, inexorably lead to the conclusion that all forms of discourse are 
 
 
 42 
fictions. As Ryan observes, “story is not tied to any particular medium, and it is 
independent of the distinction between fiction and non-fiction” (“Definition” 26). 
 
At this point, the Kantian philosophy that underpins Code’s approach can shed some 
light on key terms, as well as offering a companion conception of cognition to that 
posed above. Code holds that Kant’s concept of the “creative synthesis of the 
imagination” is “one of the most important innovations in the history of philosophy” 
(ER 77). According to Kant, the cognitive processes of sorting and understanding—
for White, fiction-making operations—are undertaken by the “imagination”. Code 
acknowledges that the term “imagination” is not fortuitous, but it denotes the image-
forming faculty of the mind for Kant (ER 102). Nevertheless, the cognitive 
arrangement of (tangible) empirical input and (intangible) concepts is limited by 
reason and logic. This process, synthesised by pre-existing schemata, signals an 
epistemic difference between invention and emplotment. For Code, 
 
In consequence of [Kant’s] innovation, it is possible to account for the 
creative nature of human cognition: a taking and structuring of 
experience, not a passive receiving and recording. Within the 
constraints imposed upon this creativity by the nature of the world and 
of human cognitive capacity, the subjective possibilities of making 
sense of experience are many and varied. There is a considerable degree 
of freedom in knowledge; hence, an adequate explication of human 
knowledge must give scope and grant respectability to subjective 
factors that structure the process of knowledge acquisition, while 
preserving an ideal of objectivity, or realism normatively construed. If 
the entire project is not to amount to an endorsement of an “anything 
goes” kind of relativism, there must be constraints upon subjectivity in 
the form of epistemic imperatives and criteria of epistemic confidence. 
If these cannot be separated from moral imperatives of the standard 
sort, the balance between subjectivity and objectivity cannot readily be 
maintained (77). 
 
Both Code and White recognise creative elements in the process of cognition, and that 
narrative creates meaning. In fact, for Code, narrative is an essential genre for the 
characterisation of human action (ER 29). She writes, “It does seem to be true … that 
one cannot hope to understand human action in isolation from lives, histories, 
contexts, and narratives, and I think it is equally true that one cannot hope to 
understand cognitive activity and intellectual virtue apart from lives, histories, and 
context” (ER 28). A telling difference between Code’s and White’s positions, 
however, may be that Code allows for the separation of meaning and understanding as 
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epistemic categories from moral concerns, whereas White conflates them. Code 
asserts: 
 
[I]t is not my intention to deny that “facts are what they are … 
independently of us”; particularly if this statement means that the world 
has a certain nature that it is our central, cognitive purpose to discover 
and understand. … I take exception [to] the “recorder-model” of human 
cognition. In my view, we are discoverers rather than recorders of how 
things are. Out of this discovery, we derive the information that forms 
the basis of our knowledge, belief, and understanding. It is our 
responsibility to perform this task with respect for how things are. … 
One who has not been scrupulous in knowing cannot be scrupulous in 
doing (94-5). 
 
In this passage Code gives her rationale for focusing on epistemic responsibility 
rather than truth claims as such; her position will be more fully explicated in the next 
chapter. For the purposes of this discussion, referentiality and verifiability as upheld 
by White, Ryan, Heyne and Lehman, are supported as indicators of non-fictionality 
by the theory of cognition underpinning Code’s approach. A non-fiction text is indeed 
subject to verifiability, but empirically unverifiable knowledge or “truth claims” can 
be substantiated, or epistemically justified. Consequently, I proceed in this thesis with 
the understanding that non-fiction and fiction are ontologically distinct categories, 
produced by epistemically-guided processes of cognition. 
 
Narrative Features: Closure, Meaning, Reflexivity and Reification 
 
Having endorsed a philosophical ontological difference between fiction and non-
fiction, I now reorientate the discussion to some key issues regarding representation in 
literary journalism. As both genrification and authorial decisions about representation 
produce a rhetorical effect, this discussion is predicated on an author’s claim to have 
produced a work of non-fiction in a narrative mode.8  
 
The representation of phenomenological events in non-fiction narrative forms creates 
myriad issues as specific as word choice and as broad as narrative structure, from the 
use of tropes to the presence of the author in the text. One of these key contentious 
features of literary journalism in relation to its non-fiction status is closure. Hartsock 
contends that narrative literary journalists have been influenced by a “critical 
articulation” that emerged from literary realism. Naturalism, especially, called for “an 
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examination in which the material world would dictate its ‘transcription.’ … [I]n the 
close examination of the material world, what became evident was that it was by no 
means a rational and orderly one—no matter how rigidly enforced by convention, 
whether social, scientific, intellectual, religious, or aesthetic” (46–7). Hartsock cites 
Hamlin Garland as one literary theorist who tried to “strike a balance between an 
acknowledgment of the existence of a phenomenological world, however contingent, 
and the existence of a world only perceivable through the fallibilities of a 
consciousness”, and continues, “This is a critical stance that reflects remarkably the 
modus I suggest is at work in narrative literary journalism” (47). Hartsock then draws 
on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin to reconsider the relationship between phenomenal 
reality and narrative closure.  
 
Bakhtin acknowledges as a starting point a shared human contemporary reality and 
“the living people who occupy it together with their opinions”. He continues, “From 
this vantage point, from this contemporary reality with its diversity of speech and 
voice, there comes about a new orientation in the world and in time (including the 
‘absolute past’ of tradition) through personal experience and investigation” (25). This 
reorientation is what Bakhtin calls the “inconclusive present-day reality” (39) or 
“inconclusive present”, a term that reflects the fluidity and inconclusive nature of 
reality. Hartsock contends that the literary journalistic project grew from the 
recognition on some level of “the impossibility of ever adequately rendering a 
contingent world”, and that the efforts of literary journalists have been “part of an 
attempt to resist unsustainable critical totalizations or closure because of that 
phenomenological fluidity” (42). For Hartsock, a practitioner signals their intention to 
come into contact with the real world by resisting closure, reification, or by drawing 
attention to the changing nature of phenomenal reality. He further demonstrates how 
the fictional novel “discovered” the inconclusive present, “something the nonfictional 
narrative was long indulging”, thus as a result “it may be more appropriate to 
conclude that the modern fictional novel borrowed technique from nonfictional 
narratives and not the other way around” (118). While Hartsock’s study of historical 
influences is illuminating, it is perhaps overstating to identify the absence of closure 
as a characteristic of (contemporary) literary journalism. Of the six book-length works 
of literary journalism analysed in this thesis, for example, each demonstrates a 
different level of commitment to closure, with some attempting to subvert closure 
 
 
 45 
completely, while other practitioners employ the feature to great—although not 
unproblematic—effect. The analyses in chapters five and six also demonstrate that 
contemporary literary journalists may attempt to avoid closure in their non-fiction 
narratives, but the form of narrative invites closure, thus creating tension between the 
intent and text.  
 
Hartsock’s claim that narrative literary journalism attempts to “strike a balance” 
between objective reality and subjectivity may more accurately apply to David 
Eason’s conception of a “modernist” approach to the genre. Eason’s theoretical 
differentiation of “modernist” and “realist” texts proposes that the latter organises 
“the topic of the report as an object of display,” while “the reporter and reader, whose 
values are assumed and not explored, are joined in an act of observing that assures 
conventional ways of understanding still apply” (192). As such, closure is a narrative 
feature for realists, and can be expected (and found) in the work of: Tom Wolfe, Gay 
Talese and Truman Capote. Eason continues: “In contrast, modernist texts, most 
clearly reflected in the reporting of Joan Didion, Norman Mailer, and Hunter 
Thompson, describe what it feels like to live in a world where there is no consensus 
about a frame of reference to explain ‘what it all means’” (192). These types of texts 
resist closure, or rather, acknowledge the fluidity and inconclusive nature of reality. 
As Ricketson observes, however, “Eason does not appear to allow for the possibility 
of a practitioners being fully alive to the difficulties of representing events and people 
yet choosing to present their findings in a realist narrative mode. Conversely, a 
practitioner’s self-conscious demonstrating of the difficulties of representation can 
have the effect of obscuring the subject or, consciously or otherwise, of foreclosing 
their inquiry” (“Ethical Issues” 153). The presence of closure in a work of literary 
journalism may, or may not, then, reflect an ideological position of a practitioner. Of 
the six texts analysed in chapters five and six, each displays a different commitment 
to closure, and the analyses suggest that each book produces a unique rhetorical 
effect. Eason’s theory is helpful when characterising individual works of literary 
journalism, but less so when applied to practitioners. The discussion here raises an 
important question: if phenomenal reality is indeed fluid and inconclusive, how can 
the “validity” of closure be assessed in works of literary journalism?  
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One argument made by White about the nature of this process is that any implication 
of causation or emplotment leading to narrative closure is essentially fictive. Code 
might rejoin that closure represents a category of knowledge that is subjective, but 
that relies on epistemic cognitive processes that produce understanding as a type of 
truth—that is, the type of closure offered is finally limited by “constraints upon 
subjectivity in the form of epistemic imperatives and criteria of epistemic confidence” 
(ER 77). As such, it would be difficult indeed to apply the discipline of verification 
when assessing closure in a work of literary journalism, but “validity” of a narrative’s 
closure can be evaluated by consideration of the epistemic responsibility—or 
situation—of the practitioner, as outlined in the following chapter.  
 
Some examples may demonstrate this point here. For some critics and practitioners, 
such as Hollowell (1977), Hellmann (1980), and Weschler (in Boynton 2005), a point 
of departure of literary journalism from non-fiction is located precisely in 
practitioners’ intention to draw meaning from fact. Literary journalism is typically 
charged with using “fictional” techniques to impose meaning that cannot be “found” 
in phenomenal reality. Australian writer Helen Garner characterises this as “trying to 
arrange the material objects and events and dialogue on the page in such a way that 
they do the heavy lifting, so I won’t have to interpret or pontificate” (in Eisenhuth and 
McDonald 165). Garner’s methodology here has been contentious: is the arrangement 
of verifiable content an act of manipulation, in the term’s most pejorative sense? It is 
certainly a type of rhetorical positioning that invites particular kinds of interpretation 
from readers. But as interviews with prominent Australian literary journalists reveal: 
“using the word fiction flies in the face of what practitioners … believe they are 
doing” (Ricketson, “Ethical Issues” 150–151). That is, deriving meaning from fact 
may be a work of the imagination, but imagination here should be understood in the 
Kantian sense; as Code observes, it is “a mediating power or faculty between 
understanding and sensibility. It is the bearer of the schemata for the production of 
images that delimit a category, and permit its application to experience”. Code uses 
terms and phrases such as “to form images”, “to construct concepts”, “mediating” and 
“production” to emphasize that “the knowing process is, above all, active in its 
creativity” (ER 102).  
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While meaning in non-fictional texts is an indication of fictionalisation for some 
theorists, for others it is a defining and desirable characteristic for narrative non-
fiction. For example, in The Literature of Fact, Weber states:  
 
[I]t is my view that the literary quality of recent nonfiction is located 
precisely in the capacity of the writer to find in factual experience 
some “tissue of significances,” some “resonant meanings.” Such 
meanings may be less “totalizing” or grandly metaphysical than they 
once were, but they are as nonetheless present in nonfiction that seeks 
the level of art as in fiction, and works of literary nonfiction can be 
explored by examining how writers have used fictional techniques to 
reveal meaning and by trying to gauge the extent to which they have 
been able to do so (49). 
  
A practitioner’s intention to draw meaning from fact should not be equated with 
fiction through Weber’s use of the misnomer “fictional techniques”. Tracy Kidder, 
winner of a Pulitzer for general non-fiction, points out that techniques commonly 
held to belong to fiction writing did not originate there: “They belong to storytelling” 
(in Sims and Kramer 19). Nevertheless, as Weber states, the work of scholars in this 
area is to examine how writers may “totalize” meaning, and gauge the extent to 
which practitioners may do so. This might also give insight into the potential overuse 
of such techniques and provide theoretical case studies to guide future literary 
journalists. Further, Weber’s perspective recognises the value of meaning in non-
fiction, without conflating the genre with fiction. 
 
One technique used to subvert what Weber terms “totalizing” or “grandly 
metaphysical” meanings is reflexive practice. Reflexivity in general is a “crucially 
important aspect of epistemic competence” for Code. She defines it as “insight into 
the extent of one’s own cognitive capacities, to distance oneself as much as possible 
so one can be critical of one’s own knowing” (ER 176). Reflexivity in literary 
journalism reminds readers of the subjectivity behind the text, and consequently its 
constructed nature. In this way many works of literary journalism differ from 
historical discourse, which rarely reveals the mechanics of its construction. Reflexive 
techniques have observably changed over time in response to dominant culture. James 
Agee, for example, is a much-quoted forerunner of this tradition. He used avant-
garde, highly reflexive writing techniques with two main intentions: to critique 
objectivity in texts that reproduced the norms of representation in late nineteenth-
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century citizen-witnessing (Bartley). Agee’s method guided the reader’s 
consciousness to the constructed nature of the text; readers were consequently 
compelled to reflect on the real-world existence of subjects. He wrote, for example:  
 
George Gudger is a human being…. I could invent incidents, 
appearances, additions to his character, background, surroundings, future, 
which might well point up and indicate and clinch things relevant to him 
which in fact I’m sure are true… [But] he is in those terms living, right 
now, in flesh and blood and breathing … [I]t is essentially and finally a 
hopeless [thing], to try merely to reproduce and communicate his living 
as nearly as exactly as possible, nevertheless I can think of no worthier 
and many worse subjects to attempt (232–3).  
 
The intention here appears to be to narrow the distance between the real and the 
represented by emphasising it. Frus supports this reflexive mode of representation, 
suggesting it “may be an effective way to challenge the reification implied by most 
mass-cultural forms” (180). She further contends that reflexivity encourages the 
“recognition of the hegemonic workings of society” (117). But Barbara Foley 
questions Frus’s privileging of reflexivity in works of literary journalism, stating:  
 
For what this means is that texts which problematize their own truth-claims 
and direct attention to their own conditions of production are intrinsically 
those best equipped to challenge, and break down, reification. Frus's 
“heroes” in this regard are Norman Mailer … and Janet Malcolm … who 
presumably repudiate positivist objectivism and grasp the textual 
construction of reality. Despite their self-conscious sophistication, 
however, these writers are, in my view, hardly unblinded by what I would 
call “ideology”. … [P]ropositions, set forth however “reflexively”, still 
contain a “content” that calls out for assessment separate from the “form” 
of their articulation (Foley, “Politics” 346). 
 
In an analysis of reflexivity in literary journalism, then, it is important to be aware that 
reflexivity may unsettle a determinate representation of reality, but that it can also 
mask an ostensibly transparent text. Reflexivity can thus be used both critically and 
constructively. As a critique it targets uncritical acceptance of modes of representation 
that attempt to represent the world; but simultaneously it can be used to produce a new 
kind of aesthetic experience that re-orientates readers back to the phenomenal reality it 
seeks to represent. 
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Book-length works of literary journalism may or may not display reflexivity, 
resistance to reification and closure, but when employed, each of these features can 
contribute to creating an aesthetic experience for the reader that reorientates them 
towards the bi-referentiality of the text. That is, the text may be a cohesive narrative, 
but these features can also stress a text’s correspondence to observable, phenomenal 
events—its claim to non-fiction status. But some texts do not rely on such narrative 
features. In such texts, the referentiality of the text is often established through 
paratextual features. Framing the narrative in this way produces not only a rhetorical 
effect, but also invests the text with what Genette terms a “contractual force” 
(Paratexts 11). 
 
Paratexts 
 
As early as the fifth century B. C., evidence can be found of writers offering 
explanatory notes as a way to prepare their readers, or instruct them in the text’s 
epistemological background. In the introduction to his account of the Peloponnesian 
war, Thucydides’s dedication to the methodology of truth articulates authorial intent 
and specifies the practices used to obtain information (in Kovach and Rosenstiel 70). 
The dedication further aims to establish the authority of the writer, and thus the 
authority of the historical account. In 1997, Genette coined the terms “epitext” and 
“peritext” to denote two areas of text used to convey “a commentary that is authorial 
or more or less legitimated by the author.” Together the epitext and peritext make up 
the paratext, a site Genette refers to as the “fringe” but elsewhere has been called a 
“frame” (see Berlatsky 173-84; Frow 106-7; Derrida 70; Symes 19-25). Combined, 
these areas function as “a zone between text and off-text, a zone not only of transition 
but also of transaction: a privileged place of a pragmatics and a strategy, of an 
influence on the public, an influence that—whether well or poorly understood and 
achieved—is at the service of a better reception for the text and a more pertinent 
reading of it” (Paratexts 2 emphasis in original). Of course, Genette recognises that a 
“pertinent” reading is directly correlated to the author’s desire for the text’s reception 
(2), but for works of non-fiction this is an important point as the text’s reception is 
directly influenced by a practitioner’s claim to authority.  
 
Thucydides’s introduction comprises part of the peritext, the spatial zone closest to 
the text itself, which includes outermost elements such as the cover and title page, the 
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book’s material construction (including format, paper, typeface and so on) (Genette, 
Paratexts 16), as well as the introduction, dedication, foreword/afterword and so on. 
The second zone, or epitext, denotes “any paratextual element not materially 
appended to the text within the same volume but circulating, as it were, freely, in a 
virtually limitless physical and social space” (344). This zone includes the publisher’s 
epitext which has a primarily promotional or marketing function and does not always 
involve the author in a meaningful way (347), semiofficial allographic epitext, which 
is “allography more or less ‘authorized’ by some authorial assent or even inspiration” 
(348), public authorial epitext which includes any authorial public response to the text 
or its reception directed at the public, such as interviews and public conversations 
(Paratexts 351) and private epitext, including letters, journals and oral confidences 
that shed light on the text (Paratexts 371).  
 
The particular importance paratext holds for literary journalism has do with its 
potential illocutionary force. Genette contends that some paratextual elements may 
hold little—if any—significance, functioning simply “to communicate a piece of 
sheer information—the name of the author for example” (Paratexts 11), although he 
later states that an author’s name is a “constituent element” in autobiographical 
works—or referential writing where the credibility of testimony rests largely on the 
identity of the witness or person reporting (Paratexts 41).9 Other elements more 
obviously communicate an intention of, or interpretation by, the author; make an 
assertion; create a commitment, or issue a command (Paratexts 11). It is the latter two 
functions—commitment and command—that have the most obvious illocutionary 
force and work to draw readers into a negotiation over how to read a work of literary 
journalism. As Heyne points out, the nonfictional status of a text does not always 
make a difference to how it is read, although it “can make a difference to those 
readers for whom it already makes a difference” (“Where Fiction Meets Nonfiction” 
325). Elsewhere, however, he concedes that “in order to evaluate a complex 
nonfiction narrative, it is essential to understand the exact truth-claims being made 
and how they fit into the author’s overall intentions” (“Toward a Theory” 488). Both 
of these sentiments are echoed by Abbott (30–31), Berlatsky (184), Darrel (266–67) 
and Frow, who argues that while “we cannot conclude … that interpreters have 
licence to read whatever generic form they please into a text … this is not to say that 
these guidelines must be respected.” Further, “Readers and writers negotiate the 
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generic status of particular texts but do not have the power to make their ascriptions 
an inherent property of those texts” (Genre 109).  
 
Genette also takes the line that the illocutionary power of the paratext is potential 
rather than given, although he clearly sees authorial intention as valuable. He states 
that “valid or not, the author’s viewpoint is part of the paratextual performance, 
sustains it, inspires it, anchors it”, but that “the critic is by no means bound to 
subscribe to that viewpoint. I maintain only that, knowing it, he cannot completely 
disregard it, and if he wants to contradict it he must first assimilate it”. Genette’s 
conclusion that “To accept [the paratext]—or, for that matter, to reject it—one is 
better off perceiving it fully and clearly” (Paratexts 408–9) aligns with Heyne’s; 
finally, any intentional reading of non-fiction must take into account the author and 
publisher’s framing devices through paratextual markers. Choosing to disregard or 
read against them is the prerogative of the reader, but to do so without acknowledging 
their intended illocutionary effect is to direct one’s interpretation away from what 
Heyne terms “a proper response” (“Toward a Theory” 480), a phrase that echoes 
Genette’s “pertinent reading”. 
 
Genette describes paratextual cues as having different levels of influence; he also 
observes that the illocutionary power of paratexts is greatest in works of non-fiction. 
For genres such as autobiography, memoir or narrative history, Genette refers to a 
level of “commitment” as one possible indication from the author, with some authors 
choosing to create a higher level, or “more binding contractual force” (Paratexts 11 
emphasis added). Arguably, the contractual force of paratexts of literary journalistic 
works should be some of the strongest, in light of their emerging generic status. While 
the label “non-fiction” signals a genre indication, the number of variables involved in 
literary journalism—for example, how the information was gathered, the relationship 
of the author to the subject, the extent to which names and information have been 
changed—raises questions in the mind of the reader that, left unanswered, have the 
potential to create an incomplete, false or misleading “horizon of expectations” 
(Frow, Genre 70) for the reader.  
 
Paratextual information consequently becomes a central component in negotiating an 
author’s intentions for how their book should be read. Paratexts cue a reader’s 
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expectations at the levels of questions and expectations, although “this is always a 
matter of interpretation, not of recognition” (Frow, “Reproducibles” 1630), and 
readers are not obligated to respond to such cues. Readers also undoubtedly bring 
their own understanding of a genre to a text as an initial step in negotiating how to 
read the text, and each of these paratextual features has the potential to refine 
expectations. In this way the author encodes the text with markers of intention, giving 
the reader the opportunity to supplement their understanding of what constitutes “non-
fiction” with information to decode the text. This process is effectively a social 
transaction, the characteristics of which mirror to some extent the negotiation of a 
contract in legal or moral terms.  
 
Author-Reader Contracts 
 
Literary journalists working outside a news media organisation are neither bound nor 
protected by a normative set of journalistic practices. This state of affairs necessitates 
that each practitioner negotiate their own ethical epistemic practice on a text-by-text 
basis. Writers and—at times—theorists invoke the metaphor of a “contract” between 
an author and reader to describe the process of negotiation of a text’s status. John 
McPhee, a leading practitioner of narrative non-fiction, comments on the use of 
composite characterisation to demonstrate his understanding of this negotiation: “If 
[using composite characterisation is] what they mean by the line blurring between 
fiction and nonfiction, then I’d prefer another image. What I see in that image is that 
we don’t know where fiction stops and facts begin. That violates a contract with the 
reader” (in Sims, Literary Journalists 16). This comment may promote a simplistic 
understanding of non-fiction narrative in that it does not account for embedded 
meaning, inherent in narrative forms, that goes beyond factual statement of verifiable 
events (the annal or chronicle forms, for example). It does, however, reference the 
practitioner’s intention not to invent facts or even to manipulate them—as in the case 
of composite characterisation—and as such highlights the need for some kind of 
negotiation between the author and reader to set up a “horizon of expectations”.  
 
For Genette “the genre contract is constituted … by the whole of the paratext and, 
more broadly, by the relationship between text and paratext” (Paratexts 41). Theorist 
Mas’ud Zavarzadeh notes that throughout the 1950s and 1960s the term contract was 
used almost always with a disapproving tone by critics, one of whom writes of non-
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fiction novelists, “Their works are ‘interesting’, full of observation and talent and 
even wisdom, but as far as fictional faith goes we are left to make the effort by 
ourselves” (73). Pauly contends that the “crucial” political contribution of the New 
Journalism was that it “compelled us to reconsider the social rituals through which 
writers might declare themselves responsible rather than merely free” (“Politics” 
123). This responsibility of the author to establish expectations of a text’s status and 
practitioner’s implication in the narrative may then be seen as a legacy from New 
Journalism to literary journalism, and the term “contract” understood as a social 
ritual through which such a negotiation may take place.10 
 
The idea of a metaphorical contract between an author and reader is discussed by 
Heather Dubrow:  
 
[The poet] is in effect telling us the name and rules of his code, rules 
that affect not only how he should write the work but also how we 
should read it. …Through such signals as the title, the meter and the 
incorporation of familiar topoi into his opening lines, the poet sets up 
… a contract with us. He in effect agrees that he will follow at least 
some of the patterns and conventions we associate with the genre or 
genres in which he is writing, and we in turn agree that we will pay 
close attention to certain aspects of his work while realizing that 
others, because of the nature of the genres, are likely to be far less 
important (31). 
 
While Dubrow’s assertions are made in reference to poetry, and, arguably do not 
apply to all forms, the same principles can be effectively applied to other types of 
discourse, and particularly book-length literary journalism. The title (and subtitle) 
may offer paratextual indications of the text’s scope and intention, the narrative’s 
structure may set up expectations at the levels of questions and expectations, and the 
literary style may also signal specific intentions of the practitioner. For literary 
journalism, it may be contended that the first negotiation of genre is the author’s 
promise to deliver a work of non-fiction. As has been demonstrated, however, non-
fiction is a problematic term in light of what it is and is not able to connote. The term 
non-fiction may produce an understanding between author and reader that the text 
will be based on facts or verifiable evidence, but the narrative form clearly precludes 
the text from being “factual” alone, thus prompting questions about the text’s 
potential as an accurate representation of reality. The assertion of non-fictional status 
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alone, then, may not offer enough information for a reader of literary journalism to 
approach a text in a way that an author intends it to be read. 
 
The key characteristics of a legal contract are relevant to the process of negotiating a 
text’s genre status. Perhaps the three that are most helpfully indicated by the term are 
expectation, responsibility, and trust. In a work of literary journalism, a practitioner 
assumes responsibility for representing real events and entities: this is the primary 
goal of non-fiction. Beyond that, the author has the opportunity to set reader 
expectations by disclosing reasons behind the investigative work, methodologies, 
writing techniques or any other information relevant to the writing of the text. Genette 
suggests that the factual narrative’s requirement of truthfulness is “the obligation to 
report only what one knows—but at the same time everything that one knows, to 
provide all the information—and to state how one has come by that knowledge” 
(Fiction 67). Such disclosure would undoubtedly revolutionise historical and 
journalistic narrative; a more practical approach perhaps is that authors include salient 
information that they believe is necessary to inform the reading of their text. In this 
way, they accept responsibility, set expectation and set the terms of the reader’s trust 
in their stated claims. As Frow states, “Credibility, authority, and emotional tone are 
effects of these rhetorical relations and their formal expression in the syntactic and 
intonational nuance of the discourse” (Genre 75). This is the domain of epistemic 
responsibility, which will be more fully addressed in the following chapter. 
 
Of course the reader is under no obligation to accept—or even read—the terms set out 
by the author. But here again the notion of a contract is valuable as it exemplifies how 
perceived violations of the text can be validated or invalidated by the author’s 
claims—or absence of them. Pauly observes, “Writers use conventional codes to 
convey truth, but such codes are themselves just one form of a larger series of social 
occasions during which interpreter and interpreted meet to argue their positions” 
(“Politics” 123). If a reader feels an author has violated their trust, an argument can be 
made primarily in reference to terms of the knowledge offered and claims made by 
the author. The negotiation may include information outside of the text and paratext 
of a particular work of non-fiction. The reader potentially brings to the text—and thus 
the contract—their knowledge of the author as a public figure, the author’s previous 
works, information through marketing of the text, media coverage, critical reviews 
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and so on. Thus, the types of knowledge and information a reader may bring to the 
negotiation of the text is often outside of the intentions and control of the author.  
 
Authors and publishers of literary journalism are under no obligation to provide 
paratextual information that, for Genette, holds a contractual force. But the notion of 
transparency is increasingly being explored as a counter-balance for journalistic 
practices that have traditionally hidden the means of their production. In the wake of 
crumbling positivist ideologies, is transparency a viable currency in which literary 
journalists can trade?  
 
Transparency 
 
Literary journalism is not the only type of news media under scrutiny for its content 
and form. Mainstream journalism’s so-called “crisis” wrought by the movement 
towards technocentric societies is well documented (see for example Curran; Young; 
van Tuyll), with the move from analogue to digital media systems opening news 
cultures that were previously closed to the public. As a result, leading media scholars 
have called for transparency to become the news value of the future (see Forde; 
Kovach and Rosenstiel; Plaisance; van der Wurff and Schonbach). The intention of 
such scholars is to increase the profession’s legitimacy; establish jurisdiction in an 
increasingly competitive publishing environment; expose self-interest in journalists; 
and reinforce traditional journalism’s standing in society (Allen). Kovach and 
Rosenstiel assert that: 
 
Transparency … signals the journalist’s respect for the audience. It 
allows the audience to judge the validity of the information, the process 
by which it was secured, and the motives and biases of the journalist 
providing it. This makes transparency the best protection against errors 
and deception by sources. … Transparency also helps establish that the 
journalist has a public interest motive, the key to creditability. The 
willingness of the journalist to be transparent about what he or she has 
done is at the heart of establishing that the journalist is concerned with 
truth. The lie, or the mistake, is in pretending omniscience or claiming 
greater knowledge than we have (80–81). 
 
Literary journalism that produces a sense of omniscience is clearly problematic from 
this perspective. But peri- and epitexts are sites at which practitioners may defend their 
epistemic responsibility without compromising the aesthetic value—or rhetorical 
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impact—of a narrative. Karlsson differentiates between “disclosure transparency” and 
“participatory transparency”. The former is often paratextual. It makes clear the 
process of content selection, publishing links to original material and sources and 
revealing personal positions in relation to the news (537), while the latter “aims at 
getting the audience involved in the news production process in various ways” (538). 
Karlsson advocates both forms of transparency in journalism, but Allen argues that 
what Karlsson would characterise as “disclosure transparency” increases criticism 
rather than understanding; limits journalistic autonomy; can be employed to deceive 
an audience; and may ultimately undermine the very freedom transparency is intended 
to protect (325–6). Allen does not conclude that transparency has no place in 
journalism, but rather that it should exist as a normative standard rather than function 
as an “instrumental value enlisted to protect institutional legitimacy and stave off 
criticism” (324). Evidently, time is needed for transparency to develop as a universal 
norm rather than being employed as a preemptive action against criticism. But as the 
analyses in this thesis will demonstrate, Allen’s arguments are particularly pertinent 
with regards to literary journalism, and careful consideration is needed before such a 
norm is adopted.  
 
Disclosure transparency is directly related to the author-reader contract in literary 
journalism. Practitioners are able to choose the extent to which they reveal their 
sources, investigative methodologies, writing practices, and position in relation to their 
subjects. The argument between advocates and opponents of transparency in the 
journalism academy is highly relevant to literary journalism; in fact, the controversies 
outlined in chapter four suggest this argument surfaced in relation to literary 
journalism decades before it became an issue for mainstream journalism. That there 
has been no consensus on, or professional standards drawn, in relation to disclosure 
transparency for literary journalists indicates that there are no easy answers for either 
institution. As will be demonstrated with the analyses in chapters five and six, trends 
in contemporary US practice favour both disclosure and participatory transparency, 
but with varying results. In this economy, literary journalism has the potential to lead 
the way in modeling epistemic responsibility to mainstream journalism. As 
contemporary media faces a crisis of reinvention in the wake of a burgeoning online 
environment, contemporary literary journalists—with their tradition of challenging 
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and being challenged by their audiences on epistemic responsibility—have a rich 
history—as well as a clean slate—to draw on.  
 
The features of the Internet provide a new epitextual realm that is potentially far more 
accessible for readers than that of the New Journalists. Marie-Laure Ryan proposes 
four features of online media that are salient here: the Internet’s immediacy, 
hypertextuality, multimediality and interactivity (Virtual Reality 4–7). These 
characteristics strengthen the epitextual frame because of their potential universal 
accessibility, and in many cases the author’s crafting of the epitextual space. As Ryan 
writes, hypertextuality, multimediality and interactivity support—or perhaps even 
embody—the postmodern approach. By dismantling “grand narratives” and replacing 
them with “little stories” or even the “endless deferral of signification”, readers are 
denied “the satisfaction of a totalizing interpretation”, and are positioned to challenge 
“the epistemologically suspect coherence, rationality, and closure of narrative 
structures” (Ryan, Virtual Reality 7). For extended works of literary journalism there 
is growing a—perhaps unlikely—alliance between print and online media cultures. 
The former ostensibly promotes uniformity of narrative, the authority of the writer, 
and narrative coherence, while the latter functions to question authority, frustrate 
totalizing narratives and ultimately turn consumers into producers. However, as 
contended by some theorists, literary journalism seeks to avoid reification (Frus 180); 
resist critical closure (Hartsock 153); and ultimately respond to an epistemological 
crisis that calls into question notions of objectivity and authority (Hartsock 15). Thus, 
literary journalism and online media could make good bedfellows, despite the seeming 
incongruence between their static and dynamic forms. 
 
That readers value “truth” and do access primary sources and resources—including the 
practitioner-as-source—is evidenced in the growing popularity of online “companion 
sites” for book-length literary journalism. While general or semi-allographic online 
epitext includes interviews, reviews, blogs, author channels on YouTube, academic 
critical analyses and more, “companion sites” arguably provide a narrative’s central 
online presence on the Web. Such sites are central in that readers are often directed 
straight to companion sites from URLs in the physical text. Also, companion sites are 
most likely to be sanctioned by the author, thus act as “official” epitext. While they 
often contain links to other sites that promote or support the book, companion sites 
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typically contain general information such as the author’s biography, oeuvre, and 
contact information, as well as features specific to the text, such as primary source 
documents, reviews, public forums, teaching aids, video clips, photographs, and, 
increasingly, book trailers. For many authors and publishers, the primary purpose of 
such sites may be to market the text. Notwithstanding this motivation, companion sites 
have at least a dual function: that of promotion, and transparency—or epistemic 
responsibility. Online epitextual information not only establishes epistemic 
responsibility, but the potential immediacy of access increasingly strengthens its 
function as a frame.  
 
The provision of online epitextual material suggests increased awareness of epistemic 
responsibility in current practice. While epitextual material has always had the 
potential to inform or modify a reading of a text, it has not always been potentially—
or simultaneously—immediate, hypertextual, multimedial, or interactive. The effect of 
these four qualities of epitext on the narrative creates a rich field of inquiry in the 
context of the author-reader contract. By offering resources online, do literary 
journalists surrender control of the narrative to the reader immersing themselves in 
primary and secondary epitextual sources? Or are book-length works of literary 
journalism reified to the extent that they frame epitextual matter, rather than the 
epitext framing the narrative? If the latter is the case, online epitext may be operating 
under a modus in opposition to the “mounting evidence” that denies the existence of a 
verifiable reality and affirms reality’s social and cultural construction (Aucoin; Allen). 
Is transparency truly the news value of the future? And how can practitioners who 
seek to destabilize reified cultural stories protect the authority of their narratives 
without perpetuating the very state they are attempting to critique?  
 
As contended in chapter one, it is valuable to use established journalistic norms such 
as the “objectivity standard” and the “discipline of verification” to assess literary 
journalism, but results of such analyses cannot attend to the questions above. Author-
reader contracts offered through narratives and their paratexts can act as avenues for 
disclosure transparency; but these, too, have their limitations and weaknesses. In the 
next chapter I will offer Code’s theory of epistemic responsibility as a framework with 
which to assess the knowledge—and truth—claims of literary journalism. Code’s 
perspective builds on foundationalist and coherentist theories of epistemology to 
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separate the moral and epistemic issues involved in knowledge acquisition and 
presentation. I argue that while Code’s notion of a “responsibilist” approach does not 
eclipse the need for verification, it is complementary to such an assessment, and 
illuminates issues that trouble the theory and practice of contemporary literary 
journalism. 
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Chapter Three 
Epistemic Responsibility and the Literary Journalist  
 
Re-visioning the Landscape 
 
Pioneers bring familiar ways of seeing and working land to new territory. It is not 
uncommon for settlers to apply practices from a country of origin to new land in the 
discovery and exploration phases of settlement. Difficulties occur, however, when 
pioneers fail to take into account the unique features of an environment and attempt to 
impose “tried and true” methods of managing land from their home country on 
unresponsive—and, at times, hostile—terrain. James Aucoin (2001) has observed this 
phenomenon in relation to literary journalism. In his article, “Epistemic 
Responsibility and Narrative Theory”, Aucoin contends that two scholarly approaches 
are evident in the 30-year critical debate over literary journalism.11 He names 
Zavarzadeh (1976), Hellman (1981), and Heyne (1987) as scholars who have 
defended literary journalism as a genre of literature, and Sims (1984), Connery 
(1992), and Kramer (Sims and Kramer 1995) among those who “have attempted to 
legitimize literary journalism as a genre of journalism … [and] have hinged their 
classification scheme on the criterion of verifiability” (6–7). Verifiability is a 
problematic standard for the genre, Aucoin argues, owing to three key reasons: “the 
mounting evidence from science and philosophy that denies the existence of a 
verifiable reality that can be described through logical-positivist empiricism and 
affirms that reality is socially and culturally constructed” (7); “the voluminous 
evidence that journalism constructs a truth that is based on culturally accepted 
conventions” (7); and “dominant narrative theory, which holds that any imposition of 
narrative is a moral act that results to some extent in a fictionalization” (8). Aucoin 
argues that literary journalism should not be subject to the discipline of verification, 
and therefore offers “a strategy of using narrative theory and epistemic ethics to judge 
literary journalism” (5–6). 
 
In the previous chapter I engaged with dominant narrative theory and posited that 
there is, in fact, a case for separate ontological categories of fiction and non-fiction. 
Code’s reliance on Kantian philosophy also produces an argument for locating 
knowledge—and, consequently, truth—within social interactions. But while the 
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structuring of reality relies upon socially constructed “ways of knowing”, reality also 
exists independent of such constructions. As Code writes, knowledge and community 
are dependent upon each other, but both are also subject to the constraints imposed by 
the phenomenal world. “The sum total of communal knowledge at any point in 
history is a product of personal efforts to tread an intricate path between a need to 
make sense of the world (in the sense of making it one’s own) and a need to 
understand it in a communally viable way” (ER 114 emphasis in original). It follows 
that although consensus plays an important role in the synthesis of knowledge, it “is 
not the ultimate arbiter of truth or justification; there are areas of knowledge where 
disagreement is not only possible, but inevitable” (ER 115). Consequently, I continue 
in this chapter with the understanding that verifiability is an important constraint on 
potential and possible knowledge, while acknowledging that verifiability cannot 
account for different types of knowledge offered in works of literary journalism. 
 
Epistemological Approaches: Foundationalism, Coherentism, and 
Responsibilism 
 
Code’s approach differs from two established epistemological traditions: 
foundationalist and coherentist. Foundationalists hold that there is “knowledge in the 
world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it” (Code, ER 3), and 
that this knowledge forms a foundation for all other types and systems of knowledge. 
For coherentists, on the other hand, the “source of evaluation and justification of a 
belief or knowledge claim lies in its relations with other beliefs or ‘knowns’ within a 
system; explanatory relations or relations of probability or logic might be taken into 
account” (ER 4). The foundationalist and coherentist traditions are analogous to the 
traditions of literary journalism scholarship. Following Aucoin, scholars cited in the 
previous chapter broadly fall into two categories when attempting to articulate 
standards for the genre: those who primarily employ narrative theory to articulate 
standards, such as narrative coherence, verisimilitude and other literary criteria, and 
those who advocate the application of journalistic standards, such as accuracy and 
verifiable content, to works of literary journalism. Examples of those who perform 
literary readings include Hollowell, Weber, and Anderson, while scholars such as 
Lounsberry (xiii–xiv) and Kerrane and Yagoda (13) employ verifiability as a 
standard.12 Standards of verification can thus be understood as part of the 
 
 
 62 
foundationalist tradition, while narrative theory has a correlation with coherentist 
theories of epistemology.  
 
These distinctions are important in light of Code’s project. She acknowledges that 
foundationalism and coherentism “represent the best efforts of epistemology so far to 
approach ‘the problem of knowledge’”, but also contends that enquiry is limited by 
the range of possible questions these approaches allow (ER 7). A complementary 
approach is necessary, Code argues, to widen the scope of epistemological 
investigation: 
 
The persistent exemplary status of … items in foundational and 
coherentist theories of knowledge obscures the extent to which there are 
genuine choices about how to know the world and its inhabitants, 
choices that become apparent only in more complex epistemic 
circumstances—for example, in knowing other cultures, negotiating an 
environmental policy, assessing the significance of certain actions and 
policies, or predicting the implications of tests and experiments. Such 
circumstances, and others like them, occasion questions about epistemic 
responsibility. In doing so they broaden the scope of epistemology to 
include considerations of credibility and trust, of epistemic obligations 
and the legitimate scope of enquiry (“Responsibility and Rhetoric” 3).  
 
 In the same way I advocate an additional—or complementary—mode of analysis to 
those offered by literary theory and the discipline of verification for literary 
journalism. This is particularly timely for what I contend is a dominant feature of 
contemporary literary journalism. Historically, key literary journalists such as 
Ryzyard Kapuściński have produced important texts that did not appear to place 
emphasis on journalistic standards of verification, attribution or transparency despite 
asserting their non-fiction status. But I propose in this thesis that a new generation of 
practitioners—those producing their first works of book-length literary journalism 
between 2000-2010—aspire to the highest standards, both literary and journalistic. 
Critical reception can be mixed, as demonstrated in chapters five and six, but “New 
Gen” literary journalists such as Daniel Bergner (Soldiers of Light 2004), Suketu 
Mehta (Maximum City 2004), John Vaillant (The Golden Spruce 2005), Rajiv 
Chandrasekaran (Life in the Emerald City 2006), Andrew Westoll (Riverbones 2008), 
Alexandra Fuller (The Legend of Colton H. Bryant 2008), and Dave Eggers (Zeitoun 
2009) demonstrate deep commitment to both literary aims and “traditional” 
journalistic standards such as verifiability, balance and accuracy. I further contend 
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that Adrian Nicole LeBlanc (2003), Dave Cullen (2009) and Rebecca Skloot (2010), 
my central case studies in chapter five, are representative of these contemporary 
practitioners, who—in spite of increasingly blurred notions of reality—operate under 
a modus that holds reality to be discoverable, and whose texts represent their best 
effort to accurately capture such reality.13 As noted, this is a “new form of clean 
classicism” and is quite distinct from New Journalists’ emphasis on the apocalyptic 
zeitgeist of the 1960s and attendant “hysteria” of life in that era (see Foley, Telling the 
Truth; Hellmann; Hollowell).  
 
In keeping with Code’s rationale, an epistemological responsibilist approach opens 
the range of questions that can be asked of literary journalistic practice. It can also 
illuminate literary readings of texts where meaning and truth are as important as the 
events from which they proceed. Reorienting epistemological focus from end points 
to processes, Code encourages would-be knowers to engage in “Socratic dialogue” 
over their knowledge claims (ER 28-9). Cooper gives examples of epistemic 
questioning that could inform literary journalistic practice such as: “Do I really know 
what I think I know?”; “Do I know enough to act as I do?”; “What don’t I know?”; 
“What are the moral consequences of my knowing/ignorance?”; “Should I know more 
or acknowledge incomplete knowledge?” (86). Such questioning informs not just the 
practice but also the criticism of literary journalism. It emphasises the choices 
available to—and limitations imposed upon—practitioners in the way they represent 
reality, as well as their responsibility to “know well”. Likewise, critics and scholars 
may ask these questions of practitioners to illuminate analyses, but they similarly 
have an obligation to know their subject well—well enough to judge as they do—as 
they also engage in a process of representing reality. This is both the challenge and 
opportunity of opening practice to assessment of epistemic responsibility. 
 
Intellectual Virtue: Epistemology v Ethics 
 
A “responsibilist” approach to epistemology is grounded in the notion of intellectual 
virtue.14 For Code, intellectual virtue is “about possessing a fairly constant and 
dependable set of qualities and capacities, manifested in one’s orientation toward the 
world, toward one’s knowledge-seeking self, and toward other such selves as part of 
the world” (ER 52). She continues: “Virtues, both moral and intellectual, have more 
to do with ways of relating to the world than with the ‘content’ of particular actions or 
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knowledge claims” (ER 53). This division between moral and intellectual virtue is 
critical: “Here the demands of good moral conduct and good epistemic conduct are 
sharply divergent” (ER 186–7). Code emphasises that one can be intellectually 
virtuous (a knowledgeable practitioner) without being morally virtuous; con men and 
scandal-collectors are apposite examples. John D’Agata and Jim Fingal’s The 
Lifespan of a Fact (2012), analysed later in this chapter, exploits this separation of 
epistemic and moral conduct. But here a differentiation will be made between 
believing “what works for me as long as it does not harm or adversely influence 
someone else”—almost a purely moral point—and “whether I can structure my 
epistemology so that it is wrong epistemically for me to hold certain beliefs because 
my epistemic principles will not allow it” (ER 47). Code observes that the separation 
of these domains of enquiry is complex: 
 
The complexity arises because knowing well, preserving an 
appropriate degree of objectivity, thinking clearly, and being 
epistemically responsible are, in fact, moral matters. But they are not 
just moral matters; nor can they, as moral matters, be wholly 
subsumed under standard modes of ethical discussion. … [T]hey are 
not amenable to adequate discussion under the rubric of any of the 
traditional approaches to ethics nor under any reasonable amalgam 
thereof (ER 68). 
 
Indeed, the term “responsibility” belongs to the discourse of ethics. It is therefore 
important to acknowledge that the separation of an “ethics of belief” and “epistemic 
responsibility” will never be absolute. Code likens their relationship to strands of a 
thread, which, when parted, “show that it is not a unity, but composed of individual 
filaments that alone could not make up a thread” (ER 72). The rationale behind 
Code’s project is thus summarised in the following passage: 
 
Different cognitive capacities and epistemic circumstances create 
situations where experience is structured, and hence the world is 
known, quite differently from one cognitive agent to another. Each 
time a moral judgment is made, then, two parts of a situation must be 
assessed: the way it is apprehended and the action that is performed as 
a result. The former, the apprehension, is a matter for epistemological 
assessment, and the moral dimension of the situation is crucially 
dependent upon this epistemic component (ER 69). 
 
Hence, “knowing well” is a matter of moral significance, not because cognitive 
processes are moral or immoral in themselves, but because actions borne out of 
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epistemological practices are often judged ethically. I argue that conflating these 
categories has significant ramifications for the theory and practice of literary 
journalism. To the extent that they can be held apart for analytical purposes, ethics 
and epistemology should be evaluated separately to illuminate how ethical practice is 
dependent on a sound epistemic foundation. In the following chapter I (re)examine 
some literary journalistic texts using this rationale. The epistemic strand of 
intellectual virtue, however, is the focus of discussion for the remainder of chapter 
three. 
 
Reality, Accuracy and Truth 
 
An emphasis on epistemology invites an examination of conditions in which an 
individual can “know well”. One starting point is the nature of reality. Code draws on 
Kantian philosophy again when she asserts  
 
[t]he formal conditions of knowing, imposed by human cognitive 
structures, significantly (but not absolutely) determine the manner of 
the synthesis. In both Kantian and Piagetian terms, only what can be 
subjected to these formal conditions can become part of human 
knowledge. … [I]t is reasonable to suggest that empirical (that is, 
phenomenal) reality is, by definition, coextensive with the (current) 
limitations of human cognitive powers, both actual and potential (ER 
105).  
 
This echoes Weber’s point, made in chapter two, that potential knowledge in non-
fiction is limited by phenomenal reality. But Code also explicitly acknowledges the 
limits imposed by actual and potential cognitive powers. The manner of an 
individual’s structuring of reality “is dependent upon a knower’s interaction with the 
world and will vary accordingly” (ER 105). The epistemic responsibility of a literary 
journalist can then be characterised as a responsibility to interact with the world in a 
way that enables a practitioner to “know well”—that is, to anchor the coherence of 
meaning to the correspondence of empirically verifiable reality. According to Code, 
objective knowledge is produced when cognitive processes synthesise with 
phenomenal reality: 
 
There is no contradiction in claiming both that the world known to 
human beings is formed or created through the cooperation of active 
exploration, perception, thinking, and imagining and that knowledge is 
objective. For something to be an object of human knowledge, it must 
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be amenable to this creative synthesizing; yet objects themselves (that 
is, real things in the real world), together with formal conditions 
imposed by human cognitive capacities, determine the manner of the 
synthesis. Although there are many ways of knowing legitimately so-
called, evidence strongly favors the claim that these are ways of 
knowing one real world. The patterns that can be selected are limited in 
practice by the necessity that they conform, to some degree, to this 
objective reality. To this extent, objects dictate the nature of the 
synthesis (107). 
 
The idea that objective knowledge is discoverable by individuals closely reflects, I 
contend, theory underpinning the practice of contemporary literary journalism 
represented in this thesis. Both anecdotal evidence from practitioners and current 
scholarship support such a contention. Mark Kramer, founding director of the Nieman 
Foundation for Journalism, for example, reflects on evidence from his discussions 
with literary journalists, which suggests that current practitioners share a tacit 
understanding with readers. This understanding is “so strong that it amounts to a 
contract: that the writers do what they appear to do, which is to get reality as straight 
as they can manage, and not make it up” (Kramer 25). Such comments reflect a belief 
that reality is “discoverable”, and that there are “ways of knowing one real world” 
(Code, ER 107); literary journalists are part of a shared reality that can be objectively 
known. Importantly, Kramer also differentiates between the New Journalists’ project 
and contemporary literary journalism. He relates the horizon of expectations set by 
Norman Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song (1979): “The dust jacket bore the odd 
description ‘A True Life Novel.’ Although such truth-in-labeling doesn’t explicitly 
demarcate what parts are actual, it’s a good-faith proclamation to readers that they’ve 
entered a zone in which a nonfiction writer’s covenant with readers may be a tease, a 
device, but doesn’t quite apply”.15 He asserts that this category of expectations “[fall] 
outside the modern understanding of what literary journalism is” (Kramer).  
 
Theories that refute the possibility of representing reality are antithetical to the 
practice of literary journalism. “New Gen” practitioner Arnon Grunberg suggests 
“Doubt and skepticism about what constitutes reality are very healthy, but denying the 
distinction between fiction and reality … points to an attitude that results from a lack 
of skepticism and doubt. Reality offers a few ‘truths,’ which leave not a lot of room 
for skepticism. Go and stand on a rail track for instance, and wait for the train to 
come” (in Harbers 79). Grunberg’s point, although wry in tone, reflects what I argue 
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is a dominant ideological position of contemporary literary journalists. It is certainly 
not, however, an argument for a facile relationship between humans and reality. 
Writing about Grunberg’s Chambermaids and Soldiers (2009), Agnes Andeweg 
observes: “As the narrative … shows, reality is multifaceted … . That produces a 
third effect in Grunberg’s journalism: he makes his reader question what reality is. 
Not in the sense that he would deny reality exists (as the misguided representation of 
postmodernism goes), but in the sense of how to make sense of different versions of 
reality” (63). In the passage under discussion, Grunberg shifts between political, 
psychological, and physical “realities”.16 Andeweg believes that these three “different 
versions of reality chafe” (63), but I would argue that they are not, in fact, different 
versions of reality; rather, they represent different focal planes of the same reality. 
Grunberg’s—or literary journalists’—ability to switch between multiple focal planes 
demonstrates a high degree of understanding of their subject in relation to other 
elements of knowledge. This point will be explicated further in a later discussion. 
Here, however, I posit that literary journalistic “truth” is discoverable in the spaces 
between different levels of reality.  
 
Truth, in this sense, emerges from a process that moves from knowledge to 
understanding to the apprehension of meaning. If meaning can be reapplied to the 
conditions that gave it rise, it is possible to discern a “truth” in that (re)application of 
meaning. For example, Andeweg observes that Grunberg is “very aware of the gap 
between truth and reality”:  
 
Grunberg shows that “big” events break down into individual stories, 
into different realities, and that moral choices are never easy. A call 
for reality, or realism (factuality), does not necessarily bring us closer 
to the truth. Realism can be understood as the privileged access to 
truth only when truth is just conceptualized in terms of the 
correspondence between representation and fact. Truth and reality are 
two different things (63). 
 
Andeweg implies here that truth is the product of process. It is not one end of a direct 
link between fact and truth; a more direct relationship exists between fact and 
accuracy. Morrison similarly prefers to distinguish between fact and truth rather than 
fiction, as “facts can exist without human intelligence, but truth cannot” (in Lehman, 
Matters 33). While still contending that Grunberg is working on multiple focal planes, 
rather than with different realties, I support Andeweg’s assertion that “a call for 
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reality, or realism (factuality), does not necessarily bring us closer to the truth.” Truth 
can be a product of the correspondence between representation and fact, when facts 
are parsed through the process that renders them knowledge, moves to understanding, 
and allows the apprehension of meaning. Hartsock refers to part of this process when 
he writes: “facts can only be understood once there is a reflexive understanding of 
feeling or subjectivity that determines which facts are to be valued” (180). In the 
reapplication of meaning to reality, (a) “truth” is perceived.  
 
My positioning of Grunberg as representative of dominant contemporary literary 
journalistic trends is supported by current scholarship. As recently as 2012, Keeble 
and Tulloch wrote that literary journalists “claim the real”. This phrase signifies “an 
assertion about truthfulness to verifiable experience, an adherence to accuracy and 
sincerity which practitioners assert are the crucial features that distinguish their 
narratives from ‘fiction’” (7). Keeble and Tulloch also acknowledge that this is 
problematic:  
 
A demand for realism can be represented as an essentially conservative 
concept, aimed at repulsing the 20th-century postmodernist project in 
writing. … In these terms, literary journalism can be presented as a 
throwback to the idea of a stable text and stable reality that can be 
narrativised, a refutation of the pretensions of modernism in which 
eager journalists penetrate to “the quick of what’s happening.” But 
many writers would now claim, with David Shields: “Story seems to 
say everything happens for a reason, and I want to say, No, it doesn’t” 
(7–8). 
 
These opposing positions demonstrate that a “demand for realism” takes on different 
meanings for different practitioners. “Claiming the real” for some literary journalists 
may mean representing “a phenomenal world that is fundamentally indeterminate” 
(Hartsock 51), but for others, reality is discoverable, and narrative form is alive to the 
possibilities of (re)presenting their discoveries. These divisions are recognisable as 
Eason’s “modernist” and “realist” approaches. For the latter group, Keeble and Tulloch 
suggest “accuracy” and “some explicit reflection in the story about the reliability of 
information and how the journalist arrives at his or her account”—that is, disclosure 
transparency—as ways to exercise “a duty of care for the reader” (9). But is this advice 
effective for literary journalism written in an extradiegetic narrative mode? As 
contended in a discussion of Eason’s study in chapter two, a work of literary 
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journalism may or may not reflect a practitioner’s ideological position. He or she may 
well be alive to the theoretical and practical implications of structuring reality in a 
narrative without signalling their concerns textually. Are first-person narrative modes, 
therefore, more epistemically responsible than third-person narrative modes that 
obscure subjectivity? 
  
Objectivism and Subjectivism v Objectivity and Subjectivity 
 
Works of literary journalism that appear to eschew subjectivity are evidently more 
susceptible to criticism of reifying and objectifying their subjects than openly 
subjective narratives. While subjectivity may be evident even in “objective” accounts 
such as John Hersey’s Hiroshima (1946), this text has been criticised by a minority of 
reviewers—including Dwight MacDonald, Mary McCarthy, and Phyllis Frus—as 
sensationalist, morally deficient, and provoking condescension in readers because of 
its narrative mode (see Hartsock 185–7; Boyer 185–7). Frus’s criticisms of Hiroshima 
include its tendency towards narration rather than discourse; a reluctance to interpret; 
unnaturally impersonal narration causing excessive detachment; lack of critical insight; 
its rejection of the contingent and historical; and Hersey’s admission that he looked for 
“types” (90–98). Hartsock has observed, however, that Hiroshima’s “narrative 
ambition is still pointed toward narrowing the distance between the subject and the 
object because of the rhetorical choices made”. He continues: “In his own way, Hersey 
struggles in the direction of attempting to overcome the distance between subjectivity 
and objectification” (187). Hersey’s approach can be accounted for by Code’s 
definition of “objectivism”. Not to be confused with “objectivity”, objectivism 
 
involves keeping in touch, as closely as one can, with ordinary 
experience: being humble rather than haughty toward it and taking 
care not to impose theoretical structurings where the fit between 
theory and world is not as good as it could be. … Indeed, objectivism 
and realism thus construed are virtually synonymous. Objectivism 
gives the object full reign [sic]. It is directed to and conditioned by the 
object, and it peruses reality rather than aiming, peremptorily, to 
conquer it. It is a mode of contemplation: something of a secularized 
Platonic knowing. Likewise, a realist respects the nature of the object 
while (in self awareness) coming to know it as well as possible (ER 
142–3). 
 
At the heart of criticism aimed at third-person literary journalism is the disquiet 
brought about when readers lack the data they need to assess the practitioner’s 
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interaction with the world. This is equally true in the epistemic sense as it is in the 
ethical sense. But again, these two should not be conflated. Frus, for example, is 
critical of Hersey’s lack of transparency regarding the politics of the narrative’s 
construction as well as the use of his subjects as types; but she does not seem to 
question whether Hersey knew enough to represent his subjects as he did, and 
whether he considered (was aware of) the moral consequences of his knowing or 
ignorance. The text itself eschews such reflexivity, and was initially published in the 
New Yorker without any significant peritextual information. A publisher’s note in 
Hiroshima’s book form sheds some light on the text’s epistemic foundation:  
 
In May, 1946, The New Yorker sent John Hersey, journalist and author 
of A Bell for Adano, to the Far East to find out what had really 
happened at Hiroshima: to interview survivors of the catastrophe, to 
endeavour to describe what they had seen and felt and thought, what 
the destruction of their city, their lives and homes and hopes and 
friends, had meant to them in short, the cost of the bomb in terms of 
human suffering and reaction to suffering. He stayed in Japan for a 
month, gathering his own material with little, if any, help from the 
occupying authorities; he obtained the stories from actual witnesses. 
The characters in his account are living individuals, not composite 
types. The story is their own story, told as far as possible in their own 
words (“Publisher’s Note”). 
  
This disclosure indicates that Hersey’s approach was objectivist; his narrative is 
“directed to and conditioned by the object, and it peruses reality rather than aiming, 
peremptorily, to conquer it” (ER 143). It is perhaps this aim—to avoid conquering the 
object—that drove Hersey to eschew his subjectivity. While self-awareness is not 
present in the narrative itself, it is evident in Hersey’s approach that he was aware of 
the impact his subjectivity would have on the account, and that the decision to write 
“objectively” was made with knowledge of potential consequences, as well as 
adequate knowledge to represent his subject. Time has also proven this point. Writing 
forty years after Hiroshima’s publication, Hersey reflected that he had been right in 
his choices of representation: “The flat style was deliberate, and I still think I was 
right to adopt it … . A high literary manner, or a show of passion, would have brought 
me into the story as a mediator; I wanted to avoid such mediation, so the reader’s 
experience would be as direct as possible” (in Boyer 208). In this way, Hersey 
demonstrates epistemic responsibility towards his subject and his narrative.  
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An objectivist approach is also evident in five of the six texts analysed later in this 
thesis.17 Of these, only two texts—those of Adrian Nicole LeBlanc and Dave 
Cullen—are written in third person. LeBlanc’s and Cullen’s approaches to 
transparency significantly impact the reception of their texts; this will be further 
explored in chapter five. Hiroshima’s example, however, demonstrates that an 
objectivist approach manifesting in an objective mode of narration is not inherently 
poor epistemic practice—in fact, the opposite can be true. If a practitioner aims to 
produce an epistemically defensible text, the challenge is to manage the tension 
between preserving its rhetorical force and providing enough transparency disclosure 
to facilitate informed reading and analysis. A practitioner may choose not to defend 
their text’s epistemic foundation, in which case it is difficult for critics to carry out 
their work of reviewing in an epistemically responsible way. To some extent, 
practitioners who choose this option must be prepared to accept consequent criticism, 
as critics and scholars understandably assess non-fiction on its paratextual claims.  
 
As with “objectivism” and “objectivity”, Code also clarifies the difference between 
“subjectivism” and “subjectivity”:   
 
[T]he former carries negative implications that do not attach to the 
latter. “Subjectivity” involves recognizing the full person-hood and 
epistemological centrality of knowing subjects, of which theory of 
knowledge needs to take account and acquire understanding. 
“Subjectivism,” by contrast, is an outright denial of any normative 
force to realism; it is Protagorean relativism in its most literal 
interpretation. … [It] seeks to conquer what it encounters in the world, 
aiming primarily to control rather than to understand. To this end, it 
applies ready-at-hand labels at the slightest indication that they must 
stick, without due consideration about whether they do, or ought to be 
made to, fit. Partial explanations are easy; they allow us to move 
readily about the world and to cope quite well at a superficial level. 
But they close off possibilities of understanding (ER 142–3). 
 
Here a tension is clear between acknowledging subjectivity and a subjectivist 
approach. To appropriate Code’s definition, literary journalists ought to recognise and 
acknowledge the full person-hood and epistemological centrality of both themselves 
and their subjects. Finding a balance here is an important element of epistemic 
responsibility, as analyses of Helen Garner’s and Rebecca Skloot’s literary journalism 
in this thesis demonstrate. In “The Legend on the License” (1989) Hersey captures the 
subjectivist approach to journalism in the following way: “the reporter [becomes] the 
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center of interest rather than the real world he is supposed to be picturing or 
interpreting. A filter of temperament discolors the visible universe. The report becomes 
a performance. What is, or may be, going on in ‘reality’ recedes into a backdrop for the 
actor-writer; it dissolves out of focus and becomes, in the end, fuzzy, vague, 
unrecognizable, and false” (266). 
 
Four of the texts analysed in chapters five and six of this thesis openly acknowledge 
subjectivity in their practitioners’ use of first-person narration. A range of ideologies—
and reasons—informs the use of first-person narration amongst the four practitioners. 
None of the approaches, however, could easily be characterised as subjectivist. Rather, 
an objectivist approach is dominant in each text. Margaret Simons (The Meeting of the 
Waters 2003) emphasises her subjectivity to demonstrate a larger truth about the 
relationship between culture and worldview, but ultimately is objectivist in approach. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Rebecca Skloot resisted writing about her role in her 
subjects’ lives until compelled by her editor to acknowledge her subjectivity in the 
narrative. This strongly objectivist approach is problematic, however, as will be 
discussed in chapter five. Chloe Hooper (The Tall Man 2008) and Anna Krien (Into the 
Woods 2010) demonstrate a more moderate approach towards their subjectivity; but 
both utilise their subjectivity to guide their investigations and establish credibility with 
their readers. An author’s presence in a narrative does not necessarily signal that they 
are fully aware of themselves, their motivations, or the effect of their presence in the 
text. Consequently, acknowledging subjectivity is not an inherently epistemically 
responsible practice.  
 
This point is well illustrated by Helen Garner’s literary journalism. The first major 
controversy over Garner’s work will be explored in the next chapter, but here a 
discussion of her second book-length work of literary journalism demonstrates the 
limitations of first-person narration as an epistemically responsible practice. In Joe 
Cinque’s Consolation (2004), Garner covers the criminal trials of Anu Singh and 
Madhavi Rao, two law students who were accused of murder and conspiracy to 
commit murder respectively. The victim was Singh’s partner Joe Cinque, whom she 
injected with a lethal dose of heroin after a dinner party with friends. Typical of 
Garner’s writing, her subjectivity is a feature of Joe Cinque’s Consolation. Part Two of 
the narrative begins with Garner’s motivation for following the story:  
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I understand now that I went to Canberra because the break-up of my 
marriage had left me humiliated and angry. I wanted to look at women 
who were accused of murder. I wanted to gaze at them and hear their 
voices, to see the shape of their bodies and how they moved and 
gestured, to watch the expressions on their faces. I needed to find out 
if anything made them different from me: whether I could trust myself 
to keep the lid on the vengeful, punitive force that was in me, as it is in 
everyone—the wildness that one keeps in its cage, releasing it only in 
dreams and fantasy (Joe Cinque’s Consolation 25). 
 
This passage indicates that Garner was cognisant of “the full person-hood” and 
“epistemological centrality” of herself as a “knowing subject” (Code, ER 142) at the 
time of writing. It would seem that inclusion of such personal self-knowledge 
indicates epistemically responsible practice; that is, Garner tells what she knows at all 
costs. She confides in her reader, “I lay on the bed for a while thinking about Anu 
Singh and her distracted visits home from university. I wondered if my parents had 
guessed what was the matter with me, in 1964, when I took the train home to Geelong 
after I had had an abortion” (Joe Cinque’s Consolation 33). And later, “Call that 
mental illness? She’s just like me” (Joe Cinque’s Consolation 38). In this way, Garner 
is the focaliser as she draws readers into her confidence. As Clendinnen has observed, 
Joe Cinque’s Consolation “is lit by confessional introspections into her own darker 
self, which for her readers, as for Garner, clinch the authenticity and therefore the 
authority of her judgments” (“Making Stories” 6). But does knowing her self equate 
with knowing her subject—or the story—well?  
While Garner’s disclosures about her own life do not invite questioning—in this case 
she is the authority—her value-laden judgments about Singh’s case and the broader 
issues of law can be queried. Garner’s deft and, at times, caustic appraisals of the law 
and legal processes reveal an epistemic blind spot of her own. She asserts: “To read 
the record of [a committal proceeding] … is to be flung back into the same story 
when it was in a much more sprawling, undignified state, before the Crown and 
defence teams had taken hold of it to smooth away its rough edges and trim off 
damaging or uncontrollable bits that did not fit their respective ‘case concepts’” (Joe 
Cinque’s Consolation 170). Here Garner is critical of legal process without engaging 
with the equally complicated construction of her own text.18 In an interview following 
the publication of the book, she demonstrates an awareness of epistemic choices 
without reflecting on the consequences:  
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The art of it is in choice, but also a kind of inspired and totally 
legitimate mimicry. And there are times when you have to paraphrase, 
or the reader will die of boredom. I learnt this the hard way when I 
was writing Joe Cinque’s Consolation—I précis a barrister’s whole 
submission in a murder trial, but still make it sound like talking. 
Hardest work I’ve ever done. But it gave me a terrific sense of being 
in control (in Eisenhuth and McDonald 163). 
   
While Garner’s example necessitates—and indeed displays—a high degree of 
understanding in this situation, her language here suggests an approach closer to 
subjectivism than objectivism; as Code writes, this is “aiming primarily to control 
rather than to understand. … [I]t applies ready-at-hand labels at the slightest 
indication that they must stick, without due consideration about whether they do, or 
ought to be made to, fit” (ER 143). The latter point is significant. Many of her critics 
take issue with the extent to which Garner employs archetypes: 
  
[Garner] confides that her very first sight in a photograph of the 
young, beautiful woman on trial ‘raised my girl-hackles in a bristle’. 
Behind this instant physical intuition lies the stuff of a hundred fairy 
tales: the evil lurking behind the fair, young, female exterior; the 
prickling thumbs which warn bitter men and ageing women that evil 
has taken fair form in our midst. … For Garner the heroine of the case 
is Joe Cinque’s mother. When Mrs Cinque cries out in protest in court, 
Garner says, “there rose from the depths of her a tremendous, 
unassailable archetype: the mother.” … The mythification of Maria 
Cinque is necessary, dramatically, for Garner’s urgent story-making 
(Clendinnen, “Making Stories” 6–7). 
 
Rooney also analyses Garner’s use of archetypes, contending that Garner invokes the 
mythic and sacred to “[reproduce] mimetic rivalry before acceding, but only 
reluctantly and partially, to the antimythicizing Christian demand to exercise empathy 
with victims, be they sinners or not” (163). She is critical of Garner’s use of 
archetypal narrative patterns and language, particularly the portrayal of Anu Singh as 
an archetypal witch-figure as Singh and her family refused to be interviewed for 
Garner’s research. Rooney writes: “Immersion in the ‘real’ of non-fiction, moreover, 
may inhibit a writer's capacity or willingness to imagine all viewpoints fearlessly. It 
does seem fair, however, to question the vivid animosity of Garner's narrative against 
Singh, especially in view of its conversely passionate identification with the Cinques” 
(162). This is essentially epistemic criticism: did Garner know enough of Anu Singh 
to (re)present her in this way? Despite the text’s strong subjectivity and reflexivity, 
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there is no evidence—including her visceral reactions—that Garner had enough 
knowledge to warrant such a portrayal of Singh. 
 
In a further example of Garner’s selective knowledge, Dever cites the dismissal of 
domestic violence as an issue in the case. She observes: “[Garner] repeatedly 
dismisses out of hand Anu Singh's claim that she had been ‘terrified’ of Joe Cinque” 
(np). In this way Garner engages in the process she denounces in the courtroom: 
creating a narrative that will reach an audience as a controlled package. The 
confidential, confessional tone promotes her authority, but obscures Garner’s own 
narrative construction—a smoothing away of rough edges. Joe Cinque’s Consolation 
is a powerful and important book. It is not a source upon which legal judgment can be 
based, but it does provide a valuable platform for voices lost in the legal system, such 
as Nino and Maria Cinque. Finally, however, Garner has an epistemic responsibility 
to “know well”, to be guided by all evidence offered in the course of the trial, and to 
acknowledge limitations in the construction of her narrative. At best, her subjectivity 
in Joe Cinque’s Consolation obscures this responsibility; at worst, these are limits of 
which Garner does not seem aware, or chooses to ignore. Whether her position is at 
either of these extremes or somewhere in between, this case does demonstrate that 
exposing subjectivity is not a reliable indicator of epistemically responsible practice. 
 
A practitioner’s approach to their subject is, then, more important than measures 
taken to reveal the relationship between them. Epistemic responsibility begins with an 
approach to objects in the world best described by Code’s term “objectivism”: 
“keeping in touch, as closely as one can, with ordinary experience: being humble 
rather than haughty toward it and taking care not to impose theoretical structurings 
where the fit between theory and world is not as good as it could be” (ER 142). The 
extreme objectivity of Hiroshima juxtaposed against the strong subjectivity of Joe 
Cinque’s Consolation demonstrates that revelation does not equate to reliability; 
neither does reflexivity equal transparency. These two examples, chosen for their 
practitioners’ strong approaches, also show that transparency is only valuable when it 
is based on a responsibilist approach; that is, practitioners must be cognisant of the 
range of knowledge available—and unavailable—to them as they construct their 
narrative. As Code writes, “to strive for insight into the extent of one’s own cognitive 
capacities, to distance oneself as much as possible so one can be critical of one’s own 
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knowing, is a crucially important aspect of epistemic competence” (ER 176). Roy 
Peter Clark also makes a connection between virtue and epistemology when he 
writes: “In a culture of media bravado, there is plenty of room for a little strategic 
humility. This virtue teaches us that Truth—with a capital T—is unattainable, that 
even though you can never get it, that with hard work you can get at it—you can gain 
on it” (np emphasis in original). Epistemic “blind spots” may be inevitable, but a 
practitioner’s approach to the world, and to possible avenues of knowledge, creates a 
strong foundation for the truth in literary journalism.  
 
Knowledge, Understanding and Meaning 
 
The relationship between knowledge and understanding has important implications 
for the theory and practice of literary journalism. Code’s approach to epistemic 
responsibility emphasises the process or effort to achieve end-states of cognition; 
thus, both knowledge and understanding are modes of interpreting experience (ER 
135). Code writes that humans can “structure experience into reasonably coherent 
patterns of knowledge and understanding, even though we may not know the precise 
relation of these patterns to the reality they purport to reflect” (ER 133). This is in 
spite of the fact that “different aspects of what seems to be the same reality are 
coherent for different people in the same circumstances, and though our control over 
experience continually meets with limiting cases, reminding us that reality transcends 
our knowledge of it” (ER 133). Knowledge, then, is apprehended from interaction 
with the world, and structured into patterns of understanding that cohere with—and 
modify—previous knowledge and understandings. For Code, understanding is a 
process rather than a faculty (ER 148). It involves “tying one’s knowledge down: 
relating it to a context, having some conception of the relation of this one ‘bit’ of 
knowledge to the rest of what one knows” (ER 150).  
  
Understanding, then, involves a just apprehension of significance and 
endorses an ideal of seeing things “whole” in some sense. This 
characterization is somewhat paradoxical, given the unlikelihood or 
ever achieving perfect understanding, but seeing things “whole” is 
subtly different from seeing them completely, understanding them 
utterly. It has more to do with apprehending connectedness and 
significance. Indeed, one of the reasons understanding is so difficult 
and so neglected an epistemological concept may stem from its being 
always a matter of degree (ER 151). 
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In this way, understanding, or seeing things whole, is a prerequisite for “right” 
apprehension and production of meaning. Connecting elements of knowledge produces 
meaning; that is, connectedness produces significance. Understanding is contingent 
upon new knowledge and must adjust in relation to it; this does not nullify the 
possibility of “right” understanding, but does introduce the concept of understanding in 
degrees. 
 
The relationship between knowledge and understanding is exemplified in a number of 
literary journalists’ reflections on their process of research and writing. Bill Reynolds’s 
informative study of two practitioners, William Langewiesche and John Vaillant, 
illuminates the process involved in moving from knowledge to understanding and 
meaning. It also demonstrates that meaning is dependent on understanding. Over time 
new knowledge can modify understanding; consequently, the meaning of an event 
must be re-evaluated. The importance of correspondence and coherence is evident in 
this process. Reynolds bases his article on the contention that “[i]n long-form narrative, 
the story is rarely simply about the story—it is usually a metaphor for something much 
larger. While it is true that the best magazine pieces focus tightly on a theme, or in 
some cases multiple themes, there is always something else underneath the story” (60). 
He writes of Langewiesche’s American Ground (2003) and Vaillant’s The Golden 
Spruce (2005) that “the writers discovered, first in the field and then in front of the 
computer screen sculpting words from the raw material of fact, the true significance 
and meaning of their stories” (60). Reynolds’s language here is significant:  
 
As they searched for clues and assessed what they had found, the story 
began to reveal itself. It is only during this creative, artistic part of the 
process—the “Just what are we looking at here?” part, or the literary 
journalism part rather than the reporting and researching part—when 
their stories come to provide a worldview (60).  
 
The terms “discovered”, “searched” and “reveal itself” here indicate a belief that 
meaning is inherent in events and observable, shared reality. The phrase “true 
significance and meaning of their stories” similarly implies that there may be false, or 
inaccurate, signification and meaning applied in this process. However, Reynolds also 
describes the processes of assessing as the “creative, artistic part of the process”. Are 
these ideas incongruous? Is meaning being created here? Or is it being discovered? 
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Code’s use of the “creative synthesis of the imagination” again helpfully illuminates 
the beliefs implied in Reynolds’s article, and is worth repeating in full:  
 
[Using Kant’s concept] it is possible to account for the creative nature 
of human cognition: a taking and structuring of experience, not a 
passive receiving and recording. Within the constraints imposed upon 
this creativity by the nature of the world and of human cognitive 
capacity, the subjective possibilities of making sense of experience are 
many and varied. There is a considerable degree of freedom in 
knowledge; hence, an adequate explication of human knowledge must 
give scope and grant respectability to subjective factors that structure 
the process of knowledge acquisition, while preserving an ideal of 
objectivity, or realism normatively construed (ER 77). 
 
Here “creative” is not synonymous with invention, but rather signifies the process of 
structuring according to “many and varied” possibilities. The term “artistic” refers to 
the level of meaning to be attained: abstracting significance and truth requires higher 
cognitive processes than apprehending and recalling facts. Reynolds indicates as much 
as he notes Langewiesche’s story is simple to start with. It can be summarised in a 
sentence: “Two very large buildings collapse and a cluster of men spend several 
months on the cleanup”. However, “this deceptively simple story … suddenly becomes 
maddeningly complex” (63). Langewiesche describes his framework for finding 
meaning as derived from his experience as a pilot. The following passage reveals an 
objectivist approach to the world and to literary journalism: 
 
The aerial view is something entirely new. We need to admit that it 
flattens the world and mutes it in a rush of air and engines, and it 
suppresses beauty. But it also strips the façades from our 
constructions, and by raising us above the constraints of the treeline 
and the highway it imposes a brutal honesty on our perceptions. It lets 
us see ourselves in context, as creatures struggling through life on the 
face of the planet, not separate from nature, but its most expressive 
agents. It lets us see that these patterns repeat to an extent which 
before we had not known, and that there is a sense to them (in 
Reynolds 65). 
 
There is a sense here that Langewiesche attempts to give the object full rein, but is 
aware that objectivity is limited by perception. This observation is supported by the 
“Afterword” in American Ground, where Langewiesche writes: 
  
It has been suggested that I must have been glad to be the only writer 
with free access to the inner world of the Trade Centre site, but the 
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opposite is true. There was obviously more happening there than I 
alone could know or describe. … The presence of the daily press 
would have served the useful role not only of informing the public but 
also clarifying the participants’ views of themselves (210). 
 
The metaphor of an aerial view is invoked here again, this time in the form of the daily 
press as outsiders who are able to provide a wider perspective, and promote reflexivity 
amongst those immersed in their work at Ground Zero. This metaphor is a helpful one 
for literary journalists in its implication that perspective can be lost in immersive 
situations. It is important, for Langewiesche, that practitioners remove themselves 
from the situation for a time—or seek perspective from other sources—in order to 
“know” the landscape “well”.  
 
The narrative scope for Langewiesche was “readymade”, according to Reynolds, “with 
the attacks [on the World Trade Centre] at the beginning and a ceremony nine months 
later acting as natural bookends. But still, Langewiesche needed to find the story 
within these generous parameters” (65). Narrative theorists such as White would 
perhaps take issue with the term “natural bookends”, but the point is that the attack 
marked the beginning of the World Trade Centre’s deconstruction, and the ceremony 
marked the end of that particular process. Evidently, these points have been chosen by 
Langewiesche to start and end his narrative, but they could be considered neither 
arbitrary nor random when considering their impact on narrative closure. Reynolds 
writes that five weeks after the twin towers fell, Langewiesche “began to see the 
unfolding drama as a positive story in the midst of so much misery. … Buried 
underneath a mountain of man-made junk was the will to create a new world” (67). 
Langewiesche recalls: “It was obvious to me that we were looking at much, much 
more. That view came from being on the inside; it was not an external view at all. … 
An amazing experiment was happening before our very eyes. … [Telling this story 
exposed] to us (the observer, the writer, and then the reader) who we are” (in Reynolds 
67). The accumulation and apprehension of knowledge, then, structured into coherent 
patterns of understanding, produced, for Langewiesche, meaning or significance about 
the nature of US citizens. The process of understanding and signification, however, did 
not end there. 
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Interestingly, Langewiesche later modified his understanding of the meaning signified 
by the events he witnessed. Reynolds writes: “He decided he had been too absorbed in 
the tiny world of Ground Zero during those months of intense, on-site reporting to pay 
much attention to the George W. Bush administration’s exploitation of patriotism and 
9/11 for its own ends” (67). This situation illustrates Code’s proposal that 
understanding is a matter of degree (ER 151). Langewiesche’s position on Ground 
Zero afforded him a “whole” view in the sense that he “apprehend[ed] 
connectedness”—or understood how the elements affected each other in coherent 
patterns. But his perspective was limited by his position on the ground; time, distance 
from his subject and new knowledge modified his understanding, which produced a 
new significance from the events he researched. This example not only demonstrates 
the transition of knowledge to meaning, but also the importance of both 
correspondence and coherence to apprehension of meaning. Langewiesche’s 
knowledge accurately corresponded to external, observable reality. It was cohered into 
patterns that produced significance. However, it was also subject to changes of 
perspective and developments of knowledge over time. Knowledge is not, therefore, a 
static end-state of cognition, but subject to the modifying influences of new 
discoveries, different contexts and changing perspectives.  
 
Reporting does not necessarily end with an end event, but rather a tipping point where 
a practitioner’s knowledge becomes understanding. Asked when he finishes the 
reporting stage, William Finnegan replied: “When the story seems to have a beginning, 
middle, and end. When I think that the action, the narrative arc, is complete. But I’m 
often wrong about that, and more action often takes place while I’m writing. New 
endings appear. New beginnings, even” (in Boynton NNJ 96). Anna Krien, whose Into 
the Woods is analysed in chapter six, still felt like more research needed to be done 
after publication. But, she states, the reporting was finished “when I went back to the 
island, probably for the third or fourth time, and all of a sudden I could have proper 
conversations with people. … [Before that] I was not really understanding” (in 
Attwood). An analysis of epistemic responsibility should take into account the extent 
of reporting, and assess the rhetorical situation of a practitioner according to 
knowledge potentially accessible at the time of writing.19 Code makes the point that 
beliefs are grounded because of what happens in the world: “the practical 
consequences of holding certain beliefs have considerable bearing upon the 
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reasonableness [for an individual at a particular point in time], of holding the belief” 
(ER 41). An associated point here is that literary journalists are not alone subject to the 
requirements of epistemic responsibility. The wider epistemic community also has a 
mandate to approach and analyse literary journalism in an epistemically responsible 
way; that is, to acknowledge the inherently static nature of books in their consideration 
of literary journalists’ epistemic responsibility. 
 
Epistemic Community and Contracts 
 
Code identifies community as a fundamental precondition of knowledge. She 
illustrates the dependence of knowledge-seekers upon community in the following 
way:   
 
The wolf boy of Aveyron knows little, if anything, of what the 
“average” human being knows. His ignorance cannot be explained by 
saying that the world is not there for him to experience and know; nor 
can it adequately be explained by his not having human language. The 
most important fact in accounting for his ignorance is that he has had 
no access to a human community of knowers. I am not suggesting that 
he knows nothing: clearly he knows a good deal of what wolves know. 
I cite the example to illustrate the vital dependence of knowledge-
seekers upon the epistemic community (ER 65). 
 
Humans are, Code observes, dependent upon each other for apprehending possible and 
potential ways to structure reality. Yet, “the epistemological importance of this 
commonplace occurrence is too frequently obscured by assumptions about cognitive 
autonomy” (ER 192). Epistemic communities are essentially bound by trust. Truth-
telling at its most basic level is a primary assumption; to opt out “is to deliberately opt 
out of a shared form of life” (ER 181). Code also writes that certain epistemic 
endeavours and circumstances inhere higher standards of responsibility and 
accountability than others (ER 62). Literary journalism’s engagement with phenomenal 
reality and consequent “truth claims” place it firmly in this category. The epistemic 
community of a literary journalist may include, but is not confined to: their subject(s), 
their subjects’ communities, fellow practitioners (past and present), critics, scholars, 
editors, publishers, policy makers, grant committee members, and, of course, readers.  
 
A key point concerning epistemic community is that it needs to be taken into account 
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knower and of his/her environment and epistemic community are epistemologically 
relevant, for they act as enabling and/or constraining factors in the growth of 
knowledge, both for individuals and for communities” (ER 26-7). Mainstream 
journalism has a well-established, clearly defined community with boundaries around 
what constitutes knowledge. As the previous chapter demonstrates, the literary 
journalist’s epistemic community is still very much developing. Constraints upon what 
constitutes knowledge, and how it can be delivered in an epistemically—as opposed to 
ethically—responsible way are still being developed. Consequently, responses from 
the epistemic community will be taken into consideration when analysing texts in the 
next three chapters. A corollary but often overlooked point here is that not only the 
literary journalists, but each of the individuals or groups that constitute the epistemic 
community also has a mandate to “know well” in the same way that literary journalists 
are bound by epistemic responsibility.  
 
Code invokes the notion of a contract to explicate the function of an epistemic 
community. She writes: 
 
The contract analogy is helpful in understanding central features of the 
way epistemic communities function, but its usefulness does not 
depend upon its having any discernible, or convincingly speculative, 
origins. … I do not conceive of an epistemic contract as an event 
which creates obligations but rather as a model for understanding the 
structure and workings of epistemic interdependence. … This model is 
useful in explaining the outrage that occurs when trust is violated. It 
helps account for the conviction that something tangible was violated 
and that the violator is thereby accountable. … Legislation preventing 
false advertising shows that, in the public domain, it is not enough for 
such agreements to remain tacit. Our sense that it is reasonable to 
assume that people will provide accurate information, to the general 
agreement to do so, even where the law is not involved (ER 179). 
 
In the previous chapter I used the analogy of a contract in a similar way. I drew on 
Genette’s term “contractual force” to argue that paratexts can be dynamic sites of 
negotiation for a literary journalistic contract. Again, Genette emphasises that a reader 
is not bound to enter into an agreement about how to approach a text, but maintains 
“only that, knowing it, he cannot completely disregard it, and if he wants to contradict 
it he must first assimilate it” (Paratexts 408–9). Genette concludes that whether a 
reader accepts or rejects the negotiation offered, “one is better off perceiving it fully 
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and clearly” (Paratexts 409). This is in fact a matter of epistemic responsibility. A 
reader may be “better off” for perceiving an author’s intention, methodology and 
aims. But readers, and critics in particular, are also responsible for understanding the 
epistemic foundation of a work of literary journalism as they approach it and offer 
criticism or praise. Questions such as: “Do I really know what I think I know?”; “Do I 
know enough to write as I do?”; “What don’t I know?”; and “Should I know more or 
acknowledge incomplete knowledge?” are equally applicable to the criticism as to the 
practice of literary journalism.  
 
In a general application, Code observes that there are better and worse ways of 
observing the terms of a contract. For example, an individual displaying exemplary 
epistemic practice will go beyond  
 
the bare minimum required by the (unwritten) letter of the contract. 
They would not, for example, disclose only the barest facts when 
asked if they know about something (the epistemic analogue of 
working to rule); rather, they would take cognitive interdependence to 
be a value worth some effort to sustain. The contract model has the 
scope to account for such qualitative differences. Although the notion 
of a contract implies a conventional, arbitrary construct, which might 
well take a form other than it in fact does, this could be true of an 
epistemic contract only to a point. The degree of possible arbitrariness 
within a workable epistemic contract is small indeed (ER 179). 
 
This small degree of “arbitrariness” is evidently owing to the limitations imposed by 
the nature of reality, possible and potential ways of knowing, and arbitration by the 
epistemic community. In relation to literary journalism, there is, perhaps, a danger 
that upholding a “small degree” of epistemic “room to move” might constrict or 
confound one of its defining features: innovation (Sims and Kramer; Kerrane and 
Yagoda 14). The question arises: Can literary journalists push boundaries in an 
epistemically responsible way? Code’s responsibilist approach suggests that 
individuals not only can but also should eschew caution and conservatism at times in 
order to explore new possibilities. “There must be room,” she argues, “within the 
larger sphere where good knowers live, for the Socratic gadfly and for those who take 
outrageous stances to keep the epistemic community on its toes, to prevent it from 
settling into complacency or inertia. … Catalysts of cognitive change play as vital a 
role in communities of knowers as do conservers of established practice” (ER 56 
emphasis in original). While the New Journalism movement as a whole has been 
 
 
 84 
characterised as carrying out this role within the journalism establishment (see Pauly 
“Politics”), there are individuals within what I characterise as a comparatively 
conservative contemporary era, who carry out this role of “keeping the epistemic 
community on its toes”. 
 
An apposite example of two people playing out this role can be found in John 
D’Agata and Jim Fingal’s The Lifespan of a Fact. Published in 2012, the book’s 
genre classification is “Literature/Essays”, leading almost all reviewers to treat it as a 
work of non-fiction (Silverman). The publisher’s website promotes the book in the 
following way: 
 
How negotiable is a fact in nonfiction? In 2003, an essay by John 
D’Agata was rejected by the magazine that commissioned it due to 
factual inaccuracies. That essay—which eventually became the 
foundation of D’Agata’s critically acclaimed About a Mountain—was 
accepted by another magazine, The Believer, but not before they 
handed it to their own fact-checker, Jim Fingal. What resulted from 
that assignment was seven years of arguments, negotiations, and 
revisions as D’Agata and Fingal struggled to navigate the boundaries 
of literary nonfiction. This book reproduces D’Agata’s essay, along 
with D’Agata and Fingal’s extensive correspondence. What emerges 
is a brilliant and eye-opening meditation on the relationship between 
“truth” and “accuracy” and a penetrating conversation about whether it 
is appropriate for a writer to substitute one for the other (“The 
Lifespan of a Fact” emphasis added). 
 
The blurb on the cover of the book offers almost the same information, but omits the 
italicized sentences above, and replaces “what resulted from that assignment” with 
“what emerges is a brilliant and eye-opening meditation on the relationship between 
‘truth’ and ‘accuracy’ and a penetrating conversation”. After the book’s publication, it 
emerged in an interview with the authors that the initial correspondence between 
D’Agata and Fingal took between six months and year, after which the idea of 
publishing a book was formed. Fingal continues: “The rest of the ‘7 years’ were really 
the conversation that arose out of that decision, as we elaborated on the material and 
started having/composing the out-and-out debate that we never really were able to 
have within the confines of the pseudo-professional relationship we had during the 
stint at the magazine” (Cutter). Fingal also states: “I must clarify that you should 
consider the ‘Jim’ and ‘John’ of the essay to be characters enacting a parallel 
process/discussion from the one John and I actually had during the factchecking 
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process” (Cutter). The Lifespan of a Fact is thus not the original correspondence 
between Fingal and D’Agata, but a planned and constructed exchange based on their 
experience of the initial fact-checking process.  
 
Silverman notes that one of the four reviewers he contacted regarding the book was 
aware that the exchange was created to attain and fulfil a book contract, that it is “by 
definition not a reproduction, since the book is primarily made up of text that did not 
exist prior to the authors embarking on a book project” (Silverman). Interestingly, the 
one reviewer who “knew the book was not always factual” explained that one signal 
of its constructed nature was that “D’Agata has a real history of these sort of literary 
tricks” (Silverman). This echoes Lawrence Weschler’s injunction that readers need to 
be “intelligent” and “[follow] a person over years. Then you begin to get a sense of 
that writer, their voice. And you approach it as an adult encountering another adult in 
the world” (Garfield). But this case also highlights the deficiency of Weschler’s 
explanation: the other three reviewers have no less apparent claim to intelligence, and 
as none were familiar with D’Agata’s work, they read the publisher’s blurb as a claim 
to non-fiction status. The hybrid nature of the genre assignation appeared to have 
been clarified by the peritext in this case, whereas in fact both the peri- and epitext 
misled their expectations. Is this a case of epistemic irresponsibility on the part of the 
authors (and publishers)? Or can this case be considered an effective means of 
pointing out the epistemic responsibility of reviews to know their subject—and 
practitioners—well? Are these two positions mutually exclusive? 
 
The paratext enacts the issues raised by the content of the book in this way. The 
“character” in the exchange, John D’Agata, is striving to create an essay that delivers 
a genuine experience with art. D’Agata’s fact-checker, Jim Fingal, protests against 
replacing numerous verifiable facts with inaccuracies, such as “four” for “eight” (17), 
“pink” for “purple” (39), wind direction (24), the phase of the moon (25) and statistics 
on suicide (52). The latter is particularly pertinent, as the original article recreates the 
last day of Levi Presley, a 16-year-old young man whose suicide is its subject. 
“D’Agata” here embodies the intellectually virtuous (knowledgeable) practitioner 
without displaying moral virtue. He argues that non-fiction is an inadequate term for 
what he is doing—creating a work of art—and not one that he would apply to his 
essay. The exchange continues in part:  
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John: What we’re dancing around here is the idea of moral 
responsibility in nonfiction. And that’s why this sort of conversation 
always gets me peeved—and why the conversation always ends up in 
circles—because the moment we start judging a form of art in terms of 
its “moral value” is the moment we stop talking about art. Just by 
having this conversation and raising these issues we are 
disenfranchising nonfiction as literature. And this is frustrating, 
because we would never be having this conversation about a work of 
poetry or fiction or drama. Those are literary genres that we recognize, 
without any question, as literary. As artful. But nonfiction has been 
struggling to distinguish itself as art for decades in our culture.  
Jim: Well, those are literary genres that don’t make explicit claims of 
factual accuracy. Right or wrong, John, people are going to have 
different expectations of something that’s called “nonfiction.” There’s 
a perceived difference in the intentionality behind nonfiction and 
fiction, because nonfiction is supposed to have its feet firmly planted 
in reality. Isn’t that the definition of “nonfiction”? (111) 
 
D’Agata’s refusal to capitulate to the expectations set by the term “essay” and the 
(verifiable) subject matter of his text is based on his intention to produce an 
experience for the reader that he claims is not dependent on factual accuracy: 
 
John: … What the term “essay” describes is not a negation of genre—as 
“nonfiction” does—but rather an activity, ‘an attempt, a trial, an 
experiment.’ … An essay is not a vehicle for facts, in other words, nor 
for information, nor verifiable experience. An essay is an experience, 
and a very human one at that. It’s an enactment of the experience of 
trying to find meaning—an emotional meaning, an intellectual 
meaning, a political meaning, a scientific one, or whatever goal that 
artist has set for the text (111). 
 
When Fingal suggests that D’Agata give readers “a wink or a nod” (disclosure 
transparency) to signal his intentions, D’Agata responds: “I’ve been giving readers 
winks and nods for my entire career, Jim. I’ve edited anthologies, I’ve written essays, 
I’ve given lectures, I’ve taught courses … all about this issue. At some point the 
reader needs to stop demanding that they be spoon-fed like infants and start figuring 
out on their own how to deal with art that they disagree with” (110). This is clearly 
intentionally inflammatory, but it summarises D’Agata’s position: that non-fiction is a 
constructed category with which he fundamentally disagrees as it limits the possibility 
of creating a meaningful experience for the reader. Consequently, he does not feel 
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bound to disclose factual inaccuracies to the reader, as he does not identify his work 
as non-fiction.   
 
The exchange is entertaining, but the original article contains a twist as D’Agata 
acknowledges that he has replaced facts for rhetorical effect, to imbue them with 
significance they do not inherently hold. After building a theme around the number 
nine, based on the (inaccurate) fact that Levi Presley fell for nine seconds to his death, 
the article finally reveals:  
 
I think we knew, however, that he really fell for eight. … At some 
point it came clear that while I was visiting the Presleys that in fact I 
had not spoken to their son the night he died. It was clear as I left 
Vegas that some other boy had called. Clear that if I point to 
something seeming like significance there is the possibility that 
nothing real is there. Sometimes we misplace knowledge in pursuit of 
information. Sometimes our wisdom, too, in pursuit of what’s called 
knowledge (99). 
 
D’Agata is not, here, reversing his position and demonstrating that accuracy is 
important after all. He is underscoring the point that whether facts are distorted or not, 
it is part of the human condition to imbue details with meaning, which, he believes, is 
ultimately a work of imagination. Facts, by this reasoning, become negligible, and 
D’Agata’s commitment to his reader is to provide a greater truth than facts alone.  
 
Underlying the arguments made by “D’Agata” in the exchange with his fact-checker is 
a belief that is not explicitly dealt with by either the character or the author outside the 
book: that accurate facts cannot be artful. Interestingly, however, the epigraph of The 
Lifespan of a Fact is split over two pages that inform the text: “True words are not 
beautiful” (7) and “Beautiful words are not true” (9). These two quotations can be 
read as opinion or factual statements, but it soon becomes apparent that these lines 
form the underlying premise of the book. Throughout the exchange, “D’Agata” makes 
it clear that the facts are not aesthetically pleasing to his sensibility, thus he changes 
them to provide his prose with rhythm and style. It must be ventured, however, that 
while he felt the accurate facts limited his style, it could equally be the case that 
“D’Agata’s” style might have changed to accommodate the facts. The premise that 
stylish prose cannot arise from verifiable fact is subject to opinion—or, perhaps, skill. 
As one practitioner writes,  
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Like other literary journalists, I’ve found that, in fact, annoying, 
inconsistent details that threaten to wreck a scene I’m writing are often 
signals that my working theories about events need more work, and 
don’t quite explain what happened yet. Not tweaking deepens 
understanding. And getting a slice of life down authentically takes 
flexibility and hard labor (Kramer).    
 
“D’Agata” also reminds “Fingal” a number of times that he is not a journalist, thereby 
excusing his lack of notes, attribution of sources, and gaps in his research. However, 
that he made an effort to base his essay on the phenomenal reality of Levi Presley’s 
life and death, rather than making up an entirely fictional character, suggests that he is 
aware of the rhetorical power of non-fiction and that he intends to trade on it, 
regardless of the label applied.  
Epitextually, in an interview, (the real) John D’Agata reflected on the fact-checking 
process of the original article and writing the book, stating: 
 
I think I’m a little more willing to acknowledge that there is a line 
somewhere that one shouldn’t cross, but at the same time, I would still 
insist that it’s a line that only we as individual writers can draw, only 
we can determine where it is, but that we should look for it. We should 
be on the lookout for moments when we might be overstepping what’s 
appropriate (Strainchamps). 
 
Should that line be acknowledged in works of non-fiction? The “D’Agata” of the text 
would argue not. The Lifespan of a Fact plays with questions such as these, but 
particularly: “What are the moral consequences of my knowing?” Each “character” 
represents various viewpoints throughout the book, but “D’Agata’s” main thrust is 
that moral consequences are negligible in art, and that epistemic defence and attempts 
at transparency belie the intention of the non-fiction narrator. One actual consequence 
of the ambiguous generic status of the book was that many reviewers incorrectly 
reviewed the book as non-fiction. Interestingly, this is a point the real D’Agata was 
more willing to concede than his publishers. A wider consequence may be to discredit 
the genre, and, by extension, practitioners who carefully consider and negotiate their 
epistemic responsibility. This example also points out that some practitioners may set 
out to intentionally set a false or misleading set of expectations for their readers. This 
may be to make a point—as D’Agata and Fingal do here—or in order to garner 
authority for their text that they have not earned through the research process. But 
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finally, The Lifespan of a Fact does challenge boundaries. It has opened a 
discussion—not least among those who reviewed it as non-fiction—that amounts to 
an investigation of both practitioners’ and critics’ epistemic responsibility. D’Agata’s 
approach exemplifies that of “the Socratic gadfly”. Code observes that  
 
it is hard to accommodate this kind of thinker within a responsibility-
based theory. No one is inclined to doubt their interest in knowing 
well; rather, the conceptual problem arises because such projects invite 
the paradoxical conclusion that it could sometimes be necessary to be 
epistemically irresponsible, at least in the eyes of the community, to 
be responsible. Epistemic rebellion, and seemingly outrageous thought 
experiments subversive of “received” discourse, cannot, therefore, 
simply be condemned as treacherous or dismissed as irrational by 
knowers who are responsibly and openly committed to making the 
best sense of the world (particularly if “best” can be aligned, to come 
extent, with “creativity” and “inventiveness”) (ER 56). 
 
By ending this discussion with such an example, I do not intend to advocate the 
approach of “D’Agata” as an epistemically responsible one. It does, however, perform 
an important role in literary journalism’s epistemic community. The Lifespan of a 
Fact illustrates several points central to this discussion: that literary journalists need 
to be epistemically responsible towards their epistemic communities; that epistemic 
communities must also maintain a “responsibilist” approach to practitioners (and 
works) of literary journalism; and that a contract exists between members which can 
define the terms by which epistemic responsibility may be judged.  
 
The Landscape Re-visioned 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I identified Aucoin as the first to apply Code’s 
epistemic responsibilist approach to literary journalism. The framework offered here, 
however, differs from Aucoin’s in two important ways. Firstly, I contend that 
epistemic responsibility should be understood as a complementary approach to 
literary journalism scholarship, alongside both literary and journalism criticism. The 
limitations of the discipline of verification are not grounds to discount its usefulness, 
as demonstrated in Garner’s writing. Rather, I argue that verification is critical, not 
only to substantiate individual texts, but also the field as a whole. Literary readings 
are similarly vital for the growth of the field as they illuminate embedded aspects of 
texts and practices that can be overlooked without sustained scholarly attention. 
Consequently, a theory of epistemic responsibilism offers a balancing function for 
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scholarly approaches, rather than eclipsing them. It takes into account both the 
journalistic and literary aims of a text, and uses a practitioner’s knowledge claims 
about the world as a starting point, rather than a distrust of observable phenomenal 
reality.  
 
Secondly, my approach differs from Aucoin’s in that I recognise the fiction/non-
fiction dichotomy; Aucoin finds it problematic at best, arguing that literary journalism 
should not be subject to the discipline of verification. Consequently, I read Code’s 
comments about “literature” as applicable only to fiction, while Aucoin’s theoretical 
perspective allows him to apply her discussion of fictional works to literary 
journalism. He uses, for example, the following statement from Code’s chapter 
“Literature, Truth and Understanding” to support his thesis: 
 
Where actual, historical events or characters play central roles in a 
work, one expects that the research has been done accurately; but there 
is no outright obligation upon writers, given the long tradition of 
poetic license, to tell things as they were rather than as they might 
have been. The onus is thus upon the readers to be sure that any claims 
they make are responsible (ER 214). 
 
Code’s comments here are made in the context of Jane Austen’s, George Eliot’s, and 
Charles Dickens’s writing. I do not read Code’s point in reference to non-fiction’s 
claim to reality; however, Aucoin uses it to support his contention that a writer “is 
situated as an independent moral agent, responsible for what he writes, and readers, as 
independent moral agents, must independently decide whether to believe him” (Aucoin 
15). While the latter point holds, it does not release a journalist—or literary 
journalist—from their responsibility to accept the limits placed upon them by 
phenomenal reality, or to subject their practice and texts to analyses that test those 
limits. This is one example of several which critically differentiate my approach from 
Aucoin’s: where he advocates narrative coherence and epistemic responsibility, I argue 
that correspondence and verifiability are equally important. 
 
The “inevitable lag of the critic behind the artist” (Lounsberry xi) has been a major 
factor in the controversy surrounding literary journalism during the past five decades. 
The epistemic community has, at times, lapsed in its own epistemic responsibility, but 
more often the struggle is to understand epistemological foundations on which 
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pioneering practitioners base their texts. In this chapter I have endeavoured to re-
vision the contemporary literary journalistic landscape by articulating Code’s 
approach to epistemology, and applying a number of her key ideas to examples of 
literary journalistic practice. My purpose has been to examine the unique epistemic 
foundations of literary journalism through the lens of intellectual virtue. A discussion 
that considers the relationship between knowledge, understanding and meaning, and 
reality, accuracy and truth, clarifies terms and processes, as well as illuminating 
rationale behind practice. As Code writes, “Shifting the focus of epistemological 
enquiry to a study of intellectual virtue and epistemic responsibility will enhance the 
confidence that can be lent to knowledge claims, even when absolute certainty is 
taken to be impossible” (ER 67). Code’s approach is an important branch of 
scholarship for literary journalism studies—a branch that has the potential to enhance 
confidence in the genre’s claims to responsibly represent reality. The next chapter 
(re)examines seminal controversies within the genre. In it I apply Code’s 
responsibilist approach, laid out in this chapter, to better understand the 
epistemological causes behind perceived lapses in ethics. 
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Chapter Four 
Contracts and Controversies: The Limitations of Transparency 
 
Relativism, representation and the nature of reality are central concerns to narrative 
theory and the academy. But when an author claims to have produced a work of 
narrative non-fiction, with all of the implications such a claim carries, theoretical 
concerns are supplanted by the most elemental and essential of questions: Did she get 
it right? Is that what really happened? Matthew Kieran writes, “the quest for truth is 
tightly linked to procedural matters such as checking the authenticity and 
trustworthiness of one’s sources, following up claims made to see if they bear out in 
fact, constitute plausible if unproved speculation or downright lies, attempting to 
discover if there are any motivations at work other than those presented” (152). This 
process is as relevant for subjects as it is for practitioners. As it unfolds, issues of 
memory, the relationship between writer and subject, investigative methods and 
writing practices may be scrutinised. The factual status of a text may be challenged on 
any or all of these grounds. In daily news reports, disagreements over facts or figures 
are often resolved quickly by confirmation, retraction or correction; lengthier disputes 
may take longer to resolve but often can be done without intervention by a mediator.20 
The depth, complexity and bi-referential nature of literary journalism, however, create 
a distinctive set of issues that are much harder to resolve than by straightforward 
factual verification. Book-length works further compound epistemic issues, as the 
sheer enormity of time spent in immersive reporting situations generates and 
proliferates possible versions of verifiable experience, and potentially deepens an 
author’s sense of their own subjectivity.  
 
Traditional codes of journalistic practice fail to address some of these issues, 
particularly those of an epistemological nature. There is considerable overlap of the 
ethical and the epistemological in journalistic standards developed by organisations 
such as the Society of Professional Journalists (SJP) in the United States and the 
Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA) in Australia.21 But as noted in 
chapter two, these are not binding on book-length works of literary journalism. 
Indeed, there has been no consensus on, or professional standards drawn for, the 
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practice of literary journalism in this respect (see McKay, “Åsne Seierstad” 178). 
Independent texts also fall outside of the jurisdiction of independent media regulatory 
bodies, such as the Australian Press Council (APC), which adjudicate complaints 
when standards appear to be broken.22 This of course does not prevent practitioners 
from adopting their principles. Ricketson observes that Jon Krakauer is the only 
exception to nineteen leading American practitioners, interviewed by Boynton for The 
New New Journalism, who endorse professional codes of ethics for daily journalism, 
and John Bryson is the only exception to Ricketson’s own six Australian interviewees 
who endorse the MEAA’s code of ethics (“Ethical Issues” 16). But this observation 
belies the fact that some practitioners do not consider themselves journalists or bound 
by conventional codes of practice. One example is the Australian novelist Chloe 
Hooper, whose experience contrasts with those mentioned above. When researching 
her first work of literary journalism, she understood herself to be working “outside” 
the traditions of anthropology and journalism, and had her own code of conduct. She 
explains, in “every sentence there’s a weight that’s there. … At the end of the day, I 
just felt that I had to tell the truth, and I hope that I’ve done that the right way” 
(Warhaft, In Conversation).  
 
Book-length literary journalism is consequently a “no-man’s land” in that 
practitioners have support neither from an institution, such as a newspaper or 
magazine corporation, nor an established or universal code of practice. As veteran 
practitioner John McPhee states in The Literary Journalists, “Nobody’s making rules 
that cover everybody” (in Sims, Literary Journalists 15). Nicholas Lemann also notes 
that many journalists writing their first books are shocked to learn that “Books, unlike 
newspapers and magazines, often aren’t edited or even vetted for accuracy” (in Sims, 
Literary Journalists 192). Texts are not produced in a vacuum, however. Each new 
project represents the opportunity for a practitioner to examine their epistemic 
responsibility and set reader expectations accordingly. Where, then, can literary 
journalists look for guidance when considering their epistemic responsibility?  
 
Thomas Lake’s short work of literary journalism, “The Last Heavy Footfalls of Doc 
Hullender” (2009), invites an interesting discussion in relation to standards of 
epistemic responsibility. The article, published in the online magazine Atlanta, is 
approximately 6,400 words and billed as “How a kid from Gwinnett County became 
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an Army medic, served on the front lines of two wars, and faced a question as old as 
the Earth” (see “The Last”). The subject of the article is the death of Michael “Doc” 
Hullender, an army medic deployed in Iskandariyah, Iraq, in 2007. Hullender’s death 
is portrayed as futile, as he was running to treat an injured soldier who had already 
been attended by a medic. This was his first attempt to treat a soldier’s wounds in 
battle, despite nearly nine years in the Army. But the refrain running through the 
narrative, “Am I my brother’s keeper?” produces a polemical quality in the piece; 
Iraqis are marginalised in the narrative and portrayed as subverting attempts at peace, 
which subtly raises the question of why was Hullender—an all-American boy—in 
Iraq at all? Accompanying the narrative is a hyperlink that invites the reader to “read 
about this story”, and links to another webpage in the magazine, where Lake outlines 
in approximately 1,800 words his sources for the piece (see Lake, “About”). These 
range from background information, such as “Babylon was a major city on the 
Euphrates River in what is now southern Iraq”, to disclosure of sources, “Kyle told 
the story of their meeting”, to empirical evidence supporting peripheral detail: “Chad 
said ten Miller Lites was a typical night. One Miller Lite has 96 calories, so ten would 
contain 960 calories” (“The Last”). Lake demonstrates a clear commitment to 
disclosure transparency here; his practice reflects the importance of verifiability of the 
narrative, and at least an equal emphasis given to correspondence as to coherence. But 
is such a practice viable for long-form narrative literary journalism? Is it necessary? 
Or even desirable? Readers may or may not choose to explore the link. If they do, 
does the abundance of detail undermine the rhetorical effect produced by the piece? 
And, finally, does such emphasis on epistemic defence distract the reader from 
acknowledging the author’s embedded yet powerful pro-American and anti-Iraqi 
rhetoric—one feature of the piece that is factually unverifiable? 
 
Literary journalism’s emphasis on the subjectivity of experience—the practitioner’s, 
the subject’s, or both—is clearly a double-edged sword. It sweeps away the illusion of 
a quantifiable reality produced by objective reporting, but simultaneously opens itself 
up to criticism on the grounds that its epistemic foundation does not correlate to 
mainstream journalism’s objectivity standard. Here, Code’s Epistemic Responsibility 
provides a strong basis for epistemic enquiry. It has been applied to both journalism 
and literary journalism in limited ways (see for example Cooper; Meyers; Aucoin), 
and in this chapter will be applied to controversial cases to assess the epistemic 
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responsibility of the practitioners involved. Code advocates reflexive questioning 
when determining or assessing epistemic responsibility. As Cooper notes, this type of 
questioning is generalised in the sense that it applies to all human discourse (87), but 
he employs Code’s method specifically to assess mainstream journalistic discourse. It 
is also applicable to literary journalism—arguably even more so, given that literary 
journalists must often consider and defend their authority in a way daily journalists do 
not. In this chapter, questions evaluating practitioners’ epistemic responsibility will be 
applied to various controversies. Questions such as: “Do I really know what I think I 
know?”; “Do I know enough to act (as I do)?”; “What don’t I know?”; “What are the 
moral consequences of my knowing [or] ignorance?”; and “Should I know more or 
acknowledge incomplete knowledge?” (Cooper 86) illuminate the epistemic roots of 
some ostensibly ethical controversial practices. I argue that Code’s approach can be 
employed as a useful framework to guide literary journalists through the process of 
negotiating their own epistemic responsibility. 
 
The relationship between the author-reader contract and transparency is also 
emphasized here. As noted in previous chapters, calls for transparency in mainstream 
media have proliferated in recent years. Plaisance, for example, writes that the 
Kantian notion of transparency needs to take centre stage in media ethics. In the 
struggle to “find rational ways to balance competing interests and values, the concept 
of transparency ensures that all the players, or stakeholders, are speaking the same 
language” (191). However, the following analyses pose the question introduced at the 
start of this chapter: is transparency the cure for controversy? And if not, to what 
extent should contemporary literary journalists adopt transparency as a standard? 
These cases bring into focus the relationship between knowledge, reality, truth, 
narrative, transparency, paratexts and author-reader contracts. The analyses in this 
chapter finally establish an analytical framework for subsequent readings of book-
length literary journalism in this thesis. 
 
Janet Malcolm and Helen Garner  
 
Perhaps the most widely recognised case in which a literary journalist’s interpretation 
of “non-fiction” clashed with the subject’s was publically tried between 1984 and 
1996 in Masson v. New Yorker. In this case, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson sued Janet 
Malcolm, a writer for the New Yorker magazine, for libel over claims that Malcolm 
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had both doctored and invented quotations in a profile of Masson for the magazine. 
The crux of the case was ultimately a discrepancy between Malcolm’s and Masson’s 
definition of what constitutes a quotation, and the limitations governing journalists 
when they represent speech. Malcolm’s own interpretation of the case was that it 
degenerated into a “farcical squabble” about “the degree to which a journalist may 
function as a writer rather than a stenographer” (The Journalist 157), although the 
publicity the case attracted suggests that more was at stake than whether a quotation 
should be transcribed verbatim or not. As Kathy Roberts Forde summarises, the 
crucial issue involved “the legitimacy of various professionally acceptable methods 
available to the press in representing reality.” She continues:  
 
In a press married to the ideal of objectivity—an ideal underpinning the 
notion that verbatim quotation is both possible and necessary in the 
accurate and truthful portrayal of the world as it is—Janet Malcolm’s 
understanding of quotation was ethically suspect. According to the 
received terms and norms of objectivity, to believe that some kind of 
translation must occur between speech and the written word was to 
disbelieve the journalistic premise that a report could correspond 
objectively and naturally to reality (57).  
 
Malcolm’s “understanding of quotation” is framed here as a moral charge: her 
understanding is “ethically suspect”. I would argue that at play here is a conflation of 
ethics and epistemology, or “semantic overlap” (Code, ER 45). “It is one thing to 
assert,” Code writes, “that we defend our beliefs and conclusions in ways very similar 
to those in which we defend our moral actions. It is significantly different to assert 
that our epistemic principles are moral principles tout court” (ER 48). Code’s aims 
are to show that epistemic concepts are not reducible to ethical concepts, and that 
humans structure epistemological reasoning on an analogy with moral reasoning. 
“This does not amount to an insistence that we separate the moral from the epistemic 
uses of terms such as ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘justified,’ ‘unjustified’. The 
point is to understand the similarities and differences in the reasoning processes that 
warrant the application of these terms” (ER 48). The result of collapsing these 
categories into each other is an emphasis on the ethical over the epistemic. In fact, the 
way Malcolm understands quotation is primarily an epistemic issue. In this case, 
charging Malcolm with an ethical breach obscured the epistemic core of the issue. If 
her practice was suspect, the charge should be an epistemic misdemeanour; Malcolm 
in fact acted ethically by acting out her principles.  
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This situation invites the question: Can a belief be judged ethically unsound? Code 
does not insist on separating moral and epistemic uses of terms, but some unpacking 
is helpful when considering this question. The terms “right” and “wrong” can be used 
in an ethical sense, working almost synonymously with “good” and “bad”. These are 
essentially value judgements. Epistemically, however, “right” and “wrong” are more 
closely aligned with the terms “accurate” and “inaccurate”, which suggest empirical 
validity. I would therefore argue that the “semantic overlap” has wrongly indicted 
Malcolm on a breach of ethics. As Forde demonstrates with a historical analysis of 
North American literary journalism, Malcolm was acting within a parallel branch of 
epistemology that is justifiable, if marginalised.23  
 
Malcolm articulated her epistemic foundation in the “Afterword” of The Journalist 
and the Murderer (1990). In a much-quoted passage, she wrote, “This world is not the 
world of journalistic discourse. When a journalist undertakes to quote a subject he has 
interviewed on tape, he owes it to the subject, no less than to the reader, to translate 
his speech into prose. Only the most uncharitable (or inept) journalist will hold a 
subject to his literal utterances and fail to perform the sort of editing and rewriting 
that, in life, our ear automatically and instantaneously performs” (The Journalist 155). 
While the phrase “he owes it to the subject” invokes the ethical dimension of this 
transaction, the root of the issue here are the cognitive processes of understanding and 
the apprehension of meaning. This is primarily an epistemic issue. Further explication 
of Malcolm’s position can be found in the trial transcript, where she states: “I think 
it’s wrong to make up quotes if you’re writing non-fiction … I mean, that’s one of the 
rules of the genre . . . It’s one of its pleasures, too” (in Fakazis 9). The articulation of 
Malcolm’s epistemic foundation, which establishes her belief that “the literally true 
may actually be a kind of falsification of reality” (The Journalist 154), can be 
considered what Genette terms a “delayed” epitextual item (Paratexts 330). Clearly, 
had these beliefs been articulated before the interviewing process began, Masson 
might not have agreed to participate in the article. Use of this information at the time 
of publication might have affected its reception; although, along with the New 
Yorker’s established editorial standards, readers’ familiarity with, and expectations of, 
the New Yorker’s style were not considered in the trial.24  
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Regarding transparency, the Supreme Court found that the Masson profiles offered 
the reader “no clue that the quotations [were] being used as a rhetorical device or to 
paraphrase the speaker’s actual statements” (Forde 45). In this, the Court correctly 
identified a lack of peritextual information necessary to negotiate a reading of the 
article, but it also disregarded Malcolm’s belief along with the ideological foundation 
of the magazine, which arguably functions as epitext for its articles. Readers familiar 
with the New Yorker’s style would arguably not have expected verbatim quotations 
and understood that literary style necessitates editing and refinement of speech into 
prose. But, in spite of this, the Supreme Court found for the plaintiff in 1993, 
concluding that falsity existed in quotations that were altered “so as to change 
materially the original meaning” (Forde 150). A mistrial was declared when the jury 
could not decide on damages, and in a subsequent Ninth Circuit court trial, the jury 
found for Malcolm. The case was finally dismissed by the appellate court in 1996, 
bringing to an end a twelve-year dispute, but the verdict did little to narrow the breach 
between mainstream journalistic and alternative, ideologically divergent practices.  
 
From one perspective, a case such as Masson v. New Yorker highlights how—in a 
court of law at least—the author’s intentions, narrative technique and reporting 
practices are central to a non-fiction text’s interpretation and meaning. It also shows 
the potentially dire consequences of not offering an author-reader contract. In this 
case, the reader had no peritext to draw upon to inform their reading (or, to define the 
contract). Written epitextual information was at best general to the publication as a 
whole, rather than specific to articles or practitioners who were presumably working 
under the same editors, but operating from different epistemological bases. Perhaps 
one of the most illuminating aspects of this case was that it was tried in the Supreme 
Court under the “actual malice” standard, a test which states that false and 
defamatory factual statements receive constitutional protection unless they are 
published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth (Forde 85). In 
both cases, it is the author and/or publisher’s knowledge and regard or disregard for 
the truth that is on trial. This places the author’s epistemic foundation in a central 
position—but in the initial finding against Malcolm, the validity of her belief was 
disregarded.  
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Interestingly, Forde notes that many observers attributed Malcolm’s ultimate win “at 
least in part to her rehabilitated look and demeanor. … Charles Morgan, Masson’s 
lawyer, told [Forde] that he was not able to convince the second jury, as he had the 
first, that Malcolm deliberately changed Masson’s language to make him look bad—
primarily because Malcolm presented herself so much better in the second trial” 
(193). Although it is only possible to speculate here, it is reasonable to draw a 
connection between the actual malice standard and the jury’s trust in the defendant’s 
integrity or character. Forde notes that press coverage of the first trial had described 
Malcolm as having a “severe bearing” and a “prickly demeanour” which were 
softened in the second trial by a “more colourful appearance—tailored dresses in soft 
pinks and greens, white stockings, brown suede pumps, and the absence of gray hair” 
(193). This is interesting in the light of Code’s contention that “intellectual integrity 
counts as a significant part of the evidence in much the same way as, in moral 
matters, a person’s moral integrity is a determining factor in decisions as to whether 
she or he should be trusted” (ER 39). Increased emphasis on actual malice in the 
second trial, accompanied by Malcolm’s more engaging look and demeanour, 
suggests that the jury may have been influenced to consider the issue in terms of the 
trustworthiness of the defendant. 
 
A year after publication of the disputed article, William Shawn, editor of the New 
Yorker, claimed that the reporting in the magazine was “as close to being scientific in 
its objectivity as reporting can be”, that the magazine tried to have “no advocacy, to 
have no prejudices” and that “at the New Yorker not only accuracy but truthfulness is 
sacred” (in Kornstein 130). Such claims come under Genette’s definition for 
substantial epitext—that is, textual, accessible epitext as opposed to ephemeral 
“reputation”. In the light of disgraced reporter Alastair Reid’s claims and the 
controversy surrounding both Reid and Gail Sheehy, Shawn’s comments suggest that 
he had a blind spot to some practices by New Yorker employees.25 These claims were 
subsequently misleading. Malcolm’s narrative techniques may not have been outside 
the New Yorker’s non-fiction tradition, but compression of quotations and altered 
scenes do not represent “objective” reporting practice, if the goal of objectivity is 
consistent, reliable, replicable results (Kovach and Rosenstiel 72, 81).  
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Throughout this case, Malcolm did not demonstrate evidence that she had considered 
the moral consequences of her knowing—but not disclosing—her epistemic 
foundation. Clearly there are ethical issues here in that Malcolm had developed a 
relationship with Masson without disclosing her opinion or characterization of him in 
her profile. But as a standard of epistemic responsibility, did keeping both her 
narrative technique and ideology regarding quotations opaque constitute a break of 
faith with her potential readers? The final verdict suggests not. The literal 
consequences in this case were a libel suit and a twelve-year legal proceeding, but 
the scrutiny of Malcolm throughout this case was evidently damaging to her, both 
personally and professionally. 
 
Interestingly, Janet Malcolm is cited amongst the strongest influences of Helen 
Garner, whose first work of literary journalism brings epistemic limitations into 
question. Arguably Australia’s most notable literary journalist, Garner’s highly 
subjective, boundary-pushing non-fiction has provoked critical debate and received 
both censure and praise from leading Australian intellectuals. Turning to freelance 
journalism and writing after being fired from a secondary school under controversial 
circumstances, Garner’s first novel was commercially successful but critically 
reviewed as a thinly veiled autobiography—an assessment she contested until 
recently (see Byrne). The First Stone: Some Questions About Sex and Power, 
Garner’s first work of book-length literary journalism, was published in 1995. 
Immediately following its publication, the book caused a highly public controversy 
over a number of issues, including the author-reader contract, the illocutionary power 
of the term “non-fiction” and the limitations of journalistic practice. But Garner’s 
book was controversial for reasons beyond these. Firstly, the content of The First 
Stone was particularly sensitive, being a sexual harassment claim of two young 
women against the Dean of Ormond College—a prestigious hall of residence at 
Melbourne University. Secondly, as Malcolm later wrote in a New Yorker review, 
Garner “showed her hand too early” ("Women at War") by writing the Dean a 
sympathetic letter before beginning her investigation, before, in an inevitably futile 
attempt to preserve his anonymity, giving the Dean the evocative pseudonym “Colin 
Shepherd”. Thirdly, as one reviewer contends, Garner’s response to the case “was 
too complex to survive translation into journalism, a danger that the two young 
women seem to have realised long before Garner when they chose not to speak out” 
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(Giles). Willa McDonald also observes that The First Stone pushed boundaries that 
had not been tested before in Australia. She writes that Garner’s work has “provoked 
censure when it has refused to follow traditional journalistic conventions; chosen not 
to establish a clear contract of intention with its readership; privileged the 
exploration of the writer’s emotions over intellectual frameworks; and challenged 
traditional notions of subjectivity and objectivity” (260). And finally, the controversy 
over Garner’s book figured heavily in the culture wars playing out on a national 
scale. Closely related to the “history wars” cited in the first chapter of this thesis, the 
“culture wars” called into question hegemonic ideologies and values. Proponents on 
both sides of the history wars weighed in on The First Stone controversy as it created 
the perfect storm of issues: the role of subjectivity and interpretation in 
history/journalism; patriarchal hegemonic dominance in Australian academic/high 
culture; and the role of journalism in the construction of identity—both metaphorical 
and literal. 
 
While Garner was—rightly—charged with a number of ethical lapses in her research 
and writing on the Ormond case, it is again instructive to separate some of these 
breaches from their epistemic roots. For Code, “The process of acquiring knowledge 
is as open to evaluation as are its outer, publicly observable products, for ‘it is a task 
to come to see the world as it is’. The manner of performing this task determines the 
quality of knowledge achieved” (ER 137). This stance is one of epistemological 
realism, where the goal is “right” perception and cognition (ER 137). It was 
contended in the previous chapter that Garner carried out her research for Joe 
Cinque’s Consolation with a subjectivist approach. This is also evident in The First 
Stone. Garner initially framed The First Stone as “an extended work of reportage”, but 
close critical appraisal quickly found that the expectations set by the term “reportage” 
were not met in the text. Scrutiny of the text began after academic Jenna Mead 
revealed in a public speech that Garner used six different characters to represent her 
in The First Stone. Not only was this ethically suspect, claimed Mead, but it created 
and supported an illusion of a “feminist conspiracy” against the alleged perpetrator of 
the sexual harassment charge and his supporters—who included Garner (Mead 123). 
This, and Mead’s further accusations, caused a furore amongst academics, journalists 
and the general public, which was fuelled by vitriolic talkback radio commentary, 
editorial pieces and scholarly journal articles.  
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After rigorous questioning of narrative techniques such as reconstructed dialogue and 
lack of attribution of sources, Garner was forced to include an author’s note at the 
beginning of seven successive reprints of the book between 1996 and 2005. This, 
however, did not assuage public anger at the perceived break in faith. Others simply 
read the book as fiction. One critic, Ann Curthoys, explicitly linked the lack of 
disclosure transparency as a form of contract in itself. She writes of The First Stone: 
 
I read it from the beginning as a semi-fictional account, based on real 
events, the fictionality, I thought, being indicated by the dialogue, and 
the lack of any indication of the relationship of the text to its sources. 
This, I thought, was immediately obvious: The First Stone adopted the 
protocols of citation and referencing of neither the journalist nor the 
historian. I was surprised both by Helen Garner’s own claims in various 
interviews that it was ‘nonfiction’, and by the shock many people felt 
later on learning that one person … had formed the basis for several 
different characters. To me, it was always clearly a novel, albeit 
alluding quite openly, as many novels do, to well-known ‘real’ events 
(191).  
 
Curthoys was not alone in reading the book as a work of fiction (see Ricketson, “True 
Stories” 163). The author’s note in subsequent reprints conceivably went some way 
towards clarifying the book’s epistemic roots, but for some it caused even more 
confusion. In it, Garner writes: “I … encountered obstacles to my research which 
forced me, ultimately, to write a broader, less ‘objective’, more personal book. They 
also obliged me to raise the story on to a level where, instead of its being just an 
incident specific to one institution at one historical moment, its archetypical features 
have become visible” (The First Stone np). There is still no mention here of Mead’s 
character being split into at least six; Garner’s “less objective, more personal” 
disclaimer does not engage with the fact Mead exists, and the reference to the story 
being raised to another level may account for those who read the work as fiction—
against the intention of the author.  
Garner’s later introduction to True Stories (1997) includes a reflective statement on 
the author-reader contract. She writes that a writer’s non-fiction contract with a reader 
is different to that of fiction: 
 
A reader of nonfiction counts on you to remain faithful to the same 
‘real’ world that both reader and writer physically inhabit. As a 
nonfiction writer you have … an implicit contract with your material 
and with the people you are writing about: you have to figure out an 
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honourable balance between tact and honesty. … You have a 
responsibility to the ‘facts’ as you discover them, and an obligation to 
make it clear when you have not been able to discover them (“The Art 
of a Dumb Question” 7–8). 
 
This objectivist statement, however, belies Garner’s actual epistemic approach to her 
subject. Firstly, her interest in the Ormond Case can be evaluated. Code asserts that 
the question: “Who cares?” is epistemological in the same sense as the question: 
“Who knows?” She writes that a position of caring (Garner’s point of departure for 
her narrative) “operates from a presumed … knowledge that the situations in question 
are appropriate sites for the practice of care; that their participants … need or want 
this kind of care; and that the presumptive carer(s) know(s) them well enough to 
provide the care they require”. Further, the question of who cares “calls upon self-
proclaimed carers to elaborate the epistemic qualifications—how they have informed 
themselves, what their interests are—that entitle them to intervene in these people’s 
lives, here and now” (“Who Cares?” 106). Did Garner have access to knowledge 
about “Colin Shepherd’s” needs? Or the complainants’? In the book, Garner almost 
immediately informs her readers of her epistemic qualifications: “One morning in 
August 1992 I opened the Age [newspaper] at breakfast time and read that a man I 
had never heard of, the Master of Ormond College, was up before a magistrate on a 
charge of indecent assault: a student had accused him of having put his hand on her 
breast while they were dancing.” Garner recounts the “jolt” she got from this 
“desolate little item”, and remembers thinking: “Has the world come to this?” (The 
First Stone 15). Her first reaction was not to call the newspaper, or Shepherd, to 
whom she evidently had access, but “women friends of my age, feminists pushing 
fifty. They had all noticed the item and been unsettled by it” (The First Stone 15). 
This first step arguably demonstrates a questionable choice in terms of defining an 
epistemic community. While she had not yet perhaps decided to write on the case, 
Garner’s responsibility as a “knower” is complicated here; her actions also belie the 
position of care she establishes in the narrative for her subjects and for discovering 
the “full” story. 
 
I also argue that Garner’s practice suffered not from a lack of transparency, but from 
asking questions that would lead to “right” perception and cognition. She did make 
clear when she was not able to discover facts—for example, Garner was quite open 
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about not having access to the young women who pressed charges. However, she is 
not reflexive about the way she creates “knowledge”. As with Joe Cinque’s 
Consolation, The First Stone is highly introspective; the creation of knowledge relies 
heavily on Garner’s senses. Consider the following the following passage:  
 
Stepping in from the beautiful gardens, with their flowering lines and 
spring foliage, I felt the halls in their grandeur to be overwhelmingly 
masculine: spartan, comfortless, forbidding. I had to pinch myself to 
remember that Ormond College, though originally established for men 
and their needs, had been admitting women as resident students for 
almost twenty years. To a passing observer, the presence of women 
seemed to have left no mark (The First Stone 22).  
 
Mead’s blunt assessment reads:  
 
The book substitutes hearsay and innuendo for fact and evidence. 
Analysis of the events and their consequences is displaced in favour of 
[Garner’s] own fantasies about what might have happened, accounts 
of her dreams, muddied transcripts of interviews, bits of documents, 
uninformed attempts at understanding sexual and institutional politics, 
caricatures of feminism and foggy dates (122).  
 
A similar criticism notes “Garner’s description on pages 20-22 of Ormond College 
itself is long on atmosphere but light on relevant facts” (Ricketson, “Hitchhiking” 
95). The “rendering of felt detail” is typical of literary journalism (Connery, 
Sourcebook 3), but in the absence of critical facts, Garner relies too heavily on such 
details to create a coherent narrative. Subsequently, and of central importance to this 
discussion, Garner offers her perceptions as knowledge. This is not inherently 
irresponsible: Code writes that  
 
for the intellectually virtuous, self-knowledge is as important as, and 
indeed complementary to, knowledge of the world. To achieve it, one 
must, presumably, be good at introspection, and this capacity … can 
be cultivated in oneself, even though there are crucial conscious and 
unconscious limitations upon the extent to which self-knowledge can 
be achieved and/or claimed, even through introspection (ER 57).   
 
The problem here, as Mead has identified, is presenting self-knowledge as a 
substitution for inaccessible knowledge. Given the lack of access she had to three of 
the four main parties involved in the Ormond case—the two complainants and Jenna 
Mead—this is epistemically irresponsible. Evidently, breaches identified by Garner’s 
 
 
 105 
critics were indeed ethical, but I argue that they were the logical product of poor 
epistemic practice and a lack of reflexivity in vital areas. These can best be 
characterised as “epistemic blind spots”, and stand as cautions to future practitioners. 
 
In summary, these cases highlight Garner’s problematic epistemological practice. 
Rhetorical techniques used in both The First Stone and Joe Cinque’s Consolation 
suggest that Garner did not act epistemically responsibly. Reflexively applying the 
questions “What are the limitations on my knowledge?”; “Do I really know what I 
think I know?” and “Have I made claims that I cannot substantiate?”; immediately 
illuminates epistemic deficiencies. Furthermore, Garner’s failure to disclose her 
practice clearly in initial and subsequent paratextual material lessened the epistemic 
defensibility of her book. If Code’s approach to epistemic responsibility is applied to 
these cases, it becomes evident that these situations were avoidable. As Cooper states 
of epistemic responsibility, “In thinking more fully, more deeply, more carefully, we 
may anticipate and prevent damaging consequences, and evoke an enlightening 
atmosphere” (100).  
 
Both Malcolm’s and Garner’s cases demonstrate that while alternative journalistic 
traditions exist quite legitimately and defensibly alongside mainstream journalism, 
they do not yet have the weight of recognition necessary to bridge the distance 
between expectations set by generic labels. In the cases above, writing techniques 
such as the compression of quotations, split characterisation, name suppression (and 
choice of pseudonym) as well as the role of subjectivity were contested. The 
reporting processes of both practitioners were called into question. This process of 
acquiring knowledge is “a task to come to see the world as it is” (ER 137 emphasis in 
original). In both cases, the quality and accuracy of the practitioners’ knowledge was 
challenged. Neither Malcolm nor Garner had access to a generic term that accurately 
set expectations for the narrative techniques they employed, but neither did they 
provide epistemic defence to bridge the gap between expectations set by generic cues 
and actual narratives. The Malcolm case itself produced a great deal of epistemic 
defence for the New Yorker’s practices, literary journalism in general, as well as 
being a catalyst for Janet Malcolm’s own manifesto in The Journalist and the 
Murderer. In Garner’s case, The First Stone struck a number of sensitive cultural, 
moral and ethical nerves, and her lack of disclosure was widely criticised in the 
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media.26 Each situation did, however, act as a catalyst for the practitioners involved 
to reflect on their practice and adjust accordingly, with varying degrees of success.27 
 
Joe McGinniss and Åsne Seierstad 
 
If Malcolm’s and Garner’s cases highlight issues stemming from a lack of 
paratextual information, the controversies surrounding Joe McGinniss’s The Last 
Brother: The Rise and Fall of Teddy Kennedy (1993) and Åsne Seierstad’s The 
Bookseller of Kabul (2003) illustrate how the opposite can also be true. In the midst 
of calls for increased journalistic transparency, the following cases demonstrate that 
disclosing research and writing practices does not necessarily result in decreased 
controversy. Allen’s cautions about the function of transparency inform this 
discussion. He warns that while disclosure transparency is intended to increase 
legitimacy and function as a system of accountability, it can also increase criticism 
rather than understanding (323); it can provide reasons to challenge the authority of 
the text (326); it may become a substitute for moral reasoning (332), and can be 
employed to deceive (325)—the last two of which are evident in the following 
example. 
 
The amount of paratextual information in The Last Brother suggests that McGinniss 
has gone to great lengths to inform the reader of his intentions, and to defend what he 
acknowledges may be a controversial rendering of Edward Kennedy’s life. 
McGinniss sets the tone for his narrative with an allographic epigraph from Adrienne 
Rich’s Diving into the Wreck: “I came to explore the wreck… / I came to see the 
damage that was done … / the wreck and not the story of the wreck / the thing itself 
and not the myth / the drowned face always staring towards the sun” (11). Here 
McGinniss invokes Genette’s second and most canonical function of the epigraph, 
which “consists of commenting on the text [as opposed to the title], whose meaning 
it indirectly specifies” (Paratexts 157). His intention is to demythologise “the thing 
itself”—ostensibly Teddy Kennedy—with his book. Much is made of the Kennedy 
myth throughout the lengthy introduction (13, 20, 22, 26) and particularly the four-
page author’s note at the end of the book where McGinniss writes: “Teddy Kennedy 
is far more than simply a seasoned United States senator from a prominent family. 
He is our last living link to the Kennedys of Camelot … Whatever else he may be, 
Teddy remains the embodiment of the central secular myth of our age … It has not 
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been enough for him to be simply Teddy” (619–20). McGinniss reinforces his 
intention of dispelling the myth in the author’s note, writing “it was in the hope of 
examining the effect of this phenomenon on the dutiful, resilient, flawed but willing 
Teddy Kennedy that I undertook to write this book. … This is my view, and perhaps 
mine alone, of what life might have been like for Teddy—especially during the 
1960s, when he was forced to be not only man but myth as well” (621). The irony 
here is evident; in undertaking to expose the “real” man, McGinniss has produced yet 
another “version” or “myth” of Senator Kennedy—his own.  
 
This judgment is reinforced by the narrative techniques McGinniss uses to portray 
the subjectivity of Teddy Kennedy, including recreated dialogue, free indirect 
thought report and interior monologue. By the time of The Last Brother’s publication 
in 1993, New Journalism had been out of fashion for almost two decades, but those 
who remembered the New Journalists’ exploration of subjectivity would most likely 
have remembered claims attending the use of controversial techniques. Defending 
interior monologue, for example, John Sack explained that “the writer merely had to 
ask” to know what his or her subject was thinking at any given moment. And in the 
context of reporting dialogue, he stated, “I hate to use the word reconstructed 
because [it] means that I make up the conversation … . But I just mean that … every 
conversation is something somebody told me they said’” (in Weingarten 160). From 
McGinniss’s introduction, however, it is evident that he only met his subject once 
briefly in 1968, spent six days with him in 1973 or 1974, and briefly again on the 
campaign trail in 1988, without ever having obtained an interview in which these 
events or dialogue were discussed.28 Aucoin questions McGinniss’s claimed 
“stylistic right to leap inside Teddy Kennedy’s head” on other grounds, observing 
that it would not be unreasonable “for a reader to mistrust McGinniss’s work, 
particularly when his ethical lapses from past writing assignments are considered as 
part of his MacIntyrean accounting” (17). Aucoin is referring to McGinniss’s ethical 
lapses as outlined by Janet Malcolm in The Journalist and the Murderer. Aucoin 
here invokes professional reputation as epitext that a reader may rightfully employ to 
inform their reading of McGinniss’s work. But are these reasonable grounds to 
distrust a would-be “knower”? Code asserts that the intellectual character of an agent 
is of central relevance to how a knowledge claim will be judged, in a process 
analogous to judgment of moral actions according to the moral character of an agent 
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(ER 29 emphasis in original). One might argue that intellectual and moral character 
are inseparable, but the point was made in the previous chapter that an individual 
can, indeed, be intellectually virtuous without being morally virtuous. My point here 
is not that Aucoin’s critique is unfounded; rather, that conflation of the categories is 
common and easily overlooked. At times an ethical critique may be warranted, but in 
other cases caution must be exercised to differentiate between intellectual and moral 
virtue. In this case, when epitext, peritext and the narrative itself are combined, it is 
reasonable to contend that McGinniss not only based his writing methods on flawed 
epistemological foundations, but, in doing so, he also failed to fulfil his own stated 
intention, thus defaulting on the extensive author-reader contract proposed in the 
peritext. 
 
As Jack Fuller notes, critics condemned the 1993 book variously as “an illustration 
of just how corrupt and decadent our cultural, intellectual time has become,” 
“shameless”, “licentious”, and “a textbook example of shoddy journalistic and 
publishing ethics” (News Values 149–50). Fuller further observes that the “intensity 
of the reaction to McGinniss’s book was peculiar, since McGinniss was just a little 
more candid about his method than most” (News Values 150). Indeed, the peritextual 
notes form somewhat of a defensive argument for the techniques used and liberties 
taken. The central issue here is not that the contract established was ambiguous, but 
rather that it was established on a poor epistemological basis. Despite, or because of, 
the lengthy justification, McGinniss’s aims are both contradictory and misleading. 
However, I would contend that the (ethical) criticisms of McGinniss as “shameless”, 
“corrupt”, and “decadent” are at least contestable on the grounds that McGinniss had 
justified his practices—initially to himself, and then the reader. His justifications are 
clearly epistemically unsupportable, but McGinniss’s lack of intellectual virtue 
should be the target of criticism and improvement, rather than his moral integrity.  
 
Another way of reading the negotiation between author and reader in this situation is 
to see the paratext—specifically, the peritext—as lessening the rhetorical force of the 
narrative itself. As reader-response theorist James Phelan writes,  
 
In reading, we are, strikingly, both passive and active, as the text acts 
upon us and we act upon it; the text calls upon—and we respond with—
our cognitive, emotive, psychological, social and ethical selves (though 
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of course different texts will engage some of these selves more fully 
than others). When I speak of ‘experiencing the text,’ I refer to this two-
sided, multi-dimensional, multileveled activity (711).  
 
In a non-fiction contractual negotiation, the paratext acts upon the reader—that is, 
applies illocutionary force in the manner it instructs or commands—but the reader 
has the ability also to act upon it. That is, readers create their own framework when 
they read reflexively. Despite—or, again, because of—the length and scope of 
McGinniss’s peritextual defence, its illocutionary force is arguably lessened with the 
result that a reader may approach the book within the frame of non-fiction, while 
retaining a healthy amount of scepticism about the possible accuracy of McGinniss’s 
insights—or the truth value of the book. 
 
McGinniss’s project brings into question its status as non-fiction. In The Art of Fact, 
Lounsberry argues that non-fiction must be solely composed of “documentable 
subject matter chosen from the real world as opposed to ‘invented’ from the writer’s 
mind” (xiii). She further asserts that “when the factual accuracy of a work is 
questioned, or when authorial promises are violated, a work of literary nonfiction is 
either discredited or transferred out of the category” (xiv). Lehman calls this “rigid 
police work” (Matters 17) and expresses concern at approaches that “welcome” some 
texts and “disqualify” others (“Mining” 340). Code’s writing on realism and 
understanding highlights a value judgement inherent in these different approaches: 
“To construe ‘realism’ normatively is to declare that the value in knowing and 
understanding how things are is greater than, and subsumes, the value of holding to 
favoured theories and cherished views of how they must be” (ER 136). McGinniss’s 
stated aim, in his words, to convey “my view, and perhaps mine alone, of what life 
might have been like for Teddy” (621) reveals a concerning epistemic foundation, 
and accounts for the “peculiar” reactions to his frank, transparent disclosures. The 
“peculiarity” can be accounted for in that objections were not made against the 
coherence of the text or the value of the disclosure; rather, criticism responded to a 
flawed epistemic foundation and McGinniss’s openness about his methods. 
Correspondence to reality, in this case, was sacrificed for narrative coherence. This is 
not a sound epistemic foundation for non-fiction. As Code writes, “One is to be 
guided in cognitive enterprises by an aim to understand how things really are, 
however difficult it may be to achieve such understanding. One should not rest 
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content with partial, simplified, or distorted accounts when, with greater effort, more 
adequate and more accurate ones can be achieved” (ER 136). Despite the cases of 
Malcolm and McGinniss, where no action was taken by publishing houses to re-
classify or market the texts as anything but “radical” or “controversial and 
compelling”, subsequent controversies over texts published as non-fiction suggest 
that public opinion is—to a great extent—with Lounsberry.  
 
Disclosure transparency failed again in a high-profile work of literary journalism in 
2003. Despite an extensive author-reader contract, a dispute arose when one of the 
central subjects of The Bookseller of Kabul (2003) “stepped out from its pages and 
repudiated the book” (Hill).29 The libel claim had multiple aspects that were 
considered breaches of journalistic ethics. However, here again it is possible to 
separate the ethical and epistemic strands of the case to gain greater insight into the 
interplay between the two categories, and reflect further on the impact of epistemic 
foundations on ethical considerations of literary journalism.  
 
An eight-year dispute against Åsne Seierstad began after The Bookseller of Kabul was 
published in 2003 and soon became the bestselling non-fiction book in Norwegian 
history (Topping). The subject of the narrative was a family living in Afghanistan in 
2002, whom Seierstad stayed with for four months after obtaining permission to write 
about their lives. After publication, however, the book’s central subject, Shah 
Muhammed Rais, objected to Seierstad’s portrayal of his family and vowed to 
discredit the book. A lawsuit was eventually filed after Rais rejected a private 
settlement offer from the publishers (Naughtie). al Yafai notes that “Rais’s criticism 
brings up a range of issues, from breach of trust and invasion of privacy, to a lack of 
cultural understanding. The questions are whether Seierstad truthfully reported what 
Suraia [Rais’s wife] was thinking (whether it was true) and also whether she 
accurately reflected Suraia’s story (whether it was accurate)” (np). The court initially 
ruled against Seierstad in July 2010. The judge cited negligence in reporting practice, 
but the actual finding of guilt concerned a breach of privacy. At the end of 2011, 
however, an appellate court judge overturned the finding, and Seierstad and her 
publisher were accordingly cleared of invading the family’s privacy and of factual 
inaccuracy. Following the outcome of the appeal, critics still had concerns about The 
Bookseller. As al Yafai asked, “How do you accurately reflect a society that isn’t your 
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own?” (np). Questions such as this signal the cultural gap between the experience of 
Seierstad—the daughter of a prominent Norwegian feminist—and that of her Afghani 
subjects. It also brings into focus how the methods of arriving at a belief 
(epistemology) unavoidably affect the moral product (ethics) of a situation. 
 
Along with al Yafai, McKay (2012) also identifies a number of issues arising from 
this case. These include the complexities of translation—both linguistic and cultural; 
the relationship between observer and observed; the technical and practical meanings 
of informed consent; representation of non-Western societies by western reporters; a 
journalist’s duty of care to their subject(s); and the problems inherent in shaping 
subjects into characters to promote reader engagement (“Åsne Seierstad” 177-183). 
McKay recognises that these issues are part ethical—in that they concern the 
relationship between journalists and their subjects—and part “literary”, “since they 
involve the question of how writers write about other people’s experiences” (“Åsne 
Seierstad” 175). My approach is in keeping with Code’s where she asserts that “Moral 
questions, then, have a central epistemic core that is commonly, but mistakenly, taken 
to be of a piece with the concerns submitted to moral scrutiny. This confusion tends to 
obscure a complexity that must be acknowledged” (ER 69). Here I seek to identify 
how Seierstad’s epistemological foundation precedes and informs her literary 
practice, thus distinguishing between epistemic and ethical considerations while 
demonstrating their interconnectedness.  
 
One of the significant issues arising out of this case is the use of third person point of 
view. While this has been cited by al Yafai as a moral issue, the core of its validity is 
an epistemic matter. Jack Fuller writes of extradiegetic narration: “Of all the 
techniques [Tom] Wolfe listed that blur the distinction between journalism and 
fiction, writing from the point of view of another person conflicts most sharply with 
the truth discipline. Without some intimacy with the characters, newswriting cannot 
create the feel of a traditional, realistic novel. But with too much intimacy, 
newswriting accepts a standard of truth that is far too low” (News Values 143). Fuller 
is responding here to Wolfe’s defence of third person point of view, including interior 
monologue and free indirect discourse—or slipping in and out of a subject’s 
consciousness without overt signalling. In the introduction to The New Journalism, 
Wolfe explains: “Yet how could a journalist, writing nonfiction, accurately penetrate 
 
 
 112 
the thoughts of another person? The answer proved to be marvellously simple: 
interview him about his thoughts and emotions, along with everything else” (The New 
Journalism 32). Wolfe’s defence—like Sack’s—was straightforward, but deceptively 
so as this case illustrates.  
 
Seierstad immersed herself in the family’s life for four months, was purportedly 
scrupulous in her gathering of information, and, like McGinniss, demonstrated a clear 
commitment to disclosure transparency. The peritext of The Bookseller contains a 
seven-page Foreword where the author describes the circumstances under which she 
met the bookseller and gained permission to write about his family. Seierstad also 
provides lengthy defence of narrative techniques used, some of which is reminiscent 
of Sack’s and Wolfe’s: “When I describe thoughts and feelings, the point of departure 
is what people told me they thought or felt in any given situation. Readers have asked 
me: ‘How do you know what goes on inside the heads of the various family 
members?’ I am not, of course, an omniscient author. Internal dialogue and feelings 
are based entirely on what family members described to me” (3). But this simple 
explanation belies the fact that Seierstad’s point of view is effectively hidden by the 
omniscient narrative mode. It reveals itself only in a reflexive reading. The appellate 
court did find that Seierstad accurately reported Suraia’s thoughts (Topping), but it 
did not take into account that her thoughts were contextualised according to 
Seierstad’s point of view—one that Rais claims is not held by Suraia. This is an area 
that even an extensive author-reader contract failed to cover, as the gap between a 
thought and its expression was implicitly filled by point of view. Here Allen’s 
argument that transparency can be employed as a substitute for moral reasoning can 
be seen in action (332). The gap was acknowledged in retrospect by Seierstad as a 
blind spot.30 But even if Seierstad had engaged with this issue in the extensive 
peritext, such discussion would arguably neither have changed the rhetorical effect of 
the technique in the narrative, nor prevented the claim from being brought against her 
in the libel suit.  
 
Seierstad’s epistemic defence here, that all internal dialogue and feelings were based 
on descriptions from her subjects, is solid. Between the gathering of information and 
its presentation, however, is Seierstad’s process of understanding—or forming 
coherence from these facts—apart from the point of view of her subjects, which 
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inevitably changes the meaning (and subsequent truth) of the subjects’ experience. 
Seierstad explains in an interview that her decision to represent the family in “a 
literary way” was intended to “force the reader into the story” and avoid a focus on 
her own reaction to the extremes of life in Afghanistan (Naughtie). This decision is 
primarily epistemic: Did the writer know enough to act in the way she did? Unlike 
Garner’s case, Seierstad was epistemically responsible in that she could defend her 
practice with her research—a position upheld by the legal finding of the case. 
However, as contended earlier, this mode of representation is ethically questionable, 
particularly given Seierstad’s strong views and the cultural gap between herself and 
her subjects. As one reviewer wrote, Seierstad’s “outrage at the way women are 
treated in the book crackles on every page” (Hill). Seierstad has every right 
epistemically and ethically to present her own point of view—but presenting it 
through the lens of her subjects is morally questionable.  
 
Another interesting epistemic point the culture gap raises is how point of view affects 
the meaning of facts. A 2010 interview with Seierstad and Rais highlighted divergent 
understanding of the term “bride price” between the author and her subject (Bennett 
Jones). Asked if he paid his father-in-law $300 for his wife, as the book states, Rais 
responded that such accusations were “impolite” and “defamed the honour” of 
himself and his brothers. When pressed, he emphasised that the fact of the $300 was 
not true at all; he paid over $20,000 but that constituted costs of the entire wedding, or 
“expenses and gifts to my wife”. Rais’s objection to the “very much impolite” 
assertion that he and his brothers had paid for wives might be grounds to conclude 
that the dispute was an attempt to defend his honour. But his explanation was that the 
“payment” (Seierstad’s term) was for wedding expenses; in civilian Kabul “they don’t 
sell and buy wives for themselves” (Bennett Jones). Seierstad responded that this 
point was not disputed in the court case, and demonstrated that her notes showed a 
direct quote from Rais regarding a $300 “bride price” She explained: “He [Rais] 
doesn’t like my expression of buying and selling. But when you read the book and 
you read about the discussions they have, that is how it happens in Afghanistan” 
(Bennett Jones).  
 
Cowlishaw writes that “terms such as ‘accuracy’, ‘the facts’ and ‘a disjunction 
between knower and known’ are not neutral or unambiguous ideas but represent 
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culturally and historically specific values. The prevailing value placed on measuring 
accuracy in quantitative, spatial and temporal terms may preclude the accurate 
representation of the meaning of an event to the differently positioned historical 
participants” (211 emphasis in original). Indeed, the term “buying and selling” used 
here is culturally specific and value-laden. The “truth” it carries for Seierstad coheres 
with her observations of gender inequity in Afghanistan. Similarly, Rais’s explanation 
is consistent with the way he understands Afghan society and women—the “bride 
price” is providing for his wife and her family rather than buying them. 
Correspondence and coherence here are both evident here. The “meaning” of the 
$300, however, is in dispute. In this case, Rais and Seierstad viewed the facts from 
different positions, affecting coherence, or “the interpretive procedures that allow a 
reader to transform the details of a text into larger meanings” (Rabinowitz 203). 
Should Seierstad be held accountable for presenting her interpretation of the bride 
price’s meaning and not Rais’s? Her position is epistemically valid. And as there is no 
standard of practice for literary journalism that calls for balance, if Seierstad is 
convicted of the truth of her assertion, and the facts are epistemically defensible, she 
does have a right to represent them as she perceives them. Careful consideration 
should be given, however, to imbalance caused by the rhetorical force of her own 
name as author and the disputed narrative techniques. In 2007, Rais also exercised his 
right to present his point of view by publishing Once Upon a Time There Was a 
Bookseller in Kabul, essentially a reply to Seierstad’s work of literary journalism. 
 
These two cases involving McGinniss and Seierstad bring into question the value of 
an extensive paratextual contract. In McGinniss’s case, the lengthy transparency 
disclosure was intended to defend the legitimacy of his narrative, whereas it actually 
leads the reader to the conclusion that McGinniss did not have sufficient access to 
Kennedy to perform the reconstructions and interior monologue in the narrative. The 
narrative frame was invalidated by a faulty epistemic foundation and compounded by 
poor journalistic practices. McGinniss’s paratextual defence did not validate his use 
of techniques such as interior monologue; in this way disclosure transparency failed. 
He did not have sufficient access to his subject to warrant his “stylistic right to leap 
inside Teddy Kennedy’s head”; thus his defence was unsuccessful. Disclaiming 
incomplete knowledge of the Kennedy family and Ted Kennedy’s situation (“This is 
my view, and perhaps mine alone”) also does not justify poor practice; again, his 
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limited access to his subject suggests that the authority often conferred by immersive 
reporting situations was not conferred to McGinniss.31  
 
In Seierstad’s case, an extensive author-reader contract contributed to the 
transparency of the text, but the narrative can still be contested on the grounds that her 
paratextual disclosure could not counter the rhetorical effect created by omniscient 
point of view. For Seierstad, the question: “What are the moral consequences of my 
knowing?” was not considered until after the libel suit. When knowing is more 
responsible, it is possible that the action might have been different (Code, ER 73). 
Seierstad later acknowledged that she had not considered the moral implications of 
(re)presenting the consciousness of Afghani women embedded within the 
construction of a Western, female reporter. But an examination of her epistemological 
foundations is also necessary. Seierstad concludes: “Journalism is moving into a 
different world where we are held to almost impossible standards. In everything I 
write, ever again, I need to make sure I am 100% accurate. A journalist can get away 
with this sort of controversy once, but I can’t survive it again” (Hill). This cases raises 
the corollary question of whether or not literary journalists “own” the stories they 
tell—a question that will be explored further in the following chapters. 
 
To summarise, an extensive paratextual defence does not necessarily equate to good 
epistemic or ethical practice; neither does a seemingly thorough disclosure account 
for the (contested) rhetorical power of a narrative. Possible effects produced by 
extensive paratextual disclosures are more fully explored in the three analyses in the 
following chapter, as well as Margaret Simons’s The Meeting of the Waters: The 
Hindmarsh Island Affair (2003) in chapter six. Each of these debuting literary 
journalists demonstrate far more of an awareness of epistemic responsibility than 
Malcolm and Garner, but as McGinniss and Seierstad’s cases show, disclosure 
transparency must be carefully considered in terms of what it is hiding, as much as 
what it illuminates.  
 
Richard Critchfield and Alexandra Fuller 
 
The limitations of verification are explored in Miles Maguire’s article on the literary 
journalism of Richard Critchfield. Maguire argues that the discipline of verification 
frustrates the analysis of truth claims in literary journalism scholarship, and highlights 
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what Code would characterise as a largely irresponsible epistemic community. 
According to Maguire, Critchfield’s case “provides an occasion to consider the need 
to find ways to evaluate the quality and accuracy, i.e., the truth, of the journalism that 
is presented as literary journalism. … [O]ne of the central principles of journalistic 
accuracy, the notion of a ‘discipline of verification’, can lead to serious error and 
needs modification” (10). The critic’s role is a third issue arising here. The epistemic 
community’s response to Critchfield’s literary journalism was largely irresponsible, 
Maguire observes, again because of the limitations of verification. While agreeing 
with Maguire’s underlying premise, I argue that rather than modifying the discipline 
of verification, Code’s responsibilist approach to epistemology offers an additional 
and effective approach for both the practitioner and critic to assess the truth claims of 
a work of literary journalism.  
 
In “Richard Critchfield: ‘Genius’ Journalism and the Fallacy of Verification” (2009), 
Maguire relates how Critchfield dedicated himself to “village reporting”, a form of 
immersion journalism, late in his career (9–10). This era was highly successful—with 
the exception of Shahhat: An Egyptian (1978), a book that attracted “a withering 
academic critique” and credible accusations of plagiarism (10). Maguire notes 
Critchfield’s sincerity and dedication to his field, observing, “if sincerity and craft, 
[or] good intentions, are not enough to ensure that the journalism half of the literary 
journalism equation holds up, then proponents of this genre may need to reconsider 
whether it can be viewed as a form of fact-based journalism” (10). While a number of 
accusations were made by Timothy Mitchell, a political scientist, Maguire names the 
“most troubling charge” as one against Critchfield’s claim to provide insights into an 
entire society through the experience of an ordinary family (16). Were the subjects of 
his book representative? Did Critchfield’s observations bear out the paratextual 
claims that his research subject was “typical of the great mass of poor Egyptians” and 
that Shahhat’s challenges were “exemplary”? (Critchfield xivi) After initially denying 
the charges, and several years of reflection, Critchfield eventually conceded that these 
accusations had merit and later wrote that he spent five hours walking through 
Wimbledon Common trying to figure out what had gone wrong in his reporting: 
“After all, if you’ve done a book about the Egyptian character and then discover you 
haven’t understood it at all, it makes you think” (in Maguire 17).  
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Maguire observes that systems to ensure truthfulness in literary journalism—such as 
being transparent, not inventing detail, and being truthful (see Kovach and Rosenstiel; 
Cunningham; Clark)—had no effect on this case (17). Essentially, the discipline of 
verification failed here, as it does in other works of literary journalism. Maguire’s 
conclusion is worth quoting at length: 
 
Critchfield’s case illustrates a significant gap in the methodological 
protocols that are used by journalists to get at the truth. The problem 
with the idea of a “discipline of verification” may be that it 
encourages journalists to reinforce their own prejudices rather than 
seeking to overcome them. … Verification is most often a process of 
confirmation, so that facts that are verified or confirmed are included 
and those that are not confirmed are set aside. … Missing from the 
discipline of verification, as practiced by Critchfield and others, is an 
explicit acknowledgment of limits. … But rare is the reporter who 
provides such an estimate. After all, journalists are trained to report 
what they know, not what they don’t know (18). 
 
What Maguire identifies as missing here is deeper than peritextual disclosure; he has 
previously established Critchfield’s commitment to transparency (see Maguire 15). 
Rather, Critchfield lacked awareness of his epistemic limitations. It is his failure to 
reflect on his epistemological foundation that resulted in a faulty truth claim: that his 
subject’s life was typical of an Egyptian peasant’s experience. The questions: “Do I 
really know what I think I know?” and “Should I know more or acknowledge 
incomplete knowledge?” would have cast Critchfield’s research in a different light 
and produced a different truth claim. The narrative conceals, for example, the thriving 
tourism trade occurring in and around Shahhat’s village. According to Mitchell, the 
invisible reporter is a part of this trade (144–5). Critchfield had a responsibility as a 
researcher to consider the consequences of this knowledge—essentially, that the 
tourist trade perpetuated a westernised, reified concept of “the peasant”. In Mitchell’s 
words, Critchfield’s narrative conceals “the multiple ways in which peasants continue 
to be organized as producers for nonpeasant consumption” (145). 
 
The epistemic community is also a target of Mitchell’s critique. Analyses performed 
on Critchfield’s work failed to find fault with the factual adequacy (correspondence) 
of his work because both Critchfield and his epistemic community failed to ask the 
right—epistemic—questions. Mitchell lists a number of favourable reviews of 
Shahhat, which read much like praise of contemporary literary journalism. Some 
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examples include: “an excellent dramatization of peasant life”; “enjoyable and 
readable”; as capturing “the vividness and passionate intensity of Upper Egyptian 
life”; and “one of the most absorbing accounts of peasant life I have ever read … it 
illuminates and confirms the points anthropologists have made about peasant society” 
(145–6). What the epistemic community failed to consider, however, was how 
Critchfield’s immersive situation facilitated confirmation of his prior beliefs, rather 
than constituting a process of discovery. “His ‘realism’ in the portrayal of the peasant 
has been supported … by a mass of reviewers, editors, publishers, development 
experts, policymakers, grant committee members, and university teachers” (Mitchell 
146). Mitchell’s criticism of the epistemic community’s blind spot is justifiable. 
Critchfield’s approach appeared to be objectivist, but essentially was subjectivist in 
the application of “ready-at-hand labels” without due consideration about whether 
they fit, and subsequently closed off possibilities of understanding (Code, ER 142–3). 
Maguire concludes that “Critchfield’s frame of analysis was skewed and there was no 
way for him to correct for this error within the methodology that he was using” (18). 
This is particularly problematic for literary journalism, writes Maguire, as books in 
this genre particularly are not subject to the scrutiny of editing processes that exist at 
newspapers and magazines (18). 
 
Writing of the relationship between epistemic community and truth, Pauly asserts: 
“To say a report is true is to affirm that it speaks the consensus of some actual 
community of interpreters, who read the social conditions in which the story was 
produced as well as its narrative strategies” (“Politics” 122). This case demonstrates 
the inverse reality of this statement: consensus can reinforce error in the same way it 
affirms truth. Again, the value of disclosure is that it offers the community of 
interpreters a wide scope to assess the conditions of a text’s production. But in this 
case, of all of the epistemic community members assessing Critchfield’s work, 
Mitchell was the only one who asked reflexive questions about the text’s construction 
and exposed faults in its epistemic foundations. The resulting critique revealed a 
reified, “racist stereotype of the Third World peasant, with all colonial history 
removed and all the effects of neo-colonialism made invisible” (Mitchell 145). 
Epistemic communities therefore have a responsibility to be rigorous in their critical 
practice.  
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The relationship between truth claims and epistemically responsible practice is also 
raised in Alexandra Fuller’s first work of literary journalism. Her book did not create 
significant public controversy despite its ambiguous peritextual frame and her use of 
disputed narrative techniques. However, the its mixed critical reception and limited 
commercial success in comparison to Fuller’s earlier Scribbling the Cat: Travels with 
an African Soldier (2004) and the award-winning Don’t Let’s Go to the Dogs 
Tonight: An African Childhood (2003) have been directly attributed to questionable 
use of narrative techniques (see Burrough; Forna; O’Grady). Interestingly, these two 
earlier books are categorised as autobiography, memoir and travel, genres that 
arguably lack the illocutionary force embedded in the journalistic label. The Legend of 
Colton H. Bryant (2008) has been variously marketed as biography, memoir, and 
literary journalism. Investigated from the oil fields of Wyoming while Fuller was 
freelancing for the New Yorker, the story of Bryant’s life and death on an oil rig has 
been compared to Truman Capote’s narrative style (see Finlayson). But it has also 
been assessed by Bryan Burrough, a New York Times reviewer, as cheating, although 
“not … in the sense that plagiarism is cheating”. Burrough continues: “I don’t believe 
Fuller has committed a major felony here, but it’s clearly a misdemeanor, even if she 
comes out and admits it” (np). Whether Fuller has cheated or not, a critical analysis of 
the paratext and narrative itself highlights issues that are not resolved—and may in 
fact be heightened—by the divergence between paratextual cues and narrative 
strategies. Unlike The Bookseller and Shahhat, the paratext of The Legend of Colton 
H. Bryant reveals epistemic deficiencies rather than setting a solid horizon of 
expectations. 
 
Marketed by Borders bookstore as “literary non-fiction” and publisher Simon & 
Schuster as “biography/literature”, the book’s strongest initial indication of genre is 
“non-fiction” (although “literature” possibly complicates that by its association with 
fiction). Fuller attempts to clarify the book’s factual status in an author’s note at the 
end of the book. This position causes it to function as a postface, consequently 
performing a curative or corrective function rather than framing an initial reading (see 
Genette, Paratexts 238–9):  
 
This is a work of nonfiction, but I have taken narrative liberties with the 
text. I have emphasized certain aspects of Colton’s life and of his 
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personality and disregarded others. I have re-created dialogue and 
occasionally juggled time to create a smoother story line. … I must 
emphasize, however, that Colton’s friends and family were never less 
than honest and open with me and they were endlessly patient and 
understanding with my questions …  (Legend 204).  
 
Whether the “narrative liberties” are those listed or additional, the “certain aspects” 
emphasized and disregarded may confuse rather than clarify. Fuller’s method in re-
creating dialogue is not articulated, nor is the reason for anachrony. Further, 
competing against the book’s non-fiction status is a number of paratextual and textual 
elements. The aim seems to be raising the generic status to—at least—an archetypal 
American cowboy story. Colin Symes states that a function of a text’s title is to 
provide “signposts to its possible directions and thematic orientations” (20). Under 
Genette’s classification, The Legend of Colton H. Bryant is both rhematic and 
thematic, in that it indicates genre as well as the central theme or subject. The 
incongruence here is between the status of legend and non-fiction. The legendary or 
mythic element is suggested by the sepia tones of the cover which imitate parchment 
or an old document; similarly, the archetypal status is supported by the stock 
photograph of father and son (not the subject and his father) in cowboy attire on a 
dusty road. The archetype is reinforced in the penultimate chapter: “It’s as if Colton 
and his grave stand in for every boy who died too young from the violence of 
Wyoming’s way of life” (Legend 195). 
 
These indicators are further complicated by a list of the book’s subjects entitled “Cast 
of Characters” directly after the contents page. The first intertitle, “A Western”, is 
also a genre marker, which paradoxically fulfils both of Genette’s stated purposes for 
an intertitle, in that it both settles and unsettles generic status (Paratexts 303). Fuller 
also includes the lyrics to one of Colton’s favourite songs, “Feed Jake”, as a 
peritextual element. For the reader who is already aware of Colton’s fate, this can be 
read as an elegy in the tradition of the mournful Country and Western ballad. Each of 
these elements reinforces the narrative as a “Western”, the archetypal nature of Colton 
and, arguably, the mythical status of his life and death. Juxtaposed against the 
acknowledgements page (again placed at the end of the book, after the author’s note), 
the cumulative force of peritextual features further complicates the book’s status as 
non-fiction. 
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The narrative itself reinforces the mythic dimensions of the text. Fuller establishes an 
omniscient presence through extradiegetic narration, reconstructed dialogue, interior 
monologue, analepsis, prolepsis and present tense narration. A sense of immediacy is 
created by the present-tense mode, decreasing the distance between event and 
narration, encouraging the reader to be “present” in the role of an observer, and, 
paradoxically, increasing the authority of the author. The paradox lies in the reflexive 
reader’s awareness that Fuller has never met Colton, nor witnessed any of his 
childhood, yet she makes observations such as: “Here is Colton H. Bryant at eight 
years old pedalling so pitiful fast through the streets of Evanston, Wyoming, that his 
legs look like eggbeaters” (5) and “he took your breath away with those eyes so 
unnaturally blue they went straight through you and came out the other side knowing 
more than when they went in” (51). Fuller also includes insights into his thoughts 
such as: “Colton stared at his plate of meatloaf and wished it had been made by 
Melissa” (147), a statement that can not be epistemically supported. 
 
The text is structured around two main narrative strands: major life events such as 
Colton’s first hunting trip (10-13), graduation from community school (68-71), 
meeting his partner (114-18), being employed on the oil rigs (120-24), getting married 
(144-45); and vignettes of events which caused Colton to reflect on his mortality. The 
latter events largely occur at the end of chapters and are often punctuated by what 
John Hersey calls “tag lines”. These are “touches of prose, nearly always final lines” 
from “within the point of view of a character” which hold significance beyond the 
knowledge of the one who utters them. For Hersey, “this is not reporting; it is 
projection. And the cumulative force of the projections pushes [books] right out of the 
country of journalism” (261). Here the problem is not so much with the effect of the 
tag lines, but with the possibility that they are accurate. A salient example is Colton’s 
exchange with a noisy raven, which ends with Colton throwing a stone at it. The 
raven continues to gargle in response, and Fuller records: “Colton cocked his fore and 
middle finger at it. ‘Pah!’ he said. ‘You’re dead’” (51). The allusion to death in this 
sequence is powerful; however, the scene takes place on a hunting trip in which 
Colton is the only person awake, Jake being “still asleep with his sleeping bag pulled 
up to his eyes” (50), raising the question of how Fuller came by this information. This 
is an example of what Heinze terms “paralepsis”, or the phenomenon of a narrator 
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knowing or sensing something to which they could not have access (282). This is a 
useful technique in fiction, but is epistemically unsupportable in non-fiction. 
 
The lack of verifiability here lessens the authority and hence illocutionary force of the 
narrative. This illocutionary force is often characterised as an ambiguous but almost 
tangible power unique to non-fiction narratives. John Carey calls this “the power of 
the real” (xxxvi), but it is also referred to by Wolfe (31), Hersey (267), Lehman 
(Matters of Fact 27, 39), and Harrington (83). According to theorists such as Phelan 
and Heyne, readers have the potential to subsume such observations through the 
narrative’s coherence; a lack of verifiability does not necessarily negate the author-
reader contract. But the point here is that if instances such as these draw the attentive 
reader out of the narrative, the paratext does not offer helpful guidance as to how the 
narrative corresponds with reality. Fuller’s failure to orientate the reader may account 
for her book’s lack of that elusive power and, thus, its poor popular reception. 
 
The purposes of this genre of writing are many and varied, but Fuller’s intention here 
seems to be most closely aligned with John Hartsock’s claim that literary journalism’s 
“purpose is to narrow the distance between subjectivity and the object, not divorce 
them” (132). Guiding the reader towards a higher level of engagement with the 
subject, however, without providing appropriate explanations as to how the 
information was gathered, potentially disengages—or to use Hartsock’s term—
divorces the subjectivity and the object as the subjectivity is questioned. If Fuller’s 
intention is to evoke a “willing suspension of disbelief” through the generic markers, 
placing the reader in the story with immediacy and omniscience, the reader’s 
experience is actually complicated by Fuller’s claim to non-fiction status. Again, it 
should be emphasised that it is not the use of individual techniques, or their 
cumulative force, that potentially affects this break. It is rather the contradictory 
claims in the peritext—and narrative itself—which activates metatextual questioning 
and may divorce the text from its subject.  
In the cases discussed above, practitioners offered epistemic defence, but the 
disclosures offered a faulty or contradictory horizon of expectations. Fuller’s 
disclosure was ambiguous and, as such, essentially worked against the validating 
effect both practitioners were attempting to achieve. That both attempted to provide a 
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statement of transparency indicates that the practitioners were cognisant of their 
responsibility to acknowledge their epistemic responsibility, but neither author’s notes 
bridge the gap exposed by the question: “Do I know enough to act as I do?” The most 
obvious consequence of this gap between knowledge and the content of their 
narratives is that readers will approach such texts as fictional, or “based on a true 
story” as Curthoys and others read Garner. Another concern for practitioners might be 
poor reviews or critical reception, although this does not inherently affect a book’s 
popular reception, as Critchfield’s case demonstrates.  
 
The Challenge of Epistemic Responsibility 
 
A number of questions were posed at the beginning of this chapter. Kathy Roberts 
Forde, writing on the Masson v. New Yorker case, has stated that “transparency, not 
objectivity, may well be the news value that we most need in our postmodern age” 
(218). Is transparency the cure for controversy? And if not, to what extent should 
contemporary literary journalists adopt transparency as a standard, if at all? Thomas 
Lake’s article about the death of a US army medic demonstrated a commitment to 
disclosure transparency that would be difficult to emulate for many practitioners, and 
virtually impossible for practitioners of book-length literary journalism. The cases in 
this chapter demonstrate that disclosure transparency does not indicate epistemic 
responsibility. Indeed, transparency is not the cure for controversy. In some cases 
paratextual disclosures can obscure poor journalistic practice, mislead or confuse 
readers about the truth claims of the text, or interrupt a reader’s engagement with a 
text. Conversely, non-fiction texts without author-reader contracts leave readers 
without a frame of reference with which to guide their reading experience.  
 
In each of the cases in this chapter, I have examined the epistemic responsibility 
apart from the ethical charges made by critics. Malcolm’s case highlights the fact 
that it is possible to have a sound, defensible epistemic foundation, but failure to 
disclose or defend practice can manifest in a charge of poor ethical practice. 
Malcolm had sufficient access to her subject to make her truth claims, and was 
eventually vindicated in her assertion about Masson’s character and the meaning of 
his disclosures. Garner’s The First Stone demonstrates what I have called here 
“epistemic blind spots”; that is, failure to be reflexive about the way knowledge is 
created. By drawing on her own experience to fill the holes left by inaccessible 
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subjects, Garner creates a coherent narrative that clearly lacked correspondence with 
the reality of the young women’s situation. Similarly, Joe McGinniss lacked access 
to his subject, but, unlike Garner, attempted to render his process as transparent as 
possible. Disclosure transparency cannot, however, remedy a faulty epistemic 
foundation. Åsne Seierstad showed an awareness of both her ethical and epistemic 
responsibility in the paratext of The Bookseller. The controversy over this book 
demonstrates that she had not considered the relationship between the two strands. 
And although she stands by her book as an accurate portrayal of life in Afghanistan 
for the bookseller’s family, she is wary of using a literary form in such a reporting 
context again.  
 
Richard Critchfield’s Shahhat similarly demonstrates the deficiency of an extended 
author-reader contract, as well as highlighting the responsibility of a practitioner’s 
epistemic community. The book’s first detractor, Timothy Mitchell, had the same 
amount of information to draw from as other experts in this field, yet he was the only 
reviewer to ask questions that ultimately rendered Critchfield’s “truth claims” 
unsupportable. And finally, Alexandra Fuller’s first work of literary journalism is an 
instructive example of an ambiguous contract. It shows how paratextual elements 
such as titles, intertitles, and epigraphs need to be consistent with any epistemic 
defence (such as author’s notes) and the narrative itself. Coherence between text and 
paratext is consequently as important as the narrative’s correspondence to reality.  
 
These cases also show that readers are not limited to paratextual disclosures to 
inform their reading of a text. They may also consider wider sources such as personal 
reputation, as in the case of Joe McGinniss; publication status, such as the New 
Yorker magazine’s famed fact-checking reputation; as well as subjects of the books 
themselves, as demonstrated by Shah Muhammed Rais’s libel claim against Åsne 
Seierstad and Jenna Mead’s fierce and very public vilification of Helen Garner. All 
of these elements help to compose the reader’s horizon of expectations. How, then, 
can literary journalists fulfil their epistemic responsibility? On what can first-time 
writers, in particular, draw to negotiate the author-reader contract?  
 
The starting—and perhaps most obvious—point is that practitioners must first want to 
produce an epistemically defensible text. Readers should not assume that this is 
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always the case. But for those who would attempt to determine whether their text is 
based on a firm epistemic foundation, it is contended in this chapter that reflexive, 
Socratic questioning forms a useful framework to work through this process. The 
answers to questions such as “Do I really know what I think I know?”; Do I know 
enough to act as I do?”; and “Should I know more or acknowledge incomplete 
knowledge?” reveal gaps in the epistemic foundation of a text, which then can guide 
the practitioner’s disclosure transparency in the paratext. The point here is not to, as 
Cooper puts it, “force a rigid prescriptive epistemic ethic” upon practitioners (86). 
Rather, the intention is to acknowledge the inherent tension in each unique work of 
literary journalism that needs to be resolved, and to propose a way for practitioners to 
reflect on—and defend—their epistemic responsibility.  
As such, these questions will guide the analyses in the following chapters. The 
discussion about the texts from the United States in chapter five, and Australia in 
chapter six, will consider the extent to which epistemic defence is an issue for 
contemporary literary journalists at a deeper level. The readings of these texts against 
their paratextual frames will provide case studies to inform pedagogy and practice for 
future literary journalists—and their epistemic communities. 
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Chapter Five 
Epistemic Responsibility and the New Gen 
 
The New Gen: 2000-2010 
 
At the 2000 Lukas Prize Project Conference, Robert Vare of The Atlantic Monthly and 
the Nieman Foundation addressed scholars, writers and students. He stated that while 
the magazine industry was weakening in the US, “prospects for narrative nonfiction 
writers in the other traditional source, book publishing, are exceptionally strong right 
now, as any glance at the weekly bestseller list over the last five or 10 years will 
attest.” He continued, “if the 1980’s defined a streamlined razzle-dazzle newspaper era 
of USA Today-style news bites and factoids and charts and graphs, where the sidebar 
became the main event, the hallmark of the last decade has been a growing fascination 
with long-form storytelling” (Vare). In the decade since, a new generation of writers 
has taken up the mantle of literary journalism. Among the book-length works of 
literary journalism published by American authors between 2000-2010, Adrian Nicole 
LeBlanc’s Random Family (2003), Dave Cullen’s Columbine (2009), and Rebecca 
Skloot’s The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks (2010) represent both the influence and 
the spirit of the New Journalists, in that they seek to engage their readers with social 
realities through both the content and form of their narratives—albeit more 
conservatively than their predecessors. Movement away from techniques such as 
composite characterisation, experimental vocabulary and design, and heavy 
symbolism employed by practitioners such as Wolfe, Mitchell and Didion signals a 
more careful, widely appealing style of literary journalism for the twenty-first century.  
 
If the New Journalists were “settlers” (Whitt xii) in an area they believed to be terra 
nullius, the “New Gen” of literary journalists might be seen as occupying the territory 
settled a generation ago. This is not typically a comfortable occupation. Issues 
manifested in (post)colonial experience are reflected in contemporary literary 
journalism: ownership of the land (or ownership of the story); the relationship between 
the land and its first and colonising peoples (or the relationship between story, subject 
and writer); and negotiation of colonial authority over the land (or the practitioner’s 
authority over the story). In this context it is easy to see how literary journalists have a 
moral responsibility to carry out in relation to both people and their stories. But what 
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is the epistemic responsibility of contemporary literary journalists? Objectivity rituals 
are accepted ways of achieving legitimacy in mainstream journalistic truth-telling; 
they define and normalise the scope of epistemic enquiry (Karlsson 536). How, then, 
can literary journalists understand their relationship to the nature, sources and 
limitations of what can be known? Does it require, as Kramer suggests, an implicit 
covenant with readers and sources about accuracy and candour (1995)? Is it, as Aucoin 
proposes, disconnected from the standards of accuracy and verifiability (2001)? Or is 
“internal vigilance”—which Jane Singer claims is journalists’ preference—the best 
way to ensure accountability and protect truth claims? The previous chapter examined 
epistemological issues in a number of well-documented controversies, and I contended 
that these must be considered in addition to—rather than as part of—ethical 
considerations. In this chapter I explore how American practitioners, who are 
representative of a contemporary conservative movement of literary journalism, 
negotiate epistemic responsibility, given the genre’s controversial past and the 
proliferation of platforms for epistemic defence. I offer readings of three author-reader 
contracts, engage with critical responses to the texts, and suggest how these analyses 
can inform current and future practice of literary journalism. 
 
The “New Gen” faces cultural and technological issues that could not have been 
imagined by the New Journalists of the 1960s and 1970s. As noted by journalism 
scholars, contemporary advances in technology are changing how journalists fulfil the 
democratic public service function (see Fuller 2010; Gans; Schudson 2010). A new 
communications culture necessitates that journalists provide a different kind of context 
and explication of issues for readers: 
 
As citizens encounter an ever-greater flow of data, [readers] have more 
need—not less—for identifiable sources dedicated to verifying that 
information, highlighting what is important to know and filtering out 
what is not. Rather than expand the time they spend sorting through 
information themselves, a task that becomes increasingly time-
consuming as outlets expand in number, people need sources they can 
go to that will tell them what is true and significant (Kovach and 
Rosenstiel 48 emphasis added). 
 
These two issues, truth and significance, are central to the theory and practice of 
literary journalism. Writing about “first wave” practitioners Stephen Crane, Lincoln 
Steffens and Hutchins Hapgood, Connery notes that a literary journalistic account “did 
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not just record and report, it interpreted as well” (“Third Way” 6). Practitioners “gave 
‘passing things’ meaning and context by going beyond the facts, beyond the 
expectations and requirements of daily journalism and newspaper copy editors” 
(“Third Way” 9). But newspapers and magazines, literary journalism’s traditional sites 
of publication, offered few avenues for paratextual information. Historically, epistemic 
defence has largely been embedded within narratives, difficult to access epitextually, 
or even hidden from readers, as evident in the Masson v. New Yorker case. Although 
epistemology was a central concern for the New Journalists, there was no consensus 
on how—if at all—practitioners disclosed their epistemic foundation, methods of 
gathering information, writing practices and position in relation to their subject. Pauly 
observes that while conventional journalism pursued cosmopolitan ideals such as 
objectivity, the alternative press privileged writer-reader relationships and connected 
itself to readers in specific local worlds (“Politics” 124). He uses the term 
“communitarian” to describe the covenant New Journalists had with their readers 
(“Politics” 124). This convention remains. But controversies outlined in the previous 
chapter indicate that if literary journalism challenges assumptions of how the 
phenomenal world should be perceived, consideration should be given to alternative 
ideological foundations. “New Gen” literary journalists increasingly reflect an 
awareness of this need. As this chapter demonstrates, contemporary American 
practitioners use multiple paratextual avenues to offer epistemic defence for their 
narratives, including online platforms which make participatory transparency possible.  
 
Small samples may inhibit the possibility of drawing totalizing conclusions; however, 
the texts analysed in this chapter are representative in that they exemplify a range of 
differences typical of literary journalism. These include the practitioners’ 
backgrounds; authorial intention; mode of narration; chronology; structure; peritextual 
features; and epitextual features such as online companion sites. They also highlight 
epistemic issues triggered by immersion reporting, a crucial feature of literary 
journalism practice when considering epistemic responsibility.  
 
Random Family: Adrian Nicole LeBlanc 
 
In 2003, Adrian Nicole LeBlanc joined reporters such as Steffens, George Orwell and 
Leon Dash in the powerful tradition of advocacy journalism. Random Family: Love, 
Drugs, Trouble, and Coming of Age in the Bronx follows the lives of four Puerto 
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Rican youths, Jessica and Boy George, Cesar and Coco, growing up in New York. A 
product of over a decade of immersive journalism, Random Family was named one of 
the ten best books of the year by The New York Times Book Review, was a finalist for 
the National Book Critics Circle Award, and won the Anisfield-Wolf Book Award for 
non-fiction in 2004. The book was conceived in the late 1980s while LeBlanc was 
reporting for The Village Voice on Boy George’s rise and fall as a heroin dealer. 
Fascinated by the extraordinary success of the “Kid Kingpin” and the women in his 
life, LeBlanc immersed herself in a poverty-stricken sub-culture for the next decade to 
try to understand the subjective experience of individuals behind the statistics.  
 
Authorial intention is one feature that distinguishes LeBlanc’s narrative from 
Steffens’s, Orwell’s and Dash’s. As LeBlanc explains, “What interested me was less 
the details of the drug business, but what it felt like to be a young Puerto Rican kid 
from the Bronx who was able to fly to Hawaii with his girlfriend at the drop of a hat. 
… I wanted to know what happened when these different worlds knocked up against 
each other” (Boynton, The New New Journalism 236 emphasis in original). Her desire 
was not only to know, but also to convey phenomenal reality from the perspective of 
the subject. Literary journalism scholar and LeBlanc’s mentor, Mark Kramer, states 
that the point of immersion is to “comprehend subjects at a level Henry James termed 
‘felt life’—the frank, unidealized level that includes individual difference, frailty, 
tenderness, nastiness, vanity, generosity, pomposity, humility, all in proper 
proportion” (23). For this reason, LeBlanc writes in an extradiegetic mode of 
narration, prompting reviewers to observe that Random Family reads “like a novel” 
(see Wypijewski; Horst). While experience is mediated through the writer’s sensibility 
in Steffens’s The Shame of the Cities (1904), Orwell’s Down and Out in Paris and 
London (1933), and Leon Dash’s Rosa Lee (1996), LeBlanc’s extradiegetic narrative 
mode emphasises the experience of her subjects. As discussed in the following 
analysis, this mode raises epistemic questions about the possibility of representing the 
truth of others’ experience, rather than one’s own. 
 
LeBlanc’s responsibility to disclose the scope and limits of her knowledge would seem 
strong given this narrative mode. Her presence is eschewed in Random Family despite 
the fact that she spent ten years in an immersive reporting situation. This is, perhaps, 
unsettling for some readers and critics, given that LeBlanc intermittently lived with 
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her subjects, “shuttling children to welfare appointments” and becoming a part of the 
increasingly random family (Farley). A feature of the book’s epistemic defence, 
however, is its brevity and general nature compared to The Immortal Life and 
Columbine. Dust-cover reviews variously describe the book as “a seminal work of 
journalism”, “a painstaking feat of reporting”, and “a non-fiction Middlemarch of the 
underclass”. Non-fiction status is also made explicit in the author’s note where the 
terms of the contract are defined:  
 
This is a book of nonfiction. I was present for much of what is depicted 
here; some scenes were recounted to me. Hundreds of hours of written 
and tape-recorded interviews were supplemented with other research, 
including court transcripts; medical, academic, financial, legal, police, 
and prison records; and personal letters and diaries. … Some of the 
dialogue has been taken from government wiretaps transcribed by me. 
Recollected experiences and exchanges were assembled through 
primary- and secondary-source interviews and visits to locations. In 
those cases where someone is said to have “thought” or “believed” 
something, those thoughts and beliefs were described and recounted to 
me by that person. There are no conflated events or composite 
characters in this book. Only the names of some individuals have been 
changed (405).  
 
LeBlanc widened the epistemic scope of her research by studying criminal law, drug 
policy and sentencing guidelines, and interning at a New York State court that handled 
A-1 felonies, all of which are disclosed in the author’s note (405).  
 
The interplay between the peritextual disclosure transparency and narrative is not, 
however, straightforward. The statement that sheds light on the verifiability of 
dialogue, for example, is complicated by narrative techniques such as indirect thought-
report with limited-perspective narration, blurring point of view and producing a sense 
of objective omniscience. The question raised here: “Whose knowledge is this?” is of 
primary analytic importance, according to Code. When working with a concept of 
knowledge as a construct produced by “cognitive agents within diverse social 
practices and positions of differing power and privilege, epistemological pretentions to 
disinterested objectivity have to be re-examined and deconstructed” (“Who Cares?” 
105–6). While paratextual information suggests that disinterested objectivity does not 
describe LeBlanc’s approach, the mode of narration invites this type of analysis. The 
following passage illustrates this point: 
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Sister Christine wanted to tell Coco, Get away from your family. But 
she couldn’t. Not everyone could clamber onto a lifeboat from a sinking 
raft. You either made your way by hardening up, like Iris, or you stayed 
stuck. Coco didn’t see a choice. She admired Iris’s accomplishments, 
but she couldn’t live like that. Nor could she be like her older brother, 
Manuel, who dressed himself better than his children. Coco couldn’t 
ignore the people she cared for, which is why Foxy and her little 
brother Hector turned to her first for help. The word that came to Sister 
Christine’s mind whenever she thought of Coco was enmeshed. Coco 
would have said that she had heart (148). 
 
In this passage, thoughts of the subjects and judgements made by the author/narrator 
are seemingly impossible to tell apart. The author’s note clarifies somewhat: 
“thoughts” and “beliefs” were described and recounted to LeBlanc by the person who 
held those beliefs (405). Read in this context, this entire passage reads as indirect 
thought report of Sister Christine, with the exception, perhaps, of the last sentence. Is 
this a despairing acknowledgement from Sister Christine, or an authorial rebuttal of 
LeBlanc’s? This is unclear. However, that “Coco would have said that she had heart” 
coheres with Coco’s characterisation, and given both Sister Christine and LeBlanc’s 
intimate knowledge of Coco and her history, either interpretation is epistemically 
supportable. This example of thought and speech report is typical of LeBlanc’s 
seamless transitions between observation and focalisation; however, some passages 
are more difficult to differentiate. The following extract is an apposite example: 
 
Cesar complained about prison, but it sometimes seemed easier and 
more fun than Coco’s life. Cesar had no children to feed and bathe and 
dress; he had no worries about basic necessities; he lived in a dorm with 
his friends. … Coco’s limitations were her failures; but Cesar’s 
immobility was the prison’s fault. And Cesar still dictated the terms of 
the relationship—to choose her or cast her aside (153). 
 
LeBlanc’s disclosure does not cover narrated passages such as these. The ideas are 
insightful, but it is unclear whose knowledge is represented, or who is making 
judgments here. Is this problematic? Code suggests it is. “Questions about who 
knowers are, how they are located with respect to ‘objects’ of inquiry, are integral to 
analyses of the production and justification of knowledge claims” (“Who Cares?” 
106). The preceding paragraph is clearly LeBlanc’s voice. She reports: “Coco 
composed long letters in reply. She also copied by hand letters Cesar sent her to 
forward to his incarcerated friends. … These communications suited her indirect style” 
(153). However, the passage in question could represent Cesar’s judgment of Coco: 
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his critical attitude towards her is a motif throughout the narrative. It could also be 
Coco’s, as she would likely have reflected on the differences between her hardships 
and Cesar’s to LeBlanc. But the absence of indicators of indirect thought report also 
suggest these might be LeBlanc’s observations. The question remains: Are these 
LeBlanc’s, Cesar’s, or Coco’s judgements? Whose knowledge is offered here? This is 
finally ambiguous.  
 
Questions of “truth value” result in passages like this throughout the narrative. From 
the disclosure in the author’s note, the reader cannot verify that the “knowledge” on 
offer—that Cesar’s incarceration was preferable to Coco’s day-to-day living in the 
Bronx; that Coco’s limitations were her failures; that Cesar’s immobility was the 
prison’s fault (rather than a result of his own behaviour)—is LeBlanc’s. Is it accurate? 
Is it truthful? I suggest that the former question applies if this knowledge is being 
reported from Cesar’s or Coco’s perspective; the question of “truthfulness” comes into 
play if it is LeBlanc’s knowledge on offer here. The ethical question raised in the last 
chapter by Seierstad’s case is also at work here: Does LeBlanc have the (moral) right 
to represent the experience of others in passages such as these? But the project in this 
thesis is to examine the epistemological foundation of literary journalistic texts: Is 
LeBlanc’s representation epistemically responsible and defensible? If this is indeed 
her knowledge, does her scope of enquiry legitimate such knowledge and judgments? 
Or simply: Does she know enough to report as she does? When attempting to answer 
these questions, the author’s note does provide a solid epistemic defence. Ironically, 
the section on “thoughts” and “beliefs” is not helpful. But the scope of LeBlanc’s 
research—the decade of immersion with Cesar’s and Coco’s families—indicate that 
LeBlanc indeed has access to such knowledge, and is in a position to make judgements 
such as these. The depth and complexity of reported relationships, events and their 
meanings throughout the narrative further deepen the authority and increase the 
defensibility of its epistemic foundation. This brief example demonstrates that where 
the discipline of verification fails, questions of epistemic responsibility can be 
effective to judge the “truth value” of knowledge offered.  
 
The necessity of asking “Whose knowledge is this?” indicates that LeBlanc’s presence 
is discernable in the book, despite the narrative mode. For Weber, the absence of “I” is 
a matter of appearance in prose, but specifically literary non-fiction. Selection and 
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arrangement of material reflects the reporter’s presence—the writer is a “reporting 
angel” (see 73–88). Code similarly asserts “there is no good reason to believe that 
knowledge as product could fail to bear the mark of its producers, or of the process of 
its production” (“Who Cares?” 106). In this case, the reader must rely on the 
observations and subsequent analyses of LeBlanc as a reliable narrator, without 
extensive notes to verify the narrative, such as used in Columbine. The effect of 
Cullen’s notes section will be analysed later in this chapter. But here the illocutionary 
force of the contract calls for the reader to trust LeBlanc if, indeed, analytical passages 
are not directly sourced from the thoughts or dialogue of the reader. In this sense, 
compared to Cullen’s and Skloot’s texts, LeBlanc relies least on paratextual 
explanation, and consequently most heavily on trust. But this is not necessarily 
prohibitive. Allen quotes Onora O’Neill when he suggests that an increase in 
transparency does not necessarily lead to an increase in trust. In fact, O’Neill contends 
that “trust precludes rather than requires transparency” (in Allen 325). This is a moot 
point. But in the absence of clear indicators of a text’s production, “Questions about 
who knowers are, how they are located with respect to ‘objects’ of inquiry, are integral 
to analyses of the production and justification of knowledge claims” (Code, “Who 
Cares?” 106). Here LeBlanc follows in the footsteps of her predecessors, including 
Jacob Riis, Susan Sheehan and Alex Kotlowitz (Boynton, The New New Journalism 
230), who rely on their reportorial practices and professional reputation rather than 
paratextual disclosures to defend their knowledge and truth claims. 
 
At other times, LeBlanc’s authorial voice is clearly discernable, as is her “location” 
with respect to her subjects (Code, “Who Cares?” 106). These are rare passages of 
narrative transparency, but all the more rhetorically powerful for their thematic and 
symbolic value: 
 
[Cesar] smothered [his daughter’s] hurt feelings with hugs, making it 
into a game, drowning out her crying with laughter and kisses and silly 
smooching sounds. In the subtle tyranny of that moment beat the pulse 
of Cesar’s neighbourhood—the bid for attention, the undercurrent of 
hostility for so many small needs ignored and unmet, the pleasure of 
holding power, camouflaged in teasing, the rush of love. Then the 
moment passed, and Cesar’s three-year-old daughter walked back out 
into the world and left him behind (162). 
 
 
 
 134 
Here the literary journalist’s presence is briefly exposed in the narrative. In the 
bleakness of the moment, the reader becomes aware that this is LeBlanc’s experience, 
too. A sense of helplessness pervades the scene; LeBlanc cannot intervene. Here she is 
the perceptive critic as well as the “reporting angel”; the ability to create her own 
subtly analytical moment and let it pass without pontificating is a strength in a 
narrative that has been criticised for its lack of interpretive analysis.  
 
This criticism has been made by JoAnn Wypijewski, herself a practitioner of both 
daily and long-form journalism. In her review of Random Family, Wypijewski is 
primarily concerned with the ethical issues raised by the author-subject(s) 
relationship, but she also is critical of LeBlanc’s extradiegetic narrative mode of 
representation. She contends that LeBlanc “wrote herself out of the story, becoming 
in the process its most provocative character: the voyeur who is everywhere and 
nowhere, watching and telling as things fall apart … It is only by accident, in the 
acknowledgements, that the book finally confronts the reader with the ‘American 
experience of class injustice’ that is ostensibly its subject” (np). Wypijewski’s 
comment here again illustrates Genette’s caution about the “curative” or “corrective” 
function of author’s notes placed at the end of a narrative (see Genette, Paratexts 
238–9). It betrays what is perhaps a common perception of the value of paratextual 
information; the author’s note is treated more as an afterthought than a framing device 
that negotiates how to read a text. The phrase “it is only by accident” paradoxically 
reinforces the importance of the contract to the text’s reception—the author’s note is 
evidently not important to Wypijewski. But the position of the author’s note is in 
keeping with LeBlanc’s aim to convey the lived experience of her subjects (Boynton, 
The New New Journalism 236). In an interview published in The Guardian, she 
defends her rationale: “I didn’t want it to be the white girl’s journey into the ghetto: 
there have been other books like that. I didn't want to bounce the reporting off that. 
This is a subject worthy of close scrutiny on its own” (Bedell np).  
 
Although LeBlanc’s presence is largely imperceptible in the narrative itself, she 
commits to an authorial position in relation to her subjects by framing the narrative 
with an epigraph taken from William Blake: 
 
Some say that Happiness is not Good for mortals & they ought to be 
answerd that Sorrow is not fit for Immortals & is utterly useless to any 
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one a blight never does good to a tree & if a blight kill not a tree but it 
still bear fruit let none say that the fruit was in consequence of the 
blight (vii). 
 
The epigraph here has the same function as in fiction. In the absence of a first-person 
narrative voice, the frame cautions the reader: there is nothing noble in the 
circumstances this family finds itself in, but the virtues portrayed are not a result of the 
blight (poverty, lack of education etc). Rather, they are evident in spite of the 
circumstances—that is, the blight is not a natural part of the tree. This frame clearly 
signals LeBlanc’s advocatory role for those who experience class injustice. It works 
with the author’s note to elaborate LeBlanc’s epistemic qualifications—how she has 
informed herself, what her interests are (Code, “Who Cares?” 106)—that entitle her to 
offer knowledge about her subjects. Such a reading is consistent with the narrative as 
LeBlanc offers multiple perspectives from which Jessica’s and Coco’s situations can 
be viewed, including the example of Sister Christine and Coco. She records the impact 
of Coco’s (mis)management of money, adding the caveat: “[b]ut to Coco, nothing was 
more important than family, and family included Cesar and Lourdes and friends, both 
old and new” (148). LeBlanc’s desire to highlight the humanity of her protagonists is 
also evident in the closing words of the narrative, where Cesar reassures his daughter 
he will not drop her: “Listen, you light as a feather to me” (404). And it is finally 
reinforced at the end of the author’s note, where LeBlanc concludes: “The hardships of 
these young people and their families are not unusual in their neighbourhoods. Neither 
are their gifts” (406).  
 
The effect of disregarding the author-reader contract is evident here, but so is the 
rhetorical effect of disclosure transparency post-narrative. LeBlanc has demonstrated 
an awareness of her epistemic responsibility: her rationale is consistent with her aim 
and her practice, which allows the reader room for interpretation. As Matheson writes 
of journalism without a critical frame: “The lack of overt interpretation allows the 
listener to encounter these people less as symbols of something larger or as instances 
of a wider narrative, than as specific people in a concrete world. In the encounter, an 
interpretative space is opened up in which wider questions … become available. The 
questions specific listeners ask are likely to be different” (410). In this way, 
LeBlanc’s choice reinforces the outward orientation of her narrative, and encourages 
the reader to perceive her subjects in addition to—rather than solely defined by—their 
 
 
 136 
situation. Coco and Jessica are not just symbols; they are autonomous individuals 
open to the reader’s own interpretation. But there is evidently a tension between 
guiding a reader’s interpretation of a text, and emphasising the subjectivity—and 
autonomy—of one’s subjects. 
 
This point is a central (epistemic) criticism of Wypijewski’s. She does not take issue 
with LeBlanc’s factual accuracy, but critiques the cumulative truth effect of the 
narrative as a whole. Initially, she asserts that the “truths” in the text are drowned in 
“the onrush of personal detail” (np). These include: “‘even living right was just 
another precarious hold’; that ‘success was less about climbing than about not falling 
down’; … and family generosity, however defeating, might be the only bulwark 
between awfulness and horror” (np). Further, “It seems the destiny of Jessica’s and 
Coco’s daughters to follow in their paths. It seems the destiny of young Puerto Rican 
men to go to jail (and, judging from Cesar's maturity there, seems a not half-bad 
solution). It seems the destiny of the whole community to live with extraordinary 
drama” (np). This assessment echoes Frus’s critique of the extradiegetic narrative 
mode: 
 
In general, the use of impersonal narration implies that all accidents of 
chance or fate have meaning simply because they are told, explained in 
a story. … The absence of reference to the narrative situation in the 
historical narration, coupled with the illusion of realistic representation 
and the tendency to reconcile the contradictory elements in a rounded-
off ending, fixes the world the way it is depicted here, and the reader 
tends to accept it as presented (25). 
 
The argument here is that any type of reportorial practice reifies its subjects, which in 
turn creates an illusory (or “fictive”) sense of verisimilitude. I would argue that 
LeBlanc resists reifying her subjects’ experience by attempting to subvert closure; the 
final chapter is a reconstructed scene without great significance to the “plot.” Both 
Wypijewski and Frus have a point regarding the cumulative truth effect produced by 
the extradiegetic mode and narrative structure, but an assessment of epistemic 
location suggests LeBlanc’s knowledge, understanding and truth claims are 
justifiable.  
 
While Random Family does not follow a narrative arc in a typical sense (it is atypical 
in that the complication (poverty) is thematic), the narrative does display 
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“completeness,” one of the eight Aristotelian elements of literary plot. Marsh 
identifies this element as inherently structural: the assignation of a beginning, middle 
and end signifies completeness (see Marsh 302). For Frus and White, this fixes the 
world and imposes meaning on random events. From LeBlanc’s perspective, 
however, the facts she has gathered and subsequent knowledge she has accumulated 
produce meaning and truths, in the sense Code proposes. Understanding involves 
“tying one’s knowledge down: relating it to a context, having some conception of the 
relation of … knowledge to the rest of what one knows” (ER 150). The coherence in 
Random Family is primarily facilitated by structure. LeBlanc begins the narrative 
with Jessica, a sixteen year-old who becomes pregnant in the first chapter, and ends 
with her daughter Serena’s sixteenth birthday. This passage both completes and 
begins a new cycle of teen pregnancy:  
 
Serena worked herself up into a frenzy: “They are so worried about me 
having sex. She has fourteen grandchildren. Why me? They don’t care 
if their sons do it, only their daughters. If I was a grandson, do you 
think they would all be pressuring me?” she cried. “If I want to have 
sex, I’m going to have sex. Everybody has sex. They all want me to 
change. I don’t care what my family, friends, or nobody says about me, 
I am the way I am and I don’t care!”  
She would be pregnant within six months (397). 
 
This is the “coming of age” referred to in the book’s subtitle. Despite the phenomenal 
reality of the situation, LeBlanc’s structural choices do create a layer of meaning. The 
proleptic tag-line provides extra emphasis—a glimpse at the sensibility behind the 
narratorial voice and a sense of inevitability about Serena’s situation. That this occurs 
in the penultimate chapter places Serena’s sixteenth birthday as the climax of the 
narrative, and a fulfilment of the expectation set by the subtitle. What it means to 
“come of age” then takes on increased significance through this frame, and is 
reinforced by the scene’s position in the text. LeBlanc recounts the following 
limousine ride, a gift from Serena’s mother to her as she crosses the threshold into 
adulthood: 
 
They wanted to leave the familiar world behind, but no one knew the 
direction out. “Mister,” Josh asked the chauffeur. “You must know 
everything. You been everywhere. Where should we go? The 
waterfront?” … 
 “Tremont,” Tabitha said. She still lived there, in Rocco’s old building. 
… Jessica fumed when she learned about the stop on Tremont: “I 
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wouldn’t have paid for a limo if they wanted to go for a walk.” Even if 
they wanted to go for a walk, why pick Tremont? And if they had to 
choose Tremont, why walk east? “Anthony? Mount Hope? That’s a 
drug-infested block, there’s shootings there,” Jessica said. “They could 
have at least walked in the opposite direction, by the Concourse” (399). 
 
This scene illustrates both the literal and symbolic dilemmas for three generations of 
Jessica’s family. Serena and her friends want “to leave the familiar world behind” but 
no one knows the direction out; similarly, Jessica wants more for Serena than Serena 
wants for herself, but, significantly, does not have a frame of reference outside of the 
Bronx. That this exchange occurred on the night of Serena’s sixteenth birthday may 
seem serendipitous. However, a critique might suggest its structural placement and 
symbolic power disregards the subjects’ agency and the potential for alternatives for 
Jessica and Serena. Despite the formal lack of closure—no problems are resolved, and 
in the final chapter Cesar is still in jail—the passages recounting Serena’s birthday do 
seem to offer a conclusion: that this cycle of poverty is destined to repeat itself. Is this 
a “truth”? Can this be verified? Embedded within the narrative structure, and subject 
to future events which LeBlanc cannot foresee, verification is—at this stage—an 
impossibility. Here the critic can turn to an assessment of epistemic responsibility. 
Appropriate questions then become: What was LeBlanc’s location in relation to her 
subjects? Did she have appropriate access to her subjects to infer this meaning? Are 
her truth claims justifiable, given the evidence available to her at the time? That 
LeBlanc personally witnessed this cycle with two generations, and wrote extensively 
about Lourdes’s (Jessica’s mother’s) similar experience suggests these questions can 
all be answered in the affirmative.  
 
While not addressed in the peritext of the book, LeBlanc obliquely speaks to this 
concern in an epitextual source. When asked if the kind of journalism she does can 
lead to truth, she answers: 
 
I don’t know about truth, but I believe journalism can lead to a moment 
of real human connection between the reader and a world that they 
would not otherwise know. And with luck it will be a lasting 
connection. I always tell the people I write about that I’m writing about 
their world, but that it will be my story. So the truth will be my truth, 
not necessarily the truth that they believe (Boynton, The New New 
Journalism 48–9). 
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Here LeBlanc acknowledges the subjective nature of perception and reality, and 
implicitly defends her text against criticism that it is “fixed.” For LeBlanc, the truth of 
her representation accurately reflects her knowledge, understanding and perceptions 
of phenomenal reality. The print medium in which she is quoted (Boynton’s The New 
New Journalism) is far less accessible than online material, however, and will 
consequently only act as a frame for a limited—and predominantly specialist—
audience.  
 
As calls for transparency in journalistic practice strengthen and venues for epistemic 
defence proliferate, LeBlanc’s narrative has very little online presence. As of 2012, 
LeBlanc’s professional website features only a photograph of the book’s cover and a 
link to Amazon.com where the book can be purchased. Further, in comparison to The 
Immortal Life and Columbine, other online epitextual sources regarding Random 
Family are largely comprised of reviews. The discrepancy between the amounts and 
types of epitextual resources made available by LeBlanc and later practitioners Cullen 
and Skloot may be attributable to privacy issues. The use of pseudonyms for her 
subjects suggests LeBlanc’s desire to protect them from public recognition; release of 
primary sources would clearly jeopardize their anonymity in a way not called for in 
Cullen’s and Skloot’s texts. LeBlanc’s subjects’ decisions to reveal their identities are 
then their own responsibility (see Writing Inside, Writing Outside), and do not 
compromise her commitment to their privacy, but provide one way to account for the 
lack of epitextual sources available. Otherwise, LeBlanc’s book represents an anomaly 
in what might be characterised as a trend towards transparency in contemporary 
literary journalism, but one that does not significantly damage the validity of her 
narrative or, indeed, the power of its message. 
 
LeBlanc has contracted with her readers to produce a narrative that is consistent with 
externally verifiable evidence. Her decision not to make sources available either peri- 
or epitextually opposes trends towards transparency, but in some ways, the lack of 
available epitextual sources protects Random Family from close scrutiny. The 
peritextual contract negotiated asks the reader to rely on the authority of the reporter, 
gained by the exhaustive research on her subjects’ lives. The overwhelmingly positive 
critical and popular reception of Random Family suggests that LeBlanc’s densely 
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detailed narrative and ten years of immersive reporting have earned her the trust and 
respect of her readers. 
 
The area for which LeBlanc has perhaps been most strongly criticised, the fixing of 
experience, is one that needs careful consideration for future literary journalists. As 
Frus posits: ”Emphasizing the relationship between narrator or journalist and reader 
may be an effective way to challenge the reification implied by most mass-cultural 
forms” (180). Exposing the subjectivity of the author is a hallmark of literary 
journalism, but for practitioners such as LeBlanc who suppress their subjectivity for 
the higher objective of conveying the experience of their subjects, the paratext could 
be more fruitfully employed to perform the role homodiegetic narration carries out in 
other works of literary journalism. For first-time authors, particularly, the online 
environment offers opportunities to establish epistemic responsibility in a way that is 
immediate, engaging, interactive, and open to a web of information that can validate or 
contradict authorial claims. As the next two analyses will demonstrate, online media 
can be a powerful, multifunctional medium through which epistemic responsibility can 
be established. It can also, however, create conflicting frames that call a practitioner’s 
epistemic defence into question.  
 
Columbine: Dave Cullen  
 
Dave Cullen’s Columbine received enormous critical acclaim in 2009. While perhaps 
not enjoying the same widespread popularity as Skloot’s The Immortal Life—the 
paperback version of Columbine spent only five weeks on The New York Times best 
seller list and peaked at number 10 (“Best Sellers”)—Cullen’s first extended work of 
literary journalism received almost universal critical praise. In the tradition of literary 
journalists, Cullen has been described as “a cultural translator” (“Dave Cullen’s 
Biography”). Prior to Columbine his journalism covered Evangelical Christians, gays 
in the military, Barbie doll collectors, or “anyone on the margins” (“Dave Cullen’s 
Biography”). Primarily a freelance journalist, Cullen has contributed to the New York 
Times, Washington Post, The Times of London, Slate, Daily Beast, the Guardian and 
online arts and cultural magazine, Salon. As LeBlanc’s Random Family began as an 
article for The Village Voice, Columbine grew out of a smaller assignment for Salon. 
Cullen initially covered the Columbine High School shootings in Littleton, Colorado, 
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for the magazine. His concern for media practices catalysed what would become his 
first book-length work of literary journalism. As a result, Columbine invites discussion 
about the practices of mainstream reporting of unfolding news; but the form and 
content of Cullen’s own choosing also raise questions regarding the extent to which 
exhaustive investigative reporting can—or should—produce a definitive version of 
truth. Consequently, the epistemological limits of literary journalism are raised here. I 
will also argue that the author-reader contract—the narrative and paratextual framing 
of Columbine—reveals inconsistencies in ideology and practice, inviting careful 
consideration of how works of literary journalism are framed by peritextual and online 
epitextual sources, and how apparent transparency can lead to reification of text and 
subject. Finally, the question: “Where are you coming from?” informs this analysis. 
This question refers to the “implicit importance of the knowers or would-be knowers 
and what we might call their epistemic ‘location’—in a time, a place, and in 
epistemologically relevant circumstances” (Code, ER 38). Code explains that it elicits 
“autobiographical answers, memoirs, testimony; performatives that produce and affirm 
allegiances, or commitments presented for critical-political analysis” (“Responsibility 
and Rhetoric” 1). For this analysis, the question refers to the literal location of the 
reporter in regards to the subject, but in a metaphorical sense, it also asks what kinds 
of expectations lead the literary journalist. Because Cullen eschews his own presence 
in the narrative, epistemic questions arise regarding the types of knowledge he 
withholds from readers, and the reasons for withholding it. 
 
A native of Colorado, Cullen was one of the first reporters on the scene at Columbine 
High on April 20th, 1999. In promotional interviews after the publication of his book, 
Cullen describes how he spent the afternoon and evening at the scene and posting his 
first—“uncorrupted”—story for Salon. He then drove home listening to the radio 
coverage of the tragedy and followed network coverage well into the night. Media 
coverage included the first pieces of speculative information that would later become 
widely accepted myths surrounding the massacre. Cullen continues: 
 
The pack mentality is powerful. Your peers are pretty smart, so when 
they’re all going in one direction, and everybody’s listening to each 
other, you tend to do that. … I inserted all the junk the next morning … 
I assumed I was wrong … Whether you’re covering the campaign trail, 
or anything, it’s really hard to be that lone wolf. … I had this pristine 
story with almost none of the myths, and I buckled, and inserted the 
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myths. And as I should, I have the story now showing that I got it 
wrong, because I buckled the next morning and got it wrong, but it 
didn’t have to be that way (chuckpalahniukcult). 
 
The issue here is both ethical and epistemic: Cullen uses media as a source of 
knowledge rather than verifying facts himself. The epistemic question “Do I really 
know what I think I know?” (Cooper 86) is not easily considered when working to 
deadline. Columbine is an attempt to correct this. Frank (“These Crowded 
Circumstances”; see also Berkowitz) has written about the implications of journalists 
distancing themselves from pack journalism by writing about it. He identifies this 
practice as “boundary-work rhetoric”, or “the rhetorical strategy of one group wishing 
to distinguish itself from another” (“These Crowded Circumstances” 448). 
Interestingly, Frank concludes that “distanced reflexivity” offers a way around the 
demands of objectivity. “By adhering to the third-person rhetoric of objectivity, the 
writer can make ‘the media’ an Other. ‘The media’ have become part of the story; this 
reporter has not. Such a strategy enables reporters to separate themselves from the 
pack and align themselves with the pack’s critics” (456). Written in third-person 
narrative mode, Cullen’s Columbine illustrates such “distanced reflexivity”, and 
indeed makes the media an “Other” while Cullen clearly shows in the paratext that he 
was part of the pack. This sets Cullen up as an authority on the Columbine shootings, 
and given his ten years of reporting and research, this is warranted. But I also argue 
that the combination of distanced reflexivity and the rhetorical force of the media as 
“Other” sets up reader expectations that are epistemically untenable.  
 
So where is Columbine coming from? The book functions in part as a correction of the 
record and a polemic against the practices of syndicated mainstream journalism. These 
purposes are introduced in the publisher’s peritext—specifically, six pages of critical 
praise for Columbine. While promotion of the book is a primary aim, these pages also 
set the reader’s horizon of expectations. Here the book is framed as “media criticism,” 
showing “how truth was obscured by myth,” “a correction of the record,” “myth-
busting” and letting “the truth contradict many popularly embedded ideas” (Cullen, 
Columbine ii–viii). This frame is reinforced epitextually online: Rachel Maddow of 
MSNBC commends the book for “meticulously disassembl[ing] the stories that make 
up so much of the country’s collective understanding of that tragedy.” Speaking on the 
tenth anniversary of the school killings, she advises her audience that:  
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Today’s anniversary can be an opportunity not only to remember and 
honour the victims, but also to get the Columbine story right. If there 
are going to be national lessons learned from that tragedy…it makes 
sense to base them on what actually happened, not on the stories we 
have told ourselves to try to make sense of it all, despite their distance 
from the facts (Maddow).  
 
That Cullen’s book is another story attempting to make sense of the shootings is not 
acknowledged; in fact, the book is marketed as a “definitive account” (dust cover). 
Cullen reinforces this in an author’s note on sources that precedes the narrative: “In 
the great media blunders during the initial coverage of the story, where nearly 
everyone got the central facts wrong, I was among the guilty parties. I hope this book 
contributes to setting the story right” (Columbine xiv). That there is “a” right story, 
waiting to be discovered, is implicit here; Cullen equates correct facts with truth in a 
way that other literary journalists may not. The peritextual evidence cited above 
suggests Cullen’s contribution has been accepted by critics as “the definitive account,” 
and, as paratext, functions to create that expectation for the reader.  
 
Interestingly, in the narrative itself, Cullen strongly rejects the idea of one story being 
the “true” version. In a chapter entitled “Media Crime”, he writes: “It is an axiom of 
journalism that disaster stories begin in confusion and grow clearer over time. Facts 
rush in, the fog lifts, an accurate picture solidifies. The public accepts this. But the 
final portrait is often furthest from the truth” (Columbine 150). Skloot also recognises 
that artful arrangement makes facts “take on different weight” (Cavanaugh), 
disconnecting factual accuracy from truth value. Given the truth claims of both books, 
the practitioners’ failure to engage with this idea in reference to their own narratives is 
somewhat concerning, but particularly so in a book marketed as a definitive account. 
As Code writes, “to strive for insight into the extent of one’s own cognitive capacities, 
to distance oneself as much as possible so one can be critical of one’s own knowing, is 
a crucially important aspect of epistemic competence” (ER 176). But Cullen extends 
his thesis: “Journalists were not relying exclusively on ‘students.’ The entire industry 
was depending on the Denver Post. … It did not single-handedly create any of the 
myths, but as the Post bought into one after another after another, each mistaken 
conclusion felt safe. The pack followed” (Columbine 152). Cullen here sets his 
narrative up in opposition to mainstream media reports. Nestled between densely 
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detailed reconstructions and vivid flashbacks, “Media Crime” not only raises questions 
about the mainstream media’s poor handling of this one event, it also produces a 
disquieting question: what chance does anyone have of “getting it right”? Questioning 
the media works here to validate Cullen’s own version of events.  
 
Code’s call for recognition of epistemic limits is salient here. The immersive reporting 
element of literary journalism may impose “standards of intellectual achievement over 
and above those expected of persons simply as persons” (Code, ER 62 emphasis in 
original). However, Code also encourages “[e]xploration of cognitive experiences 
where evident efforts are made to arrive at a right sense of the situation offer a way of 
seeing what kind of attitude of mind is appropriately realistic in recognizing the 
sovereignty of the object and the limitations of human cognition” (ER 141). One of 
Cullen’s only critics in the mainstream media, Janet Maslin, undertakes this task by 
questioning the epistemic validity of his narrative. The New York Times journalist asks 
in an online review: “What does Mr. Cullen’s claim to pre-eminence really mean? 
How much of it is backed by his book and how much by the sheer volume of research 
in which he immersed himself? In some ways this author’s notes are more revealing 
than his text” (np). This suggests that Maslin does take the paratext seriously, but has 
juxtaposed the narrative critically against the peritext rather than using the peritext as a 
frame. Rather than reinforcing his truth claims, Maslin argues, the notes section 
represents “misplaced confidence from his arduousness … and hair-splitting precision 
[of detail]” (np).  
 
While not disputing the accuracy of Cullen’s “facts,” Maslin questions the possibility 
of Columbine fulfilling its claims. Crucial to the assessment of Cullen’s epistemic—
rather than ethical—responsibility, Maslin notes that the last sealed depositions 
containing primary source information will be released in 2027. This, along with the 
fact that Cullen never met the killers, or their families, suggests that Maslin’s criticism 
is not without foundation. The extensive peritext—which acts as epistemic defence—
offers verifiability, but does not reflect on the epistemic limitations of Cullen’s 
knowledge. In another example, an online epitextual source shows Cullen describing 
how after the first five years working on the book, his “characters” Eric Harris and 
Dylan Klebold were “completely different” to the characters as they appear in 
Columbine (Ulin). While clearly attempting to represent his journey towards “the 
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truth”, Cullen perhaps paradoxically demonstrates here the fluidity of representation 
built on facts.  
 
Maslin’s criticism also raises the question of ownership. This issue is one that has long 
been a concern to literary journalists. While it is inherently ethical, the question “Who 
owns the story?” is worked out epistemologically, as knowledge of the subject belongs 
to the literary journalist. As Helen Garner has stated: “The story is not a story until a 
writer tells it” (An Evening). This stance places the literary journalist as the owner of 
their work of literary journalism, without appropriating the right of the subject to tell 
their own story, or have it told by another practitioner. It also reinforces Code’s 
injunction that the writer must have a “right” sense of the situation (ER 141), in that 
they are (morally) responsible for the amount, type and quality of knowledge that 
informs their narrative.  
 
The three practitioners in this chapter approach ownership quite differently. LeBlanc’s 
choice to elide herself from Random Family reflects the aim for her subjects to speak 
for themselves. Nevertheless, she acknowledges that the narrative is her own: “I 
always tell the people I write about that I’m writing about their world, but that it will 
be my story. So the truth will be my truth, not necessarily the truth they believe” (in 
Boynton, The New New Journalism 247). Skloot, as will be demonstrated, raises the 
issue both in the narrative and paratextually. She signals her concern and 
acknowledges her epistemic and ethical responsibility as a participant in her subjects’ 
story, but maintains it is not her story—she is the conduit (WKNOPBS). Cullen’s 
position seems most problematic, as paratextual frames emphasise that this is “the” 
story—a position that is reinforced by the narrative mode.  
 
Cullen’s extradiegetic mode of narration arguably adds a degree of difficulty to the 
defence of epistemic responsibility. Unlike Skloot’s text, which is mediated by an 
authorial presence, Cullen’s produces an illusion of omniscience. This is not unusual, 
however, in literary journalism. Tom Wolfe noted of the New Journalism that “most of 
the best work in the form has been done in the third-person narration with the writer 
keeping himself absolutely invisible, such as the work of Capote, Talese, the early 
Breslin, Sack, John Gregory Dunne, Joe McGinniss” (The New Journalism 42). 
Cullen’s choice not to represent his own subjectivity in the narrative is not articulated 
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beyond a passing reference in the author’s note: “To avoid injecting myself into the 
story, I generally refer to the press in the third person” (Columbine xiv), but he does 
not articulate why this is important for him as a practitioner. Unlike the effect in 
LeBlanc’s text, which is to produce a self-effacing narrator, the tone and extradiegetic 
mode in Columbine combine to create an authoritative narrator—a rhetorical situation 
vital to the truth claims of the text. This stance is evident from the opening paragraph 
of the book: 
 
He told them he loved them. Each and every one of them. He spoke 
without notes but chose his words carefully. Frank DeAngelis waited 
out the pom-pom routines, the academic awards, and the student-made 
videos. After an hour of revelry, the short, middle-aged man strode 
across the gleaming basketball court to address his student body 
(Columbine 3). 
 
Another product of this narrative stance is that Cullen frequently offers analysis 
without attribution. This is a powerful rhetorical device, and one that the extensive 
notes section following the narrative is intended to qualify. Jack Fuller notes that “the 
journalistic discipline of attribution often comes into conflict with a writer’s use of 
sophisticated literary techniques” (News Values 157), but can be accomplished to re-
establish a simple relationship between the reader, the narrator, and the writer (158). 
Frank similarly notes that “literary journalists do not want to compromise the artistic 
integrity of their work by mucking it up with attribution” (“You Had To Be There” 
155), but concludes that while “writers of reconstructive narrative are doing good 
journalism, some of the best around”, they “need to do a better job of letting … 
audiences understand how good journalism is made” (157).  
 
This is ostensibly Cullen’s concern. Where he disguises his physical presence in the 
narrative, it is identified in the notes section; for example, a passage beginning, “When 
a journalist stopped by” is cited in the notes section with annotation “I was the 
journalist” (Columbine 408). The intended effect here is clearly to attribute or validate 
the scene without interrupting the rhetorical effect of the passage. It is also intended to 
establish Cullen as a transparent practitioner, deepening the narrative’s verifiability 
and thus its reliability. The extensive documentation of sources and explanatory notes 
in the paratext is intended to validate the accuracy of the narrative—and clearly 
succeeds for most critics. But does Cullen’s assertion that “the final portrait is often 
 
 
 147 
furthest from the truth” (Columbine 150) apply here? Is the final version the truth? As 
stated, literary journalism grew out of a journalistic endeavour that relies 
fundamentally on the writer’s subjectivity, seeking to decrease the distance between 
subject and object (Hartsock 42). Embedding subjectivity in paratextual frames 
emphasises the objectivity of the research process, but positions readers to focus on 
what are represented as facts, rather than acknowledging the epistemic gaps that 
destabilise truth claims. 
 
Positioning readers in this way is not an exclusively literary function: standard or 
expository non-fiction is subject to the same pressures and effects of selection as 
literary non-fiction. As Lehman contends:  
 
The standard news writing form that lies at the source of much 
nonfiction writing in contemporary America reveals how authors 
quietly manipulate many readers of nonfiction. In these narratives, 
subjective decisions such as access to sources, whom to quote and in 
what order, and what details to highlight normally are hidden from the 
reader in favor of a style and structure that insists on nominal 
objectivity (“Mining” 338). 
 
The elements identified here by Lehman are clearly also at work in mainstream 
journalism, the main difference here being that the general structure is pre-ordained 
from over a century of practice, thus also largely hidden from the reader through 
familiarity. That covert positioning occurs in other genres, however, does not preclude 
the importance of a discussion of structure’s effect in literary journalism. The extent to 
which reader positioning affects representation of primary documentation is important 
to consider. In a lecture Cullen gives on structure in Columbine, he reports: 
 
One of the slightly manipulative things that I did, was I knew that I 
wanted to introduce several different things before the murders, and 
have some of [the subjects] die, and some of them live, and not have 
you know which ones…and it would affect you in a certain way; it 
would also make you more glad and value the fact that some of the 
people you were rooting for lived, and made it … I think it makes it 
more real and more intense (Ulin). 
 
Cullen partly achieves his aims through the structure of the narrative, which is divided 
into three main elements. The first element is coverage of events leading up to the 
shootings, the second is the massacre itself, and third covers the ongoing effects on 
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survivors and survivors’ families. These elements provide the core structure while 
analeptic, occasional proleptic, and descriptive digressions interrupt the progression, 
creating tension, and producing questions and—eventually—answers that intensify the 
reading experience. This cycle of questions and answers works as a self-verification 
mechanism. One concern here—and one that The Immortal Life, for example, 
avoids—is that Cullen’s research and opinions are largely indecipherable; thus he 
presents his own conclusions as fact. Perhaps the most salient example is Cullen’s 
characterisation of Eric Harris—the instigator of the plot behind the shootings—which 
builds towards an assessment of Harris as a psychopath. 
 
One of the framing questions that propels the narrative is what drove Eric and Dylan 
to plan and carry out the attack on the school. Agent Dwayne Fuselier is used to 
develop this line of questioning, to interpret the data left by the killers, and ultimately, 
to give the answer. Interestingly, as the narrative develops, Fuselier’s voice is fused 
with the narrator’s. Fuselier is introduced in the narrative as a parent of a Columbine 
High School student, Brian. His role as an investigator, however, becomes apparent, 
and soon Fuselier has hard evidence with which to make a diagnosis: 
 
His big break came just a few days after the murders, before he saw the 
Basement Tapes. Fuselier heard an ATF agent quoting a ghastly phrase 
Eric Harris had written.  
 “What you got there?” Fuselier asked. 
A journal. For the last year of his life, Eric Harris had written down 
many of his plans in a journal. Fuselier zipped over and read the 
opening line … 
“When I read that first sentence, all the commotion in the band room 
just ended,” he said later. “I just zoned out. Everything else faded.” 
Suddenly the big bombs began to make a lot more sense. ... Eric would 
prove the easier killer to understand. Eric always knew what he was up 
to. Dylan didn’t (Columbine 169–70). 
 
Cullen does not reveal Fuselier’s assessment at this point; in fact, it is alluded to three 
more times before the diagnosis is revealed, first emphasising its accuracy before 
articulating it with “Dr. Fuselier was not surprised by the notes. Very cold-blooded” 
(Columbine 208). And again: “Fuselier read the stories. He shuddered. All the 
conclusions were reasonable—and wrong. … By this time, Fuselier had read Eric’s 
journal and seen the Basement Tapes. He knew what the media did not. There had 
been no trigger” (Columbine 209). By the time Fuselier’s diagnosis is revealed, the 
 
 
 149 
reader has been positioned to accept it as an answer to “why” these killings occurred. 
“Fuselier spent the next twelve weeks contesting his theory. That’s how he 
approached a problem: develop a hypothesis and then search for every scrap of 
evidence to refute it. … If it withstands that, it’s solid. Psychopathy held” (Columbine 
239). Fuselier’s process here has been mimicked by Cullen; information has been 
offered but diagnosis withheld until “it’s solid,” and the reader is not offered the 
opportunity to assess for themselves. Fuselier’s assessment is confirmed as 
“textbook” on page 247 where a report is given at a major FBI summit, functioning 
again to confirm the positioning of facts and carry out a self-verification function. 
Anomalies within the diagnosis are dealt with multiple times in the following way: 
“It’s not clear exactly what Eric was up to with Dr. Albert. … ‘I would be very 
surprised if Eric was being honest and straightforward with his doctor,’ Fuselier said. 
‘Psychopaths attempt to, and often succeed, in manipulating mental health 
professionals, too’” (Columbine 261). Here Cullen notes details that are incongruent 
with the diagnosis, but they are dismissed by Agent Fuselier. In light of the self-
verifying structure to this point, there is no space for the reader to contest this 
representation. If questions do arise for the reader, Cullen again situates the reader as 
an outsider, reliant on Fuselier for perspective: 
 
Eric outdid Dylan with apologies. To the untrained eye, he seemed 
sincere. The psychologists on the case found Eric less convincing. They 
saw a psychopath. Classic. He even pulled the stunt of self-diagnosing 
to dismiss it. “I wish I was a fucking psychopath so I didn’t have any 
remorse,” Eric said. “But I do.” 
Watching that made Dr. Fuselier angry. Remorse meant a deep desire to 
correct a mistake. Eric hadn’t done that yet. He excused his actions 
several times on the tapes. Fuselier was tough to rattle, but that got to 
him (Columbine 328). 
 
At this point, Cullen still focalises through Fuselier, but towards the end of the text as 
Cullen recreates the scene at the time of the shootings, focalisation is dropped as 
Cullen assumes the expert role:  
  
They roamed aimlessly upstairs. To civilians, it seems odd that they 
stopped shooting and entered this “quiet period.” It’s actually pretty 
normal for a psychopath. They enjoy their exploits, but murder gets 
boring, too. Even serial killers lose interest after a few days. Eric was 
likely proud and inflated, but tired of it already. Dylan was less 
predictable, but probably resembled a bipolar experiencing a mixed 
episode: depressed and manic at once—indifferent to his actions; 
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remorseless but not sadistic. He was ready to die, fused with Eric and 
following his lead (Columbine 350).  
 
Columbine’s bibliography demonstrates that Cullen has gone to great lengths to gain 
background knowledge here. His assertions beginning “It’s actually pretty normal for 
a psychopath” can be upheld by his extensive research into psychopathy. But the 
question remains about the diagnosis for Eric—and Dylan. Over one hundred pages 
previously have created a path to this conclusion, buttressed by Fuselier’s diagnosis 
and Cullen’s extensive research.  
 
Narrative techniques such as those demonstrated here verify the conclusions the 
author has made through extensive research, but again, there is no room in the 
narrative for questioning the “definitive” nature of the account. One way this is 
acknowledged is that the peritext points the reader to Cullen’s own website (see 
“Columbine Online”) where primary documents are accessible; although, arguably, 
by the time the reader accesses them, the narrative will already act as a frame through 
which the primary sources will be viewed. Nora Berning’s discussion about the 
interplay between print and electronic media is illuminating here. She argues that 
Mark Bowden’s Blackhawk Down companion website is  
 
a crucial resource through which readers can retain a degree of 
autonomy from ‘the tyranny of the author.’ The appropriation of the 
text takes place according to the reader’s own discursive rules. The text 
itself becomes a structural component for the formation of cultural 
capital which eventually translates into a critical perspective on culture 
(Berning).  
 
But in Columbine’s case, the reified narrative conceivably resists the plurality of 
meanings online epitextual sources are intended to open. As with The Immortal Life, 
the peritext of Columbine directs the reader to the companion website, effectively 
creating a complex multimedia text, and again, complicating the boundaries of the 
narrative. Of his official site “Columbine Online,” Cullen writes in the peritext:  
 
The sheer size of the Columbine evidence is overwhelming. And most 
of the early reporting on why it happened was wrong. I culled through 
thousands of police files, pictures, journals, videos, interviews, 911 
calls, crime scene photos, etc. As I organized the information, I decided 
to share my research online. For this site, I compiled the most 
significant evidence and tried to make it easy to find. I hope this helps 
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you navigate the maze of myths, distortions and the truth. Good luck on 
your search (“Columbine Online”). 
 
I would argue, however, that the author-reader contract as negotiated through the 
paratextual frames of the narrative does not offer the reader degrees of autonomy, nor 
does it allow for appropriation of the text. The narrative itself frames the online 
component of the text, closing off the potential plurality of meanings and reinforcing 
the authority of Cullen’s version.  
 
Berning also acknowledges that the features of the Internet can work against 
authenticating the meaning of a text. This is undoubtedly a result of the juxtaposition 
of frames in a sequence or structure unmediated by the author; in this case, an image 
read in isolation delivers a different idea to that proposed within the context of a 
narrative. Of the Blackhawk Down companion website Berning writes: 
 
The electronic properties have unintended consequences and convey a 
message that stands in stark contrast to what Bowden exposes in his 
writing. For instance, the author deconstructs and criticizes the notion 
of American heroism and the ideology behind it. The multimedia 
elements, however, evoke the image of the American soldier as a hero, 
ignoring the disastrous course of events denounced in the story. Hence, 
instead of increasing the credibility and authenticity of a literary 
reportage, the features of the Internet can have a distorting effect (np). 
 
Here I argue a difference between the framing devices of narratives is evident: the 
peritext of Columbine dominates and frames the online epitext, while for Berning, 
Blackhawk Down’s peritext is compromised by dominant images in the epitext. 
 
Columbine is undoubtedly an important, extensively researched work of literary 
journalism. Cullen’s combination of research and rhetorical narrative strategies fulfil 
his aim of bringing characters alive, and evoking powerful emotive responses from his 
readers. The extensive paratext reveals a deep commitment to transparency, in the 
same way that his aim of “setting the story right” indicates a responsibilist approach to 
journalism. As this analysis demonstrates, however, the combination of extradiegetic 
narration and extensive paratextual notes in fact closes the narrative, and reinforces the 
“definitive” claims made by critics and the publisher. Other accounts of the 
Columbine tragedy offer both powerful and plausible explanations for Eric Harris’s 
and Dylan Klebold’s motivations, however, which call into question the epistemic 
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foundation of Columbine.32 Did Cullen have access to enough information to create 
his narrative? Undoubtedly. But is there more (unavailable) information that could 
inform his questions of why the boys killed? Indeed there is. For Code, “[s]hifting the 
focus of epistemological enquiry to a study of intellectual virtue and epistemic 
responsibility will enhance the confidence that can be lent to knowledge claims, even 
when absolute certainty is taken to be impossible” (ER 67). The point of this analysis, 
however, has been that indicators of epistemic responsibility can obscure as well as 
illuminate a text’s epistemological foundation. Conditions for “knowing well” may be 
an open-ended set (ER 39), but Maslin’s critique defined the field of inquiry, and 
found the truth claims of Columbine to be untenable. Cullen’s effort is extraordinary, 
but this analysis exposes a tension between immersive reporting, the limitations on the 
possibility of “knowing well”, and attendant claims that can be made about literary 
journalism. 
 
The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks: Rebecca Skloot 
 
As of December 4, 2011, Rebecca Skloot’s The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks still 
held second place as a New York Times bestseller—this, after 36 weeks on the 
prestigious list. While this is an extraordinary achievement for any debut work, it is 
perhaps even more unusual that science writing has garnered such a wide readership 
and sustained popularity. The book’s enormously positive reception may in part be 
attributed to Rebecca Skloot’s strong presence in the media, but its success has also 
been attributed to its thematic concerns, compelling narrative form, sympathetic 
treatment of its subjects and extensive paratextual support. In short, its features 
recommend it as an important work of literary journalism.  
 
Originally a science major, in 2008 Skloot obtained a MFA in Creative Nonfiction and 
combined these interests to write her first book. The Immortal Life is Rebecca Skloot’s 
narrative of an African-American woman who unknowingly produced the world’s first 
“immortal” cell line; that is, human cells that reproduce infinitely. Like Columbine, 
the book follows three narrative strands: the life and death of Henrietta Lacks; the 
appropriation of her cells and subsequent rise of the lucrative biogenetic industry; and 
the story of Henrietta’s family, but specifically her daughter, Deborah. Skloot uses her 
own research journey as a through-line to hold the narrative together. It is “the story 
behind the story” and has both authenticating and validating functions. The narrative is 
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bookended by a prologue in which Skloot describes the first time she heard about 
Henrietta Lacks and the HeLa cells, and, in the final chapter, her reaction to Deborah’s 
death in 2009, shortly before the book was published.  
 
Skloot’s relationship with Deborah is consequently central to the narrative. It provides 
the narrative drive: Will Deborah open up to Rebecca? How will it happen? Will the 
rest of the family accept this new development as Deborah has? Can one reporter help 
repair years of damage by intrusive and unfeeling media? It also provides 
opportunities for Skloot to reflect on the ethical implications of her role as a reporter 
on the family, her impact on the story, and the family’s impact on her own ideologies 
and beliefs. Significantly, however, Skloot resisted including herself in the narrative in 
early drafts of the narrative (Pitzer). This resistance slowly gave way throughout the 
revision process at the urging of her editor, but it does raise an interesting 
epistemological issue. If Random Family triggers the primary question: Whose 
knowledge is it? and a reflexive reading of Columbine asks: Does the scope of enquiry 
legitimate knowledge and judgments offered? The Immortal Life poses the following: 
Does a practitioner have an epistemic responsibility to reveal how their own 
experience shapes the narrative? How might a text be read differently depending on its 
epistemic defence? Ethical considerations are dealt with extensively by Skloot; in the 
following analysis, the epistemological implications of shaping narratives will be 
considered. 
 
According to Code’s definitions of objectivism and subjectivism (ER 142–3) and 
paratextual sources of The Immortal Life, Skloot demonstrates an objectivist approach 
to reporting. The paratext of The Immortal Life initially signals a strong commitment 
to epistemic responsibility. But the ethical dimension of the story and issues it raises 
take centre stage. In a section entitled “A Few Words About This Book,” Skloot 
writes: “The history of Henrietta Lacks and the HeLa cells raises important issues 
regarding science, ethics, race, and class; I’ve done my best to present them clearly 
within the narrative of the Lacks story” (The Immortal Life x). This frame is reinforced 
in the Afterword, which contains a discussion regarding the ethics of tissue ownership 
and research. Skloot’s stance is encapsulated here in a direct address to the reader: 
“How you should feel about all this isn’t obvious. It’s not as if scientists are stealing 
your arm or some vital organ. They’re using tissue scraps you parted with voluntarily. 
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Still, that often involves someone taking part of you. And people often have a strong 
sense of ownership when it comes to their bodies. Even tiny scraps of them” (The 
Immortal Life 317). The issue of informed consent is also raised in the Afterword. 
Here, the terms “disclosure”, “unknown” and “confusion” are epistemological. But 
being embedded within a discussion of ethics, epistemic concerns are opaque. This 
privileging of ethical analysis is evident throughout the book, but also applies to the 
epistemic community’s wider discussions of the text. 
 
The narrative’s paratextual frames are supported by a high degree of disclosure 
transparency, beginning with Skloot’s motivation for researching and writing the 
story. The peritext highlights issues of truth, perspective, beginnings, endings, and 
borderlands of narrative. Skloot also tentatively offers an explanation for including 
herself in the story: “I did eventually meet Deborah, who would turn out to be one of 
the strongest and most resilient women I’d ever known. We’d form a deep personal 
bond, and slowly, without realising it, I’d become a character in her story, and she in 
mine” (The Immortal Life 7). Here Skloot employs narrative as a metaphor to bridge 
the gap between text and experience. Deborah, in many ways the book’s protagonist, 
also uses language that frames her experience in narrative terms. Skloot quotes 
Deborah verbatim when she writes: “[Deborah] laughed and said, ‘I tell you one 
thing—the story’s not over yet. You got your work cut out for you, girl! This thing’s 
crazy enough for three books!’” (53); “There’s two sides to the story, and that’s what 
we want to bring out. Nothing about my mother is truth if it’s about wantin to fry the 
researchers. It’s not about punish the doctors or slander the hospital. I don’t want 
that” (250); and “‘It’s too late for Henrietta’s children,’ she told me one day over the 
phone. ‘This story ain’t about us anymore. It’s about the new Lacks children’” (302). 
That Deborah is quoted as perceiving herself and her role in the context of a narrative 
adds an authenticating layer to Skloot’s project. The reader is reminded that the story 
is unfinished, but there is also an indication that it is being shaped to bring them to 
certain conclusions (“It’s about the new Lacks children”). LeBlanc offers no such 
guidance; as Wypijewski observed, the narrative mode of Random Family precludes 
direction to the “bigger” story. But both narratives engage their readers’ subjectivity 
in the lives of their subjects. While readers of Random Family may find themselves 
immersed in the world of Coco and Jessica without interruption, the reflexivity of The 
Immortal Life functions to remind readers of the subjects’ phenomenal reality.  
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This process is also enacted in subtle ways in the narrative. Mary Kubicek, a 
laboratory assistant at the time of Henrietta’s death, was present at the autopsy. Skloot 
recreates the scene from her perspective. Mary stands in the doorway, panicking and 
concerned that she might faint, but also compelled to do her job. Henrietta’s body is 
dehumanised—Mary is in the room “with a corpse”. She wants to “run out of the 
morgue and back to the lab”, but approaches the body and greets Dr. Wilbur, the 
pathologist. Then, to avoid looking at Henrietta’s “lifeless” eyes, she turns to look at 
the bare feet at the other end of the table. Skloot recounts:   
 
“When I saw those toenails,” Mary told me years later, “I nearly 
fainted. I thought, Oh jeez, she’s a real person. I started to imagine her 
sitting in her bathroom painting those toenails, and it hit me for the first 
time that those cells we’d been working with all this time and sending 
all over the world, they came from a live woman. I’d never thought of it 
that way” (The Immortal Life 90–1).  
 
Whether calculated or not, Mary’s reaction here enacts a process Skloot is trying to 
facilitate for the reader. Her experience suggests that Henrietta was an abstraction for 
Mary, until her bright red toenails, immaculately kept during Henrietta’s lifetime, 
were viewed during the autopsy. The detail brings Henrietta to life. In the same way 
Skloot aims to reorientate the reader from the narrative’s internal to external 
referentiality, or reality, through verifiable detail. To use a visual metaphor, Skloot 
makes the reader look at Henrietta, rather than through her. The combination of 
content and form of literary journalism facilitate this bi-referentiality: the story is 
compelling at the level of narrative, but “the power of the real” (Carey xxxvi) is at 
play both in Mary’s and the reader’s experience. Representation of fine detail (such as 
the shoe Skloot finds in Henrietta’s dilapidated family home) deepens narrative 
coherence and correspondence, and verification authenticates other—less empirical—
knowledge. Although Skloot does not appear in the scene, her authorial presence 
tangibly guides the reader to an awareness not only of the materiality of the text, but 
also the reality of the subject. While LeBlanc authenticates her narrative through 
similar use of fine textual detail, the lack of paratextual frames and reflexivity support 
the narrative’s inward referentiality. This promotes a level of engagement similar to a 
novel, perhaps to the detriment of the advocatory role of the text. 
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This “power of the real” is intensified through the discipline of verification. In an 
online interview, Skloot expresses her surprise at comments made online or at 
readings that question her claims to the verifiability of narrative detail. She states that 
she is repeatedly asked: “‘So how much liberty did you have to take?’ Not did you 
take any, but how much? There’s this assumption that it’s impossible to recreate 
history in a way that reads like a story” (Pitzer). As this is clearly dealt with in the 
peritext, reader comments here betray the same scepticism of the truth and power of 
paratextual contracts in LeBlanc’s book. Both authors include statements outlining 
their reportorial practice in the peritext, both of which are demonstrably either 
discounted or disbelieved by their readers. However, while LeBlanc offers very little 
epitextual framing, online epitext offers Skloot a chance to expand her defence—
potentially with immediacy—and reiterate her commitment to the “facts”: 
 
In the opening scene it’s raining, and the room looks a certain way, and 
her husband is parked outside under an oak tree. The weather came 
from the weather bureau. I saw archival pictures of the tree and took it 
to an expert, who said “Yes, that’s an oak.” I saw archival photos of the 
room. Rebuilding that kind of narrative uses historical documents and 
interviews where you cross-source it. There’s just one moment in the 
book that only had one person who recalled it, and I said that in the 
book. But other than that, multiple sources verified all the information. 
I think it’s interesting that people assume that when they read dialogue 
that took place in the 1950s, it was made up, because I wasn’t there. 
But in fact there are ways you can recreate that accurately in reporting. 
It is absolutely possible to recreate nonfiction in a narrative way and 
still be factual. It takes a heck of a long time, but it’s worth it (Pitzer). 
 
Skloot’s defence is reminiscent of fellow literary journalist Walt Harrington’s, who 
demonstrates a similar research ethic, and maintains that verifiability is a choice to be 
made, not an unattainable goal (see The Writer's Choice). “Incredulity” (88) at the 
possibility of reconstructing scenes accurately, expressed by Harrington’s audience, 
mirrors that of LeBlanc’s and Skloot’s, suggesting that the role, value and potential 
power of paratextual defence needs to be given greater attention and prominence in 
works of literary journalism. With only one exception, Skloot claims that all 
information is verifiable by multiple sources, and she invites her readers to test this 
claim by the inclusion of primary audio, visual and documentary sources in the 
book’s online companion website (see Skloot, “Special Features”).  
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The scientific emphasis in the narrative parallels the claim that “Every detail in the 
story is verifiable in various ways” (WKNOPBS). Skloot’s background in science has 
undoubtedly informed her research process and underscores the value she places on 
verifiability. On the area of science, scholar Jack Fuller argues: 
 
Journalism is supposed to illuminate matters of public concern, and this 
includes the job of discovering significant information that otherwise 
might be hidden. So journalism must approach science (and other 
specialized disciplines that command large amounts of public money 
and deal with grave public issues) with the same disciplined scepticism 
with which it approaches the activities of a city council or a governor 
(News Values 172–73). 
 
There is certainly a degree of disciplined scepticism in The Immortal Life. Ethics and 
finances surrounding the industry of tissue research are the subject of the Afterword, 
again framing the narrative with theoretical and statistical information. This frame is 
also reinforced epitextually, with Skloot highlighting the ethical and financial issues 
brought up in her book in online forums (AgendaStevePaikin; Garness; Henry; 
WKNOPBS; Pitzer). Yet Skloot actively seeks to humanise, rather than demonise, the 
scientists involved with the development of HeLa cells. Henrietta’s, Deborah’s and 
the cells’ stories are interwoven into a tripartite narrative framework, demonstrating 
“that there are human beings behind every biological sample in a laboratory, but that 
there are also human beings behind every scientist” (Henry). The complex 
relationship of the three narrative strands is belied by “facts” or statistical 
representation alone. It is in fact Skloot’s subjectivity that guides the reader to see the 
facts in the light of the human story, eschewing scepticism, instead infusing verifiable 
facts with perspective and compassion.  
 
While it may initially seem paradoxical, Skloot’s perspective—and empathy for the 
subjects of her book—is not at odds with a scientific approach to research, or 
objectivity. In fact, if Skloot’s claims to verifiability of every detail in her narrative 
are true, she has practised what Kovach and Rosenstiel consider the original meaning 
of objectivity. As they argue in their book, “being impartial or neutral is not a core 
principle of journalism,” and “impartiality was never what was meant by objectivity” 
(95). Rather,  
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[w]hen the concept originally evolved, [objectivity] was not meant to 
imply that journalists were free of bias. Quite the contrary. The term 
began to appear … out of a growing recognition that journalists were 
full of bias, often unconsciously. Objectivity called for journalists to 
develop a consistent method of testing information—a transparent 
approach to evidence—precisely so that personal and cultural biases 
would not undermine the accuracy of their work (72 emphasis added). 
 
Michael Schudson supports this interpretation of “objectivity” to some extent, defining 
it as “at once a moral ideal, a set of reporting and editing practices, and an observable 
pattern of news writing” (“Objectivity Norm” 149). Schudson quotes Walter 
Lippmann’s treatise from the early 1920s, arguing that objectivity is “the unity of 
method, rather than of aim; the unity of the disciplined experiment” (“Objectivity 
Norm” 163). Skloot’s epistemic defence claims to reproduce the standard of 
transparency intended by the prescribed form of daily journalism. Where daily 
journalists write in an observable pattern to signal personal disinterest and thus 
transparency, a notion Jack Fuller describes as “hopelessly naïve” (News Values 14), 
the combination of reflexivity, homodiegetic narration and paratextual framing 
perform the same function in literary journalism. In this light, Skloot’s research 
method seems to be the embodiment of objectivity. As noted, she claims “There’s just 
one moment in the book that only had one person who recalled it, and I said that in the 
book. But other than that, multiple sources verified all the information” (Henry). 
Effectively, Skloot’s claim means that other journalists researching Henrietta’s life 
could potentially replicate her research. For Kovach and Rosenstiel, this is the 
journalistic goal: 
 
In science, the reliability of an experiment, or its objectivity, is defined 
by whether someone else could replicate the experiment. In journalism, 
only by explaining how we know what we know can we approximate 
this idea of people being able, if they were of a mind to, replicate the 
reporting. This is what is meant by objectivity of method in science, or 
in journalism (81). 
 
Skloot claims the highest verification standard for the content of The Immortal Life, at 
times revealing her research process in passages such as: “He grabbed my tape 
recorder from the centre of the table, handed it to Day, and said, ‘Okay, Miss Rebecca 
got questions for you, Pop. Tell her what you know.’ Day took the recorder from 
Sonny’s hand and said nothing” (The Immortal Life 164), and “‘This is Rebecca,’ she 
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told the librarian, bouncing on her toes again. ‘She’s writing about Henrietta Lacks!’” 
(The Immortal Life 74). 
 
A key point in this thesis, however, is that the discipline of verification does not solve 
all epistemic problems. Code is writing about fiction when she states: “Acquiring an 
accurate, right sense of a situation is a primary epistemic task, then, just as a writer’s 
attempt to find a right form of expression is, in large part, an epistemic problem” (ER 
141 emphasis in original). But this comment also applies to literary journalism. 
Connery notes that writers have long “grappled with finding the most effective form 
of prose discourse to make like comprehensible. … [The search] usually has signified 
a persistence in discovering ways to relate language and text, and a desire to discover 
the limitations of the printed word in recording and depicting reality” (“Third Way” 
5). For Skloot, finding the right form of expression was a long process, and her 
epitextual disclosure highlights some significant issues. In an online interview, Skloot 
discusses her initial reluctance to include herself in The Immortal Life:  
 
I teach writing, and I often say to my students, you know, “Stop 
inserting yourself into other people’s stories … where you don’t 
belong.” … I actually get annoyed with writers who put themselves in 
stories. So I was very resistant to doing it … I kept saying, it’s their 
story, it’s not my story, and then at some point I realised that I had 
actually become a character in their story. It wasn’t that it was my story 
of trying to get the story, but I was yet another journalist, or person who 
had come along, and had a big effect on them, in some cases positive, 
in some cases pretty dangerous. There are a lot of things the book is 
about, and one of them is this undercurrent of … the effect that 
journalists can have on people’s lives, whether they mean it or not, or 
whether they are even aware of what they’re doing (WKNOPBS). 
 
Ethics and epistemology are again conflated here, with the terms “effects”, “positive”, 
“dangerous”, “realised” and “aware” used in the context of journalists’ engagement 
with their subjects. But how important is a literary journalist’s own subjectivity when 
writing in a first-person narrative mode? According to Code, subjectivity “involves 
recognising the full person-hood and epistemological centrality of knowing subjects, 
of which theory of knowledge needs to take an account and acquire understanding” 
(ER 142). Skloot clearly recognises the subjectivity of the Lacks family members, but 
is she epistemically responsible about self-representation? 
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 Skloot extends her explanation in another interview, reinforcing the ethical strand of 
representation: “In the end, I realized it would be dishonest of me to leave myself out 
of the book. It wasn’t about me inserting myself into their story, it was about admitting 
that I had become a character in their story without realizing it. It was, in a sense, 
disclosure” (Henry). Skloot has been widely applauded for her transparent, ethical 
practice, but it is instructive to return to her resistance to “inserting herself into other 
people’s stories” to assess the epistemic implications of finding “a right form of 
expression” (Code, ER 141).  
 
The scene Skloot refers to in the interview mentioned earlier is one of the most 
dramatic in the narrative. The year is 2001, and there has just been a breakthrough in 
the search for Deborah’s sister, Elsie. Elsie “never went past a child in her head” (The 
Immortal Life 270), according to Deborah, and spent five years in Crownsville State 
Hospital, where she was likely used as a subject for medical research before her death 
in 1955. After their discoveries, Skloot and Deborah decide to continue their journey 
and are staying in a hotel when Deborah, prone to volatile mood swings, reacts 
violently to a misinterpretation of Skloot’s smile. She starts yelling, begins packing 
her sister’s medical records into canvas bags, then suddenly rushes toward Skloot and 
slams her up against a wall (The Immortal Life 283). Referring to this event, Skloot 
later recounted that during the drafting process: 
 
At first, I was barely present in any of the first-person parts of the book, 
because I was really holding back and not wanting to have it be about 
my emotions. It took a lot of revising to let myself have some reactions. 
Some of that was my editor. When she read the first version that I gave 
to her, she was like, “OK, you seem like a psychopath in this scene, 
because Deborah just threw you against the wall, and she’s screaming 
at you, and you don’t react. You have to react.” My editor drew out a 
little of that emotional stuff that I was really hesitant to put in (Pitzer). 
 
The phrase “A little of that emotional stuff”, however, downplays Skloot’s reaction to 
Deborah. This scene climaxes in the following way: 
  
“Who sent you? Who’s paying you?” she yelled, her hand still holding 
me against the wall. “Who paid for this room?” 
“We’ve been through this!” I said. “Remember? Credit cards? Student 
loans?” 
Then, for the first time since we met, I lost my patience with Deborah. I 
jerked free of her grip and told her to get the fuck off me and chill the 
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fuck out. She stood inches from me, staring wild-eyed again for what 
felt like minutes. Then, suddenly, she grinned and reached up to smooth 
my hair, saying, “I never seen you mad before. I was starting to wonder 
if you was even human cause you never cuss in front of me” (The 
Immortal Life 284).  
 
This passage raises some interesting—if demanding—points regarding epistemology, 
representation and a “right” form of expression. The first and most obvious point 
arising from this scene is that Skloot’s reaction was not initially represented at all. She 
had knowledge of this event, factual and emotional, yet during the narrative’s 
construction, acted on her objectivist belief that this story was about Deborah, not 
herself. This decision was arguably made according to Skloot’s ideological 
foundation, manifesting as journalistic ethics. She explains:  
 
[Y]ou don’t learn anything about my backstory unless it’s relevant to 
Deborah or to the family’s story in some way. In the prologue, you 
learn that I didn’t come from a religious background, that I came from 
the Pacific Northwest, and that I’m white—and those are specifically 
juxtaposed against Deborah. You don’t really learn that much about me 
as a character outside of their story. That was what I constantly had in 
my head, that it only belonged if it was something relevant to their story 
(Pitzer emphasis added). 
 
Juxtaposed against Skloot’s acknowledgement, “I realized it would be dishonest of me 
to leave myself out of the book” (Henry), this statement raises the question: What 
knowledge belongs in a story? And further, what criteria should be used to define this? 
Skloot clearly has a standard: is this information relevant to Deborah or the family’s 
story in some way? This is, perhaps, a sound ethical criterion. But is it epistemically 
defensible? The effect of Skloot suppressing her reaction to Deborah’s violent attack 
suggests not. According to her editor, representation in that case would have caused 
her to “seem like a psychopath”. The injunction: “You have to react” discounts the 
point that the event has passed. More explicit, accurate feedback might have indicated 
Skloot had to reveal her reaction. Is this disclosure transparency? Or is it sculpting a 
narrative? Can these two be separated? This example suggests not. It also shows how 
epistemic considerations are regularly superseded by more obvious ethical demands. A 
practitioner’s duty of care to their subject and their story is high indeed, but the literary 
journalist’s obligation to represent reality as it is—despite how theoretically fraught 
that phrase may be—is at least of equal importance. This example demonstrates how 
“cherished beliefs pose formidable bastions of opposition to epistemic change” (Code, 
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ER 251), and highlights the tension between ethical and epistemic concerns in the 
representation of “real” events.  
 
Fuller acknowledges that authors may choose to restrain emotions for personal or 
professional reasons, but claims that “these complexities decline in importance when 
the writer establishes his presence clearly throughout the narrative” (News Values 
159). I would argue, however, that this example illustrates how epistemic complexities 
increase in importance when a practitioner represents him or herself. Skloot 
acknowledges that she has modified her practice—in opposition to her personal and 
professional belief, and this can be assessed as transparency disclosure. But that she 
was compelled to modify the scene by her editor, against her own judgment, suggests 
that there is room for some reflexive epistemic questioning in Skloot’s practice. In this 
case, the epistemic community can be seen as working reliably; that is, her editor 
identified the nexus between Skloot’s objectivist approach to her subject, and her 
epistemic responsibility to faithfully represent reality. This tension is one that must be 
carefully managed, as further analysis of this passage demonstrates.  
 
The way dialogue is used to build dramatic tension throughout this scene is also 
noteworthy. Both direct and indirect speech are employed in this passage where 
Deborah’s rage escalates while Skloot desperately tries to convince her that she is 
wrong. In the exchange of direct dialogue, Deborah “snaps” and then “yells”, Skloot 
“tells” and then “yells”, which builds to what should arguably be the climactic 
moment. Here it is worth including this dialogue again in full: 
 
“Who sent you? Who’s paying you?” [Deborah] yelled, her hand still 
holding me against the wall. “Who paid for this room?” 
“We’ve been through this!” I said. “Remember? Credit cards? Student 
loans?” 
Then, for the first time since we met, I lost my patience with Deborah. I 
jerked free of her grip and told her to get the fuck off me and chill the 
fuck out (The Immortal Life 283). 
 
The inquit tag “said” here seems anomalous in such a volatile situation, particularly 
when used in conjunction with the exclamation mark. But the indirect representation 
of Skloot’s own speech diffuses the climactic moment of the exchange. Had the final 
sentence of dialogue been represented directly, the passage would peak here. But, 
Skloot’s—possibly exasperated, possibly desperate—cry is the last tone directly 
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conveyed, before she loses patience and the scene ends in an anti-climax. For the rest 
of the chapter and well into the following chapter, Skloot is silent, apart from indirect 
representation of her thought and speech. The point here is perhaps hypercritical. But 
the purpose is to draw attention to the epistemic effects of skewing a narrative to 
emphasise the experience of the subject. In trying to give Deborah’s experience “full 
[rein]” (Code, ER 142), Skloot does not offer the reader knowledge that accurately 
reflects her own experience. This example is also interesting in that Skloot sets the 
highest standard in the peritext—verbatim representation—for reproducing dialogue. 
She appropriates the rationale of one of Henrietta’s relatives: “If you pretty up how 
people spoke and change the things they said, that’s dishonest. It’s taking away their 
lives, their experiences, and their selves” (The Immortal Life ix). While Skloot is 
particular about verbatim dialogue, she adopts the second part of this rationale for her 
subjects, but not for herself. A similar case occurs in the chapter entitled “Soul 
Cleansing”, where Skloot is present and records her reaction to Deborah’s breakdown 
in the following way:  
  
I’d been watching all this from a recliner a few feet away, dumb-
founded, terrified to move or make noise, frantically scribbling notes. In 
any other circumstance I might have thought the whole thing was crazy. 
But what was happening between Gary and Deborah at that moment 
was the furthest thing from crazy I’d seen all day. As I watched, all I 
could think was, Oh my god … I did this to her (The Immortal Life 
292). 
 
The ethical issue is clear here: Skloot is experiencing the fulfilment of her initial 
concerns that she was one more reporter imposing herself on the lives of the Lackses. 
She went ahead nonetheless, and in doing so pushed Deborah to her limits. This 
situation achieves some narrative closure in a following chapter, where Skloot is 
called up the front of Deborah’s church and cheered by the congregation for her role in 
revealing Henrietta’s story. Here, it seems, is justification—if not redemption—for 
Skloot. But for the rest of the chapter “Soul Cleansing”, all of the dialogue represented 
belongs to Gary and Deborah, the other two people in the room; Skloot is again silent.  
 
One could argue that Skloot’s limited subjectivity combined with her objectivist 
approach is more epistemically responsible than mainstream journalistic practice, 
which often hides both process and perspective. Again, Kovach and Rosenstiel argue 
that the use of “the neutral voice” is a form of deception (74). Their statement echoes 
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Kathy Roberts Forde’s contention that “transparency rather than objectivity may well 
be the news value we most need in our postmodern age” (218), as well as a 2009 study 
which revealed “one striking new element [which] is the norm that the journalistic 
process be transparent—for both sources and the audience” (van der Wurff and 
Schonbach 412). Each of these journalism scholars might identify Skloot as an 
epistemically responsible practitioner by this standard, but as the analysis has 
demonstrated, apparently transparent texts can hide epistemic concerns. 
  
Media ethicist Sandra Borden argues that the professional value of objectivity calls on 
journalists to “keep their feelings out of their stories,” and where this is impractical or 
impossible, “professional standards encourage them to declare their empathy with a 
source or conflict of interest” (223). This analysis demonstrates that epistemic 
responsibility is reliant on more than a declaration. Skloot’s debut work is one 
example of how literary journalism can merge facts, figures, statistics, emotions and 
perspectives without compromising a commitment to the highest standards of 
verifiability. But does this guarantee a sound epistemic foundation? First-person 
narration may seem to be less problematic in that it allows disclosure transparency in 
both research practice and ethical responsibility throughout a narrative. This would not 
have been possible had Skloot used an omniscient, extra-diegetic narrative mode such 
as that employed by LeBlanc or Cullen. Clearly, however, epistemic responsibility 
must be carefully assessed in spite of narrative techniques used. A balance is required 
between the objectivist goal of giving the object “full [rein]” and acknowledging one’s 
subjectivity. Code explains that “to enjoin objectivism is to enjoin sensitivity to 
subjectivistic attitudes both in oneself and, where it touches one, in others” (ER 143). 
The point in this case is not the literary journalist’s inattention to their subject, but to 
themselves as a subject of the narrative. 
 
Conclusions 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I proposed that issues manifested in (post)colonial 
experience are reflected in contemporary literary journalism. These include ownership 
of the land (or ownership of the story); the relationship between the land and its first 
and colonising peoples (or the relationship between story, subject and writer); and 
negotiation of colonial authority over the land (or the practitioner’s authority over the 
story). People’s stories are not terra nullius; at times they are highly contested sites of 
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personal experience and representation for subjects and practitioners alike. This type 
of reflection invites ethical examination, but in this chapter I have identified epistemic 
implications involved in telling other people’s stories. While “it is not possible to 
devise a rule of thumb for assessing the epistemic responsibility of other persons” (ER 
175), Code nevertheless advocates enquiry into individuals’ epistemic responsibility. 
In these analyses I have applied the types of reflexive questioning encouraged by 
Code, in order to assess the truth claims of three contemporary works of literary 
journalism. LeBlanc, Cullen and Skloot are not merely members of an epistemic 
community. To appropriate Code’s terminology again, these practitioners are both 
“conservers and modifiers” of literary journalism. As such, they have a “constitutive 
role” to conduct their “moral and intellectual life so as to contribute to the creation 
and preservation of the best possible standards appropriate to the practices within 
which one lives” (ER 194). Each practitioner is clearly cognisant of this 
responsibility, and demonstrates a high degree of epistemic responsibility. The 
purpose of these analyses has been to highlight both strengths and gaps in literary 
journalism’s epistemic foundation, to reflect on current practices, and suggest areas of 
improvement for future practitioners. 
 
LeBlanc’s Random Family invites epistemic questioning that asks: Whose knowledge 
is this? Is representation epistemically responsible and defensible? Does the scope of 
enquiry legitimate such knowledge and judgments? At times the answers to these 
questions are opaque in LeBlanc’s narrative. But an analysis of Random Family 
suggests that where the discipline of verification fails, an evaluation of epistemic 
responsibility provides a strong evaluation of the “truth value” offered. Code’s 
assertion that a “knower’s” location with respect to the object of their inquiry is 
integral to the production and justification of knowledge claims” guides this analysis 
(ER 106). There are substantial differences between LeBlanc’s and Cullen’s access to 
sources, types of knowledge (personal, communal, relational, generational), and truth 
claims, indicating that there are distinctions between types of immersion journalism 
and the knowledge they can offer. Immersion is, however, the key characteristic of 
epistemically responsible practice.  
 
Cullen’s book raises the issue of the media as a source of knowledge rather than 
seeker of knowledge, but complicates its strong critique by participating in the same 
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process it condemns. Columbine is a painstakingly researched reconstruction of a 
national tragedy, and deserves the critical praise it has garnered. But the analysis of 
Cullen’s epistemic responsibility suggests that, like other practitioners, Cullen has 
epistemic “blind spots” that simultaneously produce strong truth claims and 
destabilise his version of events as the definitive account. Again, for Code, the ability 
to be “critical of one’s own knowing is a crucially important aspect of epistemic 
competence” (ER 176). But in Columbine the potential fluidity of representation built 
on facts is not acknowledged. In the same way, “facts” which do not cohere with 
Fuselier’s and Cullen’s diagnosis of psychopathy are glossed over. This raises the 
questions: Are the knowledge and truth claims of Columbine epistemically 
justifiable? Is Cullen, to appropriate Code’s words, “in a position to know” that his 
truth claims are definitive (ER 39)? Or is this, finally, Cullen’s story? Alternate 
versions of the Columbine tragedy suggest that this is indeed Cullen’s story, but the 
combination of narrative mode and paratextual framing lead readers away from this 
conclusion. Rhetorical devices and lack of attribution hide Cullen’s subjectivity in a 
way that, I argue, paratextual disclosure is unlikely to rectify. The cyclical structure of 
questions and answers works as a self-verification mechanism for the narrative that 
further reifies this version of events and reinforces Cullen’s personal judgments—
albeit judgments based on extensive, immersive research. The online epitext is offered 
as disclosure transparency, but I have argued that the effect is a closing off of 
potential plurality of meanings as the narrative itself frames the online research 
resources. Again, Cullen’s research effort is extraordinary, but this analysis exposes 
the tension between definitely “truth claims” and the epistemological possibility of 
“knowing well” with limited access to sources and resources.  
 
And finally, Skloot’s narrative has been praised for its depth of research, the 
emotional depth it evokes, and the quality of the reporting. Indeed, this acclaim is 
well deserved. But analysis of epistemic responsibility triggers the question: what is a 
literary journalist’s epistemic duty to reveal how their subjectivity shapes the 
narrative? I have argued that the first-person narrative mode conceals epistemological 
concerns that need to be addressed in the process of constructing a narrative. Ethical 
issues are undoubtedly central to The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, but I argue 
that the emphasis on these precludes rigorous epistemic questioning. The metaphor of 
narrative—Deborah and Skloot both employ this lexicon—adds an authenticating 
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layer to the story; this inclusion seems to suggest that Skloot has considered 
problematic issues of representing her subjects in a narrative mode, but the anti-
climactic ending to her altercation with Deborah suggests that further reflection is 
needed in this area. This scene also raises issues of how a practitioner’s self-
knowledge is represented in literary journalism—is an emphasis on a subject’s 
experience detrimental to the “truth value” of a text? This analysis suggests the 
answer is yes. The Immortal Life harnesses “the power of the real” to produce an 
emotionally engaging, vividly rendered narrative. It is indeed “a heroic work of 
cultural and medical journalism”, a “moving” story of “modern medicine and 
bioethics” and “full of poignancy and humanity” (dustcover). But it also raises 
important epistemic questions that are useful for the continued theorisation and 
practice of literary journalism. 
 
There is no doubt that between 2000-2010, Rebecca Skloot, Dave Cullen and Adrian 
Nicole LeBlanc all established themselves as powerful new voices in contemporary 
media. While already relatively successful in their freelance work, publication of 
book-length works of literary journalism has placed them as politically, socially and 
culturally significant interpreters of our time. Skloot and Cullen’s narratives are 
arguably as important for what they say about the media and modern forms of 
storytelling as for their compelling investigation of contemporary issues. The differing 
narrative modes, frames negotiating the author-reader contract, research methods and 
narrative styles employed by these three practitioners are typical of the range of 
practices represented in literary journalism—although nowhere near exhaustive. They 
also represent, however, the “new form of clean classicism” that signals maturation 
from the days of New Journalism, and further suggests that contemporary literary 
journalists are aware of the increasing importance of transparency in practice. The 
readings undertaken in this chapter reveal the complexities initiated by online access 
to epitextual sources, and suggest that writers must carefully negotiate the intratextual, 
peritextual and epitextual claims of their narratives to avoid sending contradictory 
messages to readers, undermining research efforts, or making unsustainable truth 
claims.  
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Chapter Six 
Contemporary Australian Literary Journalism 
 
In his 2009 call for international scholarship on the discipline, Norman Sims 
acknowledges that literary journalism is not only an American phenomenon, but that 
it appears in other cultures with variations. He writes: “International forms that are 
akin to what we call literary journalism often put more stress on social usefulness than 
on artistry, which may be one of many marks that distinguish them from the North 
American varieties” (“Problem” 10). While LeBlanc’s Random Family, Cullen’s 
Columbine and Skloot’s The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks have been acclaimed 
for their style or artistry as demonstrated in the previous chapter, this does not 
preclude or diminish their social function. Issues of race, class and violence focalised 
through the lens of individuals’ experiences do represent, and to some extent 
encourage reflection upon, wider social problems in the United States. However, the 
limited range of subjects—or “hyper-personalisation”—of such issues does tend to 
over-simplify “enormously complex histories [while] diverting attention from other 
important social, political, geostrategic, religious and environmental factors” (Keeble 
84). By focusing on individual experience rather than sites of group conflict, is North 
American literary journalism offering a way to understand the complexities of the 
social world? Or does it privilege individual experience? John Pauly takes up this 
theme in his 2011 keynote address to the International Association for Literary 
Journalism Studies, asserting, “Literary journalism, at least in the United States, has 
typically preferred the cultural to the civic. It discovers its most profound stories in 
humans’ quest for meaning, rather than in the civic drama of news” (“Drama” 79). 
Pauly contends that this focus on the cultural is to the detriment of meaningful 
reporting on civic life. He asks: “Is it possible for literary journalism to describe a 
social field, in which individuals are not the entire focus but moments in a larger 
social process, in the way that cultural studies and sociology regularly attempt?” 
(“Drama” 79)    
 
While literary journalism in the United States “has typically preferred the cultural to 
the civic”, civic issues predominate in Australian literary journalism. Cultural 
concerns underlie many Australian works of literary journalism, but they are often 
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explored through the lens of civic life and group conflict. From Guy Rundle’s Hunter 
S. Thompson-esque election coverage to David Marr’s narrative exposés into political 
crises, and from Paul McGeough’s coverage of the Middle East to Malcolm Knox’s 
critique of the jury system, Australian practitioners are deeply concerned with 
understanding the meaning of group life, responsibility, and civic conflict.33 In 2003 
Mark Mordue observed the beginning of “a renaissance in Australian non-fiction” that 
featured “a radical hybridisation of style and content.” He also suggested that this 
might be a result of readers seeking “recognition and identity in the non-fiction form” 
when it is lacking in fiction (Mordue). As will be argued in this chapter, concern with 
civic life in fact performs this function in landmark works of Australian literary 
journalism: that of examining and developing national identity.  
 
An apposite example is John Bryson’s 1985 classic Evil Angels. Bryson’s book is 
arguably Australia’s most recognisable work of literary journalism. Of the seven 
books written about Azaria Chamberlain’s death, it unquestionably had the greatest 
impact in shifting public sentiment toward Lindy Chamberlain, who was accused of 
killing her nine-week-old daughter at Ayers Rock in central Australia in 1980. Like In 
Cold Blood, Evil Angels is written in an omniscient mode, features fully reconstructed 
scenes and dialogue in full, as well as narrative devices to contextualise the 
Chamberlains’ religious background. Penny Pether has compared Evil Angels with In 
Cold Blood in that both represent “judgments about law and society, and thus about 
nation” (45). Pether further observes that Evil Angels and David Marr’s and Marian 
Wilkinson’s more recent Dark Victory (2004), share an interest in the role that legal 
actors, judges and lawyers play in “the epic of Australian national identity”. She 
writes that Bryson,  
a lawyer by training and at his best as a writer in the genre of literary 
journalism, uses … characters … as stalking horses for his dissection of 
a grim pettiness and hostility to people who are “not like us” that 
characterize Anglo-Australia at its worst, and of how the law becomes 
complicit in and compounds this moral failing of the dominant national 
culture when due process is no more than … “surreal epistemology” 
(45). 
 
Dark Victory, a narrative investigating the plight of asylum seekers in Australia, 
similarly depicts what happens when “the potent fictions of the rule of law become no 
more than cynical sham” and how “ancient fears of invasion by immigration…become 
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the dominant cultural story, and circumscribe the vision of how the nation’s past might 
shape its future” (Pether 45). Evil Angels and Dark Victory are stylistically dissimilar. 
If Bryson’s work can be compared with Capote’s, a helpful comparison can be made 
between Dark Victory and Woodward’s and Bernstein’s All the President’s Men 
(1974) in both style and function as political exposé. These two books reflect the 
diverse characteristics of literary journalism, as does their content. But does this 
diversity preclude any guiding sense of purpose? Is there any evidence that literary 
journalism performs a cultural or political function in Australia comparable to that of 
the New Journalism? 
 
The underlying concerns of these two books are consonant with those analysed in this 
chapter. In fact, I contend that a significant amount of Australian literary journalism—
the subjects of which range from murder trials to asylum seekers, Royal Commissions 
to deaths in custody, and sexual harassment claims to old-growth forest logging—is 
concerned with the question: what does it mean to be Australian? This is manifested in 
various ways: How does a country with a colonial past come to understand itself as a 
postcolonial society? How can Indigenous, Anglo, and “other” Australians identify 
with each other? Who has power? How can it be shared? And if a homogenous notion 
of “being Australian” does exist, why is it so hard to relate to “others” who are “not 
like us” (Pether 45)? The stories Australian literary journalists tell about the land and 
people’s relationship to it represent an effort not to rewrite the history books, but 
rather to make sense of a fragmented contemporary society, and to challenge 
established constructions of national identity perpetuated by mainstream media.  
 
Terra nullius is an apt metaphor to describe the current state of scholarship on 
Australian literary journalism. In 2003 Mark Mordue identified a critical need for 
dialogue between journalism, the academy and Australia’s literary fraternities given 
the lack of traditional outlets for long-form literary non-fiction (n.p.). But as recently 
as 2011, Sue Joseph has observed there is still a “dearth of research” into emerging 
forms of non-fiction in Australia (‘Creative Non-fiction’ 32). If there is currently a 
discussion taking place, Joseph writes, it is only happening among a small number of 
practitioner/academics in various universities, and to date it does not hold any sort of 
cultural gravitas (“Australian” 38).  Yet literary journalism, itself a “no-man’s land” 
for so long, is a powerful medium through which Australian stories can be told. The 
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discussion in chapter one shows that scholars of literary journalism have learned 
valuable lessons about the importance of inclusiveness, honoring differences, the 
effects of labelling, and, most recently with the emergence of international 
scholarship, the power made available by open dialogue and a willingness to learn 
from other traditions (see Bak). These are lessons both practitioners and scholars can 
bring to the contemporary practice of Australian literary journalism. Literary 
journalism is largely unexplored territory in scholarship for a number of reasons, not 
least of which is the historic divide between the literary and journalistic communities. 
Here the metaphor of “no-man’s land” in the sense of contested—but unoccupied—
ground in a war is particularly apt. The literary establishment in Australia considered 
mainstream journalism a disreputable profession well into the twentieth century (Hirst 
89), a situation comparable to Tom Wolfe’s standoff with “Literary Gentlemen in the 
Grandstand” in the US. In turn, Australian journalists have traditionally regarded 
themselves “great destroyers of intellectual pretensions” (in Conley 50), leaving those 
who practise the self-conscious or “highbrow” tradition of literary journalism without 
a home. While conditions have thus been historically unfavourable for the practice of 
literary journalism, Ricketson notes that the current “vibrant” state of book-length 
mainstream journalism in Australia is quantifiable through commercial and critical 
success. In the same study he also contends that contemporary practice outstrips the 
scholarship surrounding it (“Book-length Journalism” 76).  
 
Robert Boynton’s The New New Journalism (2005) thus does not have an equivalent 
in Australia. However, Joseph’s paper titled: “Australian Creative Non-fiction” 
(2011) contains interviews with twelve practitioners, six of whom have produced a 
book-length work of literary journalism as it is defined in this thesis. This article 
provides some useful connections and contrasts between North American and 
Australian contemporary literary journalists. While Boynton’s interviewees more 
readily identify themselves with a tradition than their Australian counterparts, 
practitioners from both countries have demonstrated a reluctance to be labelled in a 
specific field. Joseph notes that her interviewees are almost of one accord in 
questioning the need for labelling what they do. She further observes that there is 
something idiosyncratically Australian about this response: “idiosyncratic because the 
dismissive nature of the responses carry … a ‘larrikin’ element—they really go 
against the gravitas accorded the discussion in the USA and UK” (“Australian” 49). 
 
 
 172 
While this may be so, resistance to labelling is demonstrably a global issue, and the 
“larrikin” element perhaps is more indicative of some antipathy towards the academy 
rather than the seriousness with which Australian practitioners approach their work. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the absence of a readily identifiable canon, consensus on a 
name, or a perceived need for a name—all issues Australia shares with the field 
worldwide—a new generation of literary journalists not only exists, but is also 
making a powerful impact on Australian national identity and culture.  
 
The relatively short history of the nation since Federation in 1901, combined with its 
colonial past, has produced different conditions for the production and reception of 
literary journalism to those in the US. These conditions have arguably been influential 
in shaping its production and function. The first can be characterised as a lack of an 
identifiable tradition of Australian literary journalism, combined with the paucity of 
resources to sustain one. This is a catch-22 situation: without a strong tradition, 
resources are unlikely to be allocated, but without resources, a tradition cannot 
develop. There are, however, exceptions. Some scholars contend that Australia did 
not have the wave of New Journalism the US had (Josephi and Muller 72), but Denis 
Cryle argues that the Nation Review, established in 1972, represents a “home grown” 
form of what was taking place in the US during that decade (see also Joseph, “What 
If”). Rather than imitating American trends, Cryle contends that the iconoclastic, 
satirical, “larrikin” characteristics of that publication were “pre-eminently anti-British 
and anti-respectable rather than modelled on American trends” and aimed to “redefine 
the relationship between writers and readers to break down the aura of impersonality” 
(np). He also cites the “new nationalism of the period” as a catalyst for the emergence 
of the publication, whose editor listed the need “to explore the possibility of being 
Australian” (np) as a prime objective. In this, Cryle aligns his analysis with 
Hartsock’s understanding of literary journalism as a response to social transformation 
(193), although MacCallum emphasises that “Australian New Journalism was much 
more evolutionary than its often revolutionary and celebrated American equivalent” 
(in Cryle np). This evolutionary quality is still evident in contemporary works, as the 
analyses in this chapter demonstrate.  
 
Importantly, it has also been noted that while the mainstream press was commercially 
driven, Australia’s wave of literary journalism was enabled by “the largesse of liberal 
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millionaire, Gordon Barton,” who “gave the Review and its talented contributors 
unprecedented freedom to engage in political parody and to challenge the moral 
certainties of conventional and daily journalism” (Cryle). The impact of the Nation 
Review, however, was limited. Pauly is one of many who identify New Journalism as 
a turn towards questions of culture in order to capture that era’s sense of its own 
experience (“Drama” 77). But without the steady, influential presence of publications 
such as the New Yorker, Esquire, Harpers, the Village Voice and Rolling Stone, 
Australian literary journalism has not received either the institutional or public 
recognition it has in the US. Ricketson notes that, along with Nation Review, 
“Magazines like Australian Society and the Independent Monthly … sometimes ran 
literary journalism but either did not have the money to support the research time 
literary journalists needed or the know-how to train journalists in this demanding 
form. It has largely fallen to individual journalists to do their own experiments” 
(“True Stories” 156). Subsequently, without funding for sustained investigative work, 
Australian practitioners did not have the resources afforded the “prose poets of the 
quotidian” (Boynton, The New New Journalism xv), hence they applied the discipline 
of narrative literary journalism to current affairs, politics and civic drama.  
 
This civic focus remains dominant in Australian literary journalism. Between 2000 
and 2010, three Australian practitioners produced their first book-length works. 
Margaret Simons’s The Meeting of the Waters: The Hindmarsh Island Affair (MOTW) 
(2003), Chloe Hooper’s The Tall Man: Death and Life on Palm Island (2008) and 
Anna Krien’s Into the Woods: The Battle For Tasmania’s Forests (2010) all explore 
power relations between citizens and authorities through the prism of a “civic drama”. 
Significantly, cultural or ideological clashes give rise to group conflict in each case, 
thus cultural concerns are also central in each text. Conflict located at the intersection 
between culture and civic responsibility exposes power imbalances, thus the 
relationship between the two domains is largely symbiotic. Consequently, a common 
thread running through these texts is an analysis of society where personal (and 
national) identity, beliefs and practices clash with civic duties and their enforcement. 
While literary journalism’s historical tradition of providing a voice for the 
marginalised is manifested in these texts, each practitioner attempts to provide a range 
of perspectives around the conflict, including those of business stakeholders, 
members of government, law enforcers and media personalities. These are events in 
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which “individuals are not the entire focus but moments in a larger social process” 
(Pauly, “Drama” 79), or as Margaret Simons puts it, she is writing about “figures in 
the landscape” (MOTW 294). A deeper question then underscores the narratives: what 
do these stories reveal about what it means to be a figure in Australia’s national 
landscape? 
 
Along with Simons, Hooper and Krien discredit the idea of “an” Australian national 
identity. All demonstrate the myth of collective identity through the exploration of 
group conflict. Each of the practitioners also writes with an implicit awareness that 
they are both deconstructing and shaping national identity, a process that is mirrored 
by their own personal journey of reflection and discovery. A significant implication of 
this theme is that, while “outsiders", all three also consciously place themselves 
within the conflict by virtue of their relationship with their subjects and highly 
reflexive first-person narrator voices. This decision impacts on each narrative in 
different ways, but a shared anxiety is evident in the texts over the representation of 
events and concomitant issues regarding epistemic responsibility.  
 
This anxiety may be due to a number of factors, but the strongest is arguably the 
influence of the epistemic community. Again, for Code, communities of “knowers” 
are “epistemologically relevant [in assessing truth claims], for they act as enabling 
and/or constraining factors in the growth of knowledge” (ER 26). Australia’s 
relatively small population results in national media coverage for many significant or 
ongoing events. The three issues represented in these narratives—a dispute over the 
building of a bridge in South Australia, an Aboriginal death in custody and 
subsequent riot on Palm Island, and the logging of Tasmanian forests—have all 
attracted national media coverage over extended periods of time. Critics and the wider 
reading public are therefore often familiar with the “facts” of cases and conceivably 
take a position on events before book-length literary journalism is produced. For 
example, referring to the death in custody that is the subject of Hooper’s The Tall 
Man, Queensland academic Cheryl Taylor writes, “Like most Australians, I knew of 
the events … only through the media reports. These rarely revealed the experiences 
and attitudes that underlay the actions of the police and the Indigenous people 
involved” (36). Consequently, these three Australian literary journalists not only 
construct narratives to explicate the meaning of events, but must also work in 
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opposition to ideologies ingrained in the national consciousness and reinforced by 
stereotyping in mainstream media. The “backyard effect”—the sense that events with 
national significance happen in close proximity to all Australians—increases the 
vulnerability of texts to competing narratives and emphasises the role of epistemic 
responsibility for the literary journalist.  
 
An associated factor contributing to anxiety over representation is that of Australia’s 
recent, colonial history. An “outsider” knowingly and intentionally trespassing on 
established or occupied ground has deeply resonant overtones for a country still 
coming to terms with its colonial past. Knowledge—or truth claims—about “others” 
are equally fraught. Practitioners must tread carefully to avoid alienating their 
readership, many of whom may have a personal investment in—or connection to—the 
events represented in their narrative. Manifesting as the “history” and “culture wars”, 
ongoing dialogue over (post)colonial issues such as identity, citizenship, ownership 
of—and relationship to—the land are often passionate and polarising. Australian 
journals such as Meanjin, The Monthly, Quarterly Essay, The Sydney Papers and The 
Griffith Review regularly engage with issues related to national identity, often through 
the lens of controversial issues such as those represented in this chapter. Further, as 
independent practitioners, Simons, Hooper and Krien do not have access to the 
authority invested in reporters who are supported by a media institution. As suggested 
in chapter three, literary journalists are not protected by the boundaries afforded 
mainstream journalists, such as the critical distance offered by the objectivity 
standard. Therefore, readers familiar with the events will likely have a vested interest 
in knowing practitioners’ motivations and agendas. For literary journalists 
endeavouring to shed light on national consciousness, the recasting of facts in 
narrative form is indeed a complex and sensitive task.  
 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is twofold. Firstly, I investigate how these three 
practitioners negotiate epistemic responsibility. Using Code’s notion of epistemic 
responsibilism, I read the paratextual contracts juxtaposed against the rhetorical effect 
of the narrative itself. The narrative voices in these works of literary journalism are 
analysed, and I demonstrate how the anxiety over representation can be read as an 
effect produced by an increasingly polarised, cynical epistemic community. And 
secondly, in the absence of substantial scholarly work examining the character of 
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Australian literary journalism, this chapter suggests that one way of conceptualising 
contemporary practice is to explore what it means to be Australian. The following 
section will give background to the texts, before moving into an analysis of epistemic 
responsibility. 
 
The Storytellers and their Stories 
 
On July 19, 1995, a Royal Commission inquiry began into what became known as 
The Hindmarsh Island Affair, a dispute over whether or not a bridge should be built 
connecting the mainland to a small island in Lake Alexandrina, South Australia. 
Effectively, two main groups of local residents emerged in the investigation: those 
who supported the building of the bridge, and those who opposed it on grounds that 
the river is sacred. Some indigenous opponents of the bridge claimed that building the 
bridge would interfere with the “meeting of the waters”34 where salt and fresh water 
mixed in the Goolwa estuary, which would have adverse effects on female fertility. 
The details of how or why this would happen, however, were only revealed 
incrementally over the course of the Royal Commission inquiry, a process that was 
taken by some as evidence that the purported traditions were fabricated. Of most 
significance to the case, however, were the protestors’ claims that the traditions could 
not be made known to men. This gave rise to the moniker “secret women’s business”, 
a phrase which has entered the Australian lexicon to connote suspect activity. Those 
who supported the building of the bridge, known as the “dissident women”,35 claimed 
knowledge of neither the secret traditions of Hindmarsh Island, nor the relationship 
between the meeting of the waters and female fertility. The Commission was 
hampered by the inaccessibility of “factual” evidence, a poor initial investigation as 
well as vast divides in ideological and epistemic foundations. But it found that 
sufficient evidence was not available to justify protecting the site as sacred, and 
ordered that the building would proceed. This finding was effectively overturned in 
2001 by the Federal Court of Australia, but by that time the bridge had already been 
built. A huge rift had also opened up in public opinion regarding the authenticity of 
the “secret women’s business”, and the larger issue of Aboriginal land rights. The 
Hindmarsh Island controversy proved to be a watershed for indigenous affairs as the 
battle between competing narratives played out in Australia’s mainstream media.  
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South Australian journalist Margaret Simons was initially drawn to the Hindmarsh 
Affair after reading a book by journalist Chris Kenny, who had covered the story to 
date and was sceptical of the proponent women’s claims.36 Kenny initially broke the 
news that the dissident women denied the existence of secret women’s business, and 
was critical of the “political correctness” he perceived as overwhelming “common 
sense among anthropologists and journalists who should have been less gullible” 
(Simons, MOTW 125). Simons’s research culminated in The Meeting of the Waters: 
The Hindmarsh Island Affair (2003) as well as the creative writing component for her 
doctoral thesis of the same name, subtitled: An Exercise in Creative Non-fiction and 
Investigative Journalism.37 Despite this subtitle, Simons prefers the term “narrative 
journalism” to creative non-fiction for the absence of negatives (Joseph, “True 
Stories” 92). Throughout the narrative it becomes clear that Simons supports the case 
for secret women’s business on the grounds that the dissident women did not have 
access to the oral narrative that gave birth to opposition to the bridge. This position 
attracted some criticism after publication, as will be discussed. Nevertheless, as 
Ricketson notes The Meeting of the Waters has been recognised as the most thorough, 
fair-minded and revelatory account of the Hindmarsh Island affair (“Ethical Issues” 
92). It was shortlisted for four awards and won the Queensland Premier’s Award for 
non-fiction in 2003. 
 
Like Simons’s book, Hooper’s also explores the relationship between identity, stories, 
and the land, through the lens of civic conflict. The Tall Man (TM) covers an inquest 
into the death in custody of Cameron Doomadgee, an indigenous Australian and 
resident of Palm Island. Following the 1991 Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody, the suspicious circumstances surrounding Doomadgee’s death and 
the following police investigation created a firestorm in the media nationwide. 
Essentially, public opinion was divided between support for the attending police 
officer, Senior Sergeant Chris Hurley, who claimed that the fatal injuries causing 
Doomadgee’s death were the result of tripping over a step in the Palm Island police 
station, and those who believed that Cameron’s injuries were maliciously inflicted by 
Senior Sergeant Hurley.38 These injuries included a black eye, four broken ribs, a 
ruptured portal vein, and a liver almost cleaved in two—damage that the inquiry 
found comparable to the effects of a high impact car accident. Doomadgee’s death 
occurred on November 19th, 2004. On June 20th, 2007, after the case against Hurley 
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had been dismissed and then reinstated, a Supreme Court jury acquitted Senior 
Sergeant Hurley of manslaughter and assault charges. Two years after the book’s 
publication, the inquest was reopened; Hurley apologized to the Doomadgee family, 
but maintained he did not regret his actions on the day. At that inquest’s conclusion, 
the coroner stated that he could not make a definitive finding due to the unreliability 
of police and aboriginal witnesses. While the first inquest and subsequent 
manslaughter charge form the core of The Tall Man, author Chloe Hooper notes that 
Doomadgee’s death is just one such case in a chain of deaths in custody, and greater 
cycle of violence and oppression of Australia’s indigenous people. As such, Hooper 
draws on historical sources: literary and historical figures such as Conrad’s Kurtz, T. 
E. Lawrence, George Orwell and Robert “Uncle Boss” Curry, as well as indigenous 
mythology to tell Doomadgee’s and Hurley’s story, but also a wider story of colonial 
oppression and madness.  
 
While many Australian practitioners of long-form literary journalism—such as David 
Marr, Guy Rundle, Paul McGeough, Fiona Harari and Jacquie Everitt—are currently 
practising daily mainstream journalists, Hooper is primarily a novelist.39 The recipient 
of a Fulbright scholarship, Hooper studied creative writing at Columbia University 
under Philip Roth and worked as an intern at the New Yorker, an experience that 
connected her to the US tradition of literary journalism. Hooper’s 10,000-word essay 
on the death in custody of Palm Island Aborigine Cameron Doomadgee for The 
Monthly magazine won a Walkley—Australia’s highest award for journalism—for 
magazine feature writing, and was later extended and published as The Tall Man: 
Death and Life on Palm Island (2008). In book form, The Tall Man garnered nine 
awards, and most recently a screen adaptation won a second Walkley for best long-
form journalism.  
 
The most recent of the three texts analysed in this chapter, Into the Woods examines 
the issues involved in one of Australia’s longest-running civic battles. For decades, 
mainstream journalists have covered the incremental developments in an ongoing 
dispute between loggers, politicians and environmentalists in Australia’s smallest and 
southern-most state, but a particularly vicious outbreak of violence between loggers 
and environmental activists brings Anna Krien to the island. After viewing disturbing 
footage of the incident, Krien books a passage from her native Melbourne to 
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Launceston, Tasmania’s northern port city, where she begins what initially is a three-
day investigation of the protest. Inevitably, three days stretches into a month, and one 
trip into four, as Krien is one of the literary journalists who, “[r]ather than hanging 
around the edges of powerful institutions … attempt to penetrate the cultures that 
make institutions work” (Sims, Literary Journalists 3). Krien then immerses herself in 
the issues, interacting with players as diverse as loggers, politicians, activists, farmers, 
wood-workers, scientists and publicans. Beginning as a cover story for The Big Issue 
in 2009, Krien says the initial essay “felt like … the piece that everyone would have 
done. There were stereotypes; still a veil over everything” (Attwood). The essay was 
subsequently lengthened, and Into the Woods was published in 2010. To date the book 
has been shortlisted for five awards, winning both the Queensland Premier’s award 
for Literary or Media Work Advancing Public Debate, and the 2011 People’s Choice 
Award in Victoria. As indicated by these awards, the book has received an 
overwhelmingly positive reception from critics and Krien’s growing readership. 
 
Of the three practitioners represented in this chapter, epitextual evidence indicates 
Krien has the strongest link to an American tradition of literary journalism. Amanda 
Lohrey describes Krien as “the reincarnation of Hunter S. Thompson—in female 
form,” asserting Krien has “suddenly come out of left-field to almost reinvent Gonzo 
journalism in Australia, the first attribute of which is fearlessness” (in Wessman). 
Similarly, writer and critic John Birmingham claims that Into the Woods would have 
been described as New Journalism if written in the 1960s (Birmingham). The link is 
astutely made as Krien notes Tom Wolfe and Joan Didion among her influences 
(Attwood), indicating that Krien identifies more with the US tradition than with 
Australian iconoclasts. In an epitexual online interview, she states that the best non-
fiction uses the tools of fiction to tell a story in the tradition of Didion and Wolfe, 
whose non-fiction “you read … and it’s alive, and I find sometimes it’s more alive 
[than fiction]” (Byrne, Author Anna Krien). Despite these influences, Krien writes 
with a distinctly Australian voice. She brings immediacy to her writing through fully 
reconstructed scenes and dialogue, vivid imagery, and present tense prose. It is 
perhaps her exposed subjectivity and the investigation-as-journey metaphor, however, 
that most closely links Krien with the New Journalists. Rather than the sustained 
lyricism of Truman Capote or metaphysical musings of Wolfe or Didion, Krien’s 
style oscillates between highly evocative description of the natural world, personal 
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introspection, Australian colloquialisms and dialogue, extended discursive passages 
and objective reporting.  
 
Epistemic Community and the Shaping of Australian Literary Journalism 
 
The nature of literary journalism’s epistemic community in Australia is such that the 
roles of literary journalist, journalist, historian, writer, critic, academic, public 
intellectual and media commentator often overlap. A salient example from an earlier 
chapter can be found in the criticism of Garner’s The First Stone; a representative 
selection of the book’s critics include Kaz Cooke (novelist, cartoonist, non-fiction 
writer, columnist), Ann Curthoys (academic, historian, public intellectual), Mark 
Davis (writer, media commentator, public intellectual) and Inga Clendinnen 
(academic, historian, memoirist, public intellectual). The latter three, Curthoys, Davis 
and Clendinnen, have also been—and continue to be—important voices in the 
“history” and “culture wars” (see for example Ann Curthoys; Davis, Gangland; Davis, 
“Turf War”; Clendinnen, “Making Stories”; Clendinnen, “The History Question”). 
Consequently, the degrees of separation between literary journalist, colleague and 
critic are few indeed.  
 
Conley reports in a 1998 study that since 1830, at least 168 Australian journalists have 
published novels (46). Simons also notes the anecdote that there are only two types of 
ambition in Australian journalism: “those who wanted to leave and write novels, and 
those who wanted to be editor of the [Melbourne broadsheet] Age. I was one of the 
former” (Fit to Print 4). Given the high degree of familiarity amongst Australia’s 
epistemic community—or “community of knowers” (Code, ER 245)—combined with 
the lack of identifiable literary journalistic tradition, and distinct divides between the 
journalism and literary practices, Australian literary journalists are, to a large degree, 
risk takers. Simons, again, highlights this state in Fit to Print when recounting 
reactions to her heavily subjective essay published in the magazine Eureka Street. She 
writes that Sydney Morning Herald journalist Margo Kingston “warned me that there 
were a few people who might not want to talk to me again. ‘[Author, journalist and 
essayist] Laura Tingle is cross because she thinks you called her husband a has-been. 
She says you wrote it more like a novel than an article.’ ‘That was kind of the point,’ I 
said” (Fit to Print 34). 
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A combination of these factors: a relatively small, tightly-knit epistemic community, 
Australia’s “history” and “culture wars” and national dialogue over the politics of 
representation conceivably influence the literary journalistic voices of Simons, Hooper 
and Krien. All three practitioners present themselves as “outsiders”; their initial 
narrative stance is one of “not knowing”. In each case, an anxiety is evident over how 
they will be perceived as “knowers” by their subjects—and, implicitly, their readers. 
Consequently, all three texts are highly reflexive. Each practitioner is also concerned 
with the limits of their knowledge, which, for Code, “is a crucially important aspect of 
epistemic competence” (ER 176). But are these texts epistemically defensible? Unlike 
LeBlanc’s and Cullen’s books, the Australian texts are punctuated by self-questioning 
that rarely resolves. This anxiety is more resonant with Skloot’s epitextual concerns 
over representation, but—unlike Skloot—Simons, Hooper and Krien use rhetorical 
questioning and reflexivity to propel their narratives forward. Further, this epistemic 
stance of “not knowing” is not limited to these practitioners. As noted in chapters three 
and four, Garner also crafts her narratives with deeply personal, introspective 
questioning that leads her to a privileged place of “knowing”—a stance that urges her 
readers to read her reflexivity as humility. Anna Funder’s Stasiland (2003) has a 
similar approach; Lever observes that Garner and Funder “have expressed mutual 
admiration, and the books have in common the establishment of an authorial persona 
who asks both readers and interviewees to trust her observation, sensitivity, and moral 
strength” (1).40 This authorial persona is also evident in Simons’s, Hooper’s and 
Krien’s literary journalism, indicating a nascent tradition—beginning with Garner—
may be developing among these writers. 
 
The “truth claims” in The Meeting of the Waters, The Tall Man, and Into the Woods 
are, consequently, heavily reliant on the truth of personal experience. As Giggs writes, 
“Truth, for many of these authors [including Garner, Simons, Hooper, and Krien], is a 
product of bodily experience. Of registering a fact that loosens something in the 
nervous system, only later made available for cerebral analysis” (71). This state is a 
clear departure from the truth claims found in the work of LeBlanc, Cullen and Skloot. 
Notwithstanding LeBlanc’s disclaimer that the truth of Random Family is “her” truth 
(Boynton, The New New Journalism 247), each narrative analysed in the previous 
chapter displays a stronger reliance on observable, empirically verifiability to produce 
truth claims. While epistemic defence and verifiability are still concerns for the 
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Australian practitioners, there is a fundamentally different process of production of 
truth claims: one that draws on a personal connection with the narrator-as-seeker, 
rather than narrator-as-knower. For these literary journalists, knowledge is personal, 
subjective, complex, subject to distortion, and to be critically evaluated at every point. 
 
The telling of indigenous stories by non-indigenous practitioners also raises special 
epistemic challenges, as in the cases of Simons and Hooper. Seierstad’s book, 
examined in chapter four, demonstrates some difficulties in representing different 
cultures, but an Anglo Australian representing Indigenous Australian subjects evokes 
different epistemic considerations again. A central issue here is a practitioner’s 
epistemic responsibility towards subjects whose concepts of knowledge and truth are 
based on a fundamentally different epistemological foundation. Scholars such as 
Connery rightly assert that “verifiable detail is essential to the literary journalist” 
(Sourcebook 6). But how does a practitioner approach knowledge that seems 
unverifiable because it is based on what Anglo tradition would consider myth? For 
Code, this requires a value judgment: “When alternative ways of making sense of 
experience are allowed, we require some standard of value to guide our efforts toward 
reasonable choices of experts and authorities” (78). Believing that a purely objective 
assessment of empirically verifiable facts would unavoidably skew the investigation, 
Simons’s and Hooper’s task is not only to discover the “facts”, but also to investigate 
and convey their subjects’—purely subjective—experience. Their selection of 
indigenous subjects as experts and authorities indicates recognition and value of an 
alternative epistemological foundation. Simons’s and Hooper’s efforts to understand 
and represent those differences play out the ethics of belief, and set their narratives in 
opposition to those who do not acknowledge knowledge that cannot be characterised 
as “the facts”. 
 
Despite this emphasis, or perhaps because of it, Simons’s The Meeting of the Waters 
also demonstrates a strong commitment to disclosure transparency. A combination of 
competing—aggressive—media coverage, the book’s alternative journalistic ambition 
and the threat of libel underpins its extensive peritext. Simons does have a personal 
website, but, unlike Skloot’s or Cullen’s, no framing information is given beyond the 
book’s awards. The peritext is comprised of an author’s note and acknowledgements 
(three pages); a “Prelude” (two pages); a “List of Characters” (eight pages); a timeline 
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(seven pages); notes and references (25 pages); an index (11 pages); and a map. Here 
Simons highlights her investigative credentials while offering her readers the chance 
to cross-reference her sources. She also delimits the boundaries of her research: in 
both the author’s note and list of characters she highlights subjects who declined to be 
interviewed. Simons raises the issue of epistemic as well as ethical limitations from 
the first page by acknowledging that she is a white woman—an outsider to indigenous 
beliefs and culture—representing sacred or taboo indigenous events (MOTW xi). Like 
Cullen in Columbine, Simons sets up her narrative in opposition to competing 
accounts, but Simons’s truth claims are for journalistic integrity (see Ricketson, 
“Ethical Issues” 90) rather than a definitive version of events (Cullen, Columbine dust 
cover).  
 
But such epistemically responsible practice has not protected the book from criticism. 
Anthropologist Ron Brunton has attacked Simons on the grounds of interpretation and 
omission, writing: “There are ways of assessing what [journalists] say—internal 
consistency; consistency with other seemingly reliable sources; the extent to which 
their statements ring true with our experiences and those of our fellows”. He then cites 
examples of Simons’s “interpretations” (160). Brunton also questions Simons’s 
investigative credentials, asking why she did not check police files to establish 
anecdotal claims that she portrayed as evidence: “Strangely, this obvious program of 
research does not seem to have been undertaken by … the investigative journalist. I 
cannot help but wonder why” (165). Brunton’s criticism here is challenging Simons’s 
intellectual integrity: she has been selective in her investigation to further her 
interpretation of the evidence, following “a long and unfortunate tradition whereby 
patronizing whites assimilate Aborigines into convenient and preconceived 
stereotypes” (161). Simons successfully refutes both of Brunton’s criticisms, however, 
in a response to his article, referring to source information that had been edited out, 
official transcripts, as well as fully documented interview notes.41 What this sequence 
of criticism and defence demonstrates is the limitations of disclosure transparency. As 
demonstrated in the cases of McGinniss, Fuller, LeBlanc and Cullen, transparency can 
also increase criticism rather than understanding (Allen 323). Simons’s case 
demonstrates that even in providing a “web of facticity” (Tuchman), practitioners must 
be selective about what can be included, and omissions can provide a target for 
criticism.   
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Brunton’s criticism is particularly interesting in light of Simons’s effort to avoid 
“assimilat[ing] Aborigines into convenient and preconceived stereotypes” (Brunton 
161). In the reconstruction of interviews, Simons employs extended characterization 
and dialogue in full to capture the complexity and individual “voices” of those 
stereotyped in mainstream media. Her first meeting with indigenous bridge opponent 
Henry Rankine, for example, facilitates this process. In this passage Simons expects a 
cultural stereotype: the “big and probably bearded, perhaps a little frightening” 
Aboriginal elder. The stereotype is dispelled, however, by the gentle act of a man 
“handing an elderly woman into a car,” while the details of the “bouncy” Rankine with 
his baseball cap and running shoes lend the scene a feeling of levity—and indicate 
both Simons’s relief and chagrin (MOTW 44). This passage is typical of 
characterisation throughout the narrative. Like Skloot’s use of tiny details (such as 
bright nail polish and a discarded shoe), Simons employs facts—here the details of 
Rankine’s appearance and actions—to move from ignorance to experience, a process 
fundamental to the deconstruction of stereotypes. She continues: “Henry Rankine 
begins almost any contentious conversation by emphasising that he does not want 
trouble. He still supports women’s business but, he says, he has to be careful of his 
position” (MOTW 44). Present tense here creates a sense of immanence to the subject, 
while indirect discourse signals the reporter’s presence. In this way Simons avoids 
reifying her subject: she places him in time at the moment of the interview, 
encouraging the reader to consider him as a subject rather than a character. This 
passage is typical in the sense that its construction appears calculated to break down 
stereotypes and resist imposing new ones. The level of detail authenticates the 
description, while the reader can infer that Simons is surprised, signalling a subtle shift 
in her attitude towards the Aboriginal elder.  
 
An interesting counterpoint to this scene occurs a few pages later, where Simons reads 
to Henry Rankine’s wife, Jean, from fellow journalist Chris Kenny’s account of a 
meeting that took place in the Rankines’ house. This meeting proves a crux in the 
competing narratives of the Hindmarsh Affair. Kenny’s detailed account claims that 
Henry sat “cross-legged on a bean bag and Jean sat on a couch,” to which Jean 
responds—with eyebrows shooting up—“I’ve never owned a bean bag,” and that she 
does not remember being present at that meeting (MOTW 48). There is an implicit 
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warning here: facts matter. That the “secret women’s business” was not brought up at 
that meeting makes Jean’s presence or absence significant, and these two disputed 
facts are seemingly resolved by a seemingly insignificant detail: Kenny was wrong 
about the beanbag, therefore wrong about Jean’s presence. Juxtaposing scenes in this 
way may call into question Simons’s own detailed account, or call Jean Rankine into 
question as a reliable witness, but a more likely result is the discrediting of Kenny’s 
account, and reinforcement of the authority of Simons’s narrative. Simons cannot 
verify Henry’s account: as she notes, “to this day [the notes] of the meetings with the 
Rankines remain in storage somewhere in Norway” (MOTW 49), thus what happened 
at the meeting remains a contest of narratives, and the truth unresolved.  
 
In Code’s view, “standard justification and evidence-producing procedures” constitute 
an important aspect of epistemic responsibility, but are, finally, only one aspect (ER 
71). For Code, when these standards fail to resolve knowledge claims, the onus falls 
on the intellectual character of the “knower” (ER 44). This is the crux of intellectual 
virtue, and the position to which, I argue, Simons, Hooper and Krien all default. 
Practitioners such as Cullen and Skloot emphasise the factual veracity of their texts 
and rely on these to build a coherent narrative. But, unable to verify details (which 
prove to be elusive in any case), Simons unsettles the foundational concept of fact, and 
positions herself as the point at which epistemic defence must rest. She writes 
epitextually: “I think this notion of a narrative voice, and the idea of the journalist 
being prepared to take on and wear the responsibility for the narrative is a big part of 
what I mean by acknowledging subjectivity” (“Facts” 29). Linking subjectivity with 
responsibility may perhaps initially seem paradoxical: invoking subjectivity can be 
seen as a way of side-stepping a journalist’s responsibility to the truth, or bowing to an 
undermining of empiricism. But here Simons is expressing what she perceives as a 
more epistemically responsible position than objectivity, in order to produce a “richer” 
journalism, forcing the journalist to stand behind their work and defend their stance in 
relation to the facts (“Facts” 24). This is also Code’s position. Indeed, the facts do 
matter for Simons; of the five other books analysed in chapters five and six of this 
thesis, the epistemic defence in the peritext is matched only by Cullen’s. But, as 
demonstrated, contested factual details produce contesting narratives, thus epistemic 
responsibility is reoriented to the practitioner.  
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Simons emphasises the fluidity of facts in The Meeting of the Waters. In the following 
passage, Simons interviews Steve Hemming, an anthropologist and expert on the 
Ngarrindjeri. Hemming believed that the “secret women’s business” was entirely 
possible, and, after the Royal Commission, was forced to leave his job at the South 
Australian Museum as his position was “untenable” (MOTW 113). In this reflexive 
passage, Hemming reflects on the ethics of revealing culturally sensitive information, 
while Simons challenges notions of objectivity and a “stable” story: 
 
Spaghetti sticks well to table tops. Steve Hemming was clearing up 
after his children’s tea. … I was sitting at the table, having cleared a 
tiny space from spaghetti debris for my notebook. I was trying to see in 
Steve Hemming the man who had been described to me. … Hemming 
talked about anthropologists, and how “pissed off” he had become with 
the assumptions they made about their expertise. “How can anyone be 
expert on another people?” he said. “Some anthropologists can be so 
bloody arrogant.” I remarked that journalism, too, was fraught with 
arrogance and assumptions about who did the reporting, and who the 
audience was, and who was reported upon. I had in mind the scene in 
front of me—Hemming and the washing up—and how it might appear 
in this book. “What are anthropologists anyway?” Hemming responded. 
He was still caught up in his own anger, and hadn’t really heard me. 
“Some of them are just souped-up journalists. They just use people like 
some journalists use people.” I opened my mouth and shut it again, and 
decided not to take professional offence. I had been a journalist all my 
working life. I made a note of what he had said, and of the state of his 
kitchen, and the now clearly asthmatic cough of his sleeping son. I was 
the journalist. He and his family were the subjects of my notes. This is 
how stories are written, and how the teller puts things together, and 
makes a difference (MOTW 113–116). 
 
Simons here uses the technique of reporting her (own) direct dialogue as Skloot does 
in representing her altercation with Deborah. But the function is quite different. 
Engaging in a critique of objectivity on multiple levels, Simons invites the reader to 
consider the construction of her narrative by revealing—somewhat ironically—her 
thoughts during the interview of how the scene “might appear in the book”. The 
dialogue overtly critiques objectivity in mainstream journalism: it matters “who did 
the reporting, and who the audience was, and who was reported upon”. The irony is 
apparent in Hemming’s statement that anthropologists are “just souped-up journalists”, 
and that “journalists use people”, notwithstanding the fact he is being interviewed by 
one in his kitchen. Simons uses the irony to her advantage, capitalising on the theme 
of the conversation in the final statement of the passage: “This is how stories are 
 
 
 187 
written, and how the teller puts things together, and makes a difference.” In a strong 
critique, Simons here reinforces a central point of the narrative, first made in the 
peritext and recurring throughout the book: perception, selectivity, construction and 
perspective all contribute to the way a story is told. Simons is, at least ostensibly, 
warning readers to be wary of—even her—versions of “the truth”. Underlying the 
playfulness of her reflexivity in this passage is not only Hemming’s, but also her own, 
frustration at how stories are constructed, as well as the darker implication that “truth” 
is subject to construction. As Frus notes, this technique of emphasising the relationship 
between the subject, journalist and the reader works against reification of the text 
(180). While Simons risks undermining the authority of her narrative by conceding the 
limitations of her voice, this seems a risk she is willing to take to avoid reification and, 
ultimately, reinforce the authenticity and authority of her narrative.  
 
The Meeting of the Waters provides answers to questions Pauly asks of North 
American literary journalism: “How could literary journalism report more effectively 
on group life? What stylistic or interpretive trade-offs would it have to make in order 
to do so?” (“Drama” 80) Simons’s answers: trade complexity for simplicity, density 
for drama, and—her book is 512 pages long—analysis for length. Reflecting on 
narrative construction may be an unnecessary addition to the Hindmarsh story. But its 
value is in its epistemic defensibility, and the regular reiteration of a major theme in 
the book: the power and politics of storytelling. 
 
Hooper’s handling of disclosure transparency is quite different to Simons’s. Firstly, 
the peritext is not as extensive. A list of sources following the narrative is organised 
under sub-headings, for example: The Island/The Death/The Investigation/Belief (TM 
272). Quotes are attributed to their sources and Hooper’s background reading is given 
here, but notes on reporting methods, reflections on limitations, or the construction of 
narrative are not explained.42 As proposed earlier, Hooper’s uncertain narrative 
voice—like Simons’s and Krien’s—is arguably the book’s strongest epistemic 
defence. This is, perhaps, understandable given that—unlike Simons, Krien, LeBlanc, 
Cullen and Skloot—Hooper is not a trained mainstream journalist. As Code writes, “in 
the communal aspect of the knowledge-seeking process, much depends on how 
epistemic authorities establish their credentials” (ER 35). But given the mainstream 
media’s uniform coverage of Palm Island’s riots, Hooper’s “not knowing” is perhaps 
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refreshing to the reader. She thus bases the “truth claims” of The Tall Man on the truth 
of her experience. “Truth claims” in this sense are subjectively constructed—definitive 
truth for Hooper is as elusive as the spirit of the Tall Man of the book’s title. This 
epistemic stance is also partly necessary, as most readers would be aware that even 
after the third coronial enquiry a definitive finding was not possible, owing to 
unreliability of police and aboriginal witnesses (Schwarten).  
 
The narrator’s “outsider” status is introduced in the opening chapter. Hooper, a 
Melbournian and Southerner, recounts arriving on Palm Island where she immediately 
encounters two men stumbling around, leaning on each other. She is told by the 
mayor, “They’re blind” to which Hooper replies, “Obviously” (7). The passage 
continues: “I assumed she meant blind drunk. One of the brothers then shook out a 
white cane and I saw that the men were connected with a piece of string, the man with 
the cane leading his brother by the wrist” (8). Here Hooper is “awkward”, “out of 
place” and “unsure” (8). She also acknowledges: “Until I met [the Doomadgees’ 
lawyer] Boe, I had never heard of Palm Island” (9). Like Skloot, Hooper begins from a 
place of “not knowing”; she has questions about a piece of her country’s history, but, 
unlike Skloot, Hooper has a legal case through which to examine the causes of racial 
tension and the myth of national identity. While Skloot emphasises the factual 
verifiability of her narrative, Hooper relies on the authenticity of her desire to know 
the truth, no matter how complex and elusive it proves to be. 
 
But this authenticity is complicated by the narrative’s structure. Here issues of 
verifiable knowledge, lack of access and narrative representation intersect. In a public 
lecture at the University of Western Australia, Hooper stresses the importance of 
even-handedness in researching the events surrounding Doomadgee’s death and the 
subsequent inquest:   
 
I did try to be as sympathetic as I could be to Senior Sergeant Hurley 
… [I]t would be much … tidier for us to paint him as an ogre. I mean 
we literally like stories that are black and white, [but] I’d spoken to 
enough people who’d held him in high esteem to know that it was 
more complicated than that. So I feel that as a writer … it’s my job … 
to extend my sympathy to him (Hooper, “Lecture”).  
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As such, the possibility of Hurley’s innocence echoes throughout the narrative. In one 
example Hooper explains: “I tried to look at things from every angle. I took each 
doubt I had and tried to explain it away, then put it back to test whether Cameron’s 
death could have been just an accident. Was it possible that Hurley was innocent?” 
(TM 159). But despite her desire not to “paint him as an ogre”, the narrative is 
bookended with a trope from indigenous mythology that undermines Hooper’s stance. 
The Tall Man begins with a sequence that links Chris Hurley with the Tall Man of 
indigenous mythology who sneaks out at night to do evil and slides back into the 
cliffs by day. This image is reinforced in the final chapter, Hooper recounts the last 
time she saw Hurley. After a police parade, when Hooper looks for him, he has 
disappeared: “It was as if he’d dissolved into a long stream of blue” (TM 266), an 
allusion to the evil spirit slipping back into the cracks between the rocks. Throughout 
the narrative it is Hooper who creates and sustains this image of Hurley, an image at 
odds with her narrative stance; the “Tall Man” analogy is not made by any of the 
indigenous subjects in her book.  
 
Lack of access also complicates Hooper’s representation of—and subsequent truth 
claims about—Hurley. She states epitextually that one of her main goals was to avoid 
writing a book about issues, but rather to make it “be about people” (Warhaft, “Chloe 
Hooper”), and that “a story is best told through tiny human details” (Joseph, “True 
Stories” 85). But to a large extent the narrative itself dehumanises Hurley. He is 
initially in her estimation “the archetypal sheriff, clean-cut with deep-set eyes in a 
strong, handsome face, bristlingly physical and tall” (TM 19). This characterisation is 
distinctly at odds with Simons’s detailed description of Henry Rankine, which 
deconstructs the archetype rather than reinforcing it. A uniquely American term, 
“sheriff” creates almost a caricature of Hurley, drawing on a Wild West narrative 
tradition that is easily accessible for readers but perhaps works against Hooper’s aim 
to humanise her subjects. Following this physical description, Hooper uses leading 
language that extends the dehumanising process. As well as being “penned” in the 
witness box, Hooper writes of his remote placements: “This was now Hurley’s natural 
environment … He had become a creature of the Deep North, a specialist in places on 
the edges of so-called civilisation” (TM 20). The terms “creature” in its “natural 
environment” here are consistent with characterisation as the Tall Man, but 
 
 
 190 
inconsistent with Hooper’s claims of even-handedness and an acknowledgement that 
part of her job is to extend sympathy.  
 
This lack of access was due to the fact that Hurley refused to be interviewed by 
Hooper—or any media—at any time before or after the inquest and trial. Little 
compares Hooper’s technique to Capote’s characterisation of Perry Smith when she 
states: “Hooper is compelled to invent a similar line of ‘knowing’ with respect to the 
absent, yet always ever-present, antagonist, Senior Sergeant Chris Hurley” (54).43 
Access to knowledge has been a matter of contention for Australian literary 
journalists in the past. As noted, Simons was denied access to the “dissident women” 
in the Hindmarsh Affair, prompting criticism about poor reporting practices. More 
famously, as outlined in chapter four, Garner was denied access to the plaintiffs in a 
case in 1995, and again in 2003. She attempted to overcome this hurdle by a 
combination of reflexivity and fine—or illuminating—detail of the individuals when 
she had access to them in the courtroom, with varying responses from critics. At this 
point Hooper’s practice intersects with Garner’s. Her research allows her to state: 
“Hurley liked dancing. He liked to party. He had a personality to match his outsize 
build. He’d swing girls over his shoulder, spinning them in the air. He’d stand in the 
centre of a crowd telling jokes: a cocky, exuberant larrakin” (TM 21). At other times, 
Hooper is less certain about her subject, causing her to invoke metaphor to capture her 
frustration—the truth of her experience: 
 
The picture of Hurley was going in and out of focus. At moments his 
outline seemed sharp, clear. Then he blurred again. Blurred so much he 
seemed to be without edges, just a presence, a force hovering in the 
frame. … He was good cop and bad cop. In all the tumult of 
miscommunication and legal sophistry, the real Chris Hurley had got 
away (TM 96–7). 
 
Of course, the “force hovering in the frame” and that “the real Chris Hurley had got 
away” again evoke the enigmatic Tall Man of the preface, drawing Hooper’s reader to 
her earliest judgement. But here Hooper is struggling with the limitations of her 
investigation. As previously contended, the distance between the facts of the case and 
the literary interpretation requires epistemic justification. At this point of the narrative 
Hooper acknowledges this distance, but without a peritextual statement to create 
expectations, the reflexivity is difficult to justify as epistemic defence. Interestingly, 
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the criticism applied to Garner was not applied to The Tall Man; as noted by Fletcher 
and Ward, “Hooper won wide praise for her even-handedness in the book, which 
reveals Hurley to be a complex character. Despite Hurley refusing to speak to her, she 
created some vivid imagery in trying to get inside his mind” (Fletcher and Ward). 
While many academics are critical of Garner’s propensity to be “long on atmosphere 
but light on relevant facts” (Ricketson, “Hitchhiking” 95), the same criticism has not 
been applied to Hooper in The Tall Man. Possible reasons for this can be drawn from 
Code’s claims that where absolute uncertainty is taken to be impossible, a study of 
intellectual virtue and epistemic responsibility enhances confidence in knowledge 
claims (ER 67). Garner’s history, outlined in chapter three, predisposed her later 
books to criticism; both Dever and Lever note that a number of academics refused to 
read Joe Cinque’s Consolation given the controversial nature of The First Stone. 
Hooper, however, began with a clean slate. Nevertheless, it is perhaps anomalous that 
The Tall Man’s truth claims did not receive more rigorous attention.  
 
Another problem with its apparent roots in epistemology arises from Hooper’s use of 
intertextuality. From interviews conducted with unnamed family friends and the 
Yanner family of Burketown, whose relationship with Hurley could be characterised 
as complex at best, Hooper reports that Hurley was ambitious, having told the family 
friend that he was “going all the way” (TM 80). He also appeared to be a proponent of 
summary justice—“cops doling out on-the-spot punishment with their fists” (TM 
138)—which Hooper interprets as Hurley tending “to conceive of himself as the law” 
(TM 138). Such details and accompanying anecdotes, however, do not create a 
complete picture for Hooper: “ambition was only part of the explanation. These 
places can be addictive” (TM 81). She then supplements Hurley’s motivations and 
character by intertextual allusions to Conrad’s Mr Kurtz, the enigmatic T. E. 
Lawrence, and Palm Island’s first superintendent, Robert “Uncle Boss” Curry. Curry 
was “a kind of Kurtz figure himself” (TM 82) whose authoritarian rule over the island 
climaxed in a rampage of murder. After dynamiting his house with his drugged 
children inside, shooting citizens and burning down buildings, Curry was finally 
brought down by Peter Prior, a young Aboriginal man, who was given a gun by white 
officials and told to shoot Curry. Hooper completes the passage by drawing the 
comparison: “Like Kurtz, Uncle Boss died in a land he had mistaken for his own” 
(TM 83). Problematically, here Hooper invests Hurley with the darkness of motive 
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and psychology obvious in Kurtz, Curry and Lawrence. In a public lecture outlining 
the story, rationale and methodology underpinning her book, Hooper states: “It may 
be unfair of me to contrast the way these two Palm Island events, eighty years apart, 
were dealt with by the authorities of the day. But let me do it anyway” (Hooper, 
“Lecture”). This is presented as an ethical decision, but primarily concerning is the 
poor epistemic practice underpinning it. The “truth claims” here are again personal 
judgments embedded within a seamless narrative that guides the reader to 
unsubstantiated conclusions. If, as Code proposes, they are assessed on the epistemic 
responsibility of the “knower”, the above quote might signal a cause for concern.  
 
Thus, the narrative exhibits rhetorical strategies, structural decisions and intertextual 
allusions that stretch epistemic justification, and cast Hooper’s narrative voice as a 
rhetorical stance rather than supporting the role of an authentic questioner. 
Interestingly, while Simons’s strongly defended narrative came under fire from 
critics, Hooper has offered far less in the way of epistemic defence, and has been met 
with no criticism, scholarly or otherwise. This, again, may be accounted for by 
Hooper’s position in the epistemic community; like Garner, Simons had caused some 
controversy—particularly with her move from journalist to media commentator, and 
her subsequent criticism of mainstream media arguably provided grounds for her 
book’s mixed reception. A strong critique against Hooper’s stance is also difficult 
given that—unlike MOTW—there are “knowable” facts, but these have been held 
back from the epistemic community by the people involved in the events surrounding 
Doomadgee’s death. 
 
Like The Tall Man, the peritext of Into the Woods provides little epitextual defence in 
the form of an author’s note, reporting practices or even sources. Neither do Krien’s 
personal website nor the book’s promotional website offer any information to frame 
the text. In online interviews and reviews, however, Krien is critical of the notion of 
objectivity and its effects. She reflects on a sense that her reportorial persona was a 
key to obtaining information for Into the Woods: “I think people didn’t mind chatting 
to me because … I was happy to admit I wasn’t all over the issues. … I was happy to 
admit stupidity, and have them show me how to saw a log, and have them draw 
pictures for me, and we would end up having much larger conversations about their 
situations” (Attwood “Anna Krien”). Each of these elements and scenes is fully 
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reconstructed in the book. Like Simons and Hooper, Krien therefore relies on a high 
level of correspondence between her experience of investigating and its representation 
in order to gain the reader’s trust, and a narrative stance of “not knowing” that brings 
new eyes to a well-worn and much-publicised issue. The title, Into the Woods, 
foregrounds this authorial sensibility. Epitextually, Krien refers to herself as an 
“uncertain narrator”, and suggests that her status as an “outsider” was a necessity to 
cover issues that seemed to be cut and dried (Wessman). Epistemic responsibility in 
the book is thus based as much upon transparency of self as a potential “knower” as 
transparency of process.  
 
The literary journalistic form also allows Krien to use rhetorical questions to defend 
her reporting process while building trust with her readers. Hartsock demonstrates 
that the tendency of the style of mainstream news is to deny questioning by the 
reader, thus inhibiting reader participation (57). Krien leads her reader from one 
interview to the next with question and answer sequences that render her investigative 
process transparent but also model an inductive method of research. I proposed in the 
previous chapter that Cullen’s cycle of questions and answers works as a self-
verification mechanism. The effect in Into the Woods is different; rather than 
producing a compelling argument, Krien’s questioning destabilises certainty and 
promotes reflexivity. This is possibly accounted for by the fact that Cullen is working 
to prove a theory; whereas, Krien lacks a theory at all. Moving between protesters—
or, as they call themselves “ratbags”—loggers, timber industry representatives and 
politicians, Krien weighs the information from her interviews against her research and 
experience before moving forward, often without resolution. She writes, for example: 
“The activists tread a fine line between drawing attention to threatened areas and 
provoking resentment that can ultimately backfire against the forest. Have ratbag 
actions taken their cause backwards rather than forwards?” before reporting the most 
recent results of their protests (32). Here Krien leads her readers through the issues 
while building their trust; her self-assigned role as an “uncertain protagonist” initiates 
the reader into the issues in the present tense, simulating their discoveries through her 
own. As in the following example, at times Krien’s questioning does not advance her 
research process, but simply serves to reflect her thought processes and convey the 
sense of frustration she feels when trying to understand the conflict: 
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How can so many people all be looking at the same thing and see it so 
differently? … Of the older activists I’ve met who fought to save 
Tasmania’s Lake Pedder forty years ago, many speak of their belief that 
if people could only see something, take their shoes off and wade into 
it, they would feel the same way. But are these feelings—the instinct 
for natural beauty—universal? Is a sunset beautiful to everyone, or just 
some? And what of the modern sunset, made peculiar and at times 
spectacular by smog and pollution, is that also beautiful? And just how 
marred are our perceptions by our desire to be (or seem) something 
other than what we are? (146–7) 
 
Moving from the particular to the universal here, Krien widens the scope of her 
research to establish context and illuminate core issues. Rather than overtly answering 
such questions, Krien illustrates their complexity with anecdotes from her 
investigation. At an exhibition, for example, Krien finds herself at odds with the 
aesthetics of pieces crafted from Huon pine and writes: “I couldn’t help thinking, why 
does it look so tacky? Isn’t this meant to be 1000-year-old wood? Am I a snob, or is 
something dodgy seeping into this man’s work?” (147) A feature of her practice is that 
her subjects answer such questions, with their variety of answers contributing to the 
complexity of the issue: “‘Our aesthetics are vastly different,’ says Gemma Tillack. 
‘We’re attached to the aesthetics of an unmanned forest, whereas the loggers love the 
manned forest, because it’s their manning. It’s their work and they’ve created it’” 
(147). This environmentalist’s view is followed by the responses of a former Labour 
premier of Tasmania, Liberal leader Robin Gray, Green party leader Bob Brown, and 
lecturer and author Pete Hay, resulting in a range of perspectives that is representative 
of the spectrum of opinions on aesthetics and logging. Krien acts as moderator, 
questioning perspectives and challenging assumptions. She does not, however, come 
to her own conclusion, preferring to retain an open stance towards her interviewees 
and the issues. While both Krien and Hooper use sequences of rhetorical questions to 
signal their balanced, searching approach to their subjects, a key difference between 
their narratives is that Hooper’s narrative structure, employment of tropes and 
intertextual references contradict, to some extent, her “open” authorial stance; these 
techniques decidedly close the possibility for alternate representations of Hurley. And 
while Simons’s narrative resists reification by exposing the constructed nature of all 
narratives, Krien is concerned about closing her narrative, thus avoids identifying 
herself with one faction.  
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But as noted in the first chapter of this thesis, reflexivity and a questioning narrative 
stance cannot stand in for epistemic justification: “Propositions, set forth however 
‘reflexively’, still contain a ‘content’ that calls out for assessment separate from the 
‘form’ of their articulation” (Foley, “Politics” np). Appropriate epistemic questions 
here include: What is Krien’s content? What does she consider viable “knowledge” on 
which to base her investigation? As the narrative draws to a close, Krien’s emphasis 
on the factual increases as her subjectivity decreases. This is a result in part of lack of 
access to primary sources. Like the dissidents in The Meeting of the Waters and the 
Hurley camp in The Tall Man, representatives from the logging company Gunns 
Limited refused to speak to Krien. But, unlike Garner, who uses visceral reactions as 
knowledge; Hooper, who uses intertextuality to bridge gaps in content; and Simons, 
who destabilises foundationalism in narrative, Krien turns to the archives. Using such 
sources as media releases, environmental reports, numerous television programs, 
documentaries, and the Tasmanian parliament’s Hansard, Krien steps out of the 
present to reconstruct the history of the conflict over Gunns’s proposed pulp mill. The 
final section of Into the Woods entitled “The Mill” is far more grounded in fact, press 
quotes and statistics than the first four sections. Interestingly, here the tone also 
changes from uncertainty to self-assurance and, at times, irony, as Krien leads her 
readers through ten years of the proposed mill’s history. After four chapters of 
historical reconstruction, Krien steps back into the narrative: 
 
Each time I’ve sat down to type out the details about the pulp mill 
assessment, Gunns, Lennon and the complacency of state parliament, 
I’ve felt sick. It’s so blatant. … [S]omehow, in the flaming furious 
inarticulate world of Lennon, [he believes] he’s done the right thing. I 
cannot match the former premier’s certainty. I agree a pulp mill might 
have been a success, a nice little earner, but not like this. Perhaps if the 
democratic process wasn’t considered so pestilent in the state of 
Tasmania, I could see the pulp mill through Lennon’s eyes (275–6).  
  
Perhaps it is fitting, then, that in a final balancing act Krien returns to her experience 
in the Epilogue to synthesise the issues, but also to finally declare her allegiance. This, 
too, turns out to be more complex than she has anticipated. In a rally at the entrance to 
a coupe, Krien, part of the crowd, reflects on her participation. After explaining, “I’ve 
tried to balance my seesaw heart, carefully weighing up each argument. But there is 
something about this island that wants you to choose sides” (294), Krien finds herself 
making the choice: 
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I see Pete Hay, his piercing blue eyes, white hair and weathered 
fisherman’s face swaying with the push and pull. I catch his eye, we 
grin, and inside I say, fuck it. My hands against the back of the person 
in front of me, someone else’s hands on mine, I feel the crowd start to 
move. We surge over the invisible line and into the forest (294). 
 
Minutes later, this seeming declaration is complicated as, standing by the road, Krien 
sees a truck coming out of the coupe. Matthew, a logger she has previously 
interviewed, is sitting in the passenger seat. The tag-line of the paragraph reads: 
“Instinctively, we wave” (296), demonstrating the complex nature of her allegiance. 
Despite her identification with the environmentalist movement, Krien is still 
conflicted. Or, more accurately, the fact that she identifies with more than one party 
demonstrates the depth of her implication in the issues. 
 
Into the Woods ends on an ambiguous note, with Krien sitting by a fire at Camp 
Florentine. She reflects: “I’m more relaxed this time. I suspect I’ve the proprietorial air 
I accused the other activists of having. … One day it will irk me that they have no idea 
whose roles they’ve stepped into, whose well-worn reins they’re holding, whose 
slogans they’ve taken to chanting and whose enemies they’ve adopted without 
question. But tonight I’m just happy to be camping” (298). Krien here identifies 
herself with the ratbags through her “proprietorial air”, as well as distancing herself 
through criticism. For a narrative guide who epitextually purports to be in control, 
flexible and open (Wessman), this disclosure acknowledges the journey resulting in 
the feeling of ownership of the camp, as well as resisting any firm conclusions. To the 
extent that online epitextual sources act as epistemic frame for Into the Woods, Krien 
defends her distrust of objectivity by challenging all arguments presented, as well as 
questioning her own ideological foundations and preconceptions.  
 
The “truth claims” in Into the Woods are consequently reliant on Krien’s questioning 
the nature of truth itself. Epitextually she explains that objectivity in mainstream 
journalism is used as “a disguise to hide behind”, but that “there needs to be an 
underlying truth—not everyone can be right. And that was so frustrating on the island, 
because everyone has science on their side, which is impossible” (Atwood “Anna 
Krien”). For Krien, conclusions are elusive; the investigative process is “a journey 
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through selective truths” (Into the Woods 118). In keeping with her narrative stance, 
the final words of the narrative body propose a “truth” in the form of a question: 
 
Beyond all the figures, statistics and sums, the question remains: why 
are-were—John Gay, Robin Gray and their ilk so obsessed with the 
pulp mill? Why the strange phone calls to Gunns 20 defendants, Liberal 
leaders and a celebrity gardener? Why the bizarre opinion pieces? For 
an issue that they say is purely economic? Is it possible that, beyond all 
the carefully laid out arguments and the picking over of Gunns’ 
financial carcass, these men are fuelled by something as simple, base 
and merciless—and so like a Grimms’ fairytale—as hate? (279) 
 
In this way Krien avoids the responsibility of definitive truth claims; rather, the reader 
is offered possible conclusions based on her journey of discovery. Reluctance to offer 
definitive conclusions is common to the three books analysed in this chapter, as are the 
conclusions inherently embedded in the narratives. For Krien, the spin has done its 
job: she is confused and does not know who to believe (149). But the facts that do not 
elude her are those that offer themselves to her senses; walking into a logged forest 
she finds: “It’s gone. It’s all gone. It feels as though I’m at the edge of the world. … I 
feel like I am in the Swamp of Sadness from The Never-ending Story, the wet sucking 
me down, its sadness swallowing me” (288). Like Simons and Hooper, Krien finally 
offers herself as the place where responsibility falls. Hence, the journey towards 
knowledge is her epistemic justification for ignoring a police order, in the narrative’s 
final pages, pushing on the back of the person in front of her, surging over an invisible 
line and into the woods (Krien 294)—an action she undoubtedly hopes the reader will 
take with her. 
 
Australia’s New Gen: On “Being Australian”   
 
The news events investigated in these three books all involve multiple stakeholders 
from diverse sections of society. The building of a bridge, a death in custody, and a 
violent altercation between loggers and environmental protestors highlight 
discrepancies between the powerful and powerless for Simons, Hooper and Krien, a 
state at odds with Australia’s proudly egalitarian national character.44 In each 
narrative the investigation of a hard news item inevitably gives way to an exploration 
of hegemonic, cultural and ideological differences between groups in a nation where 
access to fair and balanced media and judicial systems is assumed. Power relations 
underlie each narrative, thus a concern of the practitioners considered in this chapter 
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is the relationship between the national character of Australia and the experience of its 
citizens.  
 
Simons foregrounds this purpose in the “Prelude” that frames her narrative in the 
following way: 
 
In the years since I began work on this book I have come to believe that 
there are many reasons why the story of the Hindmarsh Island bridge is 
one of the most important that can be told about Australia at the end of 
the last century and the beginning of all this. It can be seen as a tale of 
small town gossip and enmity. But as well, I think, it is one of those 
big, even archetypal, stories that tell us something about who we are 
(MOTW xvi). 
 
Hooper has explained in a writer’s panel that guiding questions for The Tall Man 
included: “What sort of country do we live in?” (Warhaft, “The Essay”). Similarly, she 
frames a lecture at the University of Western Australia by beginning: “Tonight I’d like 
to tell you a story about two men, which I hope will also tell us a story about Australia 
in the early 21st century” (Hooper, “Lecture”). Civic conflict is limited to Tasmania in 
Into the Woods, but Krien also bookends her narrative with observations about 
Australia’s colonial past and postcolonial present. Walking along the beach at twilight, 
her Tasmanian host points out the remains of middens; Krien shrugs at him in 
ignorance. After he explains they are on the site of an Aboriginal feast, her host 
muses: “‘We’ve had this land for generations … But it’s like I never saw it.’” She 
responds: “He’s right. The middens I walked over without thinking now catch my eye, 
the sharpened stones like abandoned cutlery from another time” (2). This scene is 
mirrored at the end of the book where a friend takes Krien to the coast to look for 
broken porcelain pieces from settler times. Finding them embedded in rock pools and 
sand dunes, Krien reflects: “The broken plates looked like shells, just as curious and 
gentle, not like they don’t belong at all. It is a relief to find beautiful traces of us” 
(282). These scenes frame the narrative with the themes of colonisation, belonging, 
and the indigeneity of the land, contextualising the battle in Tasmania in broader terms 
and allowing Krien to consider herself—a mainlander—in relation to the land. While 
not explicit in the same way as Simons and Hooper, Krien is also concerned with the 
meaning of Australians’ relationship with the land, and how that is manifested through 
group conflict. 
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That Australian national identity is so closely tied to issues of indigeneity is not 
surprising, considering the country’s colonial past. For Simons and Hooper, conflict 
between Indigenous and Anglo Australians is a key to understanding “who we are” 
(MOTW xvi). Lehman points out that “recognizing that facts are always embedded in 
narrative does not excuse a writer or reader from trying to sort out those facts” 
(Matters 143–4); here this process of sorting is guided by what the facts say about 
Australians’ experiences of reality. As Anglo writers, Hooper and Simons are also 
deeply concerned with casting a vision of an alternate—indigenous—experience of 
reality. Structure is employed to this end in both narratives. Perhaps the most vivid 
examples of this technique in The Meeting of the Waters are the juxtaposed extended 
metaphors of an opera and a Dreaming story. The opera metaphor is dominant, with 
the book structured in six parts, beginning with a “Prelude”, and reaching its 
“crescendo” with the findings of the Royal Commission (MOTW 342). In a chapter 
entitled “Grand Opera”, Simons writes: “And I drift back into sleep and when my 
dream returns it is like an opera. There are so many voices, all singing their own songs 
with such conviction. The emotions are huge, the narrative grand, almost everyone is 
infected with a sense of wounded righteousness, and sometimes it seems like a 
thousand small tragedies harnessed together” (341-2). As well as intimating a deeply 
European form of storytelling, the opera metaphor here signifies the impenetrability of 
the form by outsiders. Accessible only through initiation into “high culture”, opera 
holds a different resonance to other, universally accessibly European forms of 
storytelling such as myth and fairytales. The chapter finishes, however, with the 
observation that the Hindmarsh Affair can also be seen as an indigenous creation 
narrative:  
 
Like a Dreaming story, it tells us something about who we are. It tells 
us something about our culture. It is a story about cultures meeting. … 
As in a Dreaming story, the meaning is not always clear. There are 
layers that can only be progressively revealed. Each episode of the story 
is partly opaque, and yet also resonant with meaning, saying something 
about how we connect with each other, and how we make our lives in 
this landscape understandable (MOTW 380).  
 
In this passage Simons demonstrates how elements of the Hindmarsh affair contribute 
to identity formation: it “tells us something about who we are”. The opera metaphor is 
useful in emphasising the polyphonic and emotive elements of the affair, but evokes a 
sense of closure. Dreaming stories have no beginning or end, only “layers that can be 
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progressively revealed,” each of which is “resonant with meaning, saying something 
about how we connect with each other.” They construct knowledge, identity, and are 
continually undergoing a process of creation. By offering the two paradigms, Simons 
highlights the (in)accessibility of different types of cultural knowledge, as well as 
differences in their function. Simons here invites her—ostensibly Anglo—readers to 
see the affair through an unfamiliar worldview. The shift between metaphors also 
allows for comparisons to be made between Dreaming stories and the construction of 
“white men’s” narratives, the stability and factual status of which Simons notes is 
incongruent with indigenous perceptions of story. While aiming to promote 
identification between her predominantly Anglo readership with indigenous subjects, 
this may also reinforce the differences between their experiences, distancing readers 
from their subject. However, casting facts in different narrative frames invites 
identification, and reinforces the irony of indigenous beliefs being tried in a “white 
man’s” court. 
 
Similarly, Hooper encourages her readers to broaden their understanding of events by 
considering alternate worldviews. From the opening chapters, indigenous notions of 
interconnectedness are invoked through imagery and symbolism. The narrative 
acknowledges dichotomies such as black/white, past/present, natural/supernatural and 
human/mythic, but Hooper seeks to destabilise rather than support them. At times such 
connections are simply stated: “Palm Island…is a place where history is so close to the 
surface, so omnipresent, it seems to run parallel with daily life” (TM 10), but more 
often Hooper transitions between the mythic and the everyday, infusing her 
descriptions of place with atmospheric weight. Reconstructing her first visit to Palm 
Island, Hooper writes that travelling to Palm Island “had been like a sequence in a 
dream” (TM 8), and notes the “pale green sea so luminous,” with “moored small 
pristine islands” all around,” where “mountains of forest met the palm-lined shore,” 
but “Then the dream shifted” (TM 8). She continues: “In the tropics, buildings seem to 
ripen—then sag and wilt and rot. People spilled out of houses into yards, onto the 
street. We stopped at a beach, hemmed by the island’s densely forested hills—ancient 
volcanoes. Two chestnut horses were foraging nearby, wild horses left over from the 
mission stockyards. They roamed the hills and township, grazing on nature strips and 
gardens” (TM 13). In these early descriptive passages, Hooper prefigures her central 
thematic and political concerns. Imbuing descriptions of the present with allusions to 
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the past, both ancient and the more recent history of mission times, houses are like 
fruit that decomposes back into the landscape; groups of people are amorphous and, 
unrestricted by structures, naturally blend into the environment. The only restrictions, 
in fact, are imposed by nature itself, with the forested hills “hemming” the beach; 
animals are free to roam between the wild and the constructed. This description 
contrasts sharply with the representation of cities on the mainland, the effect being a 
picture of Palm Island that encompasses not only the physical but also the existential. 
 
Later, Hooper asserts, “everything in the Aboriginal world view assumes a 
connection” (TM 126). Segueing into the appalling rates of alcohol-related crime and 
child abuse, she reports the “marked difference in the way parents treated their 
children in the wet season, when the roads were inaccessible and people couldn’t leave 
to buy grog in Burketown. The children were better fed and were more likely to be at 
school than fishing” (TM 127). This logical, physical explanation is followed, 
however, by a Palm Island resident’s explanation for social breakdown in indigenous 
communities:  
 
“Nothing to do with grog, love, It’s just the Dreamtime story dogs. We 
got it here. …You look, young kids today about fourteen, fifteen, they 
all mum and dad here. Young fathers and young mothers who never 
look for the future.” She sat staring in front of her. Lizzy Daylight had 
not taught her children her songs, had not wanted to pass them on to 
this broken new world. “This Law has been smashed like a chain 
smash. You know, when a chain break off your body” (TM 127). 
 
Positioned at the end of a chapter, Aunty Betty’s belief in a broken chain of law—the 
“power lines” of Simons’s narrative—is left to resonate with readers. Those who are 
unfamiliar with indigenous worldviews are invited to “listen” to another perspective 
through direct quotation, while Hooper’s layered narrative strategy is a more subtle 
invitation to consider a different vision of the same world. 
 
Hooper deepens the interplay between the natural and supernatural with a motif that 
suggests that something larger than human interaction is at play. She offers her own 
“visionary portrait of well-known persons and events” (Lounsberry and Talese 30) in 
order to destabilise the familiar “trouble in paradise” cliché ubiquitously used in the 
intense media coverage (see Taylor 38). This “visionary portrait” initially manifests 
itself in the atmosphere of the island, and later on the mainland. Arriving on Palm 
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Island, Hooper writes that she felt “like I was wearing the heat on my body. Like it 
was wearing me” (TM 15). Senses heightened, she continues: “Soon after dawn the 
cicadas resumed their electrical humming, as if releasing some live current into the air. 
I woke in a low single bed in a room whose walls had strange stains. This island was 
on some other frequency. Its element was different, like when you enter a hospital and 
the air changes” (TM 33). The atmosphere becomes increasing threatening: there are 
“Places where the streets, the days shimmered as if you were in a kind of fever—all of 
it, with its edge of menace, like some brilliant hallucination” (TM 20). The literary 
casting of the scene evokes the idea that Hooper has entered another sphere: one in 
which the natural and supernatural worlds are inseparable. This “edge of menace” 
becomes central as Hooper casts her vision of Hurley leading up to Cameron 
Doomadgee’s death. Mediated by her sensibility, she projects her sense of atmosphere 
onto him: “perhaps his uniform was sticking to his skin in the heat and he could feel 
the sweat in the roots of his hair and this whole island was vibrating, the whole place 
out of control, and it was up to him to still it” (TM 24). These sensations—conceivably 
caused by the heat—are infused with a supernatural sense of menace that hovers 
around the edges. In the same way, Hurley himself is later presented in that dimension, 
“blurred so much he seemed to be without edges, just a presence, a force hovering in 
the frame” (TM 96). Here, reinforcing Aunty Betty’s worldview, the natural and 
supernatural worlds are inextricably linked, and readers are positioned to see the 
unfolding events from an alternative paradigm.  
 
Identification with her subjects’ perspective is a complex negotiation for Krien; 
maintaining distance from her subjects and acknowledging her role as an observer is 
central rather than peripheral. Because of this, her relationship to the ratbags is 
implicated. Krien’s friendship with activist Ula Majewski, for example, is the initial 
link to the story. She attempts to negotiate the potential bias in this connection with a 
combination of criticism and closely rendered detail. On her arrival in Tasmania, she 
makes her way to the “Pink Palace”—a house that acts as a home base for the ratbags. 
Her initial impression is one of chaos. Juxtaposing the picturesque surrounding scene 
with the house in front of her, Krien illustrates the evolution of the monikers “ratbag” 
and “feral” they use to describe themselves:  
 
The house’s pink weatherboards look as if they are bursting at the 
seams and a giant rat’s nest of pillows, blankets and lengths of foam has 
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formed on the verandah. The odd brown dreadlock sticks out like a tail. 
Stepping over the sleeping bodies, cables, axes, saws and D-locks, I 
walk tentatively through the wide-open front door. … Wandering the 
entire length of the house, I’m spat out into a backyard strewn with 
newspapers, rotting fruit, empty cider bottles, ashtrays and fermenting 
tubs of Yakult. Some guys are parked on a couple of corduroy couches; 
the cushions are ripped open, and there are telltale clumps of foam 
around the jaws of two wrestling staffies. Beyond the chaos is an 
orderly veggie patch, healthy and green under a mulberry tree. … Past 
the veggie patch is a cubby house. Someone’s sleeping bag is poking 
out of it (18). 
 
Krien’s selection of details in her description of place prefigures the characterisation 
of her subjects. Initially confronted with the “rat’s nest” on the verandah, Krien 
provides a picture of chaos and disorder, before noting the order beyond the chaos, a 
veggie patch, “healthy and green”. In many ways this picture is symbolic of what 
Krien comes to understand about the ferals. At times she is critical of their 
presentation and techniques: “I shake my head. In a world of sound-bites and five-
second grabs of footage, I can’t help thinking that if they’re going to go to the effort of 
living out here and getting the media to visit, they could smarten up” (43). She finds, 
however, a depth to their organisation and tactics that belies their appearance: “Later 
[Ula] shows me some of the work the group has produced. There are flora and fauna 
surveys, night footage of endangered species, marsupial hair samples, coupe 
documentation as well as two major reports … I’m amazed at the amount of work and 
at the ‘matter-of-fact’ style the reports are written in. It’s unexpected from this motley 
mob, who call themselves Still Wild Still Threatened” (21). Throughout the narrative 
Krien becomes more deeply concerned about the transience and disconnectedness of 
the protestors’ lives. At times she openly confronts her friends, Ula and Wazza, about 
their goals, and the means they employ to reach them; at other times she is simply an 
outsider observing: “People breathe out, others are thinking hard. A sea of dirty dark 
hoodies, all accustomed to talk of the cops and bail and bunnies” (283). In this way 
Krien, like Simons and Hooper, destabilises the myth of “an” Australian experience: 
Krien presents herself as an outsider to the reality of even her friends, but employs the 
reporting process to demonstrate how understanding can build both understanding and 
empathy. 
 
Place is also central to each of these texts in their consideration of national identity. 
Differing experiences of relationship to the land underlie the conflicts in Simons’s and 
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Krien’s narratives, while Hooper contrasts the natural beauty of Palm Island with the 
social disorder and oppression of its citizens. Along with the subjective and reflexive 
elements of The Meeting of the Waters, the journalistic—or documentary—elements 
of the book are counterbalanced by sculpted literary passages that deepen the 
dimensions of the narrative. Simons imbues reconstructed settings with atmosphere, 
or, in Frus’s terms, “transcends mere factuality” to give “the truth of experience” (26). 
Descriptions of the landscape are particularly purposeful in conveying the experience 
of a conflict fought over the ever-present, enigmatic landscape that seems to have a 
life of its own: “A gum tree leant over an outdoor table. The bark of the tree was 
somewhere between white and silver and there were clusters of bell-like gumnuts. It 
was the kind of tree you would expect to find in fairyland. We sat under it and Davey 
Thomason told me stories of protest and violence and blood and outrage and injustice” 
(MOTW 55). Here Simons juxtaposes the natural world with human nature, 
demonstrating the incongruent beauty and ugliness of each. Invoking the mythical 
quality of the title, the passage conveys the experiential sense of the conversation 
before the factual details. Alexander calls this “the disruptive strangeness of the 
literary,” noting, “unlike facts, rhetorical figures are neither true nor false” (63).  
 
If passages such as this are indeed disruptive or strange in non-fiction, they seem to be 
calculatedly so. As with the Dreaming metaphor, detail selection acts as a conduit to 
the indigenous understandings of the relationship with the land. Sliding between 
metaphors that anthropomorphise the land and narrativise the investigation, Simons 
invites her—predominantly anglicised—imagined readers to view and experience the 
story from a different perspective, an important point if readers are to identify with the 
indigenous protestors. While she recounts that British explorer Sturt wrote about the 
land in a way that dislocated any relationship between the two (MOTW 69), for the 
“proponent women”, the connection was living and vital. Before making the decision 
whether or not to disclose “secret women’s business” outside the Ngarrindjeri kinship 
network, the women stood together on the beach and sang, with one later recounting: 
“It was there on the beach really that the decision was made to tell Cheryl Saunders 
what we knew, and we didn’t make it. The beach made it. The sky and the sea made 
it” (MOTW 215). For a case borne out in the Federal Courts of Australia, the 
discrepancy between the lived experience of the Ngarrindjeri women and the truth of 
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empirical facts is enormous; the literary qualities of the narrative, however, allow 
Simons to go some way towards breaching the gap in worldviews for her readers.    
 
Hooper eventually becomes comfortable with Palm Island and its citizens, but the 
same cannot be said of her return to the mainland. Juxtaposed against earlier passages 
where Palm Island is presented as ethereal, Hooper emphasises the materiality of the 
cities and marginalisation of nature to again underscore differences between Anglo 
and Indigenous experiences of the land. After journeying back to the mainland, 
Hooper writes: 
 
The main streets of Townsville are lined with palm trees and emblems 
of colonial prosperity. Ornate urns and columns and wreaths swathe 
Victorian shopfronts which are still marked: TAILOR, STATIONERY, 
BANK. Hot-pink bougainvillea grows weed-like up wrought-iron lace to 
balconies with French doors flung open to the breeze. … Townville’s 
courthouse is a flat-roofed modernist building of weathered concrete. It 
rises amidst more palms and tropical fruit trees, with small square 
windows staring out from its façade (TM 147). 
 
In this introduction to “white” Australia, order and boundaries are emphasised as 
colonial influences. Bougainvillea, the only unsubdued plant, is “weed-like” in the 
constructed environment, while the terms “Victorian” and “French” accentuate 
European dominance in the area. The concrete building seems to have subdued the 
surrounding vegetation; its “small square windows staring out from its façade” renders 
it at once soulless and secretive. But Hooper saves perhaps the most symbolic 
description for the “war room” of the Queensland Police Union. The Brisbane Broncos 
Leagues Club is the site for a police union meeting for its members who turn out in 
force to support Senior Sergeant Hurley:  
 
The foyer of this club boasts a lush tropical water feature with a bronze 
bucking horse, and walls covered with blown-up action shots of mighty 
men in maroon, white and gold hugging a rugby ball with unrestrained 
ferocity. Their heads seemed to be fused with their necks as they ram 
each other with elbows, knees and shoulders, their faces contorted by 
the effort. … On 1 February 2007, this room was filled with two 
thousand police officers in blue uniform, all gathered to protest the 
treatment of Chris Hurley. They were mainly men, white men in tight 
clusters, insignia on their shoulders indicating rank. What was most 
striking was their height. Until the late 1980s, an officer had to be at 
least five-foot ten. This was a room of tall men, big men with tans or 
sunburn and close-cut hair (TM 197). 
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Here the literal reality of the setting is imbued with a wider symbolism. The venue 
may indeed have been chosen for this purpose: Hooper implicitly parallels the “mighty 
men in maroon”—the Brisbane Broncos—with the “white men in tight clusters”—the 
police—to emphasise both the size and ferocity of the latter. The repetition in this 
passage further stresses their numbers and size, as well as signalling Hooper’s 
discomfort amongst the “tall men”. Her reconstruction of the Police Union meeting is 
not devoid of atmosphere, but the supernatural element has been replaced with a raw 
human quality: “The air was close, clammy with sweat and testosterone. The officers 
held their hats, some using them as fans, and chatted and laughed. … We were in a 
pack. We could feel each other’s animal warmth and sweat and breath—and it made 
me shiver” (TM 198). She saves perhaps her most explicit and scathing interpretation 
of the meeting, however, for the climax of the meeting: 
 
The applause was thunderous. This felt like a revivalist meeting. Just as 
Cameron Doomadgee had become a martyr for Aboriginal Australia, 
Chris Hurley was now a martyr for anyone who felt blacks got too 
much from the system. … This was real-life über-Australia up against 
insipid, politically correct, bullshit Australia. It was North against 
South. It was the cops, huddled close together, against those besieging 
them (TM 201). 
 
The double narrative voice here signifies Hooper’s view of the meeting and its aim. 
Slipping into free indirect discourse, the irony becomes apparent; Hooper clearly 
disagrees with the statements she appears to be making by voicing the police’s 
perspective. But in doing so, Hooper dispenses with all attempts at “even-
handedness”; she becomes the judge, and all sympathy appears to be withdrawn. 
 
In this passage Hooper relinquishes—or fulfils—her “quest” for the truth of Cameron 
Doomadgee’s death, finding perhaps a greater truth about what initially fuelled the 
death in custody. The materiality and physicality of white Australian men—and their 
environment—is here most obviously juxtaposed against the spirituality and fluidity of 
the indigenous experience. It is apparent which group holds the power. The warring 
metaphor of men “huddled close together against those besieging them” strongly 
contrasts the atmosphere of Palm Island which “was vibrating, the whole place out of 
control” (TM 24, 161). Hooper represents two worlds, two ways of seeing, 
diametrically opposed and unequal in power. These representations of the incongruous 
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white and indigenous experiences are strategically juxtaposed to lead readers to 
Hooper’s central contention in the narrative: that the literal collision of black and 
white Australia in Doomadgee and Hurley is a “false battleground” (TM 243). She 
explicitly turns the reader to the synecdochal quality of the trial. In what is a climactic 
point of Hooper’s narrative, she wonders what the point of justice for Cameron 
Doomadgee is, and comes to the realisation that  
 
concentrating on a white man killing a black man took the nation back 
to its original sin, as if expurgation of this would stem the rivers of grog 
and the tides of violence drowning life in these communities. If we 
could absolve ourselves of this first sin we might be able to pretend that 
the later ones—the ones now killing a generation—happened in a realm 
beyond our reach and responsibility (243-4).  
 
This passage shifts the perspective from a specific crime to the disparity of living 
conditions and safety outlined in the government’s recently released “Little Children 
are Sacred” report. The centrality of this point has been prepared by the juxtaposition 
of environments, ideologies, and power structures, and readers are positioned to see 
the outcome of the case—in light of these elements—as inevitable.  
 
The Court subsequently finds Hurley not guilty, a fact of which most readers would be 
aware. However, Hooper invites her readers to look beyond the legal system to see the 
mythic in the verdict: “The next morning [after the trial], it was raining so hard drivers 
turned their headlights on. Sirens rang out of the wet, long and angry. The Rainbow 
Serpent was whipping its tail, flashing its tongue” (TM 263). Perhaps the most 
powerful figure in Aboriginal mythology, the Rainbow Serpent is unexpectedly 
present in the streets of Townsville, but even its presence has failed to have an impact 
in favour of the minority it represents. Here Hooper’s sense of powerlessness is 
tangible. While she herself is “incandescently white”, she has identified with the 
indigenous community. Thus, their powerlessness becomes her own—and perhaps, by 
extension, the reader’s.  
 
Krien’s rhetorical stance as the uncertain protagonist is all but abandoned in 
descriptive passages when she quite literally enters “into the woods”. Following an 
observation that the risk is in “seeing a place” (56), Krien works to engage her readers 
emotionally through detailed description that evokes a fantasy world. The description 
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begins: “By the main road, the morning shift is on, blue smoke ribbons rising up from 
their fire. At the end of the unfinished logging road, past unearthed roots and drying 
lichen the colour and consistency of tobacco, the forest glows green” (71). The blue 
smoke ribbons and forest glowing green here cast the scene in ethereal light, evoking 
the sense that—significantly—the forest is alive. Krien continues:  
 
Stepping inside [the forest], it is difficult to be objective. … Bright blue 
mushrooms huddle, and flames of orange fungi look like they’ve come 
off the side of a hotted-up V8. A red starfish mushroom stinks like 
rotten meat, making me retch. My favourite mushroom is the puffball, 
because it’s interactive. A light tap on its side triggers a cloud of spores 
into the air. It makes me feel helpful. Leeches sucking secretly on my 
legs, I try to see this place as a merchant might. As commercially viable 
timber, as furniture, as beams that do not bow, the skeleton of houses, 
as toilet paper, as floorboards, chopping boards, boats, fruit bowls; as 
paper, crayfish pots, pencils, souvenir barometers and placemats. Most 
of all I imagine the forest disappearing behind me and turning up in the 
office photocopier, or wrapped around a present, or in this book 
perhaps. Every now and then I come across the odd giant tree, its base 
like the foot of a dinosaur. These eucalypts splinter up into the sky so 
high that I have to lean backwards to take it all in. It will grow back, I 
am told by Forestry. Like hair, like fingernails, like skin. It will grow 
back (71–2).  
 
Krien’s emotional engagement with the forest here is evident as she demonstrates the 
life and growth in the woods. The mushrooms are personified as they “huddle”; Krien 
draws a visual simile from her own experience between a hotted-up V8 and bright 
orange fungi; and the “interactive” puffball mushroom shows itself receptive to her 
touch. In this passage Krien demonstrates her connection to each element—whether 
visual, kinaesthetic or emotional. Juxtaposed against prosaic objects such as chopping 
boards, fruit bowls and placemats, the loss of life and the mystical is tangible. Perhaps 
paradoxically, Krien’s attempt here to be objective heightens the emotional element of 
her experience, drawing the reader with her to the conclusion that—rendered in 
italics—appears to be devastating in spite of its pragmatic truth: It will grow back. In 
this passage Krien demonstrates the difficulty of being objective, but reflecting on her 
efforts to be balanced increases her authority as a reliable narrator and, perhaps, moral 
guide.  
 
Experiencing “place” also offers Krien the opportunity to reflect on the relationship 
between perspective and identity. It is significant in the narrative—and the wider 
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conflict—that warring factions are labelled according to their relationship with the 
land. The politicisation of labels and words then becomes an important narrative 
theme, as Krien connects “seeing” with “being”. After waiting at the Pink Palace for 
her friend to return, Krien describes Majewski: “In Melbourne she was a rainbow-
wearing, beer and red goon-swilling student and poet. Now she is a jeans and T-shirt 
wearing, beer, cider and red goon-swilling activist. She is also, according to the 
forestry industry, an eco-militant, Trotskyist, industrial terrorist, guerrilla warrior and 
radical fundamentalist” (19). The juxtaposition of Krien’s description against the 
forestry industry’s is ironic, and effectively sides Krien against the industry. The irony 
is deepened by the clearly hyperbolic labels: Krien’s description is playful, while the 
forestry industry’s is aggressive. This passage is one of many that draws attention to 
the politicisation and power of words in the battle for Tasmania’s forests, which is 
played out on the ground but also in the media. Krien does not draw back from 
engaging with the language of the conflict. At times this results in ironic humour, as 
with the above example, as well as calling Majewski the group’s “media slut”, and 
preferring “ferals” for “blockaders” (21). At other times Krien explicitly draws 
attention to the politicisation of terms. Early in the narrative she explains, “‘Working’ 
forests are divided into coupes and then identified with codes such as SX10F. Ula says 
these labels have the effect of distancing the logging operations from the reality of 
levelling forests” (15). Later this information is invoked to produce a resonant truth 
that underscores the battle over labels: 
 
Standing in the clear-fell, I suspect I’m no different from people all 
around the world, standing in places long gone, trying to feel the 
shape of a ghost, trying to feel something. In describing their sense of 
loss, the environmental movement can often seem melodramatic. 
Evoking napalm, Hiroshima and the holocaust to describe logging is 
manipulative, although it can be hard to find definitional error with 
such words. … In SX10F I climb up onto the stump of a huge tree. 
What’s left is mostly hollow. There’s enough room for a tea party in 
there. Bridget climbs up with me. She points at its pithy insides and in 
a big blokey voice mimics a logger: “It’s rotten up the inside, love! 
Dead anyway.” We laugh. The sound echoes in the vast empty space 
(122). 
 
Acknowledging that activists can be as guilty of manipulation as the forestry industry, 
Krien creates some distance between herself and the environmental movement. 
However, the universal scope becomes personal again as retrospection is outweighed 
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by the truth of her experience. The dehumanising label SX10F is particularly 
incongruent here as Krien moves again from the coupe to an individual tree and 
observes it up close. Krien is enacting her new-found knowledge: “The risk, I realise 
as Bridget chews her walking whip beside me, maps fluttering around us, is in seeing a 
place” (56). She continues her theme of the politicisation of terms and their effects 
while reflecting on her background research:  
 
The books, DVDs, brochures and pamphlets I receive from FT 
[Forestry Tasmania] are a journalist’s nightmare. I find myself 
constantly trying to decipher new words. Nature needs ‘disturbance,’ 
logging is ‘harvesting,’ deforestation is ‘afforestation,’ burning 
woodchips for electricity is a form of ‘bio-fuel’ or ‘renewable energy.’ 
… According to the timber industry, this means the forest has been 
‘disturbed’ and can be classed as ‘regrowth,’ which, linguistically, 
makes it seem less sacred. It’s easy to see how activists get cynical: you 
could piss in an ancient forest and have its status changed as a result 
(119).  
 
Krien’s main point here—that labels are employed to manipulate emotion—brings 
poignancy to her own use of terms, whether ironic or otherwise. Her use of inverted 
commas when using such terms as “greenie yuppies,” “rednecks” and “Abos” signals 
by turn playfulness and anger at the use and misuse of such monikers. By exploiting 
this hurdle in her investigation and subsequent theme, Krien calls into question the war 
of words over the forests, effectively asking the reader to look beyond semantics to see 
the forests over which the battle is being fought—as well as the reality of the people 
who are fighting it. 
 
Representing stakeholders in their complexity is another difficulty for reporters of 
group conflict. Pauly notes that narratives built around individual personalities deepen 
engagement with a subject, but may over-theorise the individual while under-
theorising the group (“Drama” 79). Divided into five sections: Ratbags, Loggers, The 
Company, Groundswell and The Mill, Into the Woods maps the conflict through 
warring factions. The purpose of Krien’s reflexive representation of stakeholders 
seems not to focus on her reactions as much as to contextualise the role of the 
individual within the larger, and quite complex, conflict. Simons similarly concludes 
The Meeting of the Waters with a drive back from Hindmarsh Island back to the 
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mainland, and on to Melbourne—or, as she puts it, “the place I call home” (MOTW 
461). On the journey she imagines the scene from above:  
 
…a car crawling across the continent like an insect on skin. Eastward. 
Towards the future. But to get there I had to drive across country, and 
all around I could see the marks on the landscape. The roads, the towns, 
the big salt scars, the river’s course, its lagoons and reaches, its taming 
locks. I wondered what myths might be told in the future about the 
ancestors who made these marks, and the great dream of settlement that 
drove their creation. Driving towards the sunset, yet always borne to the 
past (MOTW 461). 
 
A sense of closure is produced here: for Simons at least, this journey is coming to an 
end. But the widening of perspective emphasises that this has been another mark on 
the landscape—one story within a longer narrative of the country’s history that 
stretches into the future. That it may one day be told as a “myth” reinforces its 
function of revealing something to Australians about who they are, but also separates 
the end of Simons’s journey from the Hindmarsh Affair: the larger story is not yet 
finished. Nevertheless, Simons is able to draw some conclusions about the meaning of 
the events. She writes: 
 
I don’t think it was Ngarrindjeri culture that was romanticised during 
the Hindmarsh Bridge Affair—or not only Ngarrindjeri culture. I think 
it was our own, by which I mean Western European culture. We 
believed in judicial process, and the ability to find the truth. We 
believed in books over the testimony of oral culture. We were very 
confident about our ‘common sense’ and where it might lead us. We 
like to think of our culture as open. We value transparency as a 
democratic virtue. This is one of the stories we tell about ourselves. But 
in fact, as this story shows, information is distributed unevenly and 
communicated when it suits people to do so. Information follows the 
lines of power. Aboriginal cultures make this explicit. Western 
European culture—and my own journalistic culture—like to pretend 
that it isn’t necessarily so (MOTW 454). 
 
While Simons’s comments may initially seem hypocritical—after all, she has 
produced her own book on the subject—the narrative strategies she has used draw 
attention to the limitations of stories European cultures can tell about themselves, and 
the meanings produced by those forms. The inherent complexities of indigenous 
affairs and cultural perspectives often defy—or are denied—representation in forms of 
discourse essentially entrenched in Anglicized ways of perceiving the world. 
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Embracing an alternative form of storytelling, Simons emphasises how culturally 
constructed narratives reinforce dominant ideologies and hegemonic structures. An 
achievement of The Meeting of the Waters, then, is an exposure of the gap between 
indigenous and white notions of truth, objectivity, perceptions of reality, and 
ideological differences—issues that were widely ignored or disregarded by the 
“intellectually respectable” cynicism of mainstream media coverage of the Hindmarsh 
Affair. Another achievement is in the narrative’s explicit challenge to representation as 
a whole; consequently, it holds value beyond its content as news. The epistemic 
foundation of the narrative provides an alternative way for readers to see Simons and 
the subjects of the Hindmarsh Affair, the complexity of the issues, and the 
relationships between each of these elements, but it also creates a space for readers to 
see their own place in the story. 
 
Closure in The Tall Man is more elusive. Hurley is acquitted of responsibility in 
regards to Doomadgee’s death, but this brings no sense of completion. Hooper finds 
that the Hurley/Doomadgee conflict is a false battleground, one that overshadows the 
“great horror” exposed by Federal government’s “Little Children Are Sacred” report. 
Meaning in this story, then, centres on Hurley’s trial as an expurgation for past and 
current sins against indigenous Australians—a colonial history defining the nation’s 
present consciousness. Without closure for the Doomadgee family or their supporters, 
Hooper—like Simons—uses her own journey of investigation to conclude the book. 
Hooper recounts the last time she saw Hurley, at the Queensland Police Union’s 
inaugural Pride in Policing Day march. While greeting people, Hurley leans in toward 
a little girl, pretending to be a monster. She writes: “‘Grrrr!’ he cried, holding his 
hands like clawed paws in front of his face. There he was, the Tall Man” (TM 266). 
Later, when Hooper looks for him, he has disappeared: “It was as if he’d dissolved 
into a long stream of blue” (TM 266), an allusion to the Tall Man slipping back into 
the cracks between the rocks. Here the Senior Sergeant who bridged cultures has also 
found his way into mythology and the Dreaming stories of Aboriginal culture. The 
reader is left with a sense of the inevitability of the outcome in two dimensions: 
another chapter of history has been written on the disenfranchisement of Australia’s 
indigenous peoples, and the Tall Man has proved himself the elusive spirit of 
Dreaming stories.   
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Conclusions 
 
In seeking to make sense of—and find meaning in—complex and often protracted 
conflicts, Australians arguably need more than the current lexicon and mainstream 
journalistic form to convey meaningful stories that embrace cultures, histories, 
ideologies and beliefs. Literary journalism has historically fulfilled this role, and 
contemporary Australian works continue to function in this way. The examples of 
book-length literary journalism analysed in this chapter resist the lines of dominant 
discourse in mainstream media, revealing instead narratives that are at once more 
nuanced and complex than their daily journalism counterparts. Importantly, each 
practitioner attempts to destabilise cultural stereotypes to re-engage their readers with 
the people behind the issues, the agendas behind the stories, and the reality behind the 
myths—with differing degrees of success.  
 
The three texts analysed in this chapter deal with epistemic responsibility in different 
ways. For Simons, the “backyard effect” necessitates a high degree of epistemic 
justification. The extensive peritext of the book underscores her desire for disclosure 
transparency. This is supported by a highly reflexive narrative that draws attention to 
its own construction, which also functions as a critique of the motivations behind—
and construction of—competing narratives. For Hooper’s readers familiar with the 
facts of Doomadgee’s death, a narrative voice presuming to tell “the real story” would 
likely ignite scepticism and produce an unfavourable reaction. Hooper is well aware 
of the conditions under which she is writing, as she observes epitextually: “In non-
fiction, it’s important for the reader to feel they can trust the authorial voice—if they 
smell ideology or a political agenda the trust is blown” (Ruddock). As a result, 
Hooper presents herself as an ignorant outsider from the opening chapter, 
emphasising her role as a searcher for truth, although to some extent the structure of 
her narrative contradicts this epistemic stance. A similar danger exists for Krien, a 
mainlander investigating a decades-long conflict in which allegiances are paramount. 
She presents herself to both her subjects and her readers as the inexperienced reporter, 
relying on transparency at each stage of reporting and writing to maintain critical 
distance from highly emotive and politically charged issues.  
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Consequently, anxiety over representation for all three practitioners manifests itself in 
an authorial stance of “not knowing”, possibly best characterised as a colonial 
uncertainty in the context of their subject matter. As contended earlier, an “outsider” 
intentionally trespassing on occupied ground has deeply resonant overtones for a 
country struggling with race relations and power imbalances. This is particularly the 
case for Simons and Hooper who deal with issues of race, but is also relevant to Krien 
whose subject matter is the indigeneity of the land through old growth forests, and 
whose connection to the “ratbags” possibly prejudices her to favour a particular 
perspective. Again, it is interesting to note here that of the three practitioners, Simons 
offers the highest degree of epistemic defence, yet her book received the harshest 
criticism for its findings.   
 
Along with epistemic defence, these texts are also structured in such a way as to resist 
closure at an institutional or political level, again taking into account readers’ 
previous knowledge of events, and facilitating a journey from “not knowing” to an 
uncomfortable sense of completion for the writer, but not for the issue. In North 
American works which—perhaps apart from Columbine—deal with largely new 
information, the narrative arc is formed around events that reach a climax: Serena’s 
16th birthday and pregnancy, the shootings at Columbine High School, and Deborah’s 
reconciliation with her mother’s past and her own future. To a great extent in the 
Australian texts, where the climax and outcome of the conflict is already known, the 
author’s journey of discovery provides a parallel narrative arc to the events 
represented, and their desire to find “the truth” provides the narrative drive. This 
journey metaphor is central: Simons begins and ends her narrative with a road trip 
across central Australia; Hooper, the white southerner, flies to Palm Island, travels 
through the “deep north” and finishes her journey back on the mainland; and Krien 
takes the ferry across from her native Melbourne to Tasmania, a place she only dimly 
remembers visiting as a child. While complications rise from the sequence of events, 
equally important are the author’s own reactions to the sense of menace they 
encounter, as well as doubts and dead ends during the investigative process. Indeed, 
each of these narratives is affected by limitations: Simons is denied access to the 
dissident women, Hooper is denied access to Hurley, and Krien is denied access to 
Gunns Ltd. This parallel narrative arc is significant as the resolution for each conflict 
is not found in real-world events, but the author’s own conclusions about what the 
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event signifies. At the end of each narrative the group conflicts are left unresolved; 
there is a sense of “unfinished business”. The importance of the narrative, then, 
becomes its meaning rather than the resolution of events.  
 
The civic focus of Australian literary journalism represented in this chapter has 
arguably grown out of economic necessity. As noted earlier, without the literary turn 
afforded by the New Journalism, Australian literary journalism has not received either 
the institutional or public recognition it has in the US. Consequently, the content of 
literary journalism is arguably consistent with Sims’s assessment that international 
forms put more stress on social usefulness than artistry (“Problem” 10). Hooper’s 
personal observations bear this out:  
 
It seems there aren’t more [Australian] authors in this area because 
traditionally there have not been the same publishing opportunities, nor 
the wide market, that, say, American non-fiction writers have enjoyed 
... [T]here is a larger cultural opportunity cost in that Australian stories 
aren’t researched and written at the same high level. Stories tell us who 
we are as a people. They can give us a more nuanced, sophisticated 
sense of our history and culture (Joseph, “Australian” 44). 
 
This is a state that, as has been argued in this chapter, Hooper, Simons and Krien have 
sought to address. The civic conflicts that comprise the subjects of The Meeting of the 
Waters, The Tall Man, and Into the Woods open the door for complex, nuanced 
presentations of cultural concerns. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
Pauly asserts, “Literary journalism cannot be said to occupy the civic space that daily 
news once claimed as its own” (‘Drama’ 78). But Australian literary journalism 
demonstrates how a civic focus can carry out a role he perceives is missing in North 
American literary journalism; that is, to “make society as a whole available for 
analysis and conversation” (“Drama” 78). As such, Australian literary journalism has 
an important social role in influencing public debate (Ricketson, “Ethical Issues” 64, 
235), as well as providing platforms from which the epistemic community can reflect 
on uniquely Australian issues and the ever-evolving consciousness of national 
identity.  
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The “New Gen”: History Makers, Future Shapers 
 
During the late 1800s when the United States government began to recognise the need 
for additional land for processing on Ellis Island, a similar development was taking 
place in the nation’s nascent journalism establishment. While work began to expand 
the now-famous landmark in the 1890s, a first wave of literary journalism was also 
gaining momentum (Connery, Sourcebook xii). Connery explains that “the realistic 
movement that had made the common and ordinary legitimate topics for writers had 
been at least partially fuelled by a cultural need to know and understand a rapidly 
changing world, and by a staunch faith that reality was comprehensible through 
printed prose” (“Third Way” 4). In this thesis I have argued that these two elements—
the need to know and understand a rapidly changing world, and faith that this is 
possible, if problematic, through descriptive narrative journalism—are still true for a 
new generation of literary journalists. This “New Gen” combines assiduous research 
with literary narrative prose to offer truths about life in the twenty-first century. But 
disputes over new territory, as exemplified by New York’s and New Jersey’s claims 
to Ellis Island, are not always solved with the passing of time. Despite the aims and 
claims of contemporary book-length literary journalism, there still exists an uneasy 
relationship between reality and its representation for many theorists, critics, readers, 
and, crucially, practitioners. As the analyses in chapters five and six demonstrate, 
discovery, exploration, consolidation, and occupation of other people’s stories creates 
not only ethical but also complex epistemic situations to be negotiated by literary 
journalists. It has been, therefore, a central contention of this thesis that the epistemic 
imperative to “know well” is a primary concern in literary journalism scholarship. 
 
The principles of epistemic responsibility are not new to the theory, practice or 
criticism of literary journalism. Throughout this thesis, practitioners such as Janet 
Malcolm, Helen Garner, Åsne Seierstad, Joe McGinniss, William Langewiesche, 
Dave Cullen and Margaret Simons have been shown to demonstrate critical reflection 
that suggests epistemic responsibility is a central concern in their practice. Similarly, 
reviews by Janet Maslin, Joanne Wypijewski, Timothy Mitchell and Jack Fuller 
exemplify incisive critique that pays attention to truth claims and considers epistemic 
concerns accordingly. What, then, does this thesis contribute to scholarship in this 
 
 
 217 
field? One answer emerges from a corollary observation to those already offered: 
consideration of epistemic responsibility does not inexorably lead to epistemically 
defensible practise. As the analyses of literary journalists—such as Richard 
Critchfield, Joe McGinniss and Helen Garner—show, problematic epistemic 
foundations are not easily identifiable. Epistemic “blind spots” are exactly that: 
opaque to those who carry them, and only discoverable with specific attention to the 
cognitive processes that organise knowledge and produce understanding. To 
appropriate Code’s language once again, the quality of the literary journalist’s action 
(in this case, making truth claims) is dependent upon their ability to understand 
situations rightly (ER 181). Concomitantly, constructive and productive criticism 
takes into account not only the action, but also the method of arriving at a belief; that 
is, not just the ethical, but also the epistemic foundation of a work of literary 
journalism. 
 
The major part of my contribution to literary journalism scholarship, then, is to frame 
the discourse of literary journalism’s truth claims with the approach and lexicon of 
Code’s Epistemic Responsibility. I have argued, with Code, that a conflation of ethical 
and epistemic concerns often results in an obscuration of the latter, and that the two 
branches of enquiry should be held separately for the purposes of explication. While 
James Aucoin has previously identified the importance of Code’s responsibilist 
approach to literary journalism, I have argued—again, with Code—that an assessment 
of knowledge and truth claims is incomplete without analysis that considers 
coherence and correspondence, as well as epistemic justification. Factual veracity of 
literary journalism is important, and where the discipline of verification fails, an 
epistemic responsibilist approach offers a standard to assess knowledge and truth 
claims that Code characterises as “stringent” without being impossible (ER 67). Such 
an assessment of epistemic responsibility primarily requires consideration of three 
elements: the subject (or literary journalist’s) nature, environment, and the impact of 
their epistemic community (ER 50). In this thesis I have focused on the latter two to a 
great extent; the final discussion will emphasise the role of intellectual virtue in 
relation to the literary journalist. 
 
Chapter two introduced the concept that the name of an author is a “constituent 
element” of a non-fiction author-reader contract. For Genette, an author’s name 
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fulfils a contractual function whose importance varies greatly 
depending on genre: slight or nonexistent in fiction, it is much greater 
in all kinds of referential writing, where the credibility of the testimony, 
or of its transmission, rests largely on the identity of the witness or the 
person reporting it. Thus we see very few pseudonyms or anonyms 
among authors of historical or documentary works, and this is all the 
more true when the witness himself plays a part in his narrative 
(Paratexts 41). 
 
To apply Genette’s assertion here, the practitioner’s name is a key element of the 
literary journalistic contract. Indeed, it may be contended that the author’s name is the 
key element in a negotiation of expectations. The truth claims of a text, finally, must 
rest on the integrity of the one who makes them. This is also a central point for Code: 
“prominent among my considerations in assessing a knowledge claim is evidence 
about whether the person at its source is in a position to know. That person’s 
intellectual integrity counts as a significant part of the evidence in much the same way 
as, in moral matters, a person’s moral integrity is a determining factor in decisions as 
to whether she or he should be trusted” (ER 39). Consequently, intellectual virtue—as 
distinct from, but in combination with, moral virtue—is a key characteristic of the 
literary journalist. For Code, “Virtues, both moral and intellectual, have more to do 
with ways of relating to the world than with the ‘content’ of particular actions or 
knowledge claims” (ER 53). The truth or knowledge claims made in a book-length 
work of literary journalism often appear to be the primary points of analysis, but any 
assessment that eludes empirical verification or assessment of whether a practitioner 
“is in a position to know” defaults to the intellectual virtue displayed by the purported 
“knower”. Hersey put it this way: “We read journalism—or most of us still do, 
anyway—to try to learn about the external world in which our psyches have to 
struggle along, and the quality we most need in our informant is some measure of 
trustworthiness” (263). 
 
This point has been evident throughout this thesis. Controversial cases particularly 
bear out the fact that practitioners producing multiple works of book-length literary 
journalism are often pre-judged, as evidenced in chapter four. In these cases the name 
of the practitioner alone sets a “horizon of expectations” which—fairly or unfairly—
influences the reading of the text. Code’s responsibilist approach indicates that it is 
not only fair, but also incumbent upon would-be knowers (in this case, readers) to 
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assess the credentials of purported knowers (literary journalists). In cases where 
transparency disclosure is lacking, much can be accounted for by the illocutionary 
force of the literary journalist’s name. Here I would add that paratextual links to 
literary journalistic traditions also carry some illocutionary weight. Code proposes 
that an epistemic responsibilist approach works primarily through example: “We see 
how the conduct of the [intellectually] virtuous shapes both the conduct of those 
aspiring to it and conceptions of virtue itself” (ER 63). This is, of course, an 
optimistic vision of epistemic agents, and one that Code recognises as problematic—
particularly when it eschews questions of power and epistemic privilege 
(“Responsibility and Rhetoric” 6). But it is a salient point that paratextual allusions or 
endorsements that place a text “in the tradition of” a well-known figure of established 
epistemic virtue contribute towards a reader’s horizon of expectations and subsequent 
assessment of truth claims. Here the assessment of epistemic responsibility reaches a 
full circle: analysis of narrative coherence and a literary journalist’s intellectual 
character must be supported by the text’s correspondence to reality where possible; 
these are the ideal conditions for an assessment of a text’s truth claims. 
 
For Code, those involved in progressive endeavours—such as literary journalism—
are subject to higher demands of epistemic responsibility and intellectual achievement 
than “those expected of persons simply as persons” (ER 62 emphasis in original). 
Contemporary literary journalists worldwide are consequently not only inheritors of a 
legacy; as leaders in their field they are also are responsible for shaping future 
standards of responsible enquiry. The analyses in chapters five and six of this thesis 
indicate that the future of literary journalism is in safe hands. The works of LeBlanc, 
Cullen, Skloot, Simons, Hooper and Krien are not unproblematic, but each of these 
practitioners demonstrates a strong commitment to epistemic responsibility, as well as 
traits of intellectual virtue. Each writer has undertaken many of the epistemic tasks 
identified as responsible practice. In Epistemic Responsibility, these include: 
sustaining an appropriate epistemic location (39); justifying knowledge and/or truth 
claims (42); evaluating the epistemic integrity of potential sources of knowledge (43); 
scrutinising self-knowledge and its impact on truth claims (57-8); defining the field of 
knowledge (59); being open to changing boundaries in this field of knowledge (59); 
acknowledging and pursuing doubts (59); acknowledging and assessing the impact of 
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the epistemic community on knowledge (114); identifying and acknowledging 
limitations (136); and taking an objectivist approach to the subject (142-3).  
 
These epistemic tasks should be considered indicators of epistemic responsibility 
rather than an exhaustive list of competencies. In fact, Code warns against producing 
a set of rules to apply in all situations: a theory of intellectual virtue can neither offer 
“any easy calculus for assessing knowledge and belief claims nor provide a decision-
making scale against which specific knowledge claims can be measured for validity. 
Indeed, it cannot provide any definite and final answers. … One could not responsibly 
write ‘a guide for the recognition of responsible knowledge claims’” (ER 63-4). What 
an epistemic responsibilist approach can do, however, is offer principles to assess 
intellectually virtuous conduct. In doing so, individuals can acquire ways of 
discerning when claims to know are responsible, and when they are not (ER 64). To 
this end, Socratic questioning is useful. It narrows the field of irresponsible epistemic 
behaviour when claims to absolute knowledge or truth are impossible to justify. The 
epistemic tasks outlined above might be fulfilled by asking questions such as: Am I in 
a position—literal and metaphorical—to make these truth claims? Am I able to 
substantiate these truth claims on the basis of my research? Are my sources reliable 
and responsible “knowers”? How might my subjectivity impact the organisation of 
my research in problematic ways? What kind of self-knowledge is appropriate and 
necessary here? How much (more) do I need to know? What impact would further 
research have on the knowledge I already have? Is there more to discover? Have any 
changes occurred in the field since I began researching this subject? Is there anything 
here that does not fit coherently with the narrative I am constructing? If so, what is it? 
What might it mean? How has my subjects’ knowledge shaped my own? What critical 
knowledge is impacting the way I shape my narrative? What are the limitations on my 
knowledge? Have I made claims that I cannot substantiate? What might the impact be 
of not acknowledging my limitations? Have I approached my subject with an agenda? 
And, finally, Have I tried to impose a structure on my subject that does not fit? 
Similarly, an epistemically responsible critic will take into account a text’s 
correspondence with verifiable reality, its coherence, and also the known intellectual 
virtue of the literary journalist. The questions above are appropriate for the critic to 
ask, along with the questions: “Who knows?” and “Who cares?” which have been 
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shown in this thesis to be important epistemic considerations when considering a 
text’s truth claims.  
 
An epistemic responsibilist approach has much to offer the theory and practice of 
literary journalism. Conley quotes Walter Lippmann when he writes: “‘The function 
of news is to signalize an event. The function of truth is to bring to light the hidden 
facts, to set them in relation with each other, and make a picture of reality on which 
men can act.’ The reporter gathers facts and opinions that often are in conflict and 
invites readers to determine ‘truth’” (58). Indeed, the literary journalist goes beyond 
the gathering of facts to offer “truths” of their own. The responsibility inherent in this 
act of “making a picture of reality on which men can act” is heavy indeed. My 
intention in this thesis has been to make clearer the guidelines of epistemic 
responsibility, and to promote reflexive practice for both literary journalists and their 
epistemic community. 
 
The link between ethics and epistemology is complex. It was noted in chapter four 
that the quest for truth is tightly linked to procedural matters such as fact checking 
and performing a wide range of research—these are primarily epistemic tasks. But, as 
Kieran writes, “Carelessness about such procedures is … professionally culpable and, 
in this respect, constitutes a moral failure to live up to the responsibility of one’s job” 
(152). Kieran’s assessment is consistent with Code’s approach, as she writes:  
 
This task—demonstrating that these domains of enquiry must remain 
separate while, at the same time, benefitting from their evident 
overlap—is complex. The complexity arises because knowing well, 
preserving an appropriate degree of objectivity, thinking clearly, and 
being epistemically responsible are, in fact, moral matters. But they are 
not just moral matters; nor can they, as moral matters, be wholly 
subsumed under standard modes of ethical discussion (ER 68). 
 
In this thesis I have consequently attempted to draw attention to the way literary 
journalism’s knowledge and truth claims have invited moral or legal censure, and 
argue that a focus on epistemology, or the methods of arriving at a truth claim, can 
yield a more instructive, constructive analysis and critique. Like Code, my project has 
been to focus on an examination of process, or the efforts to achieve end-states, rather 
than the end-states alone (ER 8). Applying the lexicon of epistemic responsibility to 
the analysis, teaching and practice of literary journalism can, I contend, heighten 
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awareness of epistemic issues, and thus produce better-informed, more responsible 
practice. 
 
A secondary aim of this study has been to offer a characterisation of Australian 
literary journalism: that is, as a record of civic disputes that provide insight into the 
problematic nature of national identity. While the emphasis on civic matters is a key 
difference between Australian and US literary journalism, identity construction is a 
function they both perform. Pauly wrote in 1990 that writing and reading New 
Journalism affirmed a generational identity, but also “articulated a cultural identity” 
(“Politics” 119). This function is still evident: Pauly’s 2011 keynote address to the 
International Association for Literary Journalism Studies stressed the embeddedness 
of identity within cultural concerns in contemporary literary journalism (“Drama” 77). 
Lehman similarly asserts that non-fiction of this kind is “literature whose historical 
assertions and representational intentions are by definition an effort to fix our identity 
within the world around us” (Matters 37). The texts analysed in chapter six, however, 
work less to capture a sense of generational identity, and more to question monolithic 
representations of national and cultural identity. While this is a central function of 
these texts, other works such as Helen Trinca’s and Anne Davies’s Waterfront: The 
Battle that Changed Australia (2000), Malcolm Knox’s Secrets of the Jury Room 
(2005), Jacquie Everitt’s The Bitter Shore (2008), and Sally Neighbour’s The Mother 
of Mohammed (2010) in part rely on, and challenge, the character of Australia as an 
egalitarian, easy-going and welcoming nation—as represented in historical and 
political discourse. Like Marr’s and Wilkinson’s Dark Victory (2004), these book-
length narratives have less of a literary intention than those analysed in this thesis, but 
in dealing with civic concerns they come into contact with cultural conflicts and often 
brush against issues regarding identity at local and national levels.  
  
I have also endeavoured to characterise the current state of literary journalism in 
Australia. Ricketson’s (2010) and Joseph’s (2011) surveys indicate that the field of 
practising long-form literary journalists in Australia is small and fluid. Practitioners 
often do not identify themselves with the label “literary journalist”, and, as noted 
earlier, they also report financial and time constraints on producing book-length 
literary journalism. Nevertheless, a survey of tertiary journalism programs further 
indicates that there is cause for optimism about literary journalism’s future in 
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Australia. In a 2007 census, 14 out of 20 university journalism departments (or 
63.6%) reported that literary journalism is a part of the curriculum. “Evocative 
description” and “use of writer’s point of view” were the most widely taught narrative 
features, as evident in 81.8% of positive responses (Blair 20). The survey also showed 
that after feature articles, literary journalism was the most popular style of journalistic 
publication amongst academics. Blair explains that this may be accounted for by “the 
style’s extensive history, its popularity (particularly during many of the respondents’ 
youth in the 1960’s and ‘70s) and [its] acceptance in the journalism world” (22). 
Respondents also identified constraints on a more extensive focus of creative styles, 
including the degree of difficulty needed to master the genres of literary journalism 
and creative non-fiction (22), and time pressures in already-crowded courses (24). 
Nevertheless, a new generation of Australian tertiary-educated journalists is gaining 
exposure to the alternative traditions of literary journalism. Rebecca Giggs also 
suggests that innovative forms of non-fiction, such as those represented in this thesis, 
are being “fostered by mid-tier presses rather than ‘big end of town’ [publishing] 
houses or the various funding bodies”, and names Granta, Black Inc. and Scribe 
publishers as advocates for emerging non-fiction writers (in Zajac).   
 
In light of these developments, book-length literary journalism does indeed have a 
strong future in Australia. Its powerful advocatory role for those who are under- or 
mis-represented in the mainstream media has already gained the attention of influential 
bodies. The Walkley Foundation—comparable to the Pulitzer Foundation for the 
Arts—for example, introduced The Walkley Book Award in 2005 in recognition of the 
increasing roles that long-form and literary journalism play in the Australian media. 
This recognition will conceivably continue to grow, as literary journalism is a 
particularly important alternative to mainstream journalism in this country. As of 
2010, Young has identified highly concentrated media ownership, declining 
newspaper circulation, and increasing commercial pressures and economic goals as 
central characteristics of Australian media (622). The oligarchical influence on setting 
news and editorial agendas is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the freedom afforded 
literary journalists ensures readers have the option of wider, deeper, more contextual 
coverage of civic disputes. Further, as global mainstream journalism undergoes 
ideological, economic and technological crises, compounded by increasing 
disillusionment with the objectivity model, practitioners of literary journalism have 
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much to offer an institution in the process of recalibration. The reliability required of 
daily journalists might conceivably be superseded by responsibility as “objective” 
news reports are increasingly replaced with commentary and opinion, and narrative 
forms take a stronger hold in mainstream journalistic practice.  
 
I have argued in this thesis that epistemic responsibility is not solely the domain of the 
literary journalist; the epistemic community is also bound by its standards. “Knowing 
well” is indeed a virtue to which all participants in a society can aspire. This does 
not—and cannot—mean that the acquisition of knowledge is the greatest good. Rather, 
the principles of “knowing well” guide the process of translating knowledge into 
understanding, belief and, finally, truth. Code summarises this point in the following 
way: 
 
[A]chieving intellectual goodness does not depend upon knowledge in 
any standard sense. It is a matter of learning from example, from 
persons of reason, integrity, and courage. The fact that exemplary 
people are often not recognized for what they are does not negate the 
importance of this claim. Socrates’ death does not invalidate the 
principles for which he stood, any more than does Thomas More’s or 
Martin Luther King’s. This secular conception of moral and intellectual 
virtue leaves our appeals to reason and integrity without absolute 
foundations; yet they are founded in what we can best achieve within 
the scope of human potential. They are thus neither more nor less well 
founded than knowledge itself, where attempts to establish ultimate 
foundations have repeatedly failed (ER 194). 
 
Contemporary literary journalists exemplify what it means to learn from intellectually 
virtuous predecessors to a great extent. Rather than the traditions of objectivity and 
reliability, current practitioners draw directly from the writings and examples of 
immersive journalism of practitioners from the 1890s onwards. If the first wave of 
literary journalists can be likened to the original 3-acre spot of land that was Ellis 
Island in 1891, the ensuing century of adding to that land has produced a vital point of 
transition for immigrants to a new world—or terra nullius—of journalistic inquiry. 
Contemporary literary journalists might well resist acquiescing to the sovereignty of a 
name. Their work, finally, is theirs alone. But this does not discount the fact that their 
place in history has as its foundation those who—like Hutchins Hapgood, George 
Orwell and James Agee—chose to harness the power of narrative and the techniques 
of storytelling to reveal truths about life in their generation. The intellectual integrity 
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of many early literary journalists has shaped the standards of epistemic responsibility 
for subsequent generations of practitioners, who in turn shape the literary journalistic 
landscape for the future. For Code, intellectual goodness is “conducting one’s moral 
and intellectual life so as to contribute to the creation and preservation of the best 
possible standards appropriate to the practices within which one lives” (ER 193); these 
are the demands of epistemic responsibility. And for practitioners—past, present and 
future—epistemic responsibility is the final bastion for the truth claims of literary 
journalism. 
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Endnotes
 
1 Code is critical of some aspects of her work in retrospect. She writes: ”Despite my 
conviction that the central idea of Epistemic Responsibility is important and right, 
there are problems with the book, and some of the criticisms it has produced are well 
taken” (“Responsibility and Rhetoric” 5 emphasis in original). The primary 
deficiencies she observes are: the lack of boldness of a central thesis statement (5); 
the tacit—or perhaps uncritical—liberal humanism that informs the book, “where 
questions of power and epistemic privilege do not figure, and an honest, well-
meaning, transparently self-conscious epistemic agent who can make of her or his 
circumstances what she or he will is taken for granted as the central character of the 
story” (“Responsibility and Rhetoric” 6); “the book’s ambiguous relation to the 
metaphysical requirements of the Anglo-American epistemological mainstream (an 
aspect external to the position I develop)” (6); and a “failure to spell out necessary 
and sufficient conditions for claiming or attributing epistemic responsibility (an 
aspect internal to the position)” (6). While these are areas that could and should be 
strengthened, I agree—with Code—that the central idea of Epistemic Responsibility is 
important and right. As such, it is my hope that this thesis opens not only a potential 
path of inquiry for literary journalism studies, but also refreshes the discussion over 
Code’s important work.   
2 In this thesis I distinguish between “mainstream” or “traditional” journalistic 
practices and literary journalism, but here I acknowledge that there is far more 
crossover than the nomenclature suggests. Paul McGeough, chief foreign 
correspondent for The Sydney Morning Herald, is one example of a current 
practitioner regularly publishing literary journalism in a daily newspaper. Recent 
research also shows that elements of literary journalism are increasingly being used in 
daily news reports in Australian newspapers, although the inverted pyramid is still the 
dominant model for reporting (see Johnston). 
 
3 Code notes of the ambivalent response to her book that it “might have been more 
approachable had it been packaged as intervention in a largely uncharted area of 
ethics, for the rites of passage there are different and perhaps in this respect less 
stringent” (“Responsibility and Rhetoric” 6). She does, however, cite a number of 
areas in which the responsibilist approach to epistemic theory has been employed in 
“gratifying, productive ways” (9). As well as finding a home in feminist theory, other 
areas include an adaptation of medical ethics in the area of informed consent; 
epistemic empowerment for women’s and marginalized people’s cognitive locations 
in social institutions; and epistemic responsibility issues in AIDS research (9). Here 
again I signal my intention and hope that this thesis is the beginning of a productive 
relationship between a “responsibilist” epistemic philosophy and literary journalism. 
4 Matthew Ricketson’s study Ethical Issues in the Practice of Book-length Journalism 
(2009) makes a similar claim; indeed, these studies do overlap to a degree. One 
distinction between our approaches, however, is the critical move Code makes in 
separating ethics and epistemology: the greatest value of my thesis is arguably in 
making this distinction and applying a specifically epistemic responsibilist approach 
to literary journalism, rather than considering the equally important but broader 
categories of ethics and narrative journalism. 
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5 This statement reads: “At certain moments in the story, I describe the stream of a 
person’s thoughts. In such instances, I am basing my narrative on interviews with the 
subjects in which they have recalled their thoughts often repeatedly, followed by fact-
checking sessions in which the subjects confirmed their recollections. If you ask a 
person, ‘What were you thinking?’ you may get an answer that is richer and more 
revealing of the human condition than any stream of thoughts a novelist could invent” 
(Preston xi). 
 
6 This statement comes from a wider discussion of what Foley terms the “spectrum 
argument”, representing a view that fictional and nonfictional discourse cannot be 
qualitatively distinguished. Foley argues that it “conflates the necessary recognition of 
historical shifts in the mimetic contract with the impossibility of logical classification, 
thereby precluding any inquiry into the historically varying epistemological bases of 
generic distinctions” (Telling the Truth 32). The quote in full reads: “The spectrum 
argument ends up treating generic categorization as a framework imposed a posteriori 
by literary critics, ruling out the possibility that it may constitute a necessary basis for 
the contracts formed between actual writers and readers” (Telling the Truth 32).   
7 Dolezel also takes up this point. He uses possible worlds theory to identify four 
distinctions in the “macrostructural” properties of fictional and historical texts that 
reassert fundamental distinctions between the two types of narrative. They are as 
follows: 1) Historical worlds are restricted to the physically possible; 2) The cast of 
agents in the historical world is determined by the set of agents involved in the past 
event(s); 3) The persons of historical worlds—as well as their events, settings, etc.—
have to bear documented properties; 4) The gaps in historical worlds are 
epistemological, given by the limitations of human knowledge (258-259).  
8 There are some important studies that particularly focus on texts whose practitioners 
consciously blend invented material with real events; Barbara Lounsberry’s study is 
of Norman Mailer’s practice and Daniel Lehman’s writing on Tim O’Brien in Matters 
of Fact: Reading Nonfiction Over the Edge (1997) are both good examples here. The 
analyses in this thesis, however, concern texts that explicitly claim and defend their 
status as non-fiction, where no intention of “blending” fact with invention is signalled 
in good faith. 
9 Australian author Helen Darville’s The Hand that Signed the Paper illustrates 
Genette’s assertion that the name of the author is indeed a constituent element of the 
contract and has an effect that blends with the effects of other elements. While neither 
literary journalism nor non-fiction, Darville’s case illustrates how paratextual 
elements such as an author’s name can have illocutionary force. The book was first 
published in 1994 under the pseudonym of Helen Demidenko. It was marketed as a 
novel, but the author, Helen Darville, falsely claimed to be of Ukranian ancestry. 
From the book’s first publication, she dressed in national costume, assumed an accent, 
and implied that the story was an oral history, passed through her family, about her 
uncle’s experiences during the Holocaust. Before the scandal broke, the book won the 
Australian/Vogel Literary Award for young authors, the prestigious Miles Franklin 
Award, and, after the scandal was revealed, the Gold Medal of the Australian 
Literature Society. Jill Kitson told the Sydney Morning Herald that “many Vogel 
manuscripts were autobiographical”, which may have contributed to the belief that the 
book was non-fiction (Knox, “The Darville Made Me Do It”). Michael Owen-Brown 
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writes: “Darville says she used the pseudonym for two reasons. She wanted to protect 
the identity of a death camp guard living in Australia, whom she had interviewed. She 
also feared the book would not be viewed as legitimate unless the author was thought 
to come from a Ukrainian background” (np). As a result, the book was widely 
received as an oral history, and thus discredited when Darville’s true identity was 
made public. Paradoxically, in these cases where the illocutionary force of the 
contract was perhaps most powerful because of the author’s assumed authority over 
the content, market forces did little to pass judgement on the authors. For Darville, 
however, the peritext was altered in subsequent editions to renegotiate, or refine, the 
author-reader contract. In this case, the peritext of the third edition of the book—
published after her true identity was revealed—was significantly altered. As expected, 
the book was republished under her real name rather than the intentionally misleading 
pseudonym “Demidenko”, but critical praise and the publisher’s logo were also 
removed from the dustcover, biographical information was altered to disclose 
Darville’s true ancestry, and acknowledgements were added (Darville), ostensibly to 
remove the association of her novel as an oral history and clarify its fictional status. 
10 The use of the term “contract” to describe the negotiation between author and 
reader has been critiqued on the grounds that it “can lead critics astray by implying 
too many similarities between how we read and how we construct and enforce legal 
contracts” (Heyne, “Fiction Meets Nonfiction” 326). But this is a relevant 
observation. The legal arena is, in fact, a site where readers and subjects can and do 
contest narrative representations in works of literary journalism. Epistemic defence—
or its absence—can take on the power of a legal contract when an author claims non-
fiction status for a text. The implications here will be more fully explored in chapter 
four. 
11 John Hartsock takes a slightly more nuanced approach when characterising literary 
journalism scholarship. He cites the English/Journalism divide (6), but also recognises 
the cultural studies approaches of John J. Pauly, David Eason, and Shelley Fisher 
Fishkin; the closely associated post-modern Marxist scholarship of Phyllis Frus; and 
“other efforts that do not fall comfortably into any of the categories” (258), including 
Mas’ud Zavarzadeh’s Mythopoeic Reality (1980) and Eric Heyne’s “Toward a Theory 
of Literary Nonfiction” (1987). The dual traditions recognised by Aucoin, however, 
are relevant to this discussion framed in the context of “truth claims”. To this end, 
Aucoin places both Heyne and Zavarzadeh with the “genre of literature” scholars—
not unproblematically, I would argue.      
12 Interestingly, a scholar’s academic background does not necessarily determine their 
stance on such standards; Aucoin is one example of a scholar with a background in 
journalism who argues that its standards of verification are too narrow for literary 
journalism (8). Conversely, Barbara Lounsberry, a literary scholar, argues forcefully 
for verification in the journalistic tradition (xiii).  
13 This contention is supported by Kovach and Rosenstiel’s research, in which they 
report: “In our survey of journalists about core values, eight out of ten journalists 
working in national outlets, and more than seven out of ten working in local outlets, 
said they felt “there is such a thing as a true and accurate account of an event” (47) 
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14 Code differentiates her “responsibilist” position from Ernest Sosa’s “reliabilist” 
position. She acknowledges that for a person or their knowledge to be reliable 
establishes “a closer connection with truth and warrantability than responsibility can 
establish” (ER 51 in footnote). However, in her view, “a knower/believer has an 
important degree of choice with regard to modes of cognitive structuring, and is 
accountable for these choices; whereas a “reliable” knower could simply be an 
accurate, and relatively passive, recorder of experience” (ER 51). Here a distinction 
can be made between mainstream and literary journalism: the degree of choice 
available to a daily journalist when reporting an event is considerably less than that 
afforded a literary journalist. Hence, a daily journalist is more likely to be judged on 
their reliability according to established protocol and procedures, whereas literary 
journalists are not bound by the same rules of cognitive structuring, and thus have a 
much stronger mandate for responsibility. Code writes: “A person can be judged 
responsible or irresponsible only if she/he is clearly regarded as an agent (in this case 
a cognitive agent) in the circumstances in question. An evaluation of human 
knowledge-seeking in terms of responsibility is instructive precisely because of the 
active, creative nature of the endeavour” (ER 51). Clearly, in an epistemic sense, 
responsibilism is just as binding on a daily journalist as a literary journalist; the point 
here is that literary journalism highlights practitioners’ responsibility, whereas the 
objectivity standard obscures it. 
15 Barbara Foley makes a similar point. Writing in 1986, she reflects on the 
divergence of contracts invoked in works of fiction and (new) journalism: 
Turning to what I could learn about the responses of other readers to 
contemporary works of journalism and fiction, I found my own 
reactions provisionally confirmed. None of the reviewers of Ragtime 
complained that Doctorow had distorted the historical record; they may 
have quarrelled with him on various scores, but they appear to have 
acceded to his play with facts on the grounds that he was simply writing 
a novel. By contrast, many readers of works such as In Cold Blood, The 
Executioners Song, and Roots have stated that the credibility of the 
narrative collapsed for them when they discovered that certain details 
had been invented of significantly changed to enhance the thematic 
patterning of the text. Clearly these readers did not feel that the writers’ 
disregard for information existing in the historical record represented 
support for the proposition that contemporary reality is weird and 
unknowable; they simply felt that they had been deceived. I found, in 
other words, that even in works asserting the “significance of non-
significance,” the idea that history is a fiction has been asserted in 
conventionally novelistic, journalistic, and autobiographical ways 
(Telling the Truth 15). 
16 The passage in full reads:  
I take a bottle of water from the cooler. “Was it ethnic violence?” I ask. 
“No,” says Sam. “My father was a Shiite and he was murdered by a 
Shiite. A thief.” I nod. According to an article in the New Republic, the 
next war in Iraq will be between Shiites and Shiites. “And then?” I ask. 
“My father’s killer lived in our neighborhood. I went to him and I killed 
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him.” I take a drink of water and ask Sam whether he wants one as 
well, but he doesn’t. “But you were six- teen,” I say. “Shouldn’t 
someone else have done that instead? An older brother? Or an uncle?” 
(in Andeweg 62) 
17 Margaret Simons’s approach to her subjects in The Meeting of the Waters is 
arguably objectivist, but the narrative relies on an exploitation of subjectivity in order 
to emphasise the nature of perception and reality. As such, it “appears” to be 
subjectivist, and has been criticised on this point. These issues are dealt with further 
in chapter six.   
18 Two further statements made at a 2012 conference go some way towards 
illuminating Garner’s approaches to literary journalism. Garner asserted that: “The 
story does not exist as a story until the writer makes it. A story is not an object that’s 
been dropped on the ground … What you stumble on is a mess of fragments. It’s your 
task as a writer—indeed, your duty, your sole function in the universe—to do the 
labour of shaping inchoate matter into some meaningful, pain-relieving and 
aesthetically pleasing form.” In the same speech, Garner also stated: “Until I make the 
form, or rather sense one rising from the material as I helplessly brood over it, the 
things I want to say aren’t even things. … If I try to force the unborn thing into some 
clever shape my bossy intellect thrusts at me, I’ll deafen and blind myself to what’s 
going on around me” (“An Evening”). These responses perhaps reveal an underlying 
epistemic conflict at the heart of Hayden White’s theory: does nature reveal an 
underlying form and meaning (rising from the material as the writer helplessly broods 
over it), or are these imposed by a process of creation—for White, imagination (the 
labour of shaping inchoate matter into some form)? Garner’s comments suggest she 
understands the process to be both passive and active: she is at once duty-bound to do 
the labour of shaping, and wary of forcing into some clever shape. These seemingly 
contradictory statements perhaps give some insight into Garner’s conflicted epistemic 
foundation, and place her approach closer to the subjectivist than objectivist end of an 
epistemological spectrum.  
 
19 Another interesting example that bears out this point is Dave Eggers’s Zeitoun 
(2009). Eggers’s book-length work of literary journalism reconstructs Abdulrahman 
Zeitoun’s experience of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, and the following days 
where he used his canoe to rescue neighbours, feed and animals and navigate the 
flooded city of New Orleans. During this time Zeitoun was wrongfully arrested and 
spent 23 days detained as a suspected terrorist. Robbie Brown of the New York Times 
observes that Eggers’s book turned Zeitoun into “a New Orleans hero”. However, “in 
recent years, the stable, loving relationship between Mr. Zeitoun and his wife, Kathy, 
that was described in the 2009 best seller has taken a series of dark turns. The couple 
divorced last year after he was convicted of assaulting her. And on Wednesday, the 
New Orleans police charged him with plotting to have Kathy Zeitoun, her son and 
another man murdered. … In an interview with the New Orleans Times-Picayune, Ms. 
Zeitoun said the book had accurately portrayed their relationship at the time. But she 
said her ex-husband had since grown angrier and more violent and his Islamic views 
had become more ‘radical’” (Brown). The understanding that end-states of knowledge 
necessarily signify given moments in time, then, should moderate charges of 
reification. Zeitoun is written in third-person narration, and as such, eschews 
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reflexivity. This, and the tangible—although uneasy—sense of closure in the text may 
contribute to reification of its subjects, but readers arguably also have a responsibility 
to acknowledge that non-fiction narratives represent moments in time, as practitioners 
have an epistemic responsibility to consider and acknowledge the limitations of their 
knowledge where appropriate.  
20 As of 2012, the Australian Press Council is the principle body that receives and 
adjudicates media complaints. Its website states that the APC’s jurisdiction “extends 
to all the print publications and related digital outlets of its constituent bodies, which 
collectively account for about 98% of all print media sales in Australia” (see 
“Complaints”). 
21 For the SPJ’s code of ethics, see http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp. The MEEA’s 
code of ethics can be found at http://www.alliance.org.au/code-of-ethics.html 
22 For a full list of “constituent bodies” over which the APC has jurisdiction, see 
http://www.presscouncil.org.au/constituent-bodies/  
23 See Forde’s discussion of Walter Lippman and John Dewey’s dialogue about the 
role of the press in a democracy in Literary Journalism on Trial: Masson v. New 
Yorker and the First Amendment (72-86). Forde concludes: “While Lippmann (and 
Masson) suggested that one should protect the quality of public discourse so as to 
enable human freedom, Dewey (and Malcolm and the New Yorker) suggested that one 
should protect the freedom of public discourse so as to enable communities to arrive 
at truth (even contingent truths) on which to base their decisions and beliefs (86). 
24 Forde observes that the U.S. Supreme Court justices “failed to question is whether 
readers of the New Yorker actually believed that multiparagraph and even multipage 
quotations in the magazine’s fact writing were reported verbatim.” She asks 
rhetorically, “Did readers understand that some kind of convention was at work other 
than the daily journalism standard of reporting short, often partial verbatim 
quotations?” (45), the implication being that this indeed was likely the case.  
25 Jack Shafer notes that Shawn expressed regret over allowing Capote’s In Cold 
Blood to be serialised in the New Yorker decades after its publication. Shawn had 
marked up the galley proofs and identified problem areas to discuss with the author, 
but “the story ran in the magazine without addressing Shawn’s queries” (2012).  
26 The similarities between the cases are interesting: Boynton observes that Malcolm’s 
case grew beyond a mere libel suit to become a signifier for some of (US) society’s 
“most bitterly fought cultural battles, about the press, psychoanalysis, the roles of men 
and women” (Boynton, “Till Press”). A similar statement could be made of The First 
Stone controversy, in which the roles of the media, patriarchy, feminism and the 
Academy were vigorously scrutinised and debated in the public domain.  
27 Boynton notes that in The Silent Woman: Sylvia Plath and Ted Hughes (1994), 
Malcolm’s “typically cool, literary reserve is replaced by skittishness”, and that “The 
Silent Woman sometimes reads like a response to her critics. As if to reassure 
suspicious readers that no scenes were concocted she tells us exactly where 
everything happens” (“Till Press” np). Joe Cinque’s Consolation explicitly 
acknowledges the effects of the previous drama in the second chapter: “Four years 
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earlier I had published a book of reportage called The First Stone … The parallels 
between that story and this one were like a bad joke. No way was I going back out 
there” (13). It is evident to the reader that she did, of course, and her second offering 
again attracted criticism, although it was less controversial than The First Stone. 
28 There is a discrepancy here between dates; see pp 20, 616. While a minor 
inaccuracy, for some readers this kind of error may call into question even 
McGinniss’s journalistic integrity as dates are verifiable and as such, are central to 
authorial claims of accuracy. 
29 As stated in chapter two, a key indication of a text’s non-fiction status is that it is 
open to contestation. This case exemplifies the importance of this point. Rais 
published his own book in response to Seierstad’s: Once Upon a Time There Was a 
Bookseller in Kabul (2007), opening Seierstad’s version to the process of narrative 
contestation.  
30 In an interview regarding the lawsuit, Seierstad stated:  
I agree now that it is not possible to write a neutral story. … I don't 
criticise the society with my words in the book but I agree, it's there in 
the text anyway. It's not an open critique but it is a critique. … If I write 
a book in future, I may decide to take the precaution of going back to 
every person I interview, reading their quotes back to them and asking 
them to sign a letter, saying it is accurate … Journalism is moving into 
a different world where we are held to almost impossible standards. In 
everything I write, ever again, I need to make sure I am 100% accurate. 
A journalist can get away with this sort of controversy once, but I can't 
survive it again (Hill). 
31 Clark makes this point in relation to John Berendt’s Midnight in the Garden of 
Good and Evil (1994). The author’s note at the end of the book reads: “Though this is 
a work of nonfiction, I have taken certain storytelling liberties, particularly having to 
do with the timing of events. Where the narrative strays from strict nonfiction, my 
intention has been to remain faithful to the characters and to the essential drift of 
events as they really happened” (Berendt np). Clark writes of this passage: “The 
second sentence is no justification for the first. Authors cannot have it both ways, 
using bits of fiction to liven up the story while desiring a spot on the New York Times 
nonfiction list” (np). Wyatt also notes the author’s note is “tucked away” at the end of 
the book where it essentially functions as a postface (np). Genette’s observations 
about peritextual placement are salient here: 
[P]laced at the end of a book and addressed to a reader who is no longer 
potential but actual, the postface certainly makes more logical and more 
relevant reading for that reader. But for the author, and from a 
pragmatic point of view, the postface is much less effective, for it can 
no longer perform the two main types of function we have found the 
preface to have: holding the reader’s interest and guiding him by 
explaining why and how he should read the text. … Given the 
postface’s location and type of discourse, it can hope to fulfil only a 
curative, or corrective, function (Paratexts 238–39). 
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Clark compares Berendt’s ambiguous disclosure with that of G. Wayne Miller, who 
begins King of Hearts (2010) with the statement: “This is entirely a work of 
nonfiction; it contains no composite characters or scenes, and no names have been 
changed. Nothing has been invented. The author has used direct quotations only when 
he heard or saw (as in a letter) the words, and he paraphrased all other dialogues and 
statements-omitting quotation marks-once he was satisfied that these took place” (np). 
Clark concludes: “Because, by definition, what goes on in the head is invisible, the 
reporting standards must be higher than usual. When in doubt, attribute” (np).  
32 See Merritt’s and Brown’s No Easy Answers: The Truth Behind Death at 
Columbine (2002); and Kass’s A True Crime Story, a Victim, the Killers and the 
Nation's Search for Answers (2009). 
33 See Rundle’s Down to the Crossroads: On the Trail of the 2008 US Presidential 
Election (2008); McGeough’s In Baghdad: A Reporter’s War (2003); Manhattan to 
Baghdad: Despatches from the Frontline in the War on Terror (2003); Kill Khalid 
(2009); and Knox’s Secrets of the Jury Room (2005). 
 
34 “Goolwa”, the closest town to the site of the proposed bridge, is also translated as 
“meeting of the waters” in the Ngarrindjeri dialect. 
35 These women were “dissident” in relation to the claims made about the sacredness 
of the site. 
36 The title of Kenny’s book, It Would Be Nice if There Was Some Women’s Business: 
The Story Behind the Hindmarsh Island Affair (1996) was taken from an 
anthropologist’s quote around the time the dispute began. However, it captures the 
ironic stance held by the mainstream media at the time. Conversely, Simons’s title, 
The Meeting of the Waters: The Hindmarsh Island Affair, highlights the mythic, 
archetypal dimensions that brought about the issue, and prefigures the narrative 
patterns of the book. Both titles carry out the dual function identified by Symes, who 
writes that the title “looks inward to the artifact, providing it with a privileged set of 
interpretations; but it also looks outward to the marketplace, where artifacts compete 
for critical acclaim and appeal” (19).   
37 As well as the exegetical component of her thesis focusing on the issues raised in 
researching and writing the book, Simons has also published a number of articles and 
speeches that question and challenge the forms and fundamentals of journalism. 
These include Fit to Print (1999), in which Simons draws on her own experience and 
observations of the Canberra press gallery to reflect on and critique the institution 
from an outsider’s perspective; an essay recounting a conversation with Helen Garner 
on journalism, narrative and non-fiction (“Helen Garner: The Woman with the 
Hammer in the Kitchen Drawer”); a speech at the Sydney Institute (“Facts, 
Projection, Politics and the Objective Journalist”); and a journal article tracing 
journalism’s relationship with anthropology (“The Hindmarsh Island Affair and 
Australian Anthropology”). My rationale for identifying MOTW as Simons’s first 
work of book-length literary journalism is based primarily on the literary focus of her 
project. I acknowledge that Fit to Print (1999) also exhibits some of the 
characteristics evident in literary journalism as defined in this thesis, and marks a 
transitional period in Simons’s career from journalist to media commentator. 
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38 This event was the central point of contention in the court case. Initially, in an 
official police report, Hurley claimed that Doomadgee had punched him as he stepped 
out of the police van. Hurley then dragged him into the police station, and they both 
tripped on the step, falling in through the door next to each other. When the coroner 
found Doomadgee’s injuries inconsistent with this version of events, Hurley then 
claimed that he must have fallen on Doomadgee, but maintained that he had no 
recollection of that. The Court found that it was unable to definitively rule whether 
the injuries were sustained intentionally or accidently. 
39 See Harari’s A Tragedy in Two Acts: Marcus Einfeld and Teresa Brennan (2011) 
and Everitt’s The Bitter Shore: An Iranian’s Escape to Australia and the Hell They 
Found at the Border of Paradise (2008). 
  
40 The dust cover of The Tall Man features critical praise from Garner: “Life springs 
from every page of this enthralling book. Australians will weep over it. It is first-class 
reportage, meticulously researched, studded with superbly observed human detail—
and all the more moving for its intense restraint.” Similarly, the front cover of Into the 
Woods features the following from Chloe Hooper: “Anna Krien’s intimate, urgent 
book pulsates with life and truth.” Rebecca Giggs asks of an interview with Anna 
Krien if there is an implied contention of “a mentorship dynamic that could account 
for the boom in journalistic essay ands and books being written by women? Ha[s] the 
category of nonfiction subtly shifted to include more intuitive, emotional or 
psychological writing? Or could it simply be said that after so many years of 
pioneering feminist thought, women were finally learning to write politically about 
issues of national concern, to demonstrate complex and noteworthy opinions on 
industry, business, labour and civics?” (66). Giggs’s article makes a strong point that 
the area of genre and gender in Australian non-fiction writing is a rich area for future 
research. 
41 Brunton’s criticisms were published in “The Sydney Papers”, a publication by The 
Sydney Institute—a privately funded not-for-profit current affairs forum—shortly 
after MOTW was published. Simons’s rebuttal was printed in the same issue: she 
meets each of his points in the notes section of her article. (See “Hindmarsh and 
Australian Anthropology”.) 
42 A small number of online epitextual sources give some insight into Hooper’s 
epistemic foundation; however, when compared to intratextual claims, they raise a 
number of issues to do with representation, as discussed later in the chapter.  
43 Little is critical of Capote but not Hooper. Evidently her criticism is based on the 
belief that “for Capote, ingratiating himself with the two murderers in the Clutter 
family was a means to an end, a way of building a book out of a crime, and an 
experiment with the non-fiction novel that made him a literary star”. Whereas, 
Hooper’s book “is as much a disclosure of her own position as a once comfortably 
unaware white Australian woman as it is a story of why what happened at Palm could 
never be handled by hard news alone—and was in effect misrepresented by it” (54). 
44 Useful discussions of Australian national identity which cite egalitarianism as a 
characteristic can be found in: “The History Question: Who Owns the Past?” 
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(Clendinnen); “Cultivating Identity” (Keneally); and “Great Expectations: 
Government, Entitlement and an Angry Nation” (Tingle).  
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